Abbey Notre-Dame de l’Étanche –
Battles on the Meuse Heights 1914 – 1918 and 1940 – 1944
Hidden away in a valley between the villages of Deuxnouds-aux-Bois and Creuë amidst the Lorraine Côtes lies a picturesque gem with a centuries-old history: the former Premonstratensian abbey of Notre-Dame de l’Étanche. Visiting this tranquil and somewhat timeless complex, one would never guess that here and on the surrounding Meuse Heights, World War I took a decisive turn as early as September 1914. Also 30 years later, at the beginning of the final phase of World War II, events of disastrous military-strategic significance occurred here, which altogether justify casting a wider thematic and chronological net.
l’Étanche – Background
The year was 1138, when through the then Bishop of Verdun, Albéron III. de Chiny, the establishment of a Premonstratensian monastery in the rural area between his episcopal seat Verdun and the Benedictine abbey of St. Mihiel located to the south was ordered. As a location, a secluded valley in the territory of the municipality of Lamorville was chosen, which was called “Faveroles” because of the name of its owners. In earlier times, the monastery bore names such as “les Touches” or later “Notre Dame de l’Estanche”, all of which trace back to the Latin word “stagnum” and the presence of multiple springs and ponds in the elongated valley floor. In 1144, Albéron de Chiny raised the monastery to an abbey. The first abbot was Philippe de Belval, who had previously headed the newly founded 1120 Premonstratensian abbey of Belval-Bois-des-Dames a few kilometers west of the town of Stenay. In 1157, the abbey of de l’Étanche received prioral rights over the pilgrimage site of Notre-Dame-de-Benoîte-Vaux, which is still much visited today.
The Abbey of Étanche was plundered and devastated several times in its history, most notably between 1632 and 1636 by Swedish and Croatian troops. After the end of the Thirty Years’ War, the completely destroyed complex remained unused for a long time and was not rebuilt until the mid-18th century. The remains of the church and the main building existing today date from this period. Parts of the vaulted cellar can be attributed to the original 12th-century construction. Regarding the medieval events, no precise details are known except for a few contemporary treatises. After the rebuilding of the abbey between 1743 and 1770, its clerical use did not last long. In the course of the French Revolution, as early as 1790, the monks were expelled and the property with its associated lands was confiscated by the state. The monastery was converted into an agricultural enterprise and changed hands several times into modern times.
Côtes de Lorraine – Beginning of the First World War
The First World War reached the Meuse heights and the area around the de l’Étanche Abbey at the beginning of September 1914. On September 6, 1914, parts of the V. Preußischen Armeekorps (V Corps) began their advance through the Woëvre plain toward the Côtes de Lorraine. The original mission was to secure the advance of the 5. Armee (Fifth Army) of the German Crown Prince from the east by sealing off the fortress ring around the city of Verdun. The commanding general, Hermann von Strantz, had already considered the possibility during operational planning of supporting the attack of the Crown Prince’s army beyond the ordered defensive mission by pushing onto the Meuse heights down to the city of St. Mihiel and taking the Meuse forts of Camp des Romains, Paroches, and de Troyon. To this end, he widened the operational area of his corps and ordered the 10. Infanterie-Division (10th Infantry Division), originally intended as a reserve, under the command of General Robert Kosch to march first in a southern and then also in a western direction. The sealing off of the Fortress of Verdun was undertaken by the 9. Infanterie-Division (9th Infantry Division) and parts of the adjoining V. preußischen Reserve-Korps (V Reserve Corps) to the north.
Côtes de Lorraine – first attack on the Meuse heights
The German units crossed the Woëvre plain without resistance. On September 7, 1914, reconnaissance revealed that the French defensive positions constructed on the eastern slope of the Meuse heights were unoccupied. In the afternoon of that day, an order was issued by Crown Prince Wilhelm that V. Armeekorps was to take the Côtes de Lorraine including the Meuse forts. The task had already been undertaken by the 10th Infantry Division with the 20. Infanterie-Brigade (20th Infantry Brigade) (Infantry Regiments 47 and 50) in the northern sector and the 19. Infanterie-Brigade (19th Infantry Brigade) (6th Grenadier, 46th Infantry, and 1st King’s Jäger zu Pferde Regiment) in the southern sector. The 20th Infantry Brigade reached the area around the village of St.-Remy-la-Calonne and advanced the following day to Vaux-les-Palameix and Dommartin-la-Montagne. The 19th Infantry Brigade occupied without significant resistance Deuxnouds-aux-Bois, Chaillon and Lamorville with the valley lying between them around the de l’Étanche Abbey. In the coming days, squadrons of the Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 (1st King’s Jäger zu Pferde Regiment) succeeded in reaching the Meuse valley at several points, such as near Lacroix- and Rouvrois-sur-Meuse and even down into the area of the city of St. Mihiel. Nowhere did any serious resistance from the French materialize.
As early as September 8, 1914, the Meuse Heights were firmly in German hands. General Kosch issued the order to the 10th Division to capture Fort de Troyon. In addition to the heavy corps artillery, which was already ready to fire on the morning of that day, two 30.5 cm Skoda siege mortars of the 3rd Battery of the Austro-Hungarian “Krakau Half-Battalion” also began bombarding the fort on the morning of September 9, 1914. The unit had been formed in August 1914 under the command of Hauptmanns (captain) Rudolf von Ranciglio with guns from the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Fortress Artillery Regiment garrisoned in Cracow. In addition to other Austro-Hungarian mortar groups, it had been made available by the Austrians at the outbreak of war at the request of the Obersten (colonel) Heeresleitung. The Krakau Half-Battalion had previously been involved in combating the fortresses of Namur and Givet.
The Austrians had advanced with their motor tractors via today’s D 113 from Combres-sous-lès-Côtes onto the Grande Tranchée de Calonne. The Skoda M.11 howitzers, which bore the nickname “thirty point five”, were installed near a bend in the Bois de Dommartin, which henceforth received the name “Mörserknick”. Until September 9, 1914, Fort de Troyon was bombarded. The commander, Hauptmann Francois Xavier Heym, indignantly rejected the surrender demand at noon that day from Majors Neuhoff, who had been sent as a parlementaire, and shouted to the German negotiation delegation: “Non! Je suis Francais !” Thereupon the bombardment was resumed, though the Skoda mortars could no longer participate due to a lack of ammunition. The storming of the fort was scheduled for the early morning of September 12, 1914.
Under the command of the leader of the Niederschlesischen Pionier-Bataillons Nr. 5, Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) Haenichen, various parts of the 10th Infantry Division were to attack Fort de Troyon from the east and south. Assault assembly positions had been established in the Monte Etot woods to the east and la Gauffière to the south. Nothing suggested that the facility, already heavily hit by artillery fire, would be able to hold out for long. However, things turned out differently.
While a mood of victory prevailed in the German Crown Prince’s 5th Army, a development had begun in early September 1914 on the northern German army wing with the 1st and 2nd Armies that, depending on the perspective, found its way into French and German history books as the “Miracle of the Marne” or “Marne Drama”. According to many historians, the sequence of battles and retreat movements thus designated made Germany’s subsequent defeat after only one month of war already inevitable.
Looking at the maps above, it becomes clear how the complex and events surrounding the Battle of the Marne, analyzed in all facets from a military-historical perspective, ultimately affected the small area of the Meuse Heights between Verdun and the city of St. Mihiel. On September 1, 1914, the 5. Armee (Fifth Army) had succeeded in crossing the Meuse north of Verdun and, in the following days, advancing far to the south with four army corps in the narrow strip between the Meuse and the Argonne. The encirclement of Verdun threatened, forcing the French to relocate most of the units originally intended for the defense of the sector between Toul and Verdun to the western bank of the Meuse. This resulted in the exposure of the Woëvre Plain and the Côtes de Lorraine. The 10. Infanterie-Division (10th Infantry Division) was able to march to the Meuse between Verdun and St. Mihiel virtually without a fight. At the height of the operation, there was only a gap of about 12 kilometers left between the German spearheads positioned on both sides of the Meuse. The potentially war-decisive consequence of the fall of Fort de Troyon for the French would have been the encirclement and thus the loss of the entire fortress area around the city of Verdun.
However, with the end of the Battle of the Marne and the retreat of the German armies starting from the northern army wing, the Kronprinzen-Armee (Crown Prince’s Army) also had to break off its successful advance on both sides of the Meuse starting on September 12, 1914. Repeatedly, alongside representatives of the army leadership, the chief of staff of the newly formed Armee-Abteilung des Generals von Strantz (Army Detachment Strantz), Oberstleutnant Erwin Fischer, had insisted to the Obersten Heeresleitung (OHL) that the promising starting position regarding the capture of Verdun must not be given up so frivolously. In view of general confusion caused by the departure of the chief of the Obersten Heeresleitung (OHL), General Helmuth von Moltke, growing uncertainty about the strength and possible attack intentions of the Verdun garrison—which was accurately estimated at about 150,000 men—as well as current reports that French units were being moved from the Lorraine front via the Fortress of Toul in a northerly direction, the orders given remained in place. The units of the 5. Armee (Fifth Army) standing on the western bank of the Meuse retreated starting September 12, 1914, to north of the Argonne. To the surprise of the French defenders, the expected assault on Fort de Troyon was called off at the same time. The troops positioned on the Meuse Heights and in the Woëvre Plain withdrew about 40 kilometers back to behind the small Orne River between the towns of Étain and Conflans.
Côtes de Lorraine – Second Attack on the Meuse Heights
The feared French immediate counterattack did not materialize. In the high commands, people began to regret the overly cautious actions in the sector of the 4th and 5th Army and above all the abandonment of the Côtes de Lorraine and the Argonne main ridge. Already on September 16, 1914, the order was issued by the General Erich von Falkenhayn-led Obersten Heeresleitung (OHL) to retake the Meuse Heights and to break through the barrier line of the three Meuse forts Camp-des-Romains, des Paroches, and de Troyon. The task was assigned to Armee-Abteilung Strantz. This now included the V Prussian Corps temporarily taken over by General Adolf von Oven as well as the III. bayerische Armeekorps (III Bavarian Corps) detached from the 6th Bavarian Army under General Ludwig Freiherr von Gebsattel. The Prussians were to attack again in the north against the Côtes de Lorraine and the Forts de Troyon and Génicourt, while the Bavarians were to capture the forts du Camp-des-Romains, des Paroches, and city of St. Mihiel and subsequently force a crossing of the Meuse. In place of the V Corps, the 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division) was to take over security against the Fortress of Verdun. The XIV. Badische Korps (XIV Baden Corps) under the command of General Theodor Freiherr von Watter had to cover the southern flank between Pont-à-Mousson and St. Mihiel against French advances from the direction of the Fortress of Toul.
On September 19, 1914, the renewed German advance through the Woëvre Plain began. In addition to the approximately 90,000 infantrymen of the two attacking corps, as strong an artillery force as possible was also to act in a supporting role. Above all, the forts dominating the Meuse Heights were to be rapidly eliminated through the deployment of heavy and super-heavy artillery pieces.
Although the French had learned lessons from the events at the beginning of September 1914 and had massively reinforced the defenses between Verdun and St. Mihiel, the German vanguard units, to the surprise of the commanders, again reached the foot of the Meuse Heights without significant resistance. The background was that, due to a misjudgment of German intentions, the 2. französische Armee (French 2nd Army) under the command of Général de Curières de Castelnau, which had only just taken up position between Pont-à-Mousson and the Côtes de Lorraine, was withdrawn from the front by order of the commander-in-chief of the French armed forces, General Joseph Joffre, and redeployed to the area around the northern French city of Amiens to fend off German attacks. From there, Germans and French simultaneously engaged in the so-called “Race to the Sea”, in which both sides sought to outflank each other toward the North Sea.
Only scattered French units had remained for defense in the area of the Meuse Heights. Southwest of the city of St. Mihiel was the French 8th Army Corps (8e corps d’armée), which, however, was not initially combat-ready. Further north, in the center of the German attack, stood the French 75th Infantry Division (75e division d’infanterie), with which about 10,000 French defenders found themselves exposed to a nearly tenfold German superiority. Nevertheless, the French managed to disrupt the German advance in the densely forested sector of the V. Armeekorps (V Corps) with militarily skilled actions and reinforcements hurriedly brought up from the area of the Fortress of Verdun in such a way that the Prussians succeeded in neither capturing Fort de Troyon nor reaching the Meuse. In the area of the Combres Heights, which was fiercely contested in the following months, the German attack stalled already on the eastern slope of the Côtes de Lorraine.
In the sector of the III. bayerisches Armeekorps (III Bavarian Corps), operations proceeded more favorably. As of September 20, 1914, the villages lying at the foot of the Côtes de Lorraine were captured. It had rained heavily for several days and nights prior, so that all roads, paths, and fields were barely passable. For this reason as well, the French side did not expect an imminent German attack. However, the main body of the 6. bayerische Infanterie-Division (6th Bavarian Infantry Division) with the 11. und 12. Infanterie-Brigade (11th and 12th Infantry Brigades) had advanced rapidly starting September 19, 1914, primarily via the main road from Chambley to Vigneulles-les-Hattonchâtel (today’s D 901) into the area of the north-south running road Woël – St. Benoît (today’s D 904). The 5. bayerische Infanterie-Division (5th Bavarian Infantry Division) followed behind, as did the entire corps artillery with considerable difficulties, including the heavy and super-heavy batteries. Already for the following day, in the absence of noteworthy French resistance, the order was issued to scale the eastern slope of the Meuse Heights and occupy the designated artillery protective positions for the bombardment of the Meuse forts.
While in the southern sector the 12. Infanterie-Brigade with its regiments K.B. IR 6 (6th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) and K.B. IR 11 (11th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) was still fighting until the morning of September 21, 1914, for the village of Vigneulles-les-Hattonchâtel stubbornly defended by the French, the 11. Infanterie-Brigade with the regiments K.B. IR 10 (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) and K.B. IR 13 (13th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) had already succeeded at dawn in scaling the Meuse Heights between Viéville-sous-les-Côtes and Hattonville. The few French defenders of the village of Hattonchâtel, which protruded like a bastion on a mountain cone into the Woëvre plain, had retreated into the large forest area of the “Forêt Domaniale de la Montagne” southwest of the Tranchée de Calonne. In the “Raquatet” and “de l’Étanche” parcels, the first serious clashes with French infantry occurred around noon on September 21, 1914.
Losses occurred in the ranks of the spearhead forming the 10. bayerischen Infanterie-Regiments „König“ (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment). Among the fallen were the brothers Karl and Georg Kreichauf, born in Sülzburg/Upper Palatinate, as well as Josef Ahorn from Hohenwart/Upper Bavaria. The Kreichauf brothers came from a family with a total of six children. Landwehrmann Georg Kreichauf found a new home in Wendelstein in 1881, worked there as a day laborer, and married. As a father of four, he was drafted into the 9th Company of the 10th K.B. Infantry Regiment right at the outbreak of the war and marched toward France in the same regiment, just like his brother Karl, who had also settled in Wendelstein as a baker. As a “Tambourgefreiter” (drummer private first class), Karl Kreichauf served in the 11th Company of the 10th K.B. Infantry Regiment. Fate would have it that both brothers, together with Private First Class Josef Ahorn, lost their lives on September 21, 1914, in the fighting on the Meuse Heights above Viéville-sous-les-Côtes.
The three fallen soldiers were initially buried near a star-shaped crossroads on the Tranchée de Calonne about two kilometers east of Hattonchâtel. The area was later named “Ludwigshöhe,” along with a light railway station established there. At the instigation of their comrades, a monument made of sandstone was erected at the gravesite. Scarcely noticed until 2014 and left to decay, it was solemnly reinaugurated on September 20, 2014, in the presence of municipal representatives and Bavarian delegations in a freshly renovated state. Shortly after the end of the war, the remains of the three soldiers had been transferred to a comrades’ grave at the German war cemetery of Viéville-sous-les-Côtes. They rest there to this day.
Apart from such isolated skirmishes, the French defenders were able to delay the advance of the 11. bayerischen Infanterie-Brigade (11th Bavarian Infantry Brigade) only insignificantly. During a lull in the fighting, patrols reconnoitered within the “La Montagne” forest area. It turned out that the French had apparently withdrawn far toward the Meuse Valley. Around 16:30, the Bavarian regiments resumed their advance. The route led the K.B. IR 10 (10th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) through the valley of the Aviaux Brook (Ruisseau des Aviaux) via the former Abbey of Étanche toward Lavignéville. On the barren ridge east of the village (at the time Lavignéville Ridge, today the Gros Lot district), a defensive position was to be established for the following Bavarian field artillery. Corresponding orders had been given to K.B. IR 13 (13th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment), specifically somewhat further south in the area of the Vatilary Forest and the elevation adjoining toward Chaillon. For the next day, it was intended to occupy the large forest area of the Forêt de la Picanterie in the direction of the town of St. Mihiel to enable the heavy artillery to take up its firing positions provided for on the road between Lavignéville and Savonnières (today’s D 162) against the Forts du Camp des Romains and Paroches.
On the evening of September 21, 1914, the majority of the 10. und 13. bayerischen Infanterie-Regiments (10th and 13th Bavarian Infantry Regiments) had the intended positions on the heights east of the villages of Lavignéville and Chaillon reached. The K.B. IR 11 (11th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) it was after the bloodless capture of the places Savonnières and Varvinay further south, it had succeeded in advancing security detachments up to the heights of the Bois de Verzel. However, difficulties arose with the 11. bayerische Infanterie-Brigade (11th Bavarian Infantry Brigade). These resulted from the fact that regiments 47 and 50 of the V. preußischen Armeekorps (V. Prussian Army Corps) adjoining to the north had not advanced. At the southwestern edge of the extensive Bois de Lamorville, via the village Deuxnouds-aux-Bois only parts of the 1. Posenschen Feldartillerie-Regiments Nr. 20 (1st Posen Field Artillery Regiment No. 20) moved into position. The K.B. IR 10 (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment), which on the morning of September 22, 1914, with the III. Bataillon (3rd Battalion) take the villages of Lavignéville and Lamorville and with the I. Bataillon (1st Battalion) through the Spada-Wald intended to advance via the Gilaumont, le Chanot, and Narmont parcels toward the Meuse, was attacked by strong French troops from the direction of Lacroix-sur-Meuse and Rouvrois-sur-Meuse. Despite massive losses, the French succeeded in advancing across the Selouse-Wald into the Bois de Lamorville and threatening the northern flank of the Bavarians. Only through the courageous deployment of the Prussian and Bavarian field artillery as well as parts of the Prussian Infanterie-Regiment 47 (47th Infantry Regiment) managed to repel the French attack.
When the soldiers of both regiments encountered each other after the fighting, strange scenes occurred. The regimental chief of the 10. bayerisches Infanterie-Regiment (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) and the 47. preußisches Infanterie-Regiment (47th Prussian Infantry Regiment) was in each case King Ludwig III of Bavaria. The Prussian soldiers, hailing from the Province of Posen, thus far from the east of the German Reich, likewise wore Bavarian uniforms as well as the king’s insignia in the form of a crown and below it an “L” on their shoulder boards. Distinguishing their troop affiliation was consequently difficult, and communication among the soldiers was nonetheless barely possible. This triggered a certain skepticism on the part of the Bavarians, which, however, quickly vanished. Ultimately, on that very same day, the fact that both royal regiments had fought side by side was telegraphed to the high regimental owner in Munich. On September 26, 1914, an appreciative response was issued by the Bavarian king.
Since the Bavarians needed no further support after the end of the fighting, the Prussians withdrew back in the direction of Deuxnouds-aux-Bois. Furthermore, the units of the 10. preußische Infanterie-Division (10th Prussian Infantry Division) had not succeeded in gaining ground. Consequently, the course of the front north of the village of Lamorville remained unclear. The II Battalion of K.B. IR 10 (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) took up quarters as a reserve on the grounds of the former Abbey of de l’Étanche. By September 23, 1914, the Bavarians then succeeded in completely capturing the Spada-Wald up to the Heights 322 and 331 (Côte Ste Marie) located on the Meuse. The further development of the fighting in the Lücke von Spada (la Trouée de Spada) and of the position warfare lasting until the month of September 1918 is described in more detail in the relevant specialist article.
As early as the night of September 22 to 23, 1914, the majority of the artillery had taken up the designated positions for the bombardment of the Maas forts. South of Buxières-sous-les-Côtes, near today’s D 908, two 30.5 cm Skoda mortars of the k.u.k. “Halbbataillon Krakau” had once again taken up position with the 4th Battery. Fort de Liouville had been assigned to them as a target.
Along with the Austrian Skoda mortars, three heavy guns of German manufacture were also deployed. One of them was the mobile howitzer of the “schwerer Küsten-Mörser L/12 (i.R.)” type manufactured by the Krupp company, which was the only one at the beginning of the war, with a caliber of 28 cm. “i.R.” stood for “in Räderlafette”. Stationary models of this type were used, among other places, on the island of Heligoland and as the “Batterie Bismarckberg” for the coastal defense of the German colony of Kiaochow with its capital Tsingtao. In late August 1914, the mobile L/12 (i.R.) piece was taken over by the freshly formed Heavy Coastal Mortar Battery No. 7 (SKM 7) under the command of Hauptmann Kruft on the grounds of the Krupp company in Essen. Via the large Cologne-Ehrenfeld freight yard, it headed toward the Western Front.
In addition, two other special guns developed by the Krupp company made their way to the Meuse Heights, specifically with Heavy Coastal Mortar Battery No. 2 (SKM 2), also newly formed at the beginning of the war, under the command of Hauptmann von Theobald. Although they were also fortress artillery, contrary to most alternative accounts, they were not further models with a 28 cm barrel diameter, but rather howitzers of a 30.5 cm caliber. They bore the technical designation “schwerer Küsten-Mörser L/08 (i.R.)” and in a later version were called “Beta-Gerät”. Several of these guns were deployed elsewhere from the beginning of the war and later predominantly in the battles of Verdun. What was special was that they were originally designed for stationary use and were now available for mobile front-line deployment with their massive destructive power. This was made possible by special metal carriages on iron chassis and futuristic-looking steam- or benzol-powered tractors originally intended for agricultural purposes. Thus, readiness to fire could be established at each deployment site within about four hours.
The German coastal mortars were deployed against Fort du Camp des Romains. Because of a lack of evaluable sources, almost nothing can be ascertained about the exact operations of the heavy coastal mortar battery 2 aside from the few photos above. By contrast, the war diary of heavy coastal mortar battery No. 7 has been preserved in Russian archives, yielding interesting details. According to it, both batteries reached the strategically important railway station of Chambley by rail transport on September 21, 1914. Due to delays caused by the breakdown of several benzol tractors and miserable road conditions, the batteries could only move into their firing positions on the morning of September 23, 1914, via today’s D 901 road through St. Benoît, Vigneulles and Creuë.
The 28 cm gun of heavy coastal mortar battery No. 7 took up position 400 meters northwest of Savonnières-en-Woëvre near the mill that still existed at the time. At 14:30, the bombardment of Fort du Camp des Romains, located about 8,700 meters away, began. A total of 80 shells were fired until September 24, 1914. On the day of the fort’s capture, September 25, 1914, the battery remained silent due to a lack of ammunition. On the same day, a change of position was carried out in order to subsequently be able to shell Fort des Paroches.
The new firing position was located about 400 meters southeast of Varvinay along today’s D 162. Until early November 1914, the battery shelled Fort des Paroches and other targets as well, in particular the French positions and assembly areas in the area of Bois Brûlé. On November 8, 1914, the battery was pulled out and deployed further north in the Woëvre Plain. From February 1916, it took part in the Battle of Verdun.
Meanwhile, the Austrian mortars shelled Fort de Liouville. Although from September 27, 1914, the two other Skoda mortars of the 3rd Battery had also been withdrawn from Fort de Troyon and had taken up position near Buxerulles s.l. Côtes to combat Fort de Liouville, it was not possible to subdue the fort. With its artillery, Fort de Liouville disrupted German operations on the southern flank of the St. Mihiel salient and on the Meuse Heights throughout the entire course of the war. On October 6, 1914, the “Krakau Half-Battalion” marched back to Metz-Longéville in accordance with orders and quartered in the “67th Infantry Barracks”, later Caserne Roques. On May 11, 1915, the redeployment to Salzburg took place.
Côtes de Lorraine – Course of the war until fall 1916
With the subsiding of the fighting in the Spada sector at the end of September 1914 and the consolidation of the front into trench warfare, the occupancy of individual quarters also changed. Close to the front, command units of the field artillery were mostly accommodated in suitable facilities to maintain the fastest possible contact with the individual gun and observation posts.
In the case of the Abbey of Notre-Dame de l’Étanche, this concerned the Royal Bavarian 3rd Field Artillery Regiment “Prinz Leopold” (K.B. FAR 3). The parts of the infantry regiments K.B. IR 10 (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) and 13 (13th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) previously accommodated in the facility and the “Mühlen-Ferme” located to the south moved into other quarters that gradually emerged in the surrounding villages, especially in Deuxnouds-aux-Bois, Creuë, Chaillon, Varvinay, and the troop camps established in the forests. The latter included, throughout the entire war, the Königsmulde and Kaiserschlag camps in today’s Forêt Domaniale de la Pitancerie.
The 5th Battery of K.B. FAR 3 had already provided fire support to the infantry advancing on September 21, 1914. It had deployed its guns in the front line escorting K.B. IR 10 on the elongated Lavignéville ridge (today’s Gros Lot district). Its staff took up quarters for the night in the buildings of the Abbey de l’Étanche. On September 22, 1914, gradually the entire I. Abteilung of K.B. FAR 3 reached the area of Étanche Castle as well as the Lavignéville ridge and brought its 7.7 cm Model 96 n/A field guns into position. Their resolute deployment was largely responsible for repelling the French attack on the units of K.B. IR 10 as part of the engagement at Lamorville taking place on that day.
The artillerymen of the I. Abteilung spent the night of September 23, 1914, in their firing positions on the Lavignéville ridge. The II. Abteilung, which was deployed as reserve troops for the artillery commander of the III. bayerischen Armeekorps (III Bavarian Corps), took up quarters in Hattonchâtel and Viéville. The regimental staff of the I. Abteilung and its commander, Oberst (colonel) Macher, stayed overnight in Creuë, which was to become the permanent headquarters of the regiment for a period of almost two years. Although no one expected it in September 1914, K.B. FAR 3 remained in the area of the Spada sector and the Abbey de l’Étanche until August 1916.
On September 25, 1914, after several days of artillery bombardment, Fort du Camp des Romains fell into the hands of the Bavarians and Prussian pioneers. In the preceding days, the regiments K.B. IR 10 (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) and 13 (13th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) had succeeded in capturing the entire area of Spada-Waldes up to Höhen 322 und 331 (Côte Ste Marie) dominating the Meuse. For the period of trench warfare beginning in October 1914, the order to K.B. FAR 3 (3rd Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment) read: “Supporting the infantry in holding the captured positions.”
In the course of the winter of 1914/15, the regimental sector was divided into three subsectors. For these, the names “Gruppe Waldlager” (St. Mihiel to Höhen 331 und 322), “Gruppe Volk”, later “Manz”, then “Ahles” (zentraler Spada-Abschnitt) as well as “Gruppe l’Étanche” in the north (Lamorville – Senonville) became established. From the summer of 1915 onward, the middle group was dissolved, and the “Waldlager” and “l’Étanche” groups remained. The boundary between both subsectors ran through the middle of Chanot-Waldes. The headquarters of the “Gruppe Waldlager”, which corresponded to the II. Abteilung of K.B. FAR 3, was established in the Kaiserschlag camp on the modern D 910 between St, Mihiel and Chaillon. The staff and train of the northern “Gruppe l’Étanche”, consisting of the I. Abteilung of K.B. FAR 3, took up quarters in the buildings of the l’Étanche chateau as well as a camp established in the meantime in the immediate vicinity.
By the end of 1914, the French attempted to push the German troops back from the Meuse Heights. They suffered considerable losses and merely achieved that the German positions, especially in the southern part of the St. Mihiel salient, were massively expanded. From the beginning of 1915, a phase of calm returned to the northern sector. Attention turned to other areas, most notably the Bois d’Apremont, the Bois d’Ailly, and the Bois Brûlé, which was fiercely contested for several months, with its field redoubt.
Heavy fighting flared up again in the Lamorville sector and with Gruppe l’Étanche at the beginning of April 1915. The commander-in-chief of the provisional French Army Group East (Groupe provisoire du l’Est), General Augustin Dubail, had received notice from the military leadership on March 14, 1915, that the capture of the entire St. Mihiel salient was intended.
Preparations for the operation were completed on April 4, 1915. In the north, an attack group was to advance toward Lachaussée, while in the south a concentric advance via Thiaucourt and thereby the encirclement of the German troops within the salient was planned. As early as March 18, 1915, French attacks on the Combres Heights (Les Éparges) had begun and severely battered the German defense. Heavy fighting also occurred with the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division) in the Woëvre Plain starting as early as April 4, 1915, which was later referred to as the “Spring Battle between the Meuse and the Moselle”.
Also affected by the French offensive efforts was the small sector between the villages of Seuzey and Lamorville. Here, strong French forces attempted, starting on April 7, 1915, with massive artillery support, to break through the positions held by Prussian and Bavarian troops on the western edge of the Bois de Lamorville out of the Selouse Forest.
At the local interface between the V. preußischen Armeekorps (V Corps) in the north and the III. bayerischen Armeekorps (III Bavarian Corps) in the south, alongside the K.B. IR 10 (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) deployed there since September 1914, the preußische Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 67 (67th Reserve Infantry Regiment) stood at that time. In exchange for the units of the 10. Infanterie-Division (10th Infantry Division), as part of the 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division) it had been pulled out of the heavy fighting on the Combres Heights (Les Éparges) just a few days earlier and transferred to the supposedly quiet sector near Lamorville. In the following days, it became entangled in intensive fighting with a numerically vastly superior enemy. In addition to the 8. Königlich-Bayerischen Infanterie-Regiment (8th Bavarian Infantry Regiment), which had to be deployed as reinforcement, the 1st and 2nd Battery of the K.B. FAR 3 (3rd Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment) from their positions on the Lavignéville Ridge west of l’Étanche Castle also came into action. As already on September 22, 1914, with the support of the Bavarian artillery, it succeeded in repulsing the French attacks.
Mid-April 1915, the French offensive between St. Mihiel and Verdun could be considered a failure. In other sectors on the southern flank of the salient (Bois le Prêtre, Bois Brûlé, Bois d’Ailly), there was still sporadic combat. Gradually, however, these also subsided.
Despite massive deployment of troops and artillery, the French had not succeeded in gaining any significant ground anywhere. Minor successes in the area of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne and the Combres Heights (Les Éparges) had been bought at the cost of overall very high casualties. Right in front of the German fire trenches on the western edge of the Lamorville Forest, over a frontage of just one kilometer, about 700 fallen Frenchmen were counted. With their red trousers at the time, many of them remained lying in the narrow clearing between the Selouse Forest and the Bois de Lamorville until 1916.
The French territorial gains on the Combres Heights (Les Éparges) and adjoining to the west in the direction of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne were limited in scope. However, they harbored the danger of an encirclement of the exposed German positions on the Combres Ridge projecting far into the Woëvre Plain. From there, the French would have obtained an excellent observation capability into the entire German hinterland along the Meuse Heights. This would have made holding the St. Mihiel salient impossible.
Relief was to be brought by an advance of the reinforced V. Prussian Army Corps (9., 10. und 111. Infanterie-Division [9th, 10th, and 111th Infantry Divisions]), which had as its objective the main French position on the Côte des Hures, as well as a pushing forward of the front lines on both sides of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne into the Bois Haut and the district of le Taillis de Saulx.
On April 24, 1915, the Holstein regiments 73 and 76 went on the assault on both sides of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne. This succeeded and led the attacking troops up to Hill 381 hard west of the “Mouilly Cross” (road junction D 113/DS 3a). Eastward in the direction of St.-Rémy, it was possible by April 25, 1915, to capture the French positions on the Côte de Sât and advance through the valley of the Genousevaux Brook up to the ridge south of the village of les Éparges. Due to its terrain shape, it bore the name “lobster claw”. Contrary to the recommendation of V General Command, the High Command of Armee-Abteilung Strantz ordered the continuation of the attack and thereby also the capture of the French positions on the Combres Heights. The further assault failed. Until May 7, 1915, the attacks were renewed again and again, this also with ever new forces. They all remained unsuccessful and led to very high casualties.
With these battles, the period of major offensive operations in the St. Mihiel salient ended. Positional warfare began. Where the enemy trench systems were close together, the terrain permitted it, and no further success could be expected from assaults, warfare also moved underground. Mine warfare ensued. Affected by this, alongside the Combres Heights (Les Éparges), were other sectors in the salient such as the Ritterwald (Bois les Chevaliers) north of Seuzey, the Ailly-Wald (Bois d’Ailly) with its “Scharfes Eck”, as well as the Mort-Mare-Wald (Bois de Mort Mare) and the Bois de la Sonnard north of Flirey. The impressive remnants of this insidious weapon in the form of large mine craters can still be found today at the aforementioned locations.
In the Lamorville and Spada sector, the fighting had already reached a temporary conclusion with the end of the French offensive in April 1915. Of the ongoing skirmishes elsewhere, only the muffled rumble of artillery and mine warfare could be heard here. Otherwise, mutual actions were limited to patrol probes and the intensified expansion of position systems as well as logistical supply facilities of all kinds. In the area of the Abbaye de l’Étanche and the interim troop camps “l’Etanche-Schloss” and “Mühlen-Ferme”, the staff and train of the Artillerie-Gruppe “l’Etanche” (I./K.B. FAR 3 (I./3rd Royal Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment)) were quartered over the 1915/1916 turn of the year, as well as changing elements of the K.B. IR 10 (10th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment). Above all, horse-drawn units found ideal quarters because of the stables and pastures of the formerly agricultural estate. The relevant regimental histories report that drill and firing exercises were regularly held on the extensive meadows, and troop parades also took place.
From April 1916 onwards, the deceptive calm came to an end. The presence of German units had not remained hidden from the French due to their increasingly intensive aerial reconnaissance. Although the area around the former abbey of de l’Étanche was well protected by the steep slopes of the Roquant Ridge, French artillery succeeded in targeting it with high-angle fire. On April 17, 1916, the units of K.B. FAR 3 (3rd Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment) stationed there relocated to the “Creuë-Bach-Lager” north of the village of Creuë. The units of K.B. IR 10 (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) that had initially remained at l’Étanche abandoned the facility in May 1916 due to continuous artillery fire and relocated to the surrounding villages and troop camps.
In June 1916, the continuous deployment of troops on the western flank of the St. Mihiel salient ended. The III. bayerische Armeekorps (III Bavarian Corps) was withdrawn after almost two years of trench service and thrown into the center of the Battle of Verdun (Fleury, Thiaumont, honeycomb trenches, Froideterre). The sector between the Lamorville and Spada forests was taken over by K.B. IR 2 (2nd Bavarian Infantry Regiment), arriving from that same area, as part of the Armee-Abteilung Strantz now shifting to the I. bayerischen Armeekorps (I Bavarian Corps). From then on, the sector served non-combat-capable units from the major battles of the Western Front for short periods of rest and the incorporation of troop replacements. The sector division also frequently changed, so that individual regiments were no longer tied to specific positions, camps, or quarters.
Already in October 1916, K.B. IR 2 was transported away to the Battle of the Somme, only to stand again in the St. Mihiel salient after just two weeks, completely exhausted and decimated. The front sector between Seuzey and Spada, widened to about 14 kilometers and now nicknamed the “Sanatorium of the West,” was taken over by the hessische 25. Infanterie-Division (Hessian 25th Infantry Division). Prussian troops followed Bavarian contingents into 1918, each supported by individual Landwehr and Landsturm units.
Côtes de Lorraine – Development up to 1918 – Trench Construction
In the spring of 1918, the steadily increasing presence of American troops in the area of the St. Mihiel salient had been registered by the German side. The first serious engagements occurred during German reconnaissance sorties in early April 1918 in the area of the Sonnard Forest, the Bois de Mort Mare, and the village of Seicheprey (Operation Cherry Blossom). Prisoner interrogations reinforced the assumption that the French and Americans were preparing for an imminent major offensive.
This development came as by no means a surprise to the German side. It was unquestionable that the salient could not be held in the event of a major Allied offensive with American participation, at least if it were conducted from both flanks.
From mid-1916 onward, as the balance of power shifted significantly in favor of the Allies, work was undertaken on various defense strategies. These initially provided for a strong defense-in-depth of the position systems, as corresponded to the “Regulations for Position Warfare for All Arms” issued by the War Ministry at the end of June 1916. Major combat was henceforth to be conducted no longer in, but around positions and in defense zones. This also meant for the St. Mihiel salient the construction of multiple staggered defense lines.
At Armee-Abteilung Strantz (later C), the planning and execution of these measures ultimately lay in the hands of the General of Pioneers 13 (lieutenant general), Johannes Schroeter. Behind the “Wilhelm Zone,” which bore the main defense, a fallback line was planned which, initially designated as the V-Position, later received the name “Schroeter Zone.” Coming from the Montagne Forest, this was to run north of the l’Étanche Chateau on the Côte de Roquant, then cross the valley of the Aviaux Brook and transition onto the Lavignéville Ridge.
Only occasionally did an effective implementation of the project come about through the creation of stronghold-like trench segments and gallery construction. The reason for this was a critical development in the northern part of the Western Front that drew all military attention to itself. Although the Allied breakthrough attempts of 1916 could be repulsed there, because of the high losses, it had to be assumed that new major attacks by the French, English, and their allies, which were already to be expected for the spring of 1917, could no longer be withstood. The situation worsened in August 1916 due to Romania’s entry into the war on the side of Russia. The Chief of the Obersten Heeresleitung, Erich von Falkenhayn, resigned. The commander duo of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff took over. On September 2, 1916, the cessation of all attacks before Verdun was ordered. On September 15, 1916, the order was issued to the army groups for the accelerated creation of rear position systems, which were to serve the shortening of the front, the saving of troops, and strategic withdrawal operations that were foreseeably becoming necessary.
The Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht had to plan a rear position on the Arras – Laon line. From this emerged the frequently described Siegfried-Stellung. The Army Group German Crown Prince was ordered to prepare a complete withdrawal from the St. Mihiel front salient to a chord position between Verdun and Pont-à-Mousson. As a result, the order to construct the “Maas-Mosel-Stellung”, later the “Michelstellung”, was issued on September 23, 1916.
The main focus of position construction, however, remained in the area of the Siegfried-Stellung until the spring of 1917, where the expected Allied offensive efforts remained essentially unsuccessful. Corresponding major projects on other fronts were suspended during this time. In the St. Mihiel salient, construction activity only focused again from the fall of 1917 on the expansion of the position systems, including the creation of a rear chord position, the Michelstellung.
For the Schroeter Zone, this development meant the final halt in construction. According to an instruction from Armee-Abteilung C (Army Detachment C) dated September 16, 1917 (Ia. No. 2200 geh.), the few already existing position sections were merely to be maintained in their construction state and defensive capability by the respective position divisions.
Apart from individual strongpoints along the planned zone area, major fortification construction activities had anyway only occurred in those areas of the front salient where, according to the experience of 1915, Allied attacks were most to be expected. On the western flank, these were the Combres sector as well as the surroundings of the Spada gap.
On the ridge above the l’Étanche castle, where the Schroeter position ran through the extensive Roquant Forest, there are unique remnants in the form of a chain of strongpoints along with associated gallery structures and remnants of forward wire entanglements. The size and condition of the trench sections and galleries suggest that while the excavation and mining work had been completed, the rest of the interior construction of the sometimes enormous facilities was omitted.
Côtes de Lorraine – Allied offensive starting September 12, 1918
Far from the quiet front sector between Verdun and St. Mihiel and also apart from purely military events, two major overall political developments took place in the course of 1917 that were only to have a decisive impact in the war year 1918. On the one hand, this was the Russian Revolution in February 1917, and on the other hand, the official declaration of war by the USA on the German Empire and its allies in April of that year.
With the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk concluded on March 3, 1918, following the revolutionary turmoil in Russia, about 40 divisions were freed up on the German Eastern Front, which were now available for operations in the West. Before the American troop presence there could have a decisive effect, the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) wanted to regain the initiative with a major offensive and, if not defeat the allies, at least make them willing to make peace. Despite initial successes, this—beginning with „Operation Michael“—sequence of a total of five major battles ultimately failed due to insufficient planning, fundamental tactical errors, supply problems, and the Allied superiority in all respects that became increasingly evident over time.
Unaffected by this, the deployment of troops worn out from the heavy fighting in the northern half of the Western Front continued throughout the course of 1918 in the Lamorville sector. At the end of July 1918, in this manner, between St. Mihiel and the village of Seuzey, the 31. Infanterie-Division (31st Infantry Division) and, east of Lamorville, its associated 10. Lothringische Infanterie-Regiment 174 (10th Lotharingian Infantry Regiment 174) were deployed. Adjoining to the north on the Meuse Heights, the 35. k.u.k. Division (35th Austro-Hungarian Division) took up position at the beginning of August 1918. In the Bois de Lamorville as far as the sector boundary near Deuxnouds-aux-Bois stood the 62. k.u.k. Infanterie-Regiment (62nd Austro-Hungarian Infantry Regiment), whose soldiers essentially came from Transylvania in present-day Romania. In the area of the Combres Heights (Les Éparges) and the Woëvre Plain stood troops of the 13. Landwehr-Division (13th Landwehr Division).
As early as September 4, 1918, the 31. Infanterie-Division (31st Infantry Division) was withdrawn again and replaced by the Saxon 192. Infanterie-Division (192nd Saxon Infantry Division). At that time, it was clear to neither the Saxons nor the other German troops in the St. Mihiel salient what serious developments had begun and were to take their course just a week later with the Allied St. Mihiel Offensive.
In the meantime, an immense number of plans had been drawn up by the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL), Armee-Abteilung C, and also individual divisions, describing every conceivable constellation of an attack on the St. Mihiel salient. By means of constantly superseded orders, it was regulated down to the smallest detail what was to happen in the event of which attack scenario, which units were to retreat via which roads, how the withdrawal of the artillery was to take place, where, upon occupying the Michelstellung, the individual command posts, ammunition depots, artillery positions, telephone exchanges, medical facilities, etc., should be located, where chickens, horses, sheep, and cows were to be delivered, which localities, camps, galleries, and other facilities were to be destroyed. In addition, lists had to be kept and updated for every place, which determined which inhabitants were to be left to the enemy, removed to the rear, or taken as hostages.
Many of these records have been preserved in corresponding state archives and also in the municipal archive of St. Mihiel. They provide a disturbing view of the bureaucratic effort that was expended by the German side until the final phase of the war. More detailed particulars in the context of the construction and the military events surrounding the Michelstellung can be found in the related and still in preparation specialist article.
Despite all plans for an orderly retreat ultimately designed for 8 days, the German commanders were aware that an unforeseen attack scenario might have to be reckoned with, meaning that occupying the Michelstellung within a maximum of 2 days might also be necessary. This ultimately happened. Just as in September 1914 to the benefit of the German attackers, 4 years later the Allies once again benefited from the weather with poor visibility. Aerial reconnaissance was not possible for several days due to the stormy rainy weather. Even on September 7, 1918, Armee-Abteilung C was certain that an imminent attack was not to be expected. Yet this had already been ordered by the American army leadership under General John J. Pershing and ultimately scheduled for September 10, 1918, by means of “Field Order No. 9”.
In this order of the 1st US Army, which precisely defined the course of the attack, the terms “D Day” and “H Hour” were verifiably used for the first time for the time of the start of the operation. Today, they are commonly associated with “Operation Overlord”, launched on June 6, 1944, the Allied landing in Normandy. However, their origin lies in the orders for the attack on the St. Mihiel salient in September 1918.
Far superior with about 3,000 guns of all calibers, the Allied artillery was not fully combat-ready at the scheduled time, so that “D-Day” had to be postponed at short notice to September 12, 1918. On September 9, 1918, the sky cleared and German aerial reconnaissance reported that not only, as previously expected, spatially limited attacks were imminent on the southern wing, but that enemy preparations for attacks could also be discerned on the western wing of the salient. Accordingly, the procedure developed under the tactical designation “defensive battle of Michel” for the complete retreat of German troops to and behind the Michelstellung was ordered. From the early morning of September 11, 1918, which was designated as the first “Michel Day” with the code word “withdrawal”, the dismantling and relocation of the unhorsed artillery as well as the combat train not strictly necessary for further infantry combat began. The front positions on the southern flank of the salient were gradually evacuated except for individual posts mostly equipped with light machine guns, and the main defense was withdrawn into the artillery protection position. On the western flank, the garrison of the front positions initially learned nothing of the intervening developments.
Already in the night of September 12, 1918, around 02:00 German time, the heaviest enemy artillery fire set in across the entire salient. At the beginning, this fire was predominantly directed at rear targets, such as command posts, localities, and important road junctions. Heaviest Allied guns fired as far as into the suburbs of the city of Metz. On the American side alone, on September 12, 1918, about 100,000 poison gas shells containing around 200 tons of phosgene agent were fired to make it difficult for the defenders to retreat and to bring up reserves. Despite the most intensive reconnaissance efforts, the exact date of the attack had remained hidden from the German side. The regrouping of the artillery as well as the withdrawal of equipment and ammunition were in full swing. All roads heading north and east were quickly clogged. Shell craters, fallen trees, and constant air raids hindered troop movements. Necessary transport capacities were lacking, so that guns and wagons had to be hitched together in multiples or pulled by soldiers. Due to the artillery bombardment, all communications links were quickly destroyed. Orders from higher command posts no longer got through, which is why the frontline units were left to fend for themselves.
At 06:00 early German time (“H Hour”), the American infantry attack began at the central southern flank of the salient. Since the German artillery on the march back could not provide any notable support and the troop strength of the defenders was far too small given the respective width of the sector, the Americans reached their designated attack objective by noon, namely the high ground north of the town of Thiaucourt, which is located centrally in the salient. The German front was breached to the width of a division and the troops standing further west were bypassed. It was only thanks to the strict adherence to their attack plan that the Americans did not know how to exploit this critical situation to overcome the Michelstellung, which was not yet capable of defense.
In accordance with orders at “H+3 Hour”, i.e. at 09:00, the Allied troops also launched their attack on the western flank of the salient. This was essentially the 15th French Colonial Division as well as the 26th US (Yankee) Division. The objective for the first day for the French was the capture of the strategically important Combres Heights (Les Eparges). The Americans had to reach a line corresponding to today’s D 154 between the villages of Dompierre-aux-Bois and Dommartin-la-Montage. On the German side, the 13. Landwehr-Division (13th Landwehr Division), combined into “Group Combres”, continued to stand there with the k.u.k. 35th Infantry Division adjoining to the south. The sector boundary with the 192. sächsischen Infanterie-Division (192nd Saxon Infantry Division) deployed further south up to the town of St. Mihiel as part of “Group St. Mihiel” ran in the area of the Schroeter Position between the village of Deuxnouds-aux-Bois and the former Abbey of l’Étanche.
Although units of the 13. Landwehr-Division succeeded in recapturing the Combres Heights (Les Eparges) taken by the French on the first attempt and preventing any further advance by the French colonial troops, the American attack progressed rapidly on the western flank of the salient as well. By the afternoon of September 12, 1918, the projected line on the Meuse Heights had been reached. The units of the k.u.k. 35th Infantry Division had retreated into the Schroeter Zone under heavy losses and had thereby also occupied the positions on the Roquant Ridge above the l’Étanche Chateau. However, an attack on this position did not take place, as the Americans halted here as ordered after reaching the prescribed daily objective.
The Allied progress posed a severe threat to “Group St. Mihiel”, which successfully resisted French formations attacking in the center of the salient since 07:00 in the morning (“H+1 Hour”) (2nd Cavalry Division, 26th and 39th Infantry Divisions). Alongside the Saxon 192nd Infantry Division, “Group St. Mihiel” also included the main body of the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division), which had held positions east of St. Mihiel since the spring of 1916 from the Bois d’Apremont across the ridge of Le Mont, the Butte de Montsec, the Bois de Géréchamp to the village of Richecourt.
Already by noon on the day of the attack, the commander of Armee-Abteilung C, General Georg Fuchs, had issued the order for the immediate withdrawal of the Saxon 192nd Infantry Division, particularly threatened by being cut off at the tip of the salient, into the Michelstellung. The k.u.k. 35th Infantry Division in the north and parts of the 5. Landwehr-Division in the southeast were to cover the retreat by holding their positions unconditionally and then join it. In the chaotic overall events, the order did not reach the Saxons.
During a briefing in St. Mihiel on September 11, 1918, however, the regimental and battalion commanders had already drawn up plans themselves for a potentially necessary withdrawal scenario. Until about 16:00, the Saxons defended their positions against all French attacks, which were launched predominantly in the area of the Chauvoncourt bridgehead west of the Meuse (Menonville Position) as well as the Bienenwaldhöhe in the Spada Sector. There and also further north up to the Selouse Sector, which had already seen heavy fighting in 1915, now stood the 183. sächsische Infanterie-Regiment (183rd Saxon Infantry Regiment), which, despite clear inferiority, was likewise able to repel all French attacks.
As by the afternoon of September 12, 1918, the noise of battle continued to increase not only on both flanks but also in the rear of the Saxons, the commander of the 192. Infanterie-Regiments (192nd Infantry Regiment), Oberstleutnant von Loeb, ordered the entire division to disengage from the enemy and take up new positions in the area of the Schroeter Zone.
With the exception of individual elements of the rearguards, the evacuation of the forward positions went smoothly for all units. After the complete abandonment of the western Meuse bank, the staff of the 192. Infanterie-Regiments also withdrew from St. Mihiel. The town, in which about 3,000 French inhabitants still lived, fell between the fronts again after four years of German occupation. Only around 07:00 on the morning of September 13, 1918, was St. Mihiel occupied without a fight by French units. Near the village of Chaillon, the regimental command of IR 192 encountered a hussar patrol carrying the order, given hours earlier, for an immediate retreat to the Michelstellung. This order was immediately passed on to the other regiments. Around 19:00, the arduous march eastward began for the Saxon troops.
Despite the extremely successful course of the first day of the attack, the American army leadership only realized in the evening hours of September 12, 1918, that a more energetic advance could have prevented—and potentially still could prevent—the unexpectedly rapid retreat of the German troops from the center of the salient. In this respect, the 1st US Infantry Division, called “The Big Red One”, was to advance from the south toward Vigneulles-les-Hattonchâtel. The 102nd US Regiment of V US Corps was from the north, without flank protection, via the Grande Tranchée de Calonne to likewise reach Vigneulles and close the pincer. From this developed what is referred to in American accounts as “Race to Vigneulles”. Around 02:00 early on September 13, 1918, the vanguard of the 102nd US Infantry Regiment was the first to reach the completely blazing village of Hattonchâtel and at around 03:15 the first American units occupied the village of Vigneulles situated at the foot of the Meuse Heights. The 1st US Division advancing from the south did not reach its objective until around 10:00 on the morning of September 13, 1918.
Even if individual units fell into captivity, the bulk of the German and Austro-Hungarian units would succeed in slipping through the closing gap in the American front at the last moment. The troop movements took place mainly via two routes. To the north and thus also from the Lamorville sector, the units marched via the villages of Creuë, Vigneulles and then along today’s D 901 in the direction of Dampvitoux. To the south, the route went via Chaillon, Heudicourt and then along the “Bayernstraße”, a only moderately paved forest track, through the Bois de Vigneulles northeastward into the area of the village of Lachaussée. The first units passed the villages situated at the foot of the Meuse Heights at around 21:00. By the morning of September 13, 1918, when the vanguard of the 1st US Division reached the village of Vigneulles, after a forced march of about 40 kilometers, all units had taken up their positions in the Michelstellung.
Descriptions of this enterprise—notable for the logistics and performance of the individual officers and men, in which more than 50,000 members of the armed forces participated on the German and Austro-Hungarian side—can be found in the respective regimental histories and troop files. A vivid depiction of the scenery can be found in Geschichte des sächsischen Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 183 (183rd Saxon Infantry Regiment), written in 1922 by Major d.R. a.D. Dr. Armin Hase:
“The retreat presented a peculiar picture. The entire road was covered by an endlessly moving host of all kinds of military units intermingled. After the rainy day, a colorful evening dawned. Soon it grew dark—but not only the pale moon illuminated the path: from the left and right out of the forest, in the valleys, on the heights, flames blazed where the timber yards abandoned by the troops had been set on fire. It was like a Witches’ Sabbath, where the log piles burn on all mountains and heights. In Chaillon, the last houses that had not already fallen victim to the war became a prey to the flames. In the former local command headquarters, the fire crackled in all rooms, and the iron railing of the hall stairs was already glowing hot. Also Creué, in which French inhabitants had still been present until today, was almost completely in flames. The giant torches and banners of fire from Vigneulles and Hattonchâtel were already blowing towards the troops. The fires grew ever larger, appeared in ever greater numbers, and turned the starry sky red. The most wonderful picture was offered by the town of Hattonville, which had been set completely on fire. Along its rows of streets, the scaffolding beams set up a thousand small flames, as if all the houses were illuminated in an endless row, up and down the streets. While dark red flames beat into the black, smoldering smoke over this sea of fire, the mountain towered above the entire scene into the night sky, on whose peak lay the once so lovely Hattonchâtel. The houses of the mountain nest also blazed against the sky in banner-like white flames, providing the conclusion to a picture that was gruesomely gripping.“
from: Major d.R. a.D. Dr. Armin Hase, Das Königlich Sächsische Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 183, Dresden 1922, page 104.
Only on the morning of September 13, 1918, had the extent of the German withdrawal operation become recognizable to the French troops attacking on the Meuse Heights. Although contact with the enemy had been lost everywhere, the French 12th Dismounted Cuirassier Regiment (12e Régiment de Curassiers à pied) as part of the 2nd French Cavalry Division cautiously felt its way during the course of this second day of attack via the localities of Seuzey, Dompierre, Dexnouds-aux-Bois to the eastern edge of the Meuse Heights above Vigneulles. In the process, the former abbey of Étanche was also taken without a fight. A command post was established in Étanche Castle on the afternoon of September 13, 1918, which existed until September 14, 1918.
There were only minor skirmishes with parts of the German and Austro-Hungarian rear guard. Even though the French cuirassier regiment, which was awarded the order “Croix de guerre 1914–1918” for its achievements, succeeded in capturing about 1,200 German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers, alongside the hesitant American advance, it was precisely this unit that could have prevented the withdrawal of the German troops by timely seizing the retreat routes in the area of the Spada Gap and the localities of Vigneulles and Heudicourt.
Following the withdrawal of German troops from the St. Mihiel salient, which they had occupied for four years, predominantly depopulated and destroyed villages remained overnight, along with a landscape heavily scarred by past wartime events. It would take until well into the 1920s for a relevant number of inhabitants to have returned and for the damage to have been gradually repaired.
Côtes de Lorraine – Interwar Period and Second World War
Very little of note is known about the interwar period in the area of the Maas-Höhen. The latter also applies to the course of World War II. After the end of the fighting in the area of the of the fortress belt around Verdun, which, after only one day, ended on June 16, 1940, with the German capture of all surrounding forts as well as the city’s citadel, advanced under the command of the General Karl Weisenberger Units of the 16th Army belonging 71st Infantry Division, “Cloverleaf Division” and, since the capture of Verdun, also known as “The Fortunate”, advanced southward in the Meuse Valley along today’s D 964. General Weisenberger had as adjutant, company commander, and most recently machine gun officer in the rank of Oberleutnants (first lieutenant) of the 20. K.B. Infanterie-Regiments (20th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) “Prince Franz” participated in the First World War and was engaged in the fighting before Verdun and also deployed on the Meuse Heights.
Without serious resistance, the [X] to the 71. Infanterie-Division (71st Infantry Division) belonging 194. Infanterie-Regiment (194th Infantry Regiment) on the evening of June 16, 1940, at about 22:00 the City of St. Mihiel. Around midnight, a Stosstrupp (assault detachment) occupied the Fort du Camp des Romains. Brief but fierce fighting had taken place only in the village of Lacroix-sur-Meuse at the entrance of the Spada Gap arrived, which now served French troops as a retreat route toward the east, comparable to the situation of the 192. sächsischen Infanterie-Division (192nd Saxon Infantry Division) in September 1918.
East of the Côtes de Lorraine, along the narrow D 154 starting from Haudiomont, Infanterie-Regiment 211 (211th Infantry Regiment), also belonging to the 71. Infanterie-Division (71st Infantry Division), set out in pursuit of the French troops retreating southward. The advance led without serious resistance via les Éparges onto the Grande Tranchée de Calonne as well as along the DS 31 running along the eastern slope of the Meuse Heights to just north of the villages of Creuë, Chaillon, and Vigneulles-lès-Hattonchâtel. This line was reached on June 16, 1940, at around 23:00. During the night of June 17, 1940, Infanterie-Regiment 191 (191st Infantry Regiment), acting as divisional reserve, advanced to the Lamorville/Lavignéville area and at around 23:00 also occupied the abandoned former abbey of de l’Étanche.
Heavier fighting occurred the following day, June 17, 1940, in the area of the Bois de Gobessart east of St. Mihiel, where French rear guards, above all the French 155th Fortress Infantry Regiment (155e Régiment d’Infanterie de Fortresse, R.I.F.), called the “Régiment de la Meuse”, and the French 4th Machine Gun Battalion (4e Bataillon de Mitailleurs), attempted with noticeable losses to cover the retreat of their own troops and to halt the further German advance via the present-day D 907. With the objective of encircling the French troops south of the Moselle, this advance first aimed at the capture of Fort de Gironville, which fell on June 18, 1940, and then at the city of Nancy, which was encircled on June 20, 1940, and surrendered without a fight to the commanders of the participating Wehrmacht formations. In the “Lorraine Pocket” between Nancy and Belfort, three French armies with approximately 500,000 men went into German prisoner-of-war captivity. Already on June 22, 1940, in the railway carriage of Compiègne, where the German surrender had been agreed upon in 1918, the Franco-German Armistice Agreement was signed.
In the Bois de Gobessart, immediately north of the D 907 between St. Mihiel and Apremont-la-Fôret, where a little further south lie the fiercely contested First World War battlefields of Bois Brûlé and Bois d’Ailly, there is a rather large, clearly visible monument placed directly by the road, yet scarcely noticed, for the French units fighting there in June 1940 and their fallen.
For the area between the cities of St. Mihiel and Verdun, another four-year phase of German occupation now began, which was far more repressive and violent for the civilian population than during the First World War. German special units began tracking down, deporting, and murdering undesirable persons, and later also the Jewish population. The Gestapo and Feldgendarmerie relentlessly persecuted suspected enemies of the regime and agitators, with torture and executions being the order of the day. As in many other occupied cities, a camp for prisoners of war and civilian detainees was established in St. Mihiel, the so-called “Frontstalag 241” (Front-Stammlager 241). From these camps, the inmates were transferred to various “Stalags” within the territory of the German Reich to perform forced labor, predominantly in munitions factories and agriculture. In many cases, however, their lives also ended immediately after apprehension on-site or in German concentration camps. The “Frontstalag 241” in St. Mihiel, like its counterpart in the city of Verdun, the “Frontstalag 240”, existed until the spring of 1941.
The ruthless and arbitrary actions of the German occupiers quickly led to the emergence of resistance groups throughout the country, which have since been described under the umbrella term “Résistance”. Already starting in late 1940, several such groups formed in the area of the wooded, sparsely populated, and therefore difficult-to-control Meuse Heights, though they rarely became prominent during the course of the war.
A group commanded by the then only 18-year-old Charles Serano became known regionally. Initially a member of the “Francs-Tireurs et Partisans” (FTP), founded by the French Communist Party, and involved in various sabotage operations primarily in the greater Paris area, he was recruited in February 1944 by another Résistance group, the “Armée Secrète” (AS). His mission was to build up a new resistance group in the village of Viéville-sous-les-Côtes, located at the foot of the Meuse Heights, which was to carry out attacks on railway lines and bridges in support of the expected Allied invasion. For this purpose, five Gaullists from England, carrying explosives and radio equipment, were to parachute into the area of the former Abbey de l’Étanche.
Charles Serano began to recruit potential comrades. In the forests of the Meuse Heights, a large number of escaped Russian prisoners of war and crews of downed Allied bombers were hiding. Before the airborne operation could take place, Charles Serano was arrested by field gendarmes from St. Mihiel and, after being sentenced by the German military court in Bar-le-Duc, was summarily executed on May 30, 1944, in a forest northwest of Behonne, which had repeatedly served as an execution site.
After on June 6, 1944, once again on a “D-Day”, the Allied invasion of Normandy had begun, World War II reached the area between Verdun and St. Mihiel again toward the end of August 1944. Meanwhile, the Allies had been able to defend the bridgehead that had formed between the Cotentin Peninsula and the city of Caen amidst sometimes heavy fighting and to expand it further. At the beginning of August 1944, units of the 1st US Army succeeded in breaking through the German encirclement during an attack on the western flank of the bridgehead as part of “Operation Cobra”. Pushing into the resulting gap—under the command of General George S. Patton Jr.—was the 3rd US Army. This army had not participated in the actual invasion combat, but had only set foot on French soil starting in July 1944 at the invasion beaches “Utah” and “Omaha”.
Energetically, the American formations expanded in all four directions of the hinterland. In cooperation with British and Canadian units, parts of the 3rd US Army succeeded by August 19, 1944, in surrounding the German 7th Army and the 5th Panzer Army in the “Falaise Pocket” and almost completely destroying them. Following this, the German defense in Normandy collapsed, and a disorderly retreat toward the east began.
During the further advance of the Americans, heavier fighting still occurred in the area of the city of Chartres. The greater Chartres area was a centrally located traffic and railroad hub of logistical importance to the Germans. The city could only be completely captured by the 7th US Armored Division on August 18, 1944, and handed over to the advancing 5th US Infantry Division.
In mid-August 1944, the units of the 3rd US Army were reorganized. With XX Corps to the north and XII Corps to the south, two attack formations were deployed eastward toward the German border and the cities of Metz and Nancy. The further advance took place south of Paris across the Seine, then for the XX Corps in the Château-Thierry area and for the XII Corps near Vitry-le-Francois across the Marne. After crossing the Aisne near Berry-au-Bac, the city of Reims was captured by the XX Corps on August 30, 1944, and the small town of Bar-le-Duc by the XII Corps.
Facing the 3rd US Army at this time were merely a few battle-worn Wehrmacht battalions, individual artillery units, and approx. 10 German tanks. Allied reconnaissance revealed that no relevant German resistance was to be expected either in the area of the Meuse, nor the Moselle, nor in the “Siegfried Line” fortifications of the Westwall.
Already by mid-August 1944, however, it became apparent that the unexpectedly rapid advance of the Americans would develop into a massive supply problem. According to the plans drawn up before the start of “Operation Overlord”, the Allied spearheads were at that time roughly where they were not supposed to be until April 1945. Above all, the gasoline needed for the thousands of vehicles became scarce. Per day of advance alone, the 3rd US Army had consumed about 450,000 liters of fuel. In the late summer of 1944, apart from minor airlifts, this had to be predominantly landed on the beaches of Normandy and then transported by road to the forward units. Most of the railroad lines in the French hinterland had been destroyed from the air in order to prevent the bringing up of German reserves. From the landing beaches to the greater Paris area, several fixed communication routes had been created on which transport vehicles of all kinds drove back and forth around the clock. The best-known connection was the “Red Ball Express“, on which about 6,000 trucks operated simultaneously.
According to the original planning, the advance of the 3rd US Army through central France was supposed to play only a secondary role in relation to the British and Canadian troops advancing to the north under the command of their commander Bernhard Law Montgomery. Patton’s rapid advance did indeed prompt considerations regarding an operational change. Ultimately, however, it remained the case that the northern attack wedge retained its priority, including in the supply of fuel, ammunition, and rations. The main objective of these formations was the capture of the Ruhr area and the city of Antwerp with the important deep-water port for the continued supply of troops. In contrast, lying before the 3rd US Army were economically rather insignificant cities such as Karlsruhe, Mannheim, and Frankfurt am Main, as well as the Saarland, which was economically weaker compared to the Ruhr area. The decision to favor the English advance, made primarily for reasons of prestige, later turned out to be a gross miscalculation that prolonged the war by several months and cost thousands of additional lives on both sides.
Due to a lack of fuel supplies, Patton’s U.S. Third Army had to completely halt its advance in late August 1944. The northern XX Corps, spearheaded by the 7th Armored Division, had reached the eastern edge of the Argonne between Varennes-en-Argonne and Dombasle-en-Argonne. The southern XII Corps, with the 4th Armored Division at its head, remained inactive in the vicinity of the small town of Bar-le-Duc, where the German field headquarters responsible for the entire area had been located. Using undamaged German gasoline supplies and requisitioning fuel deliveries intended for other U.S. units, it was possible to make at least some of the units mobile again. Patton ordered a further advance and the establishment of two bridgeheads on the east bank of the Meuse: a northern one near the city of Verdun and a southern one encompassing the towns of Commercy and St. Mihiel.
Already on August 31, 1944, units of the 7th Armored Division captured Verdun almost without a fight and—after members of the Resistance had rendered explosive charges harmless—the former “Pont Bonrepaire”, today’s “Pont de Fernand Legay” named after one of the resistance fighters. Also, the 4th Armored Division, in conjunction with other infantry units of the XII Corps, crossed the Meuse on boats and rafts both near Commercy and in St. Mihiel. Individual reconnaissance patrols advanced as far as the Moselle and found it undefended. Due to a lack of fuel, however, any further advance by the U.S. Third Army was halted again in late August 1944.
On the German side, following the failed Hitler assassination attempt of June 20, 1944, substantial irregularities in the chain of command had occurred due to denunciations, suspicions, and suspensions. On August 16, 1944, the “Commander-in-Chief West”, Generalfeldmarschall (field marshal) Gerd von Rundstedt, was dismissed. New “C-in-C West” and later chief of “Army Group B” became Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, coming from the Eastern Front, under whose strict leadership the chaotic German retreat in France could be brought into some semblance of order. On August 20, 1944, the Führer Decree ordered the “expansion of the German Western Position”. This also included the “Moselle Line”, which relied essentially on the formerly Prussian fortress sectors of Thionville and Metz and ran further south of the city of Nancy in the direction of Alsace.
The involuntary halt of the 3rd US Army starting on August 31, 1944, completely unexpectedly enabled the German side, on the one hand, to bring the retreating troops along with large quantities of war material from France eastward to safety into German Reich territory and, on the other hand, to organize the defense on the western border.
When Patton’s units finally set in motion again on September 6, 1944, and reached the German main line of resistance, they encountered massive resistance already on the western bank of the Moselle, which initially prevented any further advance. The subsequent battles, later referred to as “Lorraine Campaign”, were very costly, predominantly for the Americans, with about 50,000 dead, wounded, and missing. Despite the most intensive use of equipment, the carpet bombing of the Metz forts and the villages in the Moselle valley, the concentrated use of napalm, and the shelling with countless artillery pieces, it took until mid-December 1944 for the pathetic remnants of the German defenders to capitulate.
Traces of these heavy battles can still be found today in the forests, the surroundings of the affected fortifications, but above all on the house facades of the affected villages, such as in Novéant, Dornot, and Corny-sur-Moselle. As a result of the forced halt of the 3rd US Army at the Meuse as well as the consolidation of the German western defense made possible thereby, further heavy and costly battles occurred until the spring of 1945, for example in the Hürtgenwald, at the Westwall, and within the framework of the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge) unleashed by the Germans on December 16, 1944.
Côtes de Lorraine – Abbaye de l’Étanche Today
In conclusion of this thematically and geographically extensive report, let us return to the tranquil Aviaux Stream Valley and the current situation of the former Abbey of l’Étanche.
Following the end of the Second World War, the agricultural use of the facility was continued. Even though the respective tenants mostly did not live in the buildings of the former abbey, they nevertheless endeavored to preserve them, if only to use them as a storage facility. In the early 1980s, the expiring lease agreement between the user at the time and the owner, the Belgian Endmont d’Hondt, was not renewed. Neither the owner, who was already elderly at the time and died in 1986, nor his heirs cared for the former Abbey of l’Étanche in the following years.
Numerous efforts and attempts at contact, including from official sides, with the goal of a long-term lease or acquisition of the site remained unsuccessful, as did the listing of the former abbey in the liste officielle des Monuments Historiques français, which had already taken place in 1984. Over the years, the buildings began to fall into disrepair, and the surrounding lands also became overgrown. The extensive metalwork such as shutters, railings, gutters, zinc sheets, etc., was gradually stolen. Only the forest areas belonging to the estate were used for hunting by one of the heirs. In 2014, the roof of the main building collapsed. The roof of the church, which had already become considerably leaky, also threatened to collapse and destroy the interior roof vault from the 18th century. Action had to be taken at short notice if the facility was to be essentially preserved.
Momentum gathered after a petition, which received quite extensive coverage in the Belgian media, drew attention to the neglect of the historically valuable French monument for which Belgians were responsible. In 2015, the acquisition of the entire estate by the Etablissement Public Foncier de Lorraine (EPFL) was finally realized. The Conservatoire d’espaces naturels de Lorraine (CEN) was entrusted with the protection of the lands, which are home to rare plant and animal species. Since its founding in 2016, the preservation and restoration of the buildings has been the responsibility of the Hattonchâtel-based association Les Amis de l’Abbaye Notre Dame de l’Etanche under the leadership of its president, Christine Hellin.
Since the spring of 2017, club members, additional private helpers, and financial backers have primarily focused on stabilizing the church and provisionally securing the roof and the vault. At the same time, extensive cleanup work was initiated, and the recreation of damaged and lost stone elements such as roof cornices began. In the meantime, the church roof has been completed, the facade has been partially repaired and cleaned, and further cleanup work has been carried out. The site is used for club activities. Guided tours take place occasionally.
In addition to its own historical and architectural value, the site around the former Abbey of L’Étanche, due to its central location on the Meuse Heights, is well suited as a starting and/or ending point for both scientific and military-historical excursions. From here, both the locations discussed in this article and many other interesting destinations with their stories, large and small, can be reached.
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).