Fort Römerlager – Fort du Camp des Romains
Fort du Camp des Romains, called Fort Römerlager by the Germans, was built between November 1875 and May 1878. It was part of the new defensive line between Toul and Verdun, created by the French following the loss of the fortresses of Metz and Thionville as well as Alsace-Lorraine as a result of the war of 1870/71. Following the concept of the initiator of this defensive line, General Séré de Rivières, the installation was planned as a barrier fort. Fort du Camp des Romains was intended to support the infantry units operating on the heights of the Meuse, protect the road and rail connections running through St. Mihiel between Toul and Verdun as well as to and from Nancy, and additionally block the Meuse crossing at St. Mihiel.
Planning and Construction:
At the end of the nineteenth century, European fortress construction was still determined by a concept originating from antiquity: It was assumed that works situated on commanding heights were difficult or impossible for infantry attackers to capture. Thus, Fort du Camp des Romains was also praised due to its exposed position as capturable only through starvation. This assessment did not even hold up through the construction phase itself.
The construction of a larger defensive installation on the site of a former Roman garrison camp south of St. Mihiel was ordered as early as February 10, 1874. An initial design variant provided for several detached bastions that could flank each other. The construction concept leading to the final design was approved on October 14, 1875. Construction began on November 1, 1875, using civilian labor from the town of St. Mihiel and the surrounding area. By May 1878, Fort Römerlager was essentially completed. In contrast to the originally estimated 2 million francs, construction costs amounted to only about 1.5 million francs. The facility offered accommodation for 21 officers, 46 Unteroffiziere (NCOs), and approx. 765 enlisted men. There was a military hospital that could care for 50 patients lying down. The armament was estimated at 41 guns, of which 23 rampart guns, 4 indirect fire guns, 6 mortars, and 8 guns to secure the perimeter ditches. Two originally planned armored casemates were not built.
The fort was flanked by the Work of Paroche located northwest of St. Mihiel. Cooperation with Fort de Liouville located to the south was difficult because there was no direct line of sight due to the heights of Bois d’Ailly. To the east and northeast as well, i.e., the expected main direction of attack of a German enemy, there was no good field of view. While this was accepted with regard to the essential tasks of the facility in the form of covering the Meuse Valley, it had a negative effect during the German attack starting on September 24, 1914.
As for all fortification works erected at the time, a fundamental change in military evaluation occurred with the advent of high-explosive ammunition (explosive projectiles) starting in the mid-1880s. All works executed only a few years earlier in quarry stone or rubble masonry or still under construction were suddenly no longer equal to artillery attacks. Fort du Camp des Romains would have required extensive modernization measures. These essentially remained unexecuted. There were only works on the embrasures and caponiers and further isolated concrete reinforcements.
Thus, several observation posts and retranchements were erected in the eastern sector. An underground telephone system as well as a cavernous ammunition depot at the northwest corner were added in the years 1889/1890. Contrary to conflicting descriptions, more extensive modernizations planned in the years up to 1909, including the construction of several concrete gun casemates and a concrete barracks, were not carried out.
In the vicinity of St. Mihiel, only Fort de Liouville underwent more extensive modernization. As early as 1889, Fort du Camp des Romains was downgraded from the status of a barrier fort, which on its own was supposed to withstand an enemy for a certain time, to the second class of fortresses. By 1910, its task was seen solely as supporting the combat operations of the field troops on the Côtes Lorraines with the available artillery in the event of a German attack. The artillery equipment was steadily reduced until the outbreak of the First World War. Expressed in French technical jargon, the installation was thus “déclassé” at the outbreak of war.
Structure and Equipment:
Due to significantly differing accounts in the various sources, exact statements regarding the technical and military equipment of Fort du Camp des Romains at the time of the fighting in September 1914 are not possible. Therefore, the information below is limited to probable conditions.
Fort Camp des Romains was built on a conical hill south of St. Mihiel with an elevation of about 386 meters. It was constructed as an irregular, four-sided redoubt.
To the west lay the main gate, flanked on its sides by structures for artillery batteries. These were connected to the central area by two lateral paths. On the terrain in front to the west, which the Germans called Waffenplatz and which also served the French as a drill ground, there were some outsourced peacetime structures, which were likely quarters. According to plans, a canteen was also located there.
The fort was oriented with its main front facing east and northeast. The upper rampart towered above the glacis by about 10 meters. It served for infantry defense. The main rampart was provided with traverse shelters and expanded to accommodate guns. Around the centrally located barracks there were a total of 9 gun positions. Whether these were fully equipped at the outbreak of war is not clarified. The openings of the positions were walled up either by the French or later by the Germans.
All masonry structures of Fort Römerlager were built with a thickness of 0.90 m to 1.10 m. The earth cover was about five meters. The surrounding fort ditch, about 12 meters wide and 8 meters deep, was secured by two single and one double caponier. As at most other installations from this period, the outer ditch wall was secured by a massive metal fence.
Besides the western main portal, the fort also had an eastern entrance, which was connected to a covered way leading east. Covered means that the slopes of the way were built so high that infantry fire was hardly possible.
This eastern entrance was secured by an external blockhouse initially made of sandstone. Even before the outbreak of war, this was supplemented by a concrete roof about 1 meter thick and an observation post facing east. In addition, the eastern entrance had an inwardly retractable iron bridge that resembled the drawbridges of medieval castles.
Based on evaluable sources, visual flashing light communications existed to St. Mihiel, to Fort des Paroches, and probably also to the further north Forts Génicourt and Rozelier. Individual sources suggest another flashing light connection to Fort Liouville, which, however, is unlikely due to the topography of the terrain. At most, this would be conceivable starting from the observation post on the blockhouse located in front to the east, which the Germans later also used as a flashing light station. Cabled telegraph and Morse code connections are said to have existed to St. Mihiel and Commercy, to Forts des Paroches and Troyon, as well as to individual infantry command posts.
At the northwest corner of the fort, a cavernous tunnel system was created as an ammunition depot in the years 1889/1890. The depot was about 12 meters deep, and thus protected against artillery fire. Trench systems existed around the fort, although, in the absence of corresponding plans, it cannot be clearly determined to what extent the remains still found today were created by the French or later by the Germans.
The central barracks of the fort were two stories high. On their flanks were two powder magazines for about 50 – 70 tons of powder each. There were ammunition factories and storage rooms for about 1 million cartridges and projectiles. An area of about 180 square meters was intended for ready-to-fire shells.
There was a cistern whose exact capacity could not be determined. Corresponding figures range between 160 and 450 cubic meters of water. The latter would have corresponded to the needs of the planned garrison (about 850 men) for four months. The cistern could be fed by rainwater via a catch basin located on the glacis. The fort also had at least 2 large kitchens as well as several ovens that could produce about 200 peacetime rations of bread daily. It was intended that the facility could supply itself autonomously for a period of at least three months and withstand a correspondingly long siege.
Above all, regarding the available artillery at the time of the fighting in late September 1914, considerably varying information is given. It is certain that the originally present number of guns had been significantly reduced. However, exact details are neither possible for the individual types nor their quantities. Predominantly, the following figures are given:
As for the ammunition supply, no reliable information has been found so far either. It was likely around 600 – 700 rounds each for the 90 and 120 mm caliber guns, as was customary at the time, about 300 rounds for the mortars, about 150 rounds for the 12 culasse, and about 500 rounds for the revolver cannons. In addition to the mentioned guns, there were several machine guns that were used intensively in the subsequent fighting.
Nor can any reliable information be given regarding the size of the garrison in September 1914. Besides 6 officers around the then commander of the fort, Lieutenant-Colonel David Grignot, three platoons of the French 166th Infantry Regiment (166e RI) under the command of Capitaine de Lusancey with about 205 men, about 220 members of the French 155th Foot Artillery Regiment (155e régiment d’artillerie à pied), as well as about 50 members of pioneer and other support units were stationed in the fort. In addition, there were about 30 civilian workers and the canteen manager, who also had to endure the coming artillery bombardment as well as the heavy fighting.
Capture of the fort by German troops on September 24 and 25, 1914:
After the III. Bayerisches Armeekorps (III Bavarian Army Corps) had been deployed in the fighting near Nancy until mid-September 1914, the units were detached from the 6. Armee (6th Army), which was being relocated to the north, and assigned to the newly formed Armee-Abteilung Strantz (Army Detachment Strantz). Around September 19, 1914, the units west of Metz were set marching in the direction of the Meuse heights. Following a rapid advance to the Côtes Lorraines and only brief fighting, e.g., around Vigneulles and Hattonville, the troops reached a line running through Lamorville, Chaillon, Savonnières, and Richecourt by September 23, 1914. From here, on September 24, 1914, the capture of St. Mihiel took place by the 6. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment (6th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) and on September 25, 1914, the storming of the Fort Camp des Romains by units of the 11. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment (11th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment), the 16. Pionier-Bataillon (16th Pioneer Battalion), as well as the III. Bataillon of the 6. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment. About 530 French defenders were taken prisoner of war.
Regarding the capture of the fort, there are various contemporary accounts. Thus, the regimental history of the 6. K.B. Infanterie-Regiment (6th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) written by Hauptmann (captain) Georg Lang in 1924 contains an interesting description of the commander of the 12th Company, Oberleutnant (first lieutenant) Reitzenstein, who was stylized as the conqueror of the fortress.
The Reichsarchiv also dedicated volume 6, “Nancy bis zum Camp des Romains” of its multivolume work “Schlachten des Weltkriegs” to the battles that led to the capture of the fort on September 25, 1914. This volume was written by Ludwig Freiherr von Gebsattel, commanding general of the III. Bayerisches Armeekorps (III Bavarian Army Corps) from 1914 to 1917. The corps bore the brunt of the fighting on the Meuse heights until the capture of St. Mihiel and Fort Römerlager in September 1914. It was subsequently deployed in the area until 1916 and held the Frontbogen von St. Mihiel against multiple French attempts to retake it.
The Bavarian general’s accounts show the development of the combat in detail. They express that although the attack was commanded by the III. Bayerisches Armeekorps, it nevertheless would not have succeeded without the assistance of the Prussian pioneers of the 16. Pionier-Bataillon (16th Pioneer Battalion). The background was that the 11. K.B. Infanterie-Regiment (11th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) entrusted with the attack had very young officers who, in particular, lacked experience in capturing enemy fortifications. In this respect, it was the Prussian pioneer officers who led the Bavarian troops in the assault on the fort and thus guaranteed success.
The most detailed and probably most authentic description of events based on contemporary sources can be found in a Bericht des Generals Wilhelm Haenichen im Ehrenbuch der Deutschen Pioniere, published in 1931 by Major Paul Henrici and the Waffenring der Deutschen Pioniere. The decisive role and contribution of the pioneers in the attack on the Fort du Camp des Romains is particularly emphasized here.
On September 23, 1914, the units of the 11th and 12th Bavarian Infantry Brigades had occupied the designated artillery protection positions for the planned attack on the city of St. Mihiel and the Meuse forts of Paroches, Camp des Romains, and Liouville. The bombardment began the same day. Deployed against Fort Römerlager were three batteries of 10 cm field guns, four 15 cm howitzer batteries, one battery of 21 cm mortars, three 28 cm coastal mortars, and, according to doubtful reports, also Austrian 30.5 cm Skoda mortars. The fort’s artillery initially replied briskly. However, under the heavy fire of the German guns, it fell silent quite soon.
On the morning of September 24, discussions took place in Chaillon between the artillery and infantry commanders and General von Gebsattel. Based on patrol and aviator reports, the impression arose that Fort du Camp des Romains was ripe for assault. In addition, no French artillery support from the western bank of the Meuse had been noticeable. Thereupon, von Gebsattel ordered the immediate capture of the fortress by abbreviated procedure by the 12th Bavarian Infantry Brigade under General von Krischbaum. The K.B. IR 6 (6th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) was to capture the city of St. Mihiel and the heights east of it and thus establish flank protection to the north. This was facilitated by the fact that Bavarian regiments 10 and 13 had succeeded, in the wake of the heavy fighting at Spada and Lamorville, in also occupying Hill 331 (Côte Ste-Marie). Thus, the entire forest area north of St. Mihiel was under German control.
K.B. IR 11 (11th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) under Generalmajor (brigadier general) Freiherr von Tautfoeus, in cooperation with the Prussian II./PiB 16 (2nd Battalion, 16th Pioneer Battalion) under Major Freiherr von Rössing, was tasked with storming the fort. Since II./PiB 16 was a field battalion, no siege train was available. The necessary assault equipment had to be improvised. Carts and handcarts were requisitioned. All available ladders were gathered. Additional material was provided by the garrison of the pioneer park in Vigneulles-les-Hattonchâtel. Improvised hand grenades were manufactured from the demolition ammunition carried along. The rod and sphere hand grenades that later became common were not yet in use at this time. Added to this were several assault ladders, sliding poles, and fire tubes from the stocks of the Metz Fortress.
The attack was scheduled for the early morning of September 25, 1914. The pioneers were set marching the day before, starting from the village of Savonnières in the direction of Marsoupe-Ferme. The equipment followed with some delay. Battalions I and II of the 11th Infantry Regiment had marched into the designated assembly positions in the Bois Pernosse around 03.00 p.m. starting from the woods of Gaumont and Wavroils through the valley of today’s D 119. The infantrymen left these in the early evening of September 24, 1914, to move into the designated assault departure positions. The IIIrd Battalion, which was still on the march from the Spada Forest, was to be deployed as a reserve upon its arrival in the area of Ailly.
Upon approaching the fort, the head of the pioneer troops with their leader, Major Freiherr von Rössing, encountered the advancing infantry columns. Reconnaissance showed that, contrary to a vague hope, the fort had not been evacuated by the French. On the height “le Haut Buisson” south of St. Mihiel, Major von Rössing met with General von Tautfoeus, the commander of K.B. IR 11. The attack was discussed using a plan of the installation that von Rössing had organized. 8 assault groups were designated to attack the fort simultaneously with three groups each from the north and south and two groups from the east. The time of the attack was set for 05.30. The mostly young infantry officers were thoroughly instructed in their tasks by the pioneer leaders. The main thrust was to come from the east by Group Three under Hauptmann Rasina at the northeast corner of the work and Group Four under Hauptmann Jensch on its east side. These were the two most experienced pioneer officers.
Darkness had set in as the troops marched toward their assault departure positions. Since the pioneer equipment was still not on site, Major von Rössing went to Marsoupe Ferme himself and found that some of it had been unloaded due to misunderstood orders. He ordered it to be reloaded immediately and led the column himself to the intended unloading point east of the fort.
The assault groups had arrived in the departure positions around 10.00 p.m. Individual squads began cutting lanes into the wire entanglement, resulting in massive casualties. Difficulties arose primarily on the eastern flank of the fort.
Column Three under Hauptmann Rasina reported around midnight that the fort was not ready for assault, the wire entanglement was intact, and the flank defenses were active. Hauptmann Jensch, leader of the 4th Column on the eastern gorge side, reported massive machine gun and revolver cannon fire from the area of the northeastern trench defense. When around 03:00 the III./K.B. IR 11 (3rd Battalion, 11th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment), intended as an assault reserve, had still not arrived, General von Tautphoeus felt compelled in view of this difficult situation to ask the 12. bayerische Infanterie-Brigade (12th Bavarian Infantry Brigade) for reinforcements. The III. Bataillon des K.B. IR 6 (3rd Battalion, 6th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) located in St. Mihiel under the commander Major von Kießling was set on the march and parts of this regiment were assigned to individual columns, such as the 11th Company of Hauptmann Jensch’s Assault Column 4.
Exactly at 05:30 the attack began. Cutting assault lanes on the north side of the fort had succeeded well, so that the units there crossed the fort ditch without major problems. The remaining columns on the south side also reached the inner rampart crest through the ditch. Column Four on the east side had to overcome the greatest resistance. Its leader, Hauptmann Jensch, was killed during the assault near the eastern gorge entrance. Around 06:00, Major von Rössing reported to the commander of K.B. IR 11, General von Tautphoeus, that the northern and western parts of the installation were under German control, but fighting was still ongoing on the eastern flank. Thus it was clear that the capture of the fort was only a matter of time. Von Tautphoeus ordered the deployment of all reserves.
Gradually, they succeeded in pushing the defenders back into the interior of the installation. The attack groups on the east side now also advanced with the reinforcement. Resistance continued to meet the attackers from all cavities, but over time the fighting shifted to the central area. There was a central gallery, which led eastward through two openings each into a courtyard. French machine guns were stationed in these exits and in the gallery itself, dominating the areas in front.
A specific incident is said to have occurred in which the leader of the 12th Company of K.B. IR 6, Oberleutnant Reitzenstein, supported by several pioneers, daringly put out of action one of the machine guns inalos the area of the northeastern exit of the central gallery by using several hand grenades and fire tubes. With the abandonment of the machine guns, the last serious resistance of the defenders was overcome. The French withdrew further into the interior of the installation. Oberleutnant Reitzenstein issued a call for surrender, which was initially answered with canister shots. Only after several hand grenades were thrown through ventilation pipes among the entrenched French into the corridors of the fort, resulting in considerable casualties, did an emissary appear.
The negotiator was a French officer with the rank of capitaine, who signaled the readiness of his commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Grignot, to initiate surrender negotiations. Reitzenstein and Leutnant (second lieutenant) Wülknitz, who had replaced the fallen Hauptmann Jensch as leader of Assault Column 4, followed him into the interior of the fort and met the remaining officers there. Commander Grignot held out the prospect of surrender on the condition that the officers be allowed to keep their sabers and swords as well as their personal baggage and that the garrison march out with military honors. It was agreed to cease hostilities first, which then happened upon corresponding orders. On the southeastern courtyard, where fighting had last taken place around the entrance to the central gallery, about 80 Frenchmen had already surrendered independently. On the south side of the fort, sporadic fighting was still taking place at this time. Around 08:25 on the morning of September 25, 1914, the battle for Fort du Camp des Romains was over. It had lasted less than three hours.
Leutnant Wülknitz had rushed out and had initiated the cessation of hostilities on the German side. He met Major von Rössing and General von Tautphoeus at the eastern entrance of the fort, who, accompanied by the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Bavarian Infantry Regiment (K.B. IR 6), Major von Kießling, had meanwhile also arrived at the fort. The German and French officers then met in the area of the central main postern of the fort. Major von Kießling was most fluent in the French language, so that the further conduct of the negotiations and the drafting of the capitulation agreement in the French-language version were left to him. General von Tautphoeus as well as Lieutenant-Colonel Grignot subsequently signed the treaty documents, with which the fate of the fort was finally sealed.
The capitulation agreement provided that the French garrison should pack up their belongings and march out at 14:00. Previously, the weaponry and ammunition rooms were handed over by French officers and the fort was examined for booby traps by the pioneers. 28 guns, four machine guns, and a considerable amount of ammunition and provisions fell into German hands. Punctually at the scheduled time, the garrison, numbering 5 to 7 officers as well as between 450 and 530 Unteroffizieren and enlisted men, marched into German captivity with military honors.
The Unteroffiziere and enlisted men began their journey via the Rue du Porte à Metz in the direction of the railway stations located on the Côtes Lorraines, above all to Vigneulles-lès-Hattonchâtel, which had a standard-gauge rail connection.
Nach den diary entries of a female resident of St. Mihiel, Madame Yvonne André, whose husband was serving as an officer in the Paroche battery at the time, the captured officers were first led into St. Mihiel, where they were allowed to dine one last time at the Hotel du Cygne before being transported away to Germany. They were said to have left a desolate impression. It can be gathered quite clearly from the entries that, contrary to the later official French presentation, the officers were not received as heroes; rather, the impression had arisen among the population that both the town itself and the Fort du Camp des Romains were not defended with absolute resolve.
This assessment was based not only on the short duration of the engagement but also on the fairly low casualty figures. On the French side, various sources suggest about 45 dead and 130 wounded. According to its own records, K.B. IR 11 (11th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) lost one officer and 22 Unteroffiziere and men in killed during the assault. In addition, four officers and 69 Unteroffiziere and men were wounded. Among the pioneers of 16. PiB (16th Pioneer Battalion), the number of dead officers was two, and among the Unteroffiziere and men it was 16. Furthermore, 35 wounded were recorded. No figures have become known regarding the casualties of III./K.B. IR 6 (3rd Battalion, 6th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment).
After the fighting, representatives of the pioneer units felt that their contribution to the capture of Fort du Camp des Romains was not sufficiently appreciated. This can be gathered right at the end of the above-linked contribution by General Wilhelm Haenichen in the Ehrenbuch der Deutschen Pioniere published in 1931. Particular criticism was directed at the regularly appearing Deutsche Heeresbericht, which in its contribution for September 25, 1914 indeed acknowledged the merits of K.B. IR 11, but did not mention the pioneers of II./PiB 16 (2nd Battalion, 16th Pioneer Battalion) with a single word. To be sure, the role of the pioneers was mentioned in the 6th volume of the series “Schlachten des Weltkrieges” written under the direction of the Reichsarchiv by General von Gebsattel. However, the achievements of their own troops clearly dominate the accounts of the Bavarian general and commander of the III. Bayerisches Armeekorps (III Bavarian Army Corps).
German usage:
Since the Germans had succeeded in establishing a bridgehead on the western bank of கோயிலes (wait, Meuse) the Meuse during the capture of the town of St. Mihiel, heavier fighting continued here with the participation of Battalions I and II of K.B. IR 6 (6th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) as well as other units, which was to last well into 1915. Then, in mid-1915, the fronts solidified. Fort du Camp des Romains now lay at the tip of a German salient that could be held until the Franco-American offensive starting on September 12, 1918, that is, for nearly four years.
The fear already expressed by individual French officers during its construction that Fort Römerlager could serve the Germans as an excellent observation post in the event of its capture had proved disastrously true. After a short time, observation posts of various foot and field artillery units were established. Looking particularly south and southwest, the view reached up to 100 kilometers in good weather. The French withdrew far to the south across the Meuse and retained only individual outposts and field guards in the immediate vicinity.
Various expansions took place, for example in the form of periscope posts, accommodation areas, and artillery positions, some of which structures can still be found today. Extensive tunnel systems were laid out from the fort ditch in all directions, cf. the demolition plan from June 1918.
The Germans held the fort until September 12, 1918, after which it was recaptured by the French as part of the Allied offensive.
The following pictures come from the album of Leutnant Rüger, a member of the 3rd Battery of the 3. K.B. Fußartillerie-Regiments (3rd Royal Bavarian Foot Artillery Regiment). The unit had established observation positions at the Fort du Camp des Romains in 1915. Leutnant Rüger took dozens of pictures that allow the life of the soldiers in the fort to be experienced.
Another member of the battery was Kanonier (gunner) Luitpold Schaller, who was killed on May 3, 1915, in the area of his battery position on the Côtes Lorraines and whose former grave can be visited near the well-known Lion of Valbois near Varvinay on the D 901.
Many thanks to Marcus Massing for providing the pictures.
Current condition:
Today, the Fort du Camp des Romains is characterized by decay. After a private French initiative in the 1990s had ambitiously begun to develop the fortification for tourism purposes, but these efforts were discontinued after a short time due to the evident unfeasibility of the required effort, the fort has since been left to itself. A few years ago, extensive safety measures were implemented. In the course of this work, the frequently photographed archway located at the western main portal was demolished. Furthermore, the entire tunnel systems created by German troops were rendered inaccessible with heavy metal grilles. The east gate, like several other previously accessible areas such as various openings in the ditch defenses, was walled up for safety reasons.
The current use of the facility is limited to hunting purposes. Occasionally, mountain bikers and motocross riders are encountered who use the rugged terrain, particularly in the area of the former place of arms, for their purposes.
Entering the grounds around Fort du Camp des Romains is life-threatening and strictly prohibited.
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).