between the Meuse and Moselle – Woëvre Plain –
Operations of the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division)
By order of Armee-Abteilung Strantz (Army Detachment Strantz), a new division was created in October 1914 from parts of the 14th and 30th Landwehr Infantry Brigades. Both formations belonged to the garrison of the fortress city of Metz. After its commander, Generalleutnant (major general) Adolf von Waldow, until that time commander of the 30th Landwehr Infantry Brigade, the new major formation was designated as “Landwehr-Division von Waldow”. It later evolved into the 5. Landwehr-Division.
The division was tasked with securing the connection of the 5. Armee (Fifth Army) to Armee-Abteilung Strantz in the Woëvre Plain between the Meuse and Moselle rivers. The adjacent division order of October 23, 1914, assigned its initial tasks more concretely, which it had to fulfill starting October 25, 1914.
The first noteworthy combat occurred a short time later. Division commander von Waldow was asked to a meeting on November 12, 1914, by the commander of the V. Preußisches Armeekorps (V Prussian Army Corps), General Adolf von Oven. The background was the intention to induce the French, through a concentrated advance, to withdraw their artillery further back, which until then had operated with heavy casualties against the quarters and supply lines of the V. Armeekorps (V Army Corps).
Fighting in November 1914 – Pintheville, Riaville
At noon on November 12, 1914, after a brief artillery preparation, units of the 14. Landwehr-Brigade (14th Landwehr Brigade) with the support of two battalions of the 33. Reserve-Division (33rd Reserve Division) were to storm the villages of Pintheville and Riaville from the positions west of Pareid, Maizeray, and Marchéville. The attack ended in a disaster. Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 36 (36th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) was indeed able to take the village of Pintheville. However, the unit came under heavy flanking fire because all other units had made only negligible progress. By evening, all units had to withdraw back to their starting positions. The 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division) suffered more than 500 casualties in this attack, most of them in Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 36, which had to be temporarily withdrawn from the front.
On November 26, 1914, Generalleutnant Carl Auler was appointed commander of the 5. Landwehr-Infanterie-Division (5th Landwehr Infantry Division). Generalleutnant von Waldow resumed command of the 30. Infanterie-Brigade (30th Infantry Brigade). By decree of the Ministry of War dated January 13, 1915, the 5. Landwehr-Division was raised to a regular, mobile, and independent division.
Until February 1915, it remained relatively quiet in the division’s front sector. The troops set about expanding their positions. The increasingly heavy fighting in the area of the Combres Heights (Les Eparges) was also felt in the division’s sector through frequent artillery raids.
Fighting in March 1915 – Marchéville-en-Woëvre
In March 1915, localized yet very heavy French attacks took place. These affected primarily the sector of the Combres Heights (Les Eparges), but also the front sectors of the 14. Landwehr-Brigade (14th Landwehr Brigade) adjoining to the east. North of Marchéville-en-Woëvre, near the area of the so-called Pflaumenwäldchen, the French had dug mine galleries toward the German position, from which they detonated two mines on the evening of March 18, 1915. Although the Germans had recognized this danger, they were not in a position to prevent the detonations by means of artillery or countermines. However, the French had miscalculated the length of their galleries, so that the explosions created two craters just in front of the German trenches, measuring about 30 and 50 meters wide and about ten meters deep. No significant casualties occurred; there were merely cave-ins of parts of the front trench.
Oberst (colonel) Hedicke, commander of the Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 66 (66th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) deployed there, reacted with presence of mind and ordered the immediate occupation of both craters. Immediately after the explosions, the French 166th Infantry Regiment (166e RI) stormed out of its trenches with the objective of capturing the village of Marchéville. Several French attacks could be repulsed and the position held. Although the French had penetrated into part of the German trenches, they were thrown out again by means of counterattacks. The Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 66 suffered about 50 dead and 110 wounded in these fights. The French casualties were a multiple of that.
April 1915 – Spring Battle between the Meuse and the Moselle
The month of April 1915 brought heavy fighting for the entire front sector southeast of Verdun. These went down in history as the “Easter Battle” or the “Spring Battle between the Meuse and the Moselle”. The French had intended, with the First French Army under General Auguste Dubail through a pincer-like advance with a main effort in the south near the village of Flirey (Bois Mort-Mare) as well as in the north in the area of the Combres Heights (Les Eparges), to pinch off the entire St. Mihiel salient. The goal was to destroy the German units stationed in the salient, then advance eastward in the direction of Metz and in this way get into the rear of the German troops stationed before Verdun.
The main French attack began on Easter Monday, April 5, 1915. Following massive drumfire originating from Pintheville, it was directed against the Maizeray – Pareid line. In addition, the French stormed out of their positions at Gussainville against the 25. Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment (25th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) south of Buzy. The softened ground had made the construction of defensive positions difficult, but it now caused trouble for the attackers, who made only slow progress in the swampy ground and presented easy targets for the defenders. At all points of the front, the French attack efforts were repulsed. In the following days, the French repeated their attacks again and again against the positions of the division and also in the area of the Combres Heights (Les Eparges). Nowhere, however, were they able to achieve lasting successes.
Ever-new regiments were deployed. The losses on the French side were immense. Fellow combatants described that in the Marchéville – Maizeray area, the ground in front of the German positions was covered with multiple layers of fallen French soldiers on top of one another. The attacks lasted until April 12, 1915, and only slowly subsided thereafter. The 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division) was able to hold its positions.
Until the Battle of Verdun – Construction of Positions
The second half of 1915 passed for the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division) without any noteworthy combat actions. During the engagements in April 1915, the French had lost a large part of their tactical reserves for this sector. On the German side, troop reorganizations took place. In addition, the time was used to adapt the trench system to the changed requirements of trench warfare. A single defensive position became three deeply echeloned lines, which in turn were subdivided into several sectors. The trench walls were elaborately revetted with fascines and the trenches were provided with drainage systems to master the high groundwater. Many concrete dugouts were also constructed. Thus, a system of positions was created that made a French breakthrough in this sector appear impossible.
At the end of December 1915, the coming Battle of Verdun cast its shadow ahead. The division command was confidentially informed by the Armee-Abteilung Strantz that the fortress of Verdun would be attacked in February 1916. The fortification work, which had been purely defensive up to that point, underwent a change, as assault staging positions had to be created for the assault troops at short notice. The 5. Armee (Fifth Army), which was to conduct the attack on Verdun, also planned an active course of action for the sector of the 5. Landwehr-Division located at the southern edge of the planned attack front. Thus, auxiliary forces for the construction of positions were assigned to the troops, which also included Russian prisoners of war. The strength of the individual battalions was temporarily reduced to approx. 900 men in order to reinforce the working parties by means of the freed-up forces. Although the damp weather, the softened clay soil, and the high groundwater massively complicated the work, it was possible to complete the intended assault staging positions by the originally planned attack date of February 12, 1916. Due to the unfavorable weather, however, the attack then had to be postponed several times.
Fighting from February 1916 – Manheulles, Fresnes-en-Woëvre
The attack on the Verdun fortress area began on February 21, 1916, with artillery preparatory fire from more than 1,200 guns and mortars. After about nine hours of bombardment, the German assault troops left their trenches around 17:00. They quickly succeeded in gaining ground. As early as the third day of the attack, the villages of Haumont, Azannes, Romagne-sous-les-Côtes, Beaumont-en-Verdunois, and Samogneux, among others, were in German hands. On February 25, 1916, Fort de Douaumont fell. This caused panic among the French and led to considerations of abandoning the entire eastern bank of the Meuse. This did not happen, as the French leadership intervened rigorously and threatened executions for any retreating officer.
Initially, the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division) was to wait for developments in the more northern combat sectors. On February 25, 1916, the time had come. In the area of the 25. Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment (25th Landwehr Infantry Regiment), it became apparent that the French had abandoned their forward positions. The German units cautiously advanced and occupied the villages of Gussainville and Hennemont cleared by the French throughout the day. On the afternoon of February 26, 1916, the order was issued to capture the village of Ville-en-Woëvre, which the French still occupied. The village was captured in heavy street fighting. After Château d’Hannoncelles had been occupied to the south by units of the 65. Landwehr-Regiment (65th Landwehr Regiment), as well as the area around Château d’Aulnois still held by the French, a line emerged in the northern sector of the 5. Landwehr-Division from Braquis via Ville-en-Woëvre, Château d’Hannocelles to Château d’Aulnois.
Since the regimental leadership expected greater successes from this rapid advance, the continuation of the attack was ordered. Still on the afternoon of February 26, 1916, an attack on the village of Manheulles started from Ville-en-Woëvre. Unlike the previously captured villages, however, Manheulles had not been abandoned by the French, but was massively fortified and prepared for defense.
The German attack stalled about 800 meters outside the edge of the village of Manheulles in French machine gun and artillery fire. Although the resumption of the attack was attempted several times into February 27, 1916, the German assault troops had to be withdrawn to their starting positions on the afternoon of that day due to a lack of reinforcements and heavy casualties.
Still on February 27, 1916, the 30. Landwehr-Brigade (30th Landwehr Brigade) with the associated 25. Landwehr-Regiment was subordinated to the 3. Bayerische Ersatz-Division (3rd Bavarian Ersatz Division), which had arrived as reinforcement. On February 28, 1916, a concentrated attack was to take place. In the afternoon, the assault on the village of Manheulles was renewed after a one-hour artillery fire. This time, penetration into the village succeeded, and the French abandoned their positions in flight. About 350 prisoners fell into German hands, as well as vast amounts of weapons, rations, and other materials. Under heavy artillery fire, the German troops prepared for the defense of the village, suffering heavy casualties. The French were not willing to give up Manheulles without a fight. In the evening, a strong French counterattack was repulsed, and the predominantly destroyed Manheulles was ultimately held with difficulty.
The attack order of the 5. Armee (Fifth Army) also affected the southern operational sector of the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division). Following the transfer of the 30. Landwehr-Brigade (30th Landwehr Brigade), the Fresnes – Champlon attack sector (today Saulx-lès-Champlon) had remained under the command of the division. The 14. Landwehr-Brigade (14th Landwehr Brigade) was deployed there. Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 66 (66th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) was to attack Champlon, while Fresnes-en-Woëvre was assigned to Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 36 (36th Landwehr Infantry Regiment). On February 25 and 26, 1916, the French trenches abandoned in this sector west of Riaville, Pintheville, and Marchéville were occupied. The attack on Fresnes began from these positions on the afternoon of February 28, 1916.
In contrast to the assault on the village of Champlon, which had been captured before the specified attack time of 15:00, the advance on Fresnes-en-Woëvre proved more difficult. The village was surrounded by wire entanglements up to 100 meters deep, crisscrossed by a multitude of machine gun nests, bunkers, and barricades, and occupied by determined French troops. The first attempt to capture it collapsed right in front of the wire entanglements. Caught in French artillery and machine gun fire, the attacking troops remained pinned down about 700 meters in front of the village and hastily dug in. They suffered heavy casualties. Any further advance was no longer possible.
On the morning of February 29, 1916, the resumption of the attack with the addition of two companies of Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 66 (66th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) from the direction of Champlon was ordered. The operation failed because, despite massive artillery preparation, the French wire entanglements had remained virtually intact. In the afternoon, the attack was called off and the troops were withdrawn to their starting positions. The soldiers had had to endure 28 hours in the cold and wet, in open terrain and without any cover under heavy artillery and machine gun fire in front of the French wire entanglements. The strains must have been unimaginable. The two days of fighting resulted in more than 300 men casualties.
Based on these experiences, it had become clear that the village of Fresnes-en-Woëvre could only be captured after extensive artillery preparation. Thus, the village was subjected to artillery fire of all calibers until March 6, 1916. Regularly conducted patrols showed that the bombardment gradually achieved the desired effect. The renewed assault was scheduled for March 7, 1916.
Due to the weakening of the Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 36 (36th Landwehr Infantry Regiment), the attack was to be carried out by the I. Bataillon des Grenadier-Regiments 6 (1st Battalion of the 6th Grenadier Regiment) in cooperation with elements of the Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 66 (66th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) as well as additional pioneer units. Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 36 was to contribute two machine gun companies and was to conduct diversionary attacks from Pintheville. The main attack was to be launched from the east, starting from Marchéville-en-Woëvre.
Before the attack, Grenadier-Regiment 6 „Graf Kleist von Dollendorff“ (6th Grenadier Regiment “Graf Kleist von Dollendorff”) was deployed as part of the 10. Infanterie-Division (10th Infantry Division) on the Côtes Lorraines in the area of the so-called “Hummerschere” west of St. Rémy. From March 3, 1916, the regiment had received four days of rest. Word spread about the task the troops were subsequently to perform. On March 5, 1916, the regimental leadership was ordered to Generalkommando 5 (V Corps Headquarters), where the details of the attack on Fresnes were explained and the corresponding orders were handed over.
After extensive reconnaissances of the attack terrain, the regiment marched on the evening of March 6, 1916 via St. Maurice-sous-les-Côtes, Woël, Doncourt to Marchéville. There, the units were equipped for the assault. In the dark of night, they occupied their assault staging positions, which were located about 700 meters from the French wire entanglements. White cloth ribbons led from the Marchéville area to these positions as an orientation aid.
On March 7, 1916, around 06:00, the attack began. This time the assault succeeded perfectly, even though the attackers were initially pushed off to the north. The German troops, led by the pioneer units, overcame the frequently destroyed wire entanglements and penetrated into the village. Intense close-quarters combat and house-to-house fighting ensued there. Fighting was particularly fierce in the area of the church and the monument in the center. Except for the tenaciously defended southwest part as well as the railway station, Fresnes-en-Woëvre was in German hands by midday on March 7, 1916. The last parts of the village were captured in the evening. About 700 prisoners were brought in. Although there was massive artillery bombardment by the French thereafter, a feared counterattack failed to materialize. On the German side, own casualties amounted to 58 dead, more than 200 wounded, and about 30 missing.
It was planned that I. Bataillon des Grenadier-Regiments 6 would be relieved after the assault in the course of March 8, 1916, initially by elements of Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 66 belonging to the 30. Landwehr-Brigade (30th Landwehr Brigade). Following the unexpectedly rapid capture of the village, the relief took place as early as the evening of March 7, 1916, and the surviving “Kleist Grenadiers” marched toward their quarters in and around the village of St. Maurice-sous-les-Côtes. The position was taken over by units of Landwehr-Infanterie-Regimenter 66 und 36.
The front line now lay at the level of the villages of Manheulles – Fresnes-en-Woëvre and Champlon. In the north, there was a connection to the positions of the 3. Bayerische Ersatz-Division (3rd Bavarian Ersatz Division), which ran along the western edge of Bois de Manheulles. In the south, the front trenches ran along the road to Champlon and from there westward up onto the Côtes de Lorraine into the area of the Combres Heights (Les Eparges). The former main position, which had run west of Marchéville and Pintheville until the capture of Fresnes, became the fallback line, which was later named the “Auler-Stellung” after the commander of the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division), Carl Auler Pasha.
Due to the difficult ground conditions, the labor required for the division multiplied. Two fully developed position systems had to be maintained in a combat-ready state. In addition, it became necessary to construct communication trenches between the two lines. These were given names such as “Fresnes-Graben” or “Territorial-Graben” and were in some cases more than five kilometers long.
Apart from frequent patrol operations, which served reconnaissance purposes and the maintenance of discipline, no noteworthy combat actions occurred in the following days. Trench duty was paramount and cost many casualties, because the French shelled the German trenches with massive artillery fire as soon as even the slightest movement could be detected. Villages such as Fresnes-en-Woëvre had to endure shelling of up to 1,000 shells per day during this time.
From mid-March 1916, initial troop reorganizations took place, initiating the gradual relief of the 5. Landwehr-Division. Parts of the 30. Landwehr-Brigade (30th Landwehr Brigade), specifically Landwehr Regiments 36 and 65, exchanged their sectors with units of the Garde-Ersatz-Division (Guard Ersatz Division). The Landwehr took up their previous positions in the area of the ridge “le Mont” west of Loupmont. The regimental history of the Garde-Infanterie-Regiment 7 (7th Guard Infantry Regiment) provides a detailed description of the encountered condition in the Woëvre sector.
On July 1, 1916, the Allies began the Battle of the Somme. From all quieter front sectors, free reserves and active troops, above all artillery, were withdrawn both by the German army leadership and by the French. After this resulted in a subsidence of combat actions in the Woëvre plain, the final relief of the 5. Landwehr-Division was ordered in late July 1916. Then the remaining units of the 14. Landwehr-Brigade (14th Landwehr Brigade) also redeployed to positions on the southern flank of the St. Mihiel salient and the integrity of the division was re-established there. Thus ended the arduous and costly deployment in the Woëvre plain for the Landwehr units, which had lasted for more than two years from the formation of the division to its relocation.
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).