Caures-Wald – Bois des Caures –
Battle of Verdun – February 21-24, 1916
The relative quiet for Infanterie-Regiment 155 (155th Infantry Regiment) came to an abrupt end in November 1915. By means of corresponding regimental and corps orders, the massive expansion of the forward positions was ordered. Bulletproof dugouts for a large number of assault and reserve troops, a strong second line, and approach trenches were constructed. It was quickly clear to everyone that this hastily executed work served to prepare a major offensive operation: the coming Battle of Verdun.
On February 5, 1916, the 77. Infanterie-Brigade (77th Infantry Brigade) came under the command of the VII. Reserve-Korps (VII Reserve Corps) located further west. On February 11/12, 1916, the elements of IR 155 deployed in the Caureswald were relieved by the XVIII. (hessische) Armee-Korps (XVIII (Hessian) Army Corps) under the command of General Dedo von Schenk. Deployed were the 21. Division (21st Infantry Division) under General Ernst von Oven as well as the 25. Division (25th Infantry Division) under General Viktor Kühne.
The positions formerly occupied by IR 155 (155th Infantry Regiment) were taken directly by the assault units designated for the first wave of attack. In the area of “Rotzoll-Wäldchen” and “Franzosengrab”, which was assigned to the 21. Division (21st Division), connecting to the west with the VII. Reserve-Korps (VII Reserve Corps), stood the 1. Nassauische Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 87 (1st Nassau Infantry Regiment No. 87) as well as the Königlich Preußische Infanterie Regiment Landgraf Friedrich I von Hessen – Cassel (1. Kurhessisches) Nr. 81 (Royal Prussian Infantry Regiment Landgraf Friedrich I of Hesse-Cassel (1st Kurhessen) No. 81). Further east up to the D 905 between Ville-devant-Chaumont and Vacherauville, connecting with the units of the III. Armeekorps (III Corps) that had deployed in the area of the Bois de Ville and Herbebois, the 25. Division (25th Division) stood in the front line with the Leibgarde-Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 115 (1. Großherzoglich-Hessisches) (Body Guard Infantry Regiment No. 115 (1st Grand Ducal Hessian)).
On the French side, the Caures Wood was in the sector of the 72. Infanterie-Division (72nd Infantry Division) under General Étienne André Bapst. The center of the wood had to be defended by the two Jäger battalions 56 under the command of Capitaine (Hauptmann (captain)) Vincent and 59 under the command of Commandant (Bataillonsführer) Renouard. The half-brigade consisting of the two battalions was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel (Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel)) Émile Driant. Both units had a total of about 1,300 soldiers. They faced a German attacking force that was about five times superior.
Colonel Driant had anticipated the German attack early on. Starting as early as the fall of 1915, he persistently insisted through submissions to various agencies up to the Ministry of War on reinforcing the position area north and east of Verdun.
In the Caures Forest, his units created a tripartite defensive system consisting of a strong outpost position near the German lines (German: a-line), a main position (French: S-line, German: b-line), and a withdrawal line (French: R-line, German: c-line). In front of the positions lay a barbed wire entanglement about 20 meters wide. Behind this was an abatis several meters wide, interwoven with wire. This made an infantry breakthrough of the French positions hardly possible without prior destruction of the obstacles by the artillery.
Fighting on February 21, 1916
The German attack was scheduled for February 12, 1916. Early in the morning, a nine-hour artillery bombardment was to begin, and the infantry attack was to start around 17:00. However, unfavorable weather with fog and snow thwarted the start of the attack, which had to be postponed repeatedly over the following days. The German assault groups held out unprotected in the forward trenches in wet and cold conditions until finally, on February 19, 1916, the withdrawal to the rear was ordered. Meanwhile, the preparations for the German attack had not remained hidden from the French. They continuously subjected the German positions to massive artillery and shrapnel fire, which led to casualties and damage to the position.
Unexpectedly, it cleared up again on the evening of February 19, 1916. Since a longer period of good weather was forecast by the meteorologists, the German Crown Prince Wilhelm ordered from his headquarters in Stenay the execution of the attack order formulated on January 27, 1916. On the morning of February 21, 1916, at around 08:15 German time, the artillery preparatory fire began in the Bois des Caures as in all sectors of the front. The battle had begun. The attacking troops reoccupied their assault jump-off positions.
Émile Drianthad written a letter to his wife as late as February 20, 1916, which contained the following passage:
„L’ordre du Général Babst, que je t’envoie, la visite de Joffre hier, prouvent que l’heure est proche et, au fond, j’éprouve une satisfaction à voir que je ne me suis pas trompé en annonçant il y a un mois ce qui arrive, par l’ordre du bataillon que je t’ai envoyé.
À la grâce de Dieu ! Vois-tu, je ferai de mon mieux et je me sens très calme. J’ai toujours eu une telle chance que j’y crois encore pour cette fois.
Leur assaut peut avoir lieu cette nuit comme il peut encore reculer de plusieurs jours, mais il est certain. Notre bois aura ses premières tranchées prises dès les premières minutes, car ils y emploieront flammes et gaz. Nous le savons par un prisonnier de ce matin.
Mes pauvres bataillons si épargnés jusqu’ici ! Enfin, eux aussi ont eu de la chance jusqu’à présent.
Qui sait ! Mais comme on se sent peu de chose à ces heures là!“
The effects of the ensuing hours-long German artillery fire on the French troops must have been monstrous. General Victor Kühne describes his impressions with the following words:
“Roaring like heavy thunderclaps, the detonating mines in the enemy position carry out their work of destruction. Mingling with the billowing masses of smoke are not only clouds of torn-up earth, but also tree trunks, beams, scraps of wire, and human bodies. A sight that surpasses the imagination of a Dante in its fearful grandeur and horror. Astonished and shaken, the infantry sees before it the work of the sister arm.”
from: General d. Art. (lieutenant general) Victor Kühne, The 25. Infanterie-Division (25th Infantry Division) in the first attack on Verdun, no year given, BA-MA Freiburg, RH 61/1690
Reports from French soldiers who survived the inferno have been preserved. For hours, they lay pressed firmly into trenches or craters and could only grasp confused thoughts out of fear. Many whimpered or screamed incessantly. Their sphincter muscles failed them. Individual medics reported that shouts and cries for help could be heard from all sides. Entire trees were uprooted and whirled about. Soldiers were injured or instantly killed by whizzing shell splinters. Individual limbs were torn off, human bodies severed lengthwise or in the middle. Corpses and entrails flew around and were hurled up into the trees. Many died immediately from the overpressure when the shells burst. In the event of a direct hit, soldiers disappeared completely into the detonation.
The German artillery fire lasted until about 17:00. Despite its massive effect, the French had managed to maintain the order of their units to some extent. Since initially only the 59. Jäger-Bataillon (59th Jäger Battalion) was in the foremost position, on the evening of February 21, 1916, the 56. Jäger-Bataillon (56th Jäger Battalion) held back at Mormont Ferme was brought up to fill the thinning ranks.
As prescribed by the order of the Fifth Army High Command, after shifting the artillery fire forward shortly after 17:00, German officer patrols of the two 21st and 25th divisions advanced into the area of the forward French trench system. Individual patrols of Infanterie-Regiment 81 (81st Infantry Regiment) (21. Division (21st Infantry Division)) succeeded in overcoming the forward French line as well as the main position at the western edge of the Caures Forest. A patrol led by Leutnants d. R. (second lieutenant) Ludwig (8./IR 81) managed to reach behind the retreat line in the western part of the forest. The successful advances were possible because the German artillery fire was very effective here. The units of the VII. Reserve-Korps (VII Reserve Corps) adjoining further to the west also encountered no significant resistance in the area of the Haumont Forest. Furthermore, the orders of AOK 5, according to which the enemy main position was primarily to be reconnoitered on February 21, 1916, in order to bombard it once more before the actual assault attack on the following day, were interpreted more offensively by the leadership of the VII. Reserve-Korps and the 21. Division.
The situation developed less positively in the eastern area of the forest, where Infanterie-Regiment 115 (115th Infantry Regiment) (25. Division (25th Infantry Division)) was deployed. The artillery fire had barely been able to reach the French positions and lay between the further advanced front line and the main position. The French had established flanking machine gun posts and blockhouses that could take the forest clearings under fire and the majority of which had remained unscathed by the artillery bombardment. In addition, because the advance order of the army leadership was followed more strictly, the patrols with about 16 to 20 men were significantly weaker than in the sector of the 21. Division, where several groups of infantry with about 40 men each were combined. The units did succeed in reconnoitering the French main position and taking individual prisoners. However, the patrols returned to their starting positions without seriously seeking combat. Likewise, during the night, the units of the 21. Division also withdrew, since the French had begun counterattacks and were placing high-casualty artillery fire on the breach points.
The progress in the sector of the VII. Reserve-Korps as well as the 21. Infanterie-Division (21st Infantry Division) had reached the Fifth Army High Command by the late afternoon of February 21, 1916. It became clear that with more energetic action, a considerably greater gain in terrain could have been achieved. Therefore, General Konstantin Schmidt von Knobelsdorff issued the order in the evening to advance as far as possible the following noon after renewed massive artillery fire. In particular, the Caures Forest was to be completely captured. The 25. Division was, in cooperation with the III. Armeekorps (III Corps) adjoining to the east, to graze the Bois de Ville and take the Wavrille-Wald. As a further attack objective, the village of Beaumont and the northern edge of the Fosses Forest were designated. In the area of the 21. Division deployed further to the west, after clearing the Caures Forest, an attack was to be launched in cooperation with the units of the VII. Reserve-Korps against Hill 344 dominating the Meuse Valley near the village of Samogneux.
Fighting on February 22, 1916
On the morning of February 22, 1916, the heaviest German artillery fire began once more. It lasted until 12:00 noon and devastated those parts of the French position that had thus far been spared. Slowly, the German troops pushed back into the forward French positions that had been evacuated during the night. Then, around 12:00, the assault followed. In the area of the French main position, fierce and at times brutal hand-to-hand fighting occurred, during which flamethrowers were also deployed. On the French side, the remnants of the companies of Lieutenant Robin (9./BCP 59) and Lieutenant Simon (8./BCP 59) particularly distinguished themselves through energetic resistance. The units had already been in the center of the German attack the previous day and were considerably decimated.
Due to the at times unfavorable layout of the forward German positions, the attacking troops had to execute extensive pivoting movements. Orientation in the shell-shattered forest terrain was hardly possible. The units of Infanterie-Regiments 81 (81st Infantry Regiment) on the western flank, which had advanced in the direction of Anglemont Ferme, entered the attack sector of the eastern advancing Infanterie-Regiments 87 (87th Infantry Regiment), which was supposed to advance on Beaumont. As a result, contact with the units of the VII. Reserve-Korps (VII Reserve Corps) located further west in the Haumont Wood was broken. Although they succeeded in capturing the main French position, the troops nevertheless remained stalled before the tenaciously defended fallback line. Responsible for this, besides reinforcements by the 51e division d’infanterie, were essentially French machine guns that provided flanking fire against the German troops from the Fay copse and from the Wavrille Heights.
In terms of the course of the fighting, February 22, 1916, turned out the reverse of the previous day. In contrast to the units of the 21. Division (21st Division), the 115. Infanterie-Regiment (115th Infantry Regiment) succeeded in achieving a breakthrough in the middle and eastern forest sector. Here, the artillery fire had had a more intense effect. Above all, the French main position had been severely hit by the preparatory fire. Stronger resistance occurred only sporadically.
Remarkable events occurred at around 15:00 east of the D 905/D 125 road junction. There, the units of the 115. Infanterie-Regiments were prevented from crossing the road and advancing further by two French machine gun nests. The 1. Abteilung of the 2. Großherzoglich-Hessisches Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 61 (2nd Grand Ducal Hessian Field Artillery Regiment No. 61) under the command of Hauptmann Wienskowski had marched up as an infantry support detachment as far as west of Ville-devant-Chaumont. The adjutant, Leutnant Zühlsdorff, who had advanced with the infantry, reported to Hauptmann Wienskowski that 2 French machine guns were blocking the road. Hauptmann Wienskowski ordered two guns to be brought forward on the road and the two machine guns to be subdued by direct fire. Reconnaissance revealed that, due to the narrow width of the road, only one gun could be deployed. Thereupon, a field gun of Type FK 96 n/A 7.7 cm caliber was unlimbered, and Leutnante Deinhard, Dünnhaupt, and Zühlsdorff pushed it by hand along with additional forces from the direction of Ville-devant-Chaumont right up to the road bend about 300 m away from the D 905/D 125 junction.
The French were surprised by the first shot of the field gun. However, it missed. The trail spade found no grip on the hard road. With every subsequent shot, the gun flew backward from the recoil and had to be pushed forward and re-aimed. Although the shield offered some protection against the projectiles of the two machine guns, during the lulls in the firing, officers Deinhard and Dünnhaupt were hit early on and put out of action. Gradually, the other artillerymen were also wounded or killed. Infantrymen helped operate the gun. After about 30 minutes and with approximately the 20th shot, a direct hit was scored on one of the two machine gun positions. Whereupon the crew of the other position took flight. Meanwhile, the infantry had watched these dramatic events with suspense.
The incident is described in the regimental history of FAR 61, cf. page 73 ff. A corresponding account can also be found in the war diary of the French 56th Chasseur Battalion (56e bataillon de chasseurs) for February 22, 1916, albeit with temporal deviations (14:30) and limited to a single French machine gun. The depiction of this duel between a gun and a machine gun, which was unusual for the standards of the time, can be regarded as authentic.
Once the machine guns were eliminated, there was no holding back. German troops stormed across the road and linked up with the units of the III. Armeekorps (III Corps) advancing in the Ville-Wald. In a valley cut that the French call “Ravin de Champneuville”, two French artillery positions identified in the preceding days were marked on the German maps, which were to be captured. However, these turned out to be steaming field kitchens. Their contents were very welcome to the starving German soldiers. The valley cut was named “Küchen-Schlucht”
French resistance collapsed. Sparse remnants of the Jäger companies gathered in the area of the command post of Colonel Driant. Around 16:00, only about 120 men were still combat-ready. The position was bypassed. The officers urged Driant to retreat because of the hopeless situation. After some hesitation, he agreed. Three groups were formed. Driant destroyed his documents and headed to the rear together with the two battalion commanders Capitaine Vincent and Commandant Renouard as well as other soldiers. South of the road fork, near a shell crater in which two Unteroffiziere (NCOs) were crouching, he was fatally struck in the head by an infantry round. His last words reportedly were “Oh là lá, mon Dieu!”.
Last Battles on February 23 and 24, 1916
Following the successes on February 22, 1916, the forward French defense line in the middle and eastern sector of the Caures Forest had been completely eliminated. The remnants of the French troops had retreated to the second line in front of Beaumont and on the northern edge of the Fosses Forest, which had since been completed. To the west, however, the units of Infanterie-Regimenter 81 (81st Infantry Regiment) and 87 (87th Infantry Regiment) still lay in front of the French retreat line, which was intact there. On the evening of February 22, 1916, no clear picture of the situation could be obtained. Further advancement did not appear possible on this day, partly because the units had become intermingled. Thus, a very cold night began for the troops in the immediate vicinity of the enemy and amid intensifying French artillery fire.
On the morning of February 23, 1916, an overview was gained once again. Parts of Infanterie-Regiment 81 had already succeeded the previous evening in advancing to the extreme western edge of the operational sector behind the French retreat line. In contrast, the bulk of the troops further east were held up in front of this position. An enveloping maneuver of the French units had thus already been initiated unnoticed. After reserves had been brought up that re-established the connection to the units of the VII. Reserve-Korps (VII Reserve Corps) stationed in the Haumont Forest, parts of the Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments 39 (39th Reserve Infantry Regiment) from the Haumont Forest were led into the flank of the French defenders. Now it succeeded in rolling up the entire retreat line from the west. The French units, primarily members of the 165. Infanterie-Regiments (French 165th Infantry Regiment (165e RI)) took flight. Thus, in the western sector too, the French lines were completely in German possession.
What followed was the capture of Anglemont Ferme in the early morning of February 24, 1916. The strong French garrison was overpowered by a patrol consisting of only a few members of IR 81 under the leadership of Leutnants Ludwig (8./IR 81). The intrepid officer had already penetrated behind the French retreat line with a patrol on the first day of the attack. Also on this day, with the support of the Füsilier-Regiments von Gersdorff (Kurhessisches) Nr. 80 (80th Fusilier Regiment “von Gersdorff” (Hessian No. 80)) and units of the VII. Reserve-Korps the capture of Hill 344 and the village of Samogneux took place.
The 25. Division (25th Infantry Division) was finally to take the village of Beaumont as well as Fosses Wood on February 24, 1916. Since Infanterie-Regiment 115 (115th Infantry Regiment) had been decimated and worn out by three days of combat, the attack was entrusted to Infanterie-Regiment Kaiser Wilhelm (2. Großherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 116 (116th Infantry Regiment), which had been deployed in Wavrille Wood on the preceding days, and Infanterie-Leibregiment Großherzogin (3. Großherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117 (117th Infantry Regiment). IR 116 deployed for the assault in the French positions of Wavrille captured the previous day, while IR 117 occupied the former French retreat line in Caures Wood. Under difficult conditions and with heavy losses, particularly due to heavy flanking fire from Fay Wood, the complete capture of the already heavily destroyed village was achieved toward afternoon. The northern edge of Fosses Wood could also still be taken on that day.
The successes on February 24, 1916, gave the German army leadership renewed hope for the overall success of the operation. The French first defense line was completely captured throughout the central front sector and French resistance as a whole was shaken. Through the capture of Hill 344, the Germans were able to see with the naked eye into the city of Verdun. In this respect, confidence spread once again, especially since units of Infanterie-Regiment 24 (24th Infantry Regiment) and other troops (III. Armeekorps (III Corps)) succeeded as early as February 25, 1916, in capturing the Panzerfeste Douaumont.
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).