Combres Heights – les Éparges
The northeastern cornerstone of the St. Mihiel salient was formed by a ridge up to 346 meters high, approx. 1,100 m long and approx. 700 m wide in the area of the Meuse Heights. The elevation, which actually consisted of two adjacent heights, was uniformly called “Combres-Höhe” by German troops, named after the village of Combres-sous-les-Côtes located at its southern foot, which remained in German hands until September 1918. The designation “Comber-Höhe” is also occasionally found. The French called the eastern part “Crète de Combres” and the western part “Crète des Éparges”, the latter after the village of Les Éparges located to the west.
Combres Heights: General Information
Based on the impressive distant view, visitors to the Combres Heights quickly realize why heavy fighting raged on this small plateau throughout the entire course of the First World War: From the eastern tip of the ridge, later known as “Point X,” the German hinterland could be surveyed extensively to the south and southeast. The holding of the St. Mihiel salient, which formed in September 1914, as well as the conduct of the Battle of Verdun, which began in February 1916, would have been unthinkable for the Germans if the French had come into possession of this excellent observation position.
Combres Heights: Military Geological Situation
The Combres Heights consist of four uniformly superposed rock layers sloping gently to the west. Up to an altitude of 325 m above sea level, the base is formed by a layer approximately 70 m thick of bluish-gray, yellow-weathered clay marl with embedded limestone nodules. At the surface, the rock is soft; at depth, it is hard and difficult to work. The clays are impermeable to water, so positions established there could easily become muddy. Underground and especially in the lower layers, the clays are completely dry, making this layer well-suited for tunneling and gallery construction. Above the clay marl base lies a layer about 10 m thick, reaching up to an altitude of 335 m above sea level, composed of brownish-yellow, ferruginous limestone, which was permeable to water and therefore unsuitable for tunneling. This layer is followed by a thickness of up to 15 m of yellowish-white, impermeable, and easily worked marly limestone, in which stable and dry fire trenches and galleries could be constructed. This layer reaches up to an altitude of 350 m above sea level and is overlain in the uppermost layers—primarily in the sectors “Granathügel,” “Combres-West,” and “Herbeuville Position”—by a white, hard coral limestone.
Based on the structure and behavior of the individual rock layers in relation to emerging surface water, the geologists of Surveying Department 2 of Armee-Abteilung Strantz (Army Detachment Strantz) made the following recommendations for tunneling and gallery construction on the Combres Heights:
- All galleries and tunnels constructed in the deep layers of the blue clay marl and the marly limestone will, as expected, remain stable and dry.
- Tunnels extending upward into the ferruginous limestone carry the risk of water ingress.
- Since the catchment area for surface water is small given the topography of the Combres Heights, catastrophic water incursions are not to be feared. However, it is possible that after very heavy rainfall and during the rainy season, especially in the vicinity of mine craters, the water volumes may become so large that, in addition to the measures customary for mining drainage, creating a slope in the galleries and tunnels toward the east is recommended.
- As far as tactical conditions permit, all galleries and tunnels should be established in the deep, unweathered layers of the clay marl, and passing through the ferruginous limestone layer should be avoided whenever possible.
The Académie De Nancy-Metz describes current geomorphological and historical aspects in the context of the Combres Heights in a homepage article titled “La Côte de Meuse aux Éparges” under the heading “Géologie de la Lorraine”. Corresponding information can also be found for many other places in the region. The articles contain interesting suggestions for private, scientific, and also school research projects.
Combres Heights: Overall Military Situation at the End of August 1914 – V. Armeekorps
For the first time, the Meuse Heights came into military focus at the end of August 1914. The central group of the German Western Army had crossed the Meuse between Sedan and Stenay with the 4th Army of Duke Albrecht of Württemberg. The 5th Army under the German Crown Prince Wilhelm was supposed to connect to the south between Stenay and Verdun, but encountered strong resistance. On August 26, 1914, the V. Armeekorps (V Corps) (9th and 10th Division), which had advanced far to the west on the right flank of the 5th Army, captured the villages of Brehéville, Lissey, and Ecurey. It was thus within immediate striking distance of the Meuse. The commander of the corps, General Hermann von Strantz, ordered the capture of the western bank of the Meuse for the following day in order to outflank and take in the rear the French forces retreating in disarray across the river. This did not happen. The subsequent orders of the Obersten (colonel) Heeresleitung (O.H.L.) and its chief Helmuth von Moltke were the beginning of a chain of misjudgments that culminated in mid-September 1914 in the retreat of the Western Army—known as the “Marne Drama”—and ultimately in the failure of the entire German campaign strategy.
What had happened? In compliance with the mutual assistance pact concluded in 1894 between France and the Russian Empire (Franco-Russian Alliance), the Russian army mobilized immediately after the German invasion of Belgium. From mid-August 1914, the Russians unexpectedly advanced with two armies into East Prussian territory. On the German side, there was only the 8th Army under the command of General Max von Prittwitz, later replaced by the commander duo Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. The German plan was to attack and defeat the Russian formations one after the other. Although the army leadership claimed no necessity for troop reinforcements, the O.H.L. felt compelled to withdraw three army corps from the Western Front and transfer them to East Prussia. In addition to the V. Armeekorps, this concerned the Guard Reserve Corps belonging to the 2nd Army as well as the XI. Armeekorps (XI Corps) fighting with the 3rd Army. The latter two corps arrived in East Prussia only after the battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, which had ended in victory for the German troops. Above all, the absence of these two corps on the right (northern) army flank, which was decisive for the German campaign, was to have fatal consequences and necessitated the O.H.L.’s decision in mid-September 1914 to break off the Battle of the Marne.
V Corps received the order to halt all offensive efforts on August 26, 1914. Although the orders caused considerable incomprehension, they were maintained by O.H.L. Even emphatic opposition from the army and corps leadership in view of the obvious possibility of capturing the fortress of Verdun failed to bring about a change of mind. As early as the following day, V Corps marched back to the east. The withdrawal of the corps necessitated regroupings in the 4th and 5th Armies and had a corresponding effect as far as the 3rd Army. For several days, the advance of all three armies was slowed down. The wavering French defense in the central sector of the Western Front unexpectedly managed to consolidate itself once again.
Following the surprising German victory at the Battle of Tannenberg, V Corps was reassigned to the Fifth Army as early as August 30, 1914, and marched back westward from the area around Metz. Within the army formation, the Meuse was to be crossed north of Verdun. As early as the following day, however, the corps was halted again and ordered back to fend off feared French attacks toward Metz east of Verdun. Commanding General Hermann von Strantz recognized, despite this chaotic back and forth, the strategic option of letting his force go on the offensive at a suitable opportunity from the Woëvre Plain toward the Meuse heights between Combres and St-Maurice-s.l.-Côtes. As a precaution, the 10th Division was pulled south starting September 3, 1914, into a line running from Jonville to Harville. In addition, increased aerial reconnaissance over the entire Woëvre Plain was ordered. Patrols were to reconnoiter in the area of the Meuse heights.
Combres Heights: Beginning of the fighting in September 1914
On September 7, 1914, V Corps actually received the order to take possession of the ridge of the Côtes Lorraines and the Meuse forts Camp des Romains, Les Paroches, and Troyon. That was the prelude to the four years of fighting on the Meuse heights. The units of the 10. Infanterie-Division (10th Infantry Division) began their advance in two columns, the 19th Infantry Brigade to the south and the 20th Infantry Brigade to the north. Parts of the Königs-Jäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 and Infanterie-Regiment 47 (47th Infantry Regiment) succeeded without difficulty in advancing into a line running from Les Éparges to St. Rémy, Dompierre, and Lavignéville. The French units had surprisingly abandoned their positions on the slopes of the Meuse heights and retreated. In the evening, parts of IR 47 went to rest west of Herbeuville, on the later “Herbeuville-Höhe”, and Hill 362, later “Combres-West”. The headquarters of the 10th Division was established in the village of Combres. Parts of Infanterie-Regiment 50 (50th Infantry Regiment) occupied the ridge of the Montgirmont and the saddle of the Combres Heights, later “Combres-Ost”. There they established positions at its highest point, the later heavily contested “Finger”.
On the following day, September 8, 1914, IR 50, reinforced by other parts of the division, continued its advance toward Fort de Troyon. Heavy artillery, including two 30.5 cm Skoda mortars of the 3rd Battery of the k.u.k. “Halbbataillons Krakau”, had already begun shelling the fort during the night. However, the planned storming had to be canceled and postponed several times due to bad weather and insufficient destructive effect. Fort Génicourt to the north as well as the Lès Paroches Battery located to the south remained intact and their artillery interfered with German operations.
The uncertainty on the part of O.H.L., fostered by a lack of long-range reconnaissance and inadequate signal communication, continued to increase. Agent reports stated that west of St. Mihiel French formations were preparing a breakthrough toward Metz. Contrary to other intelligence of the General Command of V Corps, the immediate retreat into the Woëvre Plain was therefore ordered again on September 9, 1914. Although this order was revised the very next day, pioneers and infantry had already returned to their starting positions and had left only smaller groups near Fort de Troyon. The attack had failed. Parts of IR 47 and IR 50 once again occupied positions on the Combres Heights, the Montgirmont, and the Côte des Hures, as French attacks were likewise feared from the north and west.
By order of the O.H.L., a new large formation was created under the command of General Hermann von Strantz to bring order to operations. As a result of the German retreat from the Battle of the Marne, however, the newly formed Armeegruppe v. Strantz had also been ordered back from the Côtes Lorraines about 40 km in a northeastern direction behind the small river Orne.
Since, contrary to all apprehensions, no significant French attacks occurred, the capture of the Meuse Heights and the local forts was ordered again as early as September 16, 1914. The task was assigned to the Armee-Abteilung Strantz. This force included the V. preußische (V Prussian Corps) taken over by General Adolf von Oven as well as the III. bayerische Armeekorps (III Bavarian Army Corps) of General Ludwig Freiherr von Gebsattel detached from the 6th Army. The Prussians were to attack in the north against the Côtes Lorraines and Fort de Troyon, and the Bavarians to capture the forts of Camp-des-Romains, Les Paroches, and the town of St. Mihiel. The 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division) was to seal off the fortress of Verdun from the east and cover the northern flank.
The attack originally scheduled for September 17, 1914, was delayed due to continuous rain, bogged-down artillery, and renewed fears of an impending French attack.
On September 19, 1914, the time had come. Both corps crossed the north-south road between Fresnes-en-Woëvre and Thiaucourt (today’s D 904). West of it, an artillery protective position was occupied. Reconnaissances were carried out in the area of the Meuse Heights and the villages. Despite the ongoing rain, the advance proceeded as planned. The artillery was able to take up its positions by the morning of September 20, 1914, and begin shelling the Meuse Heights.
On the morning of September 21, 1918, the infantry advanced further. Parts of the 9. Division (9th Division), including IR 19 (19th Infantry Regiment), IR 58 (58th Infantry Regiment), and GrenR 7 (7th Grenadier Regiment), were assigned to Hannonville, Herbeuville, and Combres, while the 10. Division (10th Division), including IR 46 (46th Infantry Regiment), IR 47 (47th Infantry Regiment), IR 50 (50th Infantry Regiment), and GrenR 6 (6th Grenadier Regiment), were assigned to Thillot, St. Maurice, and Billy s.l. Côtes. Unlike at the beginning of the month, the troops encountered fierce resistance in the villages. French artillery brought up under cover effectively targeted the flanks with precise fire. Despite noticeable losses, they succeeded in storming the villages and reaching a line Dommartin – Dompierre-aux-Bois on the Meuse Heights. The numerically inferior French had retreated west and northwest into the protection of the local forests.
Following the successful Battle of the Marne, the French leadership had optimistically assumed that a general German retreat would ensue. No German attacks were anticipated, not even in the area of the Woëvre plain. By outflanking the northern German army wing (“Race to the Sea”) and launching an offensive between Verdun and Reims, they intended to bring about the final decision of the war. Beginning on September 17, 1914, however, the Germans formed a front everywhere again and offered energetic resistance to the advancing French. Large French troop contingents were withdrawn from the front and transferred to the two offensive fronts. In the area of the Meuse Heights, this concerned the complete 2nd Army. At the time of the German offensive, only a reserve division (75e D.R.) and a cavalry division (7e D.C.) remained there.
The advance of the 9th Division initially proceeded according to plan on the morning of September 21, 1914. To the north, Infanterie-Regiment 58 (58th Infantry Regiment) was to capture the villages of Herbeuville and Combres and advance in the direction of St-Rémy-la-Calonne. To the south, Infanterie-Regiment 19 (19th Infantry Regiment) was to advance via Hannonville s.l. Côtes onto the Meuse Heights and further in the direction of Dommartin-la-Montagne. It turned out that the eastern slope of the Meuse Heights was occupied by the enemy. From their positions, the French infantry put up fierce resistance. The terrain caused problems for the attackers. The steep slopes were covered in many places with dense undergrowth and grapevines, whose vine supports and wiring made progress difficult. The French artillery, deployed unhindered near Fresnes-en-Woëvre, on the Côte des Hures, and west of Les Éparges, had a severe effect. By evening, IR 58, together with elements of Grenadier-Regiment 7 (7th Grenadier Regiment), had occupied the Combres Heights and Hill 362 (later Combres-West). IR 19, with one battalion, was stationed at the western edge of Hill 373, the later Herbeuville Heights, to secure artillery deployed there.
Gradually, the commander of the French 3rd Army, Genéral Maurice Sarrail, recognized the explosive nature of the situation. Originally, it was planned that the French 1st Army positioned further south under Genéral Augustin Dubail should curtail German advances in the Woëvre plain by launching its own attack. In view of the substantial German territorial gains, this proved no longer feasible.
In addition to the 67th Reserve Division initially intended for reinforcement, Sarrail ordered the transfer of the entire 6th French Army Corps positioned east of Verdun to the Meuse Heights around noon on September 21, 1914. By the morning of September 22, 1914, the French 12th DI was thus in the area of Mouilly – Vaux-les-Palameix, further south the 67th DR in front of Dompierre, and the 40th DI from Seuzey via Lamorville down to the Spada Gap. The French 107e Brigade (RI 301, 302, 304) advanced hastily on horseback, tasked with occupying Montgirmont and, if at all possible, recapturing the high ground of Les Éparges and Combres. The latter failed due to the resistance of IR 58.
The positions of IR 58 (58th Infantry Regiment) were located on the northern and western slopes of the heights. Thus, the units of the French 107th Brigade (107e Brigade), repeatedly attacking from the direction of St. Rémy and Tresauvaux, could be effectively brought under fire. However, in the absence of fire trenches and dugouts, the soldiers were completely at the mercy of enemy artillery fire.
The French did not want to give up the lost terrain without a fight. On the morning of September 22, 1914, the commander of the French 6th Army Corps (6e Corps d’Armée), General Martial Justin Verraux, ordered the recapture of the Meuse Heights between Combres and Hattonchâtel. What followed were poorly prepared attacks that would cost the French hardly any territorial gain, but hundreds of dead and multiple times that number in wounded and missing.
One of the dead was the young lieutenant Henri Alban Fournier, called “Alain Fournier”. As a member of the French 288th Infantry Regiment (288e RI) (67th Infantry Division [67e DI]), he participated in the fighting on the Meuse Heights. Along with other French soldiers, he was captured and shot on September 22, 1914, west of Dommartin-la-Montagne by members of Grenadier Regiment No. 6 (6th Grenadier Regiment). Rumor has it that under his command, targeted killings of German medics and wounded soldiers took place. Fournier was considered a promising literary talent. After the end of the war, he was stylized as a symbol of France’s intellectual youth lost in the war.
In the fighting on the Meuse Heights that lasted until the end of September 1914, the Germans also suffered noticeable losses. As of September 23, 1914, the French defense against the units that had advanced into the area of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne had solidified through the introduction of reinforcements and artillery.
The French succeeded in entangling the attackers—who were barely making headway in the dense forests anyway—in bloody skirmishes using individually, cleverly positioned outposts, machine guns, and tree snipers. In the impenetrable underbrush and facing an unseen enemy, the German units constantly became intermixed, lost their direction, and had to be regrouped repeatedly by their commanders under enemy fire.
Above all, the loss of officers and sergeant ranks was great during these days. Since, as in earlier times, they walked ahead of their units and were easily recognizable by their uniforms, they provided ideal targets for French snipers. Most of the fallen soldiers found later had died from targeted chest or head shots. The combat was fought bitterly by both sides. Wounded soldiers from both sides could not be recovered, even when carrying improvised Red Cross insignia tailored from white undershirts and red French uniform trousers.
As ordered, IR 154 (154th Infantry Regiment) and parts of Grenadier Regiment 7 (7th Grenadier Regiment) had succeeded by the evening of September 24, 1914, in reaching a line from the south beyond the road between the villages of St. Rémy and Vaux-les-Palameix, later called the “Vauxweg”. In this way, the encirclement ring around the Verdun fortress was to be narrowed toward the north. Individual groups advanced further up to the “Côte Senoux”, a height north of the road leading from St. Rémy to Mouilly (today’s D 113). Since no connection to neighboring units could be found there, they retreated to the ordered line north of the “Vauxweg”.
Parts of IR 154 (154th Infantry Regiment) were ordered back further in the direction of Dommartin-la-Montagne to take over the protection of the artillery deployed in the Chanot Forest (French: *le Chanot*) and to establish a connection with the parts of IR 19 (19th Infantry Regiment) positioned on the Herbeuville Heights. The resulting line between the villages of Vaux-les-Palameix and Combres-sous-les-Côtes was to remain essentially intact until April 1915. On both sides of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne, it later became a heavily fortified fallback position and was given the name “Alte Winterstellung”.
On September 24, 1914, the situation opposite the III Battalion of IR 19 on the western edge of Hill 373 (Herbeuville Heights) had briefly become critical. At around 05:45, a massive artillery bombardment began. Under the cover of dense ground fog, a French infantry attack was launched. Parts of the attackers reached the flank of the defenders through a valley cut southeast of St. Rémy. The attack could only be stopped immediately in front of the German trenches. Because the ground fog suddenly cleared, the French retreating through the valley of the Longeau Brook suffered heavy losses with over 300 dead. A large number of wounded left behind could not be recovered due to the continued bombardment. They died an agonizing death during the following night. The fallen of IR 19, about 35 men, were buried in a specially excavated pit in a forest clearing behind the position.
Combres Heights: further development until November 1914
To understand the further course of the fighting on the Meuse Heights and specifically on the Combres Heights, one should take a closer look at the topography of the surrounding area. The regimental history written in 1924 of Reserve Infantry Regiment 130 (130th Reserve Infantry Regiment), which was deployed in the area of the Combres Heights and the Tranchée de Calonne from October 1914 to May 1915, contains this insightful description:
(…) For a better understanding of the fighting of Reserve Infantry Regiment 130, the following orientation should be added:
From the main massif of the Meuse Heights, the Longeau Brook, rising at the level of the villages of Hannonville – Dommarlin, separates the eastern part through a deeply incised valley in such a way that the heights located north of the Combres – St. Remy – Mouilly road, namely the 346-meter-high Combresberge, the Montgirmont, and the Cote des Hures (Hill 372) located even further north, represent completely isolated mountain cones. West of the approximately 500-meter-wide valley formed by the Longeau stream, our position leads from the Meuse Heights out of the Loclont Forest across the Tranchée de Calonne past Hill 334 and the edge of Le Chanot Bois into the valley, where it encounters the outpost near Moulin Pelit and in the village of St. Remy. Then the line of fire trenches projects across the St. Remy – Combres road and reaches its conclusion in the position on the Combresberge. Also west of the stream, but beyond the village of St. Remy, approximately on the flank of the Combresberge, lies the almost barren Hill 340, followed by a myriad of wooded heights into which the many small streams flowing into the Longeau Brook have carved deep gorges. Densely wooded mountain spurs lead right up to the Longeau Brook. The closest ones are Heights 342 and 353, the former also called “lobster claw” by us due to its peculiar shape.
Heights 340, 342, 353, Montgirmont, and Cote des Hures are in the hands of the French, who have erected field fortifications on them. (…)
From this description the reader will see that our position on the Combresberge could be taken under fire not only frontally from the north, but also from the flank from the west, at least in the latter respect by artillery.
The plateau of Combres consists of 2 parts, which are separated by the field path leading from the village of Combres on the southeast edge of the heights westward over a gentle saddle to Les Eparges into the Longeau brook valley. The southern part is almost completely circular in shape, is covered on the northwest and west sides by small larch, spruce, and beech forests, slopes gently to the northwest and north in the direction of Les Eparges and the field path, and only takes the form of a steep slope overgrown with small brushwood in the southeast direction, where the St. Remy – Combres road descends over the Herbeuville saddle in a hairpin turn into the plain. Otherwise, the height, particularly the summit, is completely barren. On the northern side there is a quarry.
The height north of the farm track across the saddle, on the other hand, exhibits an elongated shape running from west to east, reaches its steepest summit immediately north of the highest saddle elevation at point 346, and drops off from here in all directions: to the west in the form of a completely bare ridge directed toward Les Eparges, approx. 300 meters long and only 40 to 60 meters wide; to the north in the form of a depression toward the farm track south of Montgirmont; to the east in the form of an increasingly narrowing ridge that then suddenly drops off into the plain at the height of the village of Combres. Here at the apex, the mountain descends very steeply into the flatland to the north and east.
The entire slope and some 20 to 30 meters of the edge are overgrown with medium-sized spruce, larch, and beech trees, among which brushwood is spreading. The vine-rich south and southeast slope of the mountain descends down to the village of Combres at first in a sheer, then increasingly gentle slope. (…)
(…) On the southern mountain (Position D) lay a series of foxholes in the small spruce forest facing west. A second position had already been excavated in the form of a fire trench on the ridge toward Les Eparges, a third in the direction of the farm track. A few outposts at the saddle and on the road to St. Rémy secured the paths. (…)
(…) The northern mountain (west of point 346, called Position C, north and east called Position B) likewise had no continuous fire trench in its forward part. A series of foxholes provided space for a company in C, and for about a battalion in B. The line led over the most advanced mountain peak toward Les Eparges, across the depression to the steep slope in B, where it ran a few meters above the edge to the apex, and then led down the eastern ridge into the plain.
Here, west of the Combres-Tresauvaux path, stood two outposts; east of the path, several trenches and dugouts provided space for about two companies. (…)
(…) There, where our position steps out of the small forest and leads across the heights to the quarry, an entirely different life and activity prevails. Here the trench lies exposed to the enemy’s view. The active French artillery answers every major movement with shrapnel and shells. Furthermore, the projectiles of the revolver cannons (donkey batteries), which in themselves look so cute and are highly coveted by the troops, but whose effects are often extremely unpleasant, frequently whistle over the breastworks and shoulder parapets. Casualties from artillery occur daily, against which the troops seek protection by deeply excavating the trench floor, by strong shoulder parapets, and by the construction of dugouts, which, however, is made extraordinarily difficult by the fact that far and wide no suitable building material is available. The relief of the companies can naturally only take place at night and remains difficult even then because the approach routes across the forest lanes and the bare slope are frequently subjected to sudden artillery fire. Here shot follows shot. The French artillery fires outstandingly accurately.
Much more exposed is the forward company in Position C. The garrison crouches in individual foxholes at a short distance from the enemy. A rearward connection across the saddle to the outpost reserve at the hairpin bend does not yet exist. Thus the men lie on the bare hilltop, completely dependent upon themselves. The enemy tries to disrupt the brisk entrenching work that subsequently begins with frequent artillery fire raids, which he does not succeed in doing, even though sensitive losses occur through the daily, often hours-long bombardments. However, the enemy fares by no means better, as our position commands his above Les Eparges and in front of the farm track from Les Eparges to Monville-Ferme.
Only to this extent is the enemy’s position more favorable, in that it can be engaged by our artillery only with difficulty and solely frontally, while our lines on the ridge are exposed both to the frontal fire of French artillery from Montgirmont and the Côtes des Hures, and to the flanking effect of its field guns from the “Hummerschere” and Hill 353, as well as its heavy fortress guns from the direction of the Troyon and Génicourt barrier forts. However, this circumstance was inherent to the entire advanced position on the Combres Heights and had to be accepted.
In Combres “B”, lively infantry activity unfolds already in the first days, particularly on the right flank, where the enemy lies in the ravine south of Monville-Ferme, covered by the wooded steep slope, up to a distance of 20 to 50 meters in front of our positions. The expansion of the trenches is pursued here too with the utmost zeal.
On the eastern slope and in valley position A, combat activity remains comparatively low in the initial period. Contact with the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division) joining on the right has already been established.
The reserves for the forward position are at this time still accommodated in small, low shell holes or dugouts on the slope near the serpentine and on the southern slope of position B. Comfortable resting in the open area is impossible, as the enemy’s artillery keeps all open terrain points and the village of Combres under constant fire. By contrast, it fails to engage the steep slopes. Here an extremely brisk activity now develops. Beams and trees hauled up at night by wagons are carried up the slopes with the greatest difficulty and installed. Thus, a camp of caves, dugouts, and blockhouses gradually emerges here.
At the serpentine, the so-called “Kaiser-Wilhelm-Straße”, the regimental staff and a battalion staff establish themselves; immediately to the east, the companies of the outpost reserve lie on several levels. A “Himmelsleiter” of several hundred steps climbs from the serpentine up to the plateau, where another company has dug itself in behind a swell in the terrain in dugouts. Similarly, the outpost reserve for B establishes itself high up on the southern slope north of the village of Combres. In infinitely laborious work, the men drag the material—wood and stones, straw and stoves—from the village of Combres up to the heights, often under enemy fire.
Drinking water is of course not available up here; it has to be carried up across the shell-pitted valley. Securing provisions is also associated with great difficulty. The field kitchens, which stand in Herbeuville during the day, drive at night via the Combres crossroads along the dangerous road right into the village and to the serpentine, from where the food must be fetched in mess kits. (…)
from: Fritz Cordes, Kriegsgeschichte des Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments 130 (130th Reserve Infantry Regiment) (Metz), Detmold 1924
Combres Heights: Munitions Crisis – Transition to Trench Warfare
This description of the situation gives an inkling of the difficulties to which the German units were exposed in the fall and winter of 1914/15. There was no prior experience whatsoever in trench warfare, particularly not in the construction of positions and especially not in the erection of bulletproof dugouts and other protection against enemy artillery fire. There was a complete lack of any knowledge and material for the construction of permanent positions.
Economically, the German Empire, like all participating nations, was not prepared for a prolonged war at all. To be sure, as early as August 4, 1914, with the “Kriegs-Ermächtigungsgesetz” (War Enabling Act), the prerequisites for organizing a wartime economy had been regulated. The Bundesrat was granted far-reaching interventions into all economic life. However, the demand for ammunition and other supply goods soared immeasurably. The British naval blockade almost completely prevented the import of goods from overseas. The supply of fertilizers, ammunition, and explosives producers with saltpeter originating predominantly from Chile threatened to collapse.
At the beginning of November 1914, the “saltpeter crisis” reached its peak, when artillery ammunition seemed to be available for only six days. Ultimately, through the confiscation of all remaining supplies in industry and agriculture, including about 750,000 tons of nitrate salts, it succeeded in maintaining the army’s ammunition supply over the winter of 1914/1915 to a reasonable extent.
In 1915, the situation improved gradually with the production of ammonia by “Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik Actiengesellschaft” (BASF AG), which was massively promoted by industry and the state through the “saltpeter promise”. Responsible were essentially the chemists Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch. In Ludwigshafen-Oppau, a first research and production facility had already existed since 1913, operating on the basis of the “Haber-Bosch process” patented in 1910. In 1916, near Halle a. d. Saale, the newly built “Merseburg Ammonia Works” was added, from which later the “Leuna Works” emerged.
Besides the shortage of explosives and ammunition, equipping the German army artillery predominantly with light guns brought disadvantages. The French, too, had focused primarily on mobility at the beginning of the war. However, with their heavy fortress artillery in the forts around Verdun, they were able to have a far-reaching and effective impact on the stalling battles on the Meuse heights and in the Woëvre-Ebene.
From September 29, 1914, the 9th Infantry Division was relieved by the 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division) (originally main reserve of Fortress Metz). The aforementioned parts of the 9th Infantry Division moved further west to relieve the heavily decimated and rest-needing 10th Infantry Division into their positions between Vaux-lès-Palameix and Seuzey. The Königlich-Bayerischer Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 8 (8th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) took over the Combres Heights previously held by IR 58 (Sections A to C), the Königlich-Bayerisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 4 (4th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) took over the Herbeuville-Höhe occupied by IR 19 (Section D) and the position parts adjoining to the west in the direction of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne.
The following weeks were dedicated to the expansion of positions and quarters to better protect against the recurring artillery fire. The command posts of the participating troop units were mostly located in a larger Steinbruch oberhalb Herbeuville. Front-line reserve units were accommodated in the village itself as well as in the constantly expanding camp areas located on the steep eastern slope of the Côtes Lorraines.
The localities situated in the rear area of the Woëvre Plain accommodated reserves and troops going to rest. Small farming villages such as Avillers-Ste-Croix, Jonville, Harville, Butgnéville, St. Hilaire, Moulotte, Labeuville or Friauville became heavily occupied quartering and supply locations. They also served for the accommodation of staffs, logistical units, and military hospitals.
The command of Armee-Abteilung Strantz established itself in the “Château des Harts” near Chambley. Following its destruction by fire on June 4, 1915, it relocated to the Château de Moncel near Jarny. The corps headquarters of the III. Bayerischen Armeekorps (III Bavarian Army Corps) and the V. Preußischen Armeekorps (V Prussian Army Corps) were located in the châteaux of St-Benoît en Woëvre and Xonville.
At the end of September 1914, fighting on the Meuse heights subsided. Orders were given to hold the positions attained. Further advancement had to be refrained from due to the flank threat posed by the fortresses of Verdun and Toul as well as the lack of progress in the attacks that had likewise bogged down on the western bank of the Meuse. The main focus of operations shifted to northern France and Belgian Flanders. On the Côtes de Lorraine, the continued artillery and machine gun fire by the French, which was costly for the Germans, remained.
Due to the lack of ammunition and long-range guns, the French artillery could not be combated seriously. Because of the exposed position on the forward slopes of the individual heights, the German positions were permanently and from multiple sides exposed to enemy bombardment. Only after the delivery of suitable trench tools and building materials could the situation be improved to some extent.
From early October 1914, the V. Armeekorps (V Corps) continued to occupy the sector from Étain to Lamorville. There, the III. K.B. Armeekorps (III Bavarian Army Corps) adjoined. In the sector of the 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division) (Combres Heights to the eastern edge of the Bois de St. Remy), the 8. K.B. Infanterie-Brigade (8th Bavarian Infantry Brigade) (K.B. IR 4 & K.B. IR 8) and the 66. Reserve-Infanterie-Brigade (66th Reserve Infantry Brigade) (RIR 67 and RIR 130) had to alternate in the positions.
The village of St-Remy-la-Calonne, located in no-man’s-land, developed into a hotspot. During the night hours, its northern part was occupied by French outposts, the southern by German ones. Regularly, there were artillery raids, patrol operations, skirmishes, and the mutual capture of soldiers and officers.
Combres Heights: Battles for the flanks – Woëvre Plain
By order of Armee-Abteilung Strantz dated October 22, 1914, a new division was created from the units in the Woëvre-Ebene that had previously been merely thrown together. Its core was formed by the reinforced 14. Landwehr-Infanterie-Brigade (14th Landwehr Infantry Brigade) (LIR 17, LIR 36, LIR 64) and the 30. Landwehr-Infanterie-Brigade (30th Landwehr Infantry Brigade) (LIR 25, LIR 65). Both units were originally part of the Metz fortress garrison. Until their deployment between the Meuse and Moselle, they had not yet participated in any noteworthy engagements. The large unit initially called Landwehr-Division v. Waldow (Landwehr Division v. Waldow), later 5. Landwehr-Infanterie-Division (5th Landwehr Infantry Division), was deployed north adjacent to the 33. Reserve-Division and to cover against the fortress of Verdun. The 5. Landwehr-Infanterie-Division became a supporting pillar of the German defense in the Woëvre-Ebene and the Frontbogen von St. Mihiel over the course of the war.
Not only from the west were the German troops exposed to flanking artillery fire. Due to the unfavorable course of the front, the French were also able from the northeast to shell the front positions at Combres, the rear area, and the resting places located there. The French front ran at this time approximately along a line from Gussainville to Hennemont to Champlon. Casualties occurred daily. Movements in the villages, the construction of positions, the supply and relief of the combat troops, all of this was only possible at night. To remedy this shortcoming, the French were to be forced to relocate their far advanced field artillery further back.
For this purpose, and also to prevent the French from transferring troops from the Verdun area and the Côtes Lorraines to the attack fronts in northern France, several operations were carried out by the German side, which, however, were not crowned with sweeping success.
Thus, as early as the night of September 28, 1914, LIR 36 (36th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) vainly attacked the village of Fresnes-en-Woëvre in order to eliminate suspected French artillery positions there. The advance bogged down in French defensive fire just before the village outskirts.
To simulate a larger operation, parts of K.B. IR 8 (8th Bavarian Infantry Regiment), which was later deployed on the Combres Heights (Sectors A and B), had simultaneously attacked in the direction of Ville-en-Woëvre and Château d’Aulnois. During this, the regimental commander of K.B. IR 8, Oberst Ferdinand Hannapel, was wounded. He died on the transport to Metz before reaching the military hospital.
Starting from the Combres Heights (Sector B), an assault detachment operation by IR 58 (58th Infantry Regiment) had been launched. It was intended to eliminate French artillery in the Longeau Brook Valley north of Lès Eparges and in the side valleys. Although the advance succeeded beyond Lès Eparges, no French artillery was found until dawn.
A similar fate befell on October 7, 1914, waiting as the relief of K.B. IR 4 (4th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) on the Herbeuville Heights (Sector D), RIR 67 (67th Reserve Infantry Regiment). The French had surprisingly occupied the villages of Riaville and Pintheville the day before, which at that time were only controlled by German outposts. The attempt at an immediate recapture failed with noticeable losses. Through control of the two villages, the French were able to move their artillery even further east. In addition, the road via Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte to Metz (today’s D 903) was now in the direct line of fire of their guns.
In the early morning of November 12, 1914, the commanders of the V Army Corps and the Landwehr Division v. Waldow, Generals Adolf von Oven and Adolf von Waldow, met in the Bois de Harville for a tactical conference. Based on previous experience, it was agreed that in view of the steadily strengthening French defense, only larger operations would be promising. It was agreed to recapture the villages of Riaville and Pintheville that very afternoon by employing the Landwehr and supported by parts of 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division). By means of further attacks, the entire front in the Woëvre-Ebene was then to be set in motion and pushed significantly closer to the fortress of Verdun.
Despite the deployment of two complete Landwehr regiments (LIR 17 (17th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) and LIR 36) as well as one battalion each of Reserve Infantry Regiments 130 and 67, the Engagement of Pintheville and Riaville ended in a disaster. Although LIR 36 succeeded after heavy fighting in occupying the village of Pintheville, by evening neither LIR 17 attacking Riaville nor I./RIR 130 deployed to cover the northern flank had made any significant progress. Thus LIR 36, which had penetrated wedge-like into the French position, found itself exposed to massive fire from all sides and the danger of encirclement. There was nothing left to do but withdraw in the darkness. By about midnight, friendly positions had been reached again. LIR 36 alone had to mourn over 600 killed, wounded, and missing in this attack, including 20 dead officers. Most of the fallen rest today at the deutschen Kriegsgräberstätte Maizeray.
Combres Heights: Deployment of the 66. Reserve-Infanterie-Brigade (66th Reserve Infantry Brigade) in the First Battle of Flanders
In those days in Belgian Flanders, on the northern flank of the German army front, the provisional last attempt to resume the war of movement failed. On October 9, 1914, the fortress of Antwerp had fallen. The O.H.L. decided to advance westward between Nieuwpoort and Ieper (Ypres) with the freed-up troops and four hurriedly formed reserve corps. The British Expeditionary Force was to be cut off from its supply ports and the entire enemy front rolled up to the south. The “First Battle of Flanders”, begun in mid-October 1914 and also called the “Battle of the Yser” or “First Battle of Ypres”, remained unsuccessful for the Germans. No appreciable territorial gains could be made. Regiment after regiment was sent into battle. On both sides, in just over four weeks, previously unimaginable losses of more than 250,000 men occurred.
The regiments deployed north of the town of Langemarck were no longer combat-capable. To a significant extent, they had consisted of wartime volunteers who had nothing to oppose the experienced British professional soldiers. In order to be able to withstand feared counterattacks, units with greater combat experience were hurriedly brought up from other front sectors. Thus it happened that on November 13, 1914, the Reserve Infantry Regiments 67 and 130 (67th and 130th Reserve Infantry Regiments) deployed in the area of the Combres Heights (66. Reserve-Infanterie-Brigade (66th Reserve Infantry Brigade)) received the order for employment “elsewhere”. On the very same day, without knowing where the journey was headed, they were transported from the large supply railway station of Conflans to Belgian Flanders.
The gap in the operations on the Maas-Höhen created by the sudden departure of the 66. Reserve-Infanterie-Brigade had to be filled. Deployed with the “Brigade Albrecht”, later the 94. Reserve-Infanterie-Brigade (94th Reserve Infantry Brigade) (inter alia RIR 219 and 220), was once again a unit that had been formed only after the outbreak of war and possessed no combat experience whatsoever, indeed not even complete infantry equipment. Only shortly before, it had left the Heuberg military training area and had been transferred to the Woëvre Plain as a reserve of Armee-Abteilung Strantz in order to acquire its field service capability there. That it was capable of field service despite its short training time was proven by it on the Combres Heights.
Regarding this deployment, interesting documents of the RIR 219 (219th Reserve Infantry Regiment) can be found in the Federal Archives in Freiburg, Military Archives Department, including combat sketches, a diary-like memoir of the Vizefeldwebels (staff sergeant) of the 8th Company Carl Scheinemann (PH 10 II/226) and an essay produced at the end of the 1920s entitled “Geschichte des Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments 219 von der Gründung bis zu seinem Ausrücken in Feindesland” (PH 10 II/227). Even though the deployment of the RIR 219 lasted only a good week, it offers rare first-hand impressions of the beginning battles on the Combres Heights in the fall of 1914.
Described above all are the adverse circumstances the troops faced due to the cold, wet weather, inadequate equipment, lack of experience in trench warfare, and the French artillery, which was clearly superior in the initial phase of the war. During the first major engagement—a French infantry attack on November 19, 1914, directed against the I. Bataillon (1st Battalion) deployed on the ridge of the Combres Heights (later Combres-East)—the position could be held in heavy combat. On November 24, 1914, the position was handed back to the troops of the 66. Reserve-Infanterie-Brigade (66th Reserve Infantry Brigade) returning from northern France. The RIR 219 had to lament losses of 18 dead and 52 wounded during its brief deployment on the Meuse Heights. It was relieved by the Königlich-Bayerische 8. Infanterie-Regiment (8th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) and transported to the Eastern theater of war as part of the later 94. Reserve-Infanterie-Brigade (94th Reserve Infantry Brigade).
Combres Heights – heavy fighting in the winter of 1914/1915
In view of the surprising German withdrawal from the Battle of the Marne, the French army leadership felt encouraged to go on the offensive themselves. Already starting in October 1914, attacks were planned from the Vosges to Arras, including east of Verdun and in the area of the St. Mihiel salient. In doing so, they overestimated their own capabilities. In view of the German offensives in northern France resumed in mid-November 1914 and the need to deploy larger troop contingents along the front for defense and the formation of reserves, they ultimately had to restrict themselves to localized individual operations. The persistently bad weather also had an inhibitory effect on the planned operations.
Offensive operations were begun on various fronts from mid-December 1914. In the Champagne sector, between the villages of Souain and Massiges, the French opened the so-called “Winter Battle in Champagne” against the 3rd German Army. On the part of the Obersten Heeresleitung, the shift of the operational focus to the Eastern Front had been ordered to defeat the Russians and thus end the two-front war. The French High Command saw in this and in the detected relocation of larger troop units the opportunity to achieve a decisive breakthrough by means of a frontal attack between Reims and the Argonne. Despite strong French superiority, only insignificant territorial gains could be achieved well into the spring of 1915.
In the St. Mihiel salient fighting took place on its southern flank, in the Bois le Prètre, Bois d’Ailly , Bois Brûlé and around the German bridgehead on the west bank of the Meuse near Chauvoncourt. Here it was the troops of the III. Bayerisches Armee-Korps (IIIrd Bavarian Army Corps), which were able not only to hold their positions but in places to achieve local gains. In the area of the Meuse Heights, just north of the road from St. Rémy to Vaux-lès-Palameix, parts of the 12th French Infantry Division attacked the Infanterie-Regiment 154 (154th Infantry Regiment) deployed there on December 26, 1914. The attack failed with heavy losses. The IR 154 held its position, which lasted until the spring battles of 1915 and subsequently became an important fallback position as the „Alte-Winter-Stellung“.
Until February 1915, no relevant combat operations took place on the Combres Heights. It remained limited to the continued artillery fire that constantly led to losses on both sides. Attention was devoted to position construction. On the German side, a continuous front trench was created incorporating the elevation in the center of the double ridge (Sector C) designated as the „Finger“. Likewise, a second defense line was established that extended across the entire ridge (Sector B) and the eastern slope (Sector A) down into the Woëvre Plain. It was intended to serve as security against enemy breakthrough attempts.
Especially on the French side, the expansion of saps toward the enemy positions was forced. In January 1915, reciprocal first mine detonations occurred in Sector B (ridge position). From individual saps, short galleries with explosive chambers were dug into the mountain. Explosives were filled into these and the enemy trench section located above, together with its garrison, was blown into the air.
In this initial phase of mine warfare, smaller charges of at most a few 100 kilograms of black powder, picric acid, dynamite, or other commercial explosives were used. These constantly harbored the danger of spontaneous combustion or a detonation by artillery fire. Only later did one move on to using security explosives known from mining, for example ammonal, donarit, or westphalite. The gallery and later tunnel system on Combres was steadily expanded. Over time, metric ton-scale explosive charges came into use. Details on the mine warfare on the Combres Heights can be found in the relevant specialist article.
At the beginning of February 1915, French artillery fire noticeably increased on the entire front of the V Corps. It concentrated over time on the northern part of the St. Mihiel salient, on approach roads, railway lines, artillery positions, camp areas, and the localities, later then explicitly on the positions of the 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division) in the area of the Combres Heights.
In coordination with the General Command of the French forces under Marshal Joseph (Jacques Césaire) Joffre, the commander of the 1st French Army, General Pierre Auguste Roques, had ordered an attack on the Combres Heights in mid-January 1915. To be used as part of the 12. Infanterie-Division (12th Infantry Division) should be the 24th Infantry Brigade, consisting of Infantry Regiments 106 and 132. Pioneers of the 6th French Génie Regiment were assigned to the attacking troops, which were supposed to blast breaches into their own and German barbed wire obstacles and carry out mine attacks.
It was planned to take the German defenses by surprise through several mine explosions and heavy artillery fire. Subsequently, the attack was to begin on the northwestern elevation, called “Crète des Éparges” by the French. The French called the strategically important position “Point A”. Among the Germans, it was called the “Finger” due to the shape of the trench system.
Parallel attacks were planned along the entire front, including on the southern flank of the St. Mihiel Salient between Bois de la Sonnard and Bois le Prêtre. The goal was to prevent the enemy from shifting troops and later to cut off the entire salient between Verdun and Pont-à-Mousson through concentric attacks from the north and south.
On the morning of February 17, 1915, an Ash Wednesday, deceptive calm prevailed on the Combres Heights and in the adjacent sectors. The trenches were only thinly manned. In the Finger position was a platoon of the 6th Company of the 8th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment (8. Königlich-Bayerisches Infanterie-Regiment). The remaining platoons were on standby near the saddle between sectors B (Combres-East) and C (Combres-West). The soldiers longed for the relief by the Infantry Regiment 130 (130th Infantry Regiment) scheduled for the evening. They had no inkling of what the coming hours and days would bring.
At 15:00 German time, four underground mines suddenly detonated at the tip of the “Finger”. These had been placed unnoticed by French pioneers out of saps into galleries near the German position. The force of the explosions led to the destruction of the affected parts of the position and to the burial of the soldiers deployed there.
The mine explosions were immediately followed by concentrated artillery fire of an intensity hitherto unknown. This lasted for about an hour. Most of the soldiers in the Finger position who had not already perished in the previous mine explosions met their death here.
At 16:00, the French infantry attack began. Elements of the French 106th Infantry Regiment (106e RI) stormed up the mountain through saps 4 to 7, occupied the resulting mine craters, and subsequently the majority of the Finger position. No resistance stirred on the German side anymore. About 20 surviving Bavarian soldiers, most of them wounded and apathetic, were captured. Further east, in sector B, the French 132nd Infantry Regiment (132e RI) had stormed forward from positions at the edge of the Bois des Éparges toward the German trenches on the crest of the Combres Heights. The attack failed with heavy losses, mainly due to poor artillery preparation. The position could be held by the elements of K.B. IR 8 deployed there.
Both sides now covered the mountain and the surrounding terrain with heavy artillery fire. The German reserves were alerted in their village quarters and immediately set on the march. The Combres Heights were completely shrouded in fumes, smoke, and dust. For the soldiers advancing from the Woëvre plain, it was only vaguely discernible. The surroundings were filled with a deep rumbling. The ground vibrated. In the sky, the trajectories of the heavy German caliber projectiles could be traced. Individual shell explosions could no longer be heard due to the high frequency of the firings.
Until the evening of February 17, 1915, the forces in Friauville, Labeuville, Dompierre and neighboring locations—specifically Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 130 (130th Reserve Infantry Regiment)—reached the village situated at the foot of the Meuse heights, Hannonville-s.l.-Côtes. The regiment was placed directly under Bavarian command. The situation was confusing. Further French attacks were to be feared for the night. Two battalions took up alarm quarters in the village, the other two were advanced to Herbeuville and Combres-sous-les-Côtes, and three companies were deployed directly on the slopes of “Kaiser-Wilhelm-Straße” (today D 113) as a reserve for II./K.B. IR 8 (2nd Battalion, 8th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment), which was hard-pressed in Sector C.
During the night, the artillery fire subsided. The French were in a position to organize the defense in the Finger-Stellung. On the morning of February 18, 1915, the artillery bombardment started anew and reached the strength of the previous day around noon. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. In the afternoon, parts of RIR 130 moved into the combat position of Sector C to support the Bavarians. In the evening, the first serious attempt to recapture the lost Finger-Stellung took place. In the heavy defensive fire of the French, it was only possible to reoccupy a short stretch of each of the two main trenches running west and to barricade oneself there. On the following days, all further attempts failed.
During a surprise French assault on February 20, 1915, the entire Kamm-Stellung in Sector B, including the later „Point X“`, had been lost. The attackers, including parts of the French 67th and 267th Infantry Regiments (67e RI, 267e RI) that had been brought up unnoticed, had overrun the parts of the 1st Battalion of RIR 130 deployed there, which were significantly inferior in numbers, and stood unmolested and to their own surprise on the southern slopes of the Combres Heights overlooking the plain. However, they were unable to exploit this unexpected success any further. By deploying all forces held back until then and parts of neighboring regiments, the majority of the German position was recaptured and held against further French attacks.
In the afternoon of February 20, 1915, the fighting subsided. The German outposts in Sectors B and C were covered all over with severely wounded and dead from both sides. Individual recovery attempts failed. They were prevented by immediately commencing French artillery and machine gun fire.
Most of the injured were able to reach the few remaining intact dugouts on the southern slope of the Combres Heights. Others had made it into the overcrowded cellars of the village of Combres-sous-les-Côtes, which had in the meantime been completely shattered. Here, medical captains and medics performed their work on friend and foe alike.
Around 22:00 German time, the relief of Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 130 by K.B. Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 4 (4th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) took place in the positions on the Combres Heights. In addition to the Bavarians, individual companies of Infanterie-Regiment 154 (154th Infantry Regiment), which had been brought up as a reserve during the fighting, were already deployed there. The still operational remnants of RIR 130 took quarters in the village of Hannonville-sous-les-Côtes.
The regiment had lost a total of 866 men during the barely two-day combat phase, thus losing about a quarter of its original troop strength. Twelve officers were among the dead. The ammunition consumption in this short time added up to over 236,000 rounds for RIR 130 (130th Reserve Infantry Regiment) alone.
The relief was difficult due to the darkness and the largely leveled sections of the position. Only when daylight came could the units orient themselves to some extent. A gruesome sight presented itself. The entire battlefield, the shell craters, and the few remaining trench sections were completely filled with corpses and body parts of both sides.
In the early morning of February 21, 1915, several further French attacks took place in Sector B, primarily against trenches 2, 5, and 6a (see adjacent sketch). The objective was to capture and hold the entire ridge and in particular the tip of the Combres Heights later designated as “Point X”. The attacks failed. Due to the immediately resuming artillery fire of the French, the Bavarians suffered considerable losses due to a lack of cover.
In the following days, the infantry fighting and the mutual artillery bombardment ebbed. As reinforcement for the heavily decimated regiments of the 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division) starting on February 23, 1915, a mixed regiment was formed from parts of the 10. Infanterie-Division (10th Infantry Division) deployed in the Lamorville sector.
Combres Heights – Spring Battle between the Meuse and Moselle
The strategic importance of the Combres Heights as the northwestern cornerstone of the St. Mihiel Salient led to a massive intensification of combat operations in the spring of 1915. After the French advances in February 1915 had not achieved the hoped-for breakthrough, the French leadership planned a larger-scale operation for the month of March 1915. In addition to renewed attacks on the Combres Heights, the German positions in the easterly adjacent sectors of the Woëvre Plain were to be broken through, thus forcing the abandonment of the Combres Heights.
The German defense of the Combres Heights at this time continued to be the responsibility of the 33. Reserve-Division (RIR 130, RIR 67 (67th Reserve Infantry Regiment), KB IR 4 and 8 (8th Bavarian Infantry Regiment)). On March 18, 1915, the French attack began. Hours of drumfire set in on the German positions, followed by infantry attacks of the French 106th Infantry Regiment (106e RI) and 132nd Infantry Regiment (132e RI) as well as attached pioneer units. Although the French troops were able to temporarily penetrate into the foremost German trenches on the ridge of the heights (Sector B), they were thrown back by energetic German counterattacks. Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 130 alone recorded high losses with more than 80 dead during these closely contested attacks on the first two combat days.
In parallel, the French began their attacks in the Woëvre Plain. Just north of Marchéville, in the area of the so-called “Pflaumenwäldchen”, the opposing lines approached each other to within about 50 meters at this time. The German defenders had not failed to notice that there was bluish clay soil on the enemy parapet. Since this type of soil was only to be found at greater depth, they correctly suspected the driving of enemy mine galleries. In response to this threat, German pioneers immediately laid out counter-galleries and established a mine listening service. However, they did not succeed in locating the enemy work in time and cutting it off through their own explosions.
On March 18, 1915, starting at 16:00, a sudden French artillery fire began on the line Maizeray – Marchéville. Shortly after 18:00, two massive underground detonations made the earth tremble: The French had detonated two mines in order to blow up the German forward trench at the Pflaumenwäldchen along with its garrison. The plan failed because the French miners had miscalculated the length of the galleries. The charges exploded in no-man’s-land, buried parts of the French trench system, and threw up two mine craters of approx. 50 and 30 meters in diameter and 6 to 8 meters in depth. The French did succeed in storming a small part of the forward German trench. However, in an immediate counterattack of LIR 66 (66th Landwehr Infantry Regiment), they were thrown out again. The craters were occupied and incorporated into the German position as an advanced defense stronghold. In the subsequent heavy April battles (especially during the major attack on Easter 1915), these mine craters and the Pflaumenwäldchen were once again to represent one of the main points of French infantry attacks.
At the end of March 1915, the Supreme Army Command ordered the relief of the considerably decimated 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division) by elements of the 10. Infanterie-Division (10th Infantry Division). In addition, it was decided to form and transfer several new infantry divisions to the threatened sectors south of Verdun, including the 111. Infanterie-Division (111th Infantry Division) and 113. Infanterie-Division (113th Infantry Division). The Combres position remained tactically divided into four subsectors: Subsector A: the eastern slope of the ridge and the beginning of the positions in the Woëvre plain, Subsector B: the actual ridge northwest of the village, Subsector C: the positions further west of the village, including the fiercely contested “Finger”, and Subsector D: the so-called quarry position opposite the village of St. Remy. Starting on March 29, 1915, units of the 10. Infanterie-Division hastily moved into these sectors, specifically Grenadier-Regiment 6 (6th Grenadier Regiment) as well as Infanterie-Regimenter 47 (47th Infantry Regiment) and 50 (50th Infantry Regiment). Overall command of the Combres position was now held alternately by individual regimental commanders, including Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) Wallmüller (GrenR 6), Oberstleutnant von Fischer (IR 50) and later also Oberstleutnant von Kaisenberg (GrenR 7 (7th Grenadier Regiment)).
The extreme combat operations on the Combres ridge between the strategically decisive point X, along the ridge position in subsector B and the adjacent subsector C escalated again as early as April 5, 1915; this was Easter Monday of the year 1915. This phase of combat was later referred to as the “Osterschlacht” or Frühjahresschlacht zwischen Maas und Mosel. After enemy artillery fire had already noticeably increased in intensity on Easter Sunday, French drumfire began on April 5, 1915, which almost completely leveled the German front lines in subsectors B and C within a short time. At this time, defense was essentially undertaken by Infanterie-Regiment 47 and parts of Grenadier-Regiment 6. The shattered trenches no longer offered any protection; the soldiers were forced to hold out in unfinished, narrow galleries and shell craters until the end of the bombardment. When the artillery fire was shifted to the rear area towards afternoon, the French infantry attack broke loose. In subsector B, on the crest of the Combres height, dense waves stormed against the sparse remnants of IR 47, but were bloodily repulsed in bitter close combat with hand grenades, bayonets, and spades.
The situation became critical in the area of trench 9. The 10th and 11th companies of IR 47 deployed there had been so decimated by the artillery fire that the French assault troops succeeded in making a breakthrough. The situation became threatening because the French were able to establish themselves with a machine gun behind a sandbag barricade and fire into the flank of the neighboring defenders. Only through the intervention of one of the last reserve platoons of IR 47 was the breakthrough able to be sealed off and the position ultimately recaptured.
Subsector C, adjoining to the west, was also affected by the French attack. There, the staff of the I. Bataillon of IR 47 with the 2nd Company were on standby, as well as the 1st and 4th companies of Grenadier-Regiment 6 in the front line. The positions in the area of the “North Grove”, which had only been provisionally developed anyway, were completely destroyed by the hours of artillery fire. As a result, the French succeeded in storming the first German trench. The German immediate counterattacks, led among others by the 2nd Company of IR 47, developed here too into brutal man-to-man combat in the completely churned-up terrain. Ultimately, however, they were successful; the German line was able to be held in the counterattack.
In the transition to subsector B, the French succeeded in capturing trenches 15 and 18 against the hopelessly outnumbered 5th Company of GrenR 6. In the immediate counterattack, only parts of the position could be recaptured. The company commander, Hauptmann (captain) Firnhaber, and Leutnant (second lieutenant) Frenzel, one of the last remaining platoon leaders, were wounded. Hauptmann Firnhaber was carried back despite the prevailing chaos, but the more seriously wounded Leutnant Frenzel had to be left behind at a spot on the battlefield deemed safe, with the promise to retrieve him later. Despite intensive searches throughout the entire next day, he was no longer found. He likely succumbed to his injuries in the hours following the attack.
The loss of part of trench 15 was fatal for the German defenders, as the French were able to look from there into the entire southern slope of the Combres ridge and into the rear area with its local villages. Only through a carefully planned surprise attack at dawn on April 6, 1915, did the 3rd Company of IR 47 under Hauptmann Titze succeed in taking full possession of the entire position again. The area around trench 15 that towered over the German lines was named “Granathügel” following these battles.
When it became foreseeable that the capture of the Combres ridge would fail again despite minor territorial gains, the French leadership shifted the main weight of its attacks into the lower-lying Woëvre plain. There, starting from the Easter days of 1915 (April 5 to 11), heavy attacks on the villages of Marchéville and Maizeray occurred again. The French infantry regiments 6, 8, and 132 essentially deployed there collided in the swampy landscape crisscrossed by watercourses, fences, and hedges with the tenacious and well-prepared defense of the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division), in particular Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 36 (36th Landwehr Infantry Regiment). During the repeated assaults, the attackers suffered devastating losses, in some cases exceeding 100 men per company. German and French combat reports contain descriptions according to which the fallen lay piled several deep in front of the German lines.
From April 12, 1915, the fighting on the Combres Heights and in the Woëvre-Ebene subsided. During the unsuccessful attacks, the French had lost a large part of their tactical reserves for this sector, in addition to the frontline troops deployed. The Combres garrison and also the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division) had held their positions despite likewise noticeable losses.
Combres Heights: Fighting in the Spring of 1915 along the Grande Tranchée de Calonne
The past period of combat had shown that the French artillery positioned west of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne and especially near Mouilly had severely affected the flank of the Combres position. To eliminate this threat, the command of the Armee-Abteilung Strantz ordered a large-scale offensive on April 18, 1915. The goal was to destroy the French artillery positions and push the enemy lines on both sides of the Calonne trench as far north as possible. Parts of the 9. Infanterie-Division (9th Infantry Division) and the 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division), additionally parts of the newly formed 111. and 113. Infanterie-Division (111th and 113th Infantry Divisions) were deployed. The attack was ultimately set for April 24, 1915, at 12:20. Preparations for the attack were begun immediately. Accommodation and approach trenches were created, artillery positions were prepared, medical facilities and ammunition depots were established. Attack lanes were cut into the impenetrable forest terrain in front of the German assault departure position.
The order of battle on the day of the attack was as follows: On the Combres Heights stood the 10. Infanterie-Division (10th Infantry Division) (IR 47 [47th Infantry Regiment], 50 [50th Infantry Regiment], GR 6 [6th Grenadier Regiment]), with the mission to hold the positions at all costs. East of the Tranchée de Calonne lay the sector of the 111. Infanterie-Division with Füs.-Regt. 73 (73rd Fusilier Regiment), IR 76 (76th Infantry Regiment) and IR 164 (164th Infantry Regiment), west of the road that of the 9. Infanterie-Division with IR 19 (19th Infantry Regiment), IR 154 (154th Infantry Regiment) and Grenadier-Regt. 7 (7th Grenadier Regiment). Adjoining to the south, in the Ranzières forest, was the 33. Reserve-Division with RIR 67 (67th Reserve Infantry Regiment) as well as the KB IR 4 and 8 (4th and 8th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiments). In the rear Herbeuville sector stood the remnants of the RIR 130 (130th Reserve Infantry Regiment). The 113. Infanterie-Division (RIR 32 [32nd Reserve Infantry Regiment], FüsR 36 [36th Fusilier Regiment], IR 48 [48th Infantry Regiment]) formed the corps reserve.
After a 20-minute fire raid, the assault columns broke forward and overran the enemy main position on the first attempt. The II. Battalion of the IR 76 pushed hard east of the Grande Tranchée de Calonne to the St-Rémy – Mouilly road and captured several French guns at Hill 381, near the Mouilly cross. The IR 164 fought its way through the Schirmer gorge and stood on the Côte Senoux around 13:15. Several French artillery positions were rendered harmless here as well. Further west, the 9th and 10th companies of the IR 19 took the heavily developed strongpoint “Schnecke” and climbed the Loclont-Höhe. The III. Battalion of the IR 154 under Major Schirmer also advanced beyond the St. Rémy – Mouilly road onto the Côte de Senoux. However, due to a lack of connection with neighboring units, it had to fall back to the ordered attack objective, the southern slope of the Loclont gorge.
On the other side of the attack strip, on its eastern flank, the III. Battalion of the RIR 130 received the order at around 16:00, starting from the Herbeuville position, to capture French earthworks above St. Rémy. At around 16:40, after brief artillery preparation, the 11th Company stormed through the Ravin des Feuilles, later the “Kaisenberg-Tal”, onto the Côte de Sât, later the “Granatrücken”, and captured several French strongpoints there as ordered.
By the evening of April 24, 1915, the attack from east to west had reached the line of the Côte de Sât ridge northwest of St. Rémy – Mouilly-Kreuz – Hill 381 – southern slope of the Loclont gorge. 20 officers and around 1,600 men as prisoners, a total of 17 guns and several machine guns were the yield. On the following day, April 25, 1915, the attack east of the Tranchée de Calonne was continued. A battalion of the FüsR 73 carried out the main thrust against the “Rote Wäldchen” and Hill 340, the III. Battalion of the RIR 130 with the 9th and 10th companies supported frontally from the depression of the St. Rémy – Mouilly road. Hill 340 was taken around 16:00. The two company commanders, the Oberleutnants d.R. (first lieutenant) Raestrup and Corbach, decided to push on immediately through the valley of the Genousevaux stream, later the “Granaten-Tal”, to the southern Hummerschere. By evening, parts of the assault troops had even reached the northern Hummerschere. By April 25, 1915, another 2,200 prisoners had been taken and 5 additional guns as well as a large number of machine guns brought in.
The advance of April 24 and 25, 1915, had carried the German troops deep into the enemy position system. With the onset of darkness, the downside of this rapid advance became apparent. Neither supplies nor rations reached the troops. In the confusing forest terrain unknown to the attackers, the fighting turned into a chaotic struggle man against man. The units had become heavily mixed up. Operational command or coordinated action was not possible. Individual squads, mostly only a few soldiers, had to defend themselves on their own in the captured enemy trenches and shell craters under constant enemy artillery and machine gun fire.
An attempt to resume the offensive took place on the morning of April 26, 1915. The II. Battalion of the IR 36, supported by parts of the RIR 130, was to storm the tip of the northern Hummerschere. The attack failed bloodily in the concentrated fire of enemy artillery and machine guns. On April 27, 1915, the attack was called off in view of heavy losses and the holding of the achieved positions was ordered. On April 28, 1915, after the end of the attack phase, the deployed units were pulled out of the front line and reorganized. The front positions were taken over by the Bavarian regiments 4 and 8 (33. Reserve-Division) as well as parts of the 113. Infanterie-Division (FüsR 36, IR 48).
The German command was not willing to accept the unclear front line, which led to constant losses. Since a tactical withdrawal was out of the question, a renewed attack was ordered. On May 4 and 5, 1915, the frontline troops advanced for another assault without artillery preparation. The goal was the surprise and complete capture of the northern Hummerschere as well as the forward relocation of their own positions at least up to Hill 353 west of the village of Les Éparges. The advance turned into a disaster. Based on a corresponding false report and the erroneous assumption that the Côte de Senoux was firmly in German hands further to the west, the companies of the I.R. 48 ran against completely intact wire entanglements. From the flank, the attacking troops came under devastating infantry and machine gun fire. Complicating matters was a sudden change in the weather. Toward afternoon, a severe thunderstorm with unusually large hailstones discharged over the battlefield. The clayey forest soil softened within minutes, and the hastily constructed cover holes and trenches immediately filled with water. Every movement became an ordeal for the completely soaked soldiers. The attack bogged down, the attacking units suffered high losses and had to retreat to their departure positions in the evening.
For the 9. Infanterie-Division stationed further west, the attack also remained unsuccessful. Due to too tightly budgeted preparation time and lack of artillery effect, the IR 154 alone lost 21 officers and 867 men during its frontal attack from the Loclont position onto the unexpectedly strongly defended Côte de Senoux (7 officers and 138 men dead, 1 officer and 147 men missing).
A final attempt to capture the northern Hummerschere was undertaken on May 8, 1915, by the 33. Reserve-Division with the regiments KB IR 4 and KB IR 8 as well as the remnants of the RIR 130 in reserve. Despite five hours of artillery preparatory fire, the assault bogged down around 11:00 in front of fully manned and largely undamaged French trenches and machine gun nests. Even bringing up the RIR 130 as reinforcement could no longer get the attack moving.
In mid-May 1915, General der Infanterie (lieutenant general) Otto von Below took over the V. Armeekorps; the 9. Infanterie-Division passed to Generalleutnant (major general) Nöldecken. The 111. and 113. Infanterie-Division were withdrawn from the Meuse heights, the 33. Reserve-Division took over the sector from the Tranchée des Hautes Ornières to Spada with the Ritter (Chevaliers) Forest, the Seuzey and field position as well as the Lamorville position; the RIR 130 stood on the right wing of the 66th Reserve Brigade. In the sector of the 9. Infanterie-Division, the enemy went over to the counterattack on June 20, 1915. His main pressure was directed against the Grenadier-Regiment 7 and the adjoining IR 19 to the left; at the front of the 3rd Company / GR 7, which was only 30 meters away, he broke into the first and second trenches. The Unteroffiziere (corporal) Maiwald and Stellmacher (2./GR 7) contained the rolling-up attack at the latrine trench. On the night of June 21, the II. and Fusilier battalions of the GR 7 threw back the intruders; on the morning of June 22, an assault detachment attack captured the entire reserve position at 3:00. Until June 26, the fusiliers fought with flamethrower support for the last 250 meters; only 40 meters could be won back. The losses of the GR 7 from June 20 to 26 amounted to 29 officers and over 1,000 Unteroffiziere and men. On July 17, the IR 154 — after the relief of the GR 7 — undertook an advance to capture the remainder of the Hummerschere, which remained unsuccessful.
With the second half of the year, the front solidified. In the Ritter (Chevaliers) Forest, where German and French lines had met at distances of 30 to 100 meters after the 1914 Marne retreat, along the Tranchée de Calonne and the Tranchée des Hautes Ornières — the two connecting roads to the plateau of Dommartin la Montagne — developed the typical close combat of trench warfare around the “Kaiser-Wilhelms-Ecke”, the “Larisch-Ecke” and the crossing over the Ornière road, with sap fighting, sandbag barricades at a 30-meter distance, mine galleries and trench mortar deployment. At the RIR 130, the patrol leaders Unteroffizier Jochum (10th Co.), Serafin (4th Co., later Iron Cross 1st Class), Gefreiter (private first class) Lübeck (10th Co.) and Musketier Kujanek (13th Co.) distinguished themselves. The German troops pushed the gallery construction to five to seven, later six to eight meters of depth; in Seuzey, an underground gallery underpass about 600 meters long with light shafts and ventilators was created as early as the summer of 1915 — one of the first facilities of its kind on the Western Front. At the IR 19, after the June battles, construction of the “Schneidergraben” as a second line began, the GR 7 systematically expanded the Loclont position for defense in depth. In September 1915, enemy artillery fire rose at times to 1,000 rounds daily in the 19th Regiment sector — a deception measure for the German Autumn Battle in Champagne. From October 6 to November 10, the GR 7 was temporarily transferred to Champagne; the IR 19 took over two companies of the Bouchot sector. By the end of 1915, the front between the Tranchée de Calonne, Loclont, Hummerschere and Chevaliers-Wald had solidified into a position staggered several kilometers deep with brick-lined trenches, networked gallery systems and multiple wire lines — the framework in which trench warfare was to be conducted until the American attack in September 1918.
When pincer attacks and counteroffensives finally bogged down on all flanks in late spring, above-ground combat gave way to brutal mine warfare during the summer months. The entire ridge from Point X to Point C was completely transformed into a crater landscape through systematic detonations and continuous artillery fire. Pioneers on both sides drove galleries under enemy lines and detonated massive explosive charges of dynamite or westphalite weighing up to 300 hundredweight, which tore craters over 20 meters in diameter into the limestone.
In shattered woods like the Ritterwald (Bois des Chevaliers) and on the Hummerschere, this war of attrition was also waged with a steadily refined arsenal of close-combat weapons. At distances of 30 to 100 meters, troops pelted each other with novel ball, disk, egg, and stick hand grenades. Heavy Minenwerfer (trench mortars) hurled 210-pound shells into enemy trenches. How relentless trench warfare remained in this shattered terrain was demonstrated once more from July 16 to 20 on the northern Hummerschere. Here, German Infanterie-Regiment 47 (47th Infantry Regiment) and the II. Bataillon of RIR 130 (130th Reserve Infantry Regiment) fought in bitter close combat from sap to sap against French Regiments 87, 118, and 220 (87e, 118e, and 220e RI). Although German troops were able to take 300 prisoners, no significant gain of terrain resulted. Fighting in this manageable combat sector cost RIR 130 another 437 casualties. By early autumn 1915, entrenched trench warfare had manifested itself at Combres Heights and neighboring sectors.
On November 2, 1916, Hanoverian Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 73 (73rd Reserve Infantry Regiment) of the 39th Reserve Infantry Brigade (19. Reserve-Division (19th Reserve Division), Armee-Abteilung Strantz) relieved Bavarian Infanterie-Regiment 25 (25th Infantry Regiment) in the right regimental sector. The right neighbor was IR 48 (48th Infantry Regiment) of the same division. The stability of the position, torn apart by mine warfare, was ensured by a tunnel nearly two kilometers long, driven twenty to twenty-five meters beneath the ridge, complete with its own power plant. Regimental staff and battalion reserve were located in St. Maurice-sous-les-Côtes, while the command post of commander Oberst von Graevenitz was situated on the slope near Herbeuville.
In early January 1917, pioneers reported that a French mine gallery had been driven underneath Granathügel and loaded with 350 hundredweight of explosives. German Vizefeldwebel who had returned from French captivity also announced a major attack in the corps sector for January 5. The friendly counter-gallery was prepared for a defensive detonation; after the expected attack failed to materialize, the undertaking turned into an independent operation. Artillery preparation was dispensed with in favor of surprise. As Stosstrupps (assault detachments), volunteers from the I. and II. Battalions under Leutnants Jaster (2nd Company) and Gabler (8th Company) were deployed, along with twenty reserve pioneers; a company of the III. Battalion stood ready as support. At St. Maurice, breakthrough terrain was replicated to scale in a practice facility.
On January 16, 1917, at 17:40, the detonation took place. Stosstrupps penetrated the enemy trench, overpowered posts and dugout garrisons, and returned to the German position with twelve prisoners, a machine gun, and an automatic rifle; their own casualties were five slightly wounded. The resulting crater—henceforth “Graevenitztrichter”—lay beyond the enemy trench and granted the enemy better observation of the German rear area from its high rim than before; permanent occupation did not take place. The official army report of January 16 mentioned the operation under “Army Group Crown Prince”.
In the following weeks, fighting at the crater rim did not cease. Patrols under Unteroffizier Brzezinski and Musketier Ulrich (January 24), Gefreiter Kogge and Block (January 26), as well as Offizier-Stellvertreter Perlick (February 1) brought in further prisoners and booty; the army report of January 27 mentioned the regiment by name. On January 19, Oberst von Graevenitz unexpectedly suffered a stroke. Major Hahn took over regimental command a few days later. On February 17, 1917, Grenadier-Regiment 7 (7th Grenadier Regiment) of the 9. Infanterie-Division (9th Infantry Division) relieved RIR 73 in the Combres Position.
Combres Heights – les Éparges – Today
Excursion: Fähnrich (officer cadet) Walter Roy, 3./IR 76 – “Be proud: I carry the flag!”
“Von Langenau is writing a letter, completely lost in thought. Slowly, he paints with large, serious, upright letters:
“My good mother,
be proud: I carry the flag,
be without worry: I carry the flag,
love me: I carry the flag.”
Then he tucks the letter into his tunic, in the most secret place, next to the rose petal. And thinks: it will soon smell of it. And thinks: Perhaps someone will find it one day… And thinks: …, for the enemy is close.”
“Lost in his thoughts, von Langenau writes a letter. Slowly, he paints with large, serious, and upright letters:
“My good mother,
be proud: I carry the flag,
be without worry: I carry the flag,
love me: I carry the flag.”
Then he buries the letter in his doublet, in the most secret place, next to the rose petal. And he thinks. It will soon be scented with it. And he thinks: perhaps one day someone will find it… And he thinks – …, for the enemy is close.”
from: Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926), “The Lay of the Love and Death of Cornet Christopher Rilke“, 1899
de: Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926), “The Song of Love and Death of Cornet Christoph Rilke“, 1899
Before the assault on April 24, 1915.
My beloved ones!
Hopefully no faithful comrade will need to send you this letter, for it is a farewell letter.
Should you hold it in your hands, then know this: I have fallen for my Emperor, for my Fatherland, and for all of you.
A difficult battle now calls, and it is a bright, alluring spring.
I have nothing further to tell you, for I have had no secrets.
And how I thank you for all the good you three have done me in life, how I thank you all for the sunshine and the happiness in which I lived, you know.
Joyful, grateful, and happy I shall die, if it must be! Yet this shall still be a greeting of the holiest love for you all and for all who loved me. I carry this last greeting with me until the last moment.
Then let it be sent to you by faithful comrades and my spirit will be with you.
May the gracious, great God guard and bless you and my German Fatherland!
In deep love, your faithful Walter.
Before the attack of April 24, 1915.
You, my dears!
I hope no faithful comrade will need to send you this letter, for it is a farewell letter.
If you hold it in your hands, you will know that I am dead: I have fallen for my emperor, for my homeland, and for all of you.
There is now a difficult battle to fight, and it is a bright and inviting spring.
Furthermore, I have nothing else to tell you, for I have had no secrets.
As I thank you for the good you have all three done me in life, as I thank you all, you know, for the sunshine and the happiness in which
I lived.
Then I will die joyful, grateful, and happy, if need be! But may this still be a greeting of the holiest love for you all and for all those who loved me. Thus, I will carry this last greeting upon me until the last moment.
Therefore, may it be sent to you by faithful companions and my spirit will be with you.
May the great God of mercy keep and bless you and my German homeland!
With all my love, your faithful Walter.
Farewell letter of the Fähnrichs Walter Roy, 3./IR 76, born June 1, 1894, in Hamburg, killed April 24, 1915, near Les Éparges, France
Farewell letter of the Fähnrichs Walter Roy, 3./IR 76, born June 1, 1894, in Hamburg, killed April 24, 1915, near Les Éparges, France
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).