la Fille Morte – Mine Warfare
The main fighting for the la Fille Morte height in the Argonne took place concurrently with the struggles for the neighboring Hill 285 described in a separate article. After the ridge had already been crossed once by Infanterie-Regiment 98 (98th Infantry Regiment) during the German attack efforts of 1914, it initially came back under French control. Due to its exposed position, it allowed the French views into the German rear area far into the Champagne region. Therefore, everything possible was done to capture la Fille Morte.
During a major German offensive on July 13, 1915, in addition to Hill 285, la Fille Morte was also to be captured by units of the 33. Infanterie-Division (33rd Infantry Division). After a total of seven hours of artillery preparation, the assault troops left their dugouts and trenches at 11:30. On the Bolante, parts of Metzer Infanterie-Regiment 98 (98th Infantry Regiment), supplemented by Landwehr units and supported by several flamethrowers, burst forth from sap heads and mine craters, overran in close combat the opposing units of the French 76th Line Infantry Regiment (76e RI), and reached the ordered position east of the Courtes Chausses-Bach.
In the western part of la Fille Morte, the 67. Infanterie-Brigade (67th Infantry Brigade) was deployed, consisting of Infanterie-Regiment 135 (135th Infantry Regiment), parts of Landwehr-Regimenter 26 und 27 (26th and 27th Landwehr Infantry Regiments), as well as Infanterie-Regiment 144 (144th Infantry Regiment). Here, the advance also proved successful. Members of the 8th Company of Regiment 135 reached the ridge line as early as 12:00 and were able to cross it in places. A briefly threatening encirclement of the far-advanced units was prevented by the resolute advancing primarily of the 11th Company of Landwehr-Regiment 26 (26th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) under the command of Lt. d. R. (second lieutenant of the reserve) Gustav Boelkow. Boelkow was killed in these battles and is buried in the Buzancy war cemetery, grave 167.
On July 13, 1915, at 14:00, the essential part of the western ridge of la Fille Morte was firmly in German hands. Only in the area of the Brückenschlucht in the upper Meurissons Valley had the German advance progressed only slightly. South of this ravine, in the sector of the I. and II. Battalions of Infanterie-Regiment 135 (135th Infantry Regiment), a stronghold and a small area of the height had remained under French control. This continued to make it possible to look deep into the German hinterland. The position was called “Fille Morte-Küppchen”.
Further east toward Hill 285, the advance of the I. Battalion of the Infanterie-Regiment 135 starting from the Schwarze Kuppe proved difficult. At a strong French strongpoint on the southern slope of the valley, which had not been engaged by the artillery during the preparatory fire, the units encountered massive resistance. Only by bringing in parts of the Infanterie-Regiment 144 (144th Infantry Regiment) and a skillful envelopment by the 2./135 could the position be taken with heavy casualties. The position was given the name “Steinfestung”, among the French it was called “Reduit de Meurissons”. Around 16:00, the last assault troops reached the western part of la Fille Morte and dug in.
Adjoining the operational sector of the 67. Brigade (67th Brigade) was the 66. Brigade (66th Brigade) under Count von Holnstein. Elements of Infanterie-Regiment 130 (130th Infantry Regiment), Jäger-Bataillon 6 (6th Jäger Battalion), and Pionier-Bataillon 29 (29th Pioneer Battalion) under Hauptmann (captain) Schimpff were deployed. The objective was the eastern part of the Fille Morte as well as the saddle between it and Hill 285. This attacking group also encountered resistance in the upper Meurissons Valley, this time from a heavy French Minenwerfer (trench mortar). After the crew of the mortar, which latterly consisted of only a single captain, had been put out of action, the capture of the eastern part of the Fille Morte was achieved with the assistance of two companies of Regiment 144 (144th Infantry Regiment). In isolated instances, the assault squads pushed beyond the ordered line and penetrated into the French artillery positions. There, several guns were rendered unserviceable and large quantities of ammunition were blown up.
After further to the east the northern side of Hill 285 had been captured by Sturm-Bataillon Nicolai (I./IR 130, 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry Regiment) as well as elements of the 26. Landwehr-Regiment (26th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) and subsequently held against several French attacks, a continuous combat front was reached by the evening of July 13, 1915, which extended from la Bolante to la Fille Morte, Hill 285, across the terrain located north of the Cheppe Brook up to Hill 263. Although the French repeatedly attempted in the following days with fresh forces to recapture the ridge line, by marshalling all reserves—which also brought units of active regiments 120 and 144 (120th and 144th Infantry Regiments) as well as Landwehr-Regiment 124 (124th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) into action—the won position could be held.
The German successes on July 13, 1915, were remarkable for two reasons: On the one hand, the German undertaking had been betrayed to the French by a German-Polish deserter from the 4th Company of Infanterie-Regiment 98 (98th Infantry Regiment) named Batulla. On the other hand, the French themselves had planned a major offensive across the entire Argonne sector for July 11, which for reasons of prestige was postponed to the French national holiday on July 14, 1915. With this attack, the French intended to advance in the eastern sector as far as the Varennes Road (today’s D 38) and roll up the German Argonne front from the flank. On the French side, the complete 5. Armeekorps (V Corps) was designated for this, which at the time of the German attack on July 13, 1915, was at any rate twice as strong as the German troop contingent. In addition, vast quantities of artillery ammunition were ready. After July 13, 1915, the French attack had to be essentially restricted to the western sector of the Argonne, since in the east almost all the artillery ammunition had been expended in combating the German advance. Yet even in the western sector of the 27. Württ. Infanterie-Division (27th Württemberg Infantry Division), the French attack remained almost entirely without any gain of ground. July 13, 1915, had developed into a black day for the French.
Following this phase of combat, the primary focus initially was the expansion of the captured positions. Through the driving of saps and their connection, the new front line was created, from which mine galleries were immediately dug to counter enemy mine detonations. The units, which had been severely battered by the fighting, were supported by elements of the Saxon 183rd Infantry Brigade, which had served as an army reserve until then. In the sector of the 10th Company of Infanterie-Regiment 135 (135th Infantry Regiment), during these position works on July 28, 1915, two wounded Musketiere (private) were found who had held out in no-man’s-land since the assault on July 13, 1915, that is, for more than two weeks. The rescue of these completely exhausted soldiers, who had survived solely on their iron ration, grasses, worms, and rainwater, bordered on a miracle.
At the I. Bataillon (1st Battalion) of Infanterie-Regiment 135 (135th Infantry Regiment), the situation was difficult. The French stronghold remaining in the area of the Brückenschlucht had to be eliminated, since a gap had formed between 1./IR 135 and 3./IR 135, nor was there any connection to 4./IR 135, which adjoined to the west. Starting in mid-July 1915, 1./IR 135 began driving a sap forward to within about 25 meters of the enemy stronghold. On August 7, 1915, the attack was carried out by 1./IR 135 and 4./IR 135, which led to the capture of the stronghold. The French attempted to recapture it several times in the following days, however, this was unsuccessful.
On September 20, 1915, a reorganization of the sectors was carried out. Such regroupings frequently caused discontent among the troops. It frequently happened that units which had meticulously carried out construction of positions had to move into a neglected sector. The reason for the troop movements was the attack ordered as early as September 9 in the area of the 33. Infanterie-Division (33rd Infantry Division), which was intended to bring the Germans into possession of the last remnants of the ridge. Both from Hill 285 and from the “Fille Morte-Küppchen” just south of the Brückenschlucht, the French were still able to conduct favorable observation of the German rear positions. This situation was to be rectified before winter. The 67. Infanterie-Brigade (67th Infantry Brigade) under Generalmajor (brigadier general) Georg Mühry was tasked with preparing the attack.
The attack was scheduled for September 27, 1915, and had initially been postponed to October 2, 1915, due to incomplete preparations. On September 25, 1915, after more than 70 hours of preparatory artillery fire, the major French offensive against the positions of the 3. Armee (Third Army), which became known as the Champagne Autumn Battle, was launched. Beginning on October 25, units were detached from the XVI. Armeekorps (XVI Corps) to strengthen the German defense, including the composite Regiment Laegeler, consisting of units from the Württemberg regiments 120, 123, and 124. At the same time, it proved necessary to launch an immediate attack in the Argonne to tie down French troops and relieve the Champagne front. Thus, the attack date was moved back up to September 27, 1915.
From the contingent of the 67. Brigade (67th Brigade), two assault groups were formed, a right one under Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) Schmitt (IR 135 [135th Infantry Regiment]) in the Bolante and western Fille Morte sector and a left one under Generalmajor (brigadier general) Stamm (LIR 26 [26th Landwehr Infantry Regiment]) adjoining to the east as far as Hill 285. Units of the active Infanterie-Regimenter 98 (98th Infantry Regiment), 130 (130th Infantry Regiment), and 135, the Landwehr-Regimenter 26, 32 (32nd Landwehr Infantry Regiment), and 124 (124th Landwehr Infantry Regiment), the Jäger-Bataillone 5 (5th Jäger Battalion) and 6 (6th Jäger Battalion), the Pionier-Bataillon 16 (16th Pioneer Battalion), and the Reserve-Pionier-Bataillon 20 (20th Reserve Pioneer Battalion) were involved. At around 10:30, the artillery preparatory fire began. At 14:00, the infantry attack started.
While the units of Kampfgruppe Schmitt, primarily Battalions I and II of Infanterie-Regiment 135, had been able to storm the ridge line of la Fille Morte by early afternoon and even occupied the surprisingly vacated foremost French position, the advance in the sector of Kampfgruppe Stamm in the direction of Hill 285 proved more difficult. To be sure, the 6. Jäger-Bataillon reached the ordered line on the saddle between la Fille Morte and Hill 285 around 02:15, as did the units of Infanterie-Regiment 98 adjoining to the left on the western crest of Hill 285. However, the troops attacking further east remained pinned down close to their own starting positions. In the course of the afternoon, heavy casualties occurred, so that towards evening the retreat of the Jäger was initiated. Although the immediate recapture of the position was ordered, the French had already moved up. As a result, the units adjoining to the west, above all 8./IR 135 under Hauptmann (captain) Schreiner, got into a precarious situation. By summoning all available men, orderlies, messengers, and batmen, the French attackers could be repulsed. By means of further reserves, sector commander Hauptmann Müller succeeded in establishing connection between both combat groups and creating a continuous line. In the course of September 28, 1915, several French counterattacks could be repulsed.
Although the situation in the area of Hill 285 did not appear satisfactory to the command of the XVI. Armeekorps (XVI Corps), further attack attempts were nevertheless abandoned, also due to the heavy strain on the troops from previous attacks and the lack of significant reserves. Subsequently, the gained line was consolidated and remained virtually unchanged for the coming three years of the war.
Already starting in October 1915 and continuing into 1916, the gradual replacement of the 33. Infanterie-Division (33rd Infantry Division) by troops of the 86. Infanterie-Brigade (86th Infantry Brigade) took place. In the sector of the Infanterie-Regiment 135 (135th Infantry Regiment) on the eastern Bolante and la Fille Morte, the 9. Lothringische Infanterie-Regiment 173 (9th Lotharingian Infantry Regiment 173) moved in. In mid-November 1915, II./IR 173 under Major Hermann Wülfing, later commander of the regiment, arrived at the combat front as the last battalion. Wülfing gave his name to various position areas in this front sector, such as a trench and a stronghold in the area of the Süd-Grund.
The French positions lay below the German trenches on the northern slope of the Courtes-Chausses Valley, which on the one hand was disadvantageous, but on the other hand enabled them to set mine galleries deeper. In view of this, increased mining operations had been ordered on the German side, and the mutual mine warfare intensified.
The turn of the year 1915/1916 proved extremely rainy, which led to position construction taking precedence above ground on both sides. Underground, mine warfare was conducted intensively, and an ever-increasing number of detonations of varying strengths were carried out by both sides. Both sides strove to reach a tacit agreement regarding the detonation times. The French initially detonated mines in the morning between 7:45 and 8:45, the Germans in the afternoon at 5:45. Later, a secret agreement was reached on binding detonation times during the night and early morning hours between 03:00 and 07:00.
Beginning in late 1915, increased efforts were made to dig underground tunnels to create shelters and to reach the forward position under cover from the rear area, particularly from the Lehmannschlucht camp complex as well as the Nord-Grund. In the area of a stronghold established in late 1915 called the Waffenplatz, several galleries were created, which were later connected to each other and became part of the Küpper-Tunnel. Further to the east, another tunnel, nearly 500 meters long including side galleries, was dug from the Süd-Grund through the Kronprinzenhöhe into the Nord-Grund, in order to relocate the camp unfavorably situated in the Süd-Grund further to the rear and connect it with the forward position areas. The tunnel was given the name Kaiser-Tunnel. It housed a military hospital with an operating room as well as an electric power station consisting of a marine engine, which also ensured the supply of electricity to the local section of the mine warfare installation. In March 1916, the facility was supplemented by a connection extending to the second foremost trench, which was called the Bataillonstunnel, and later by the Ortliebtunnel, which provided a rear connection from the Nordgrund to the Siebenschläfergraben running above the Nord-Grund,
Throughout the spring and summer of 1916, mine warfare continued with increasing intensity, particularly in the middle sector of the Fille-Morte Position. Following a mine explosion, ready troops would each storm the resulting crater and set up for defense on the edges facing the enemy. The enemy endeavored to prevent the shift in positions through counterattacks and artillery fire. Thus the months passed with loss-heavy combat above and below ground. A continuous chain of craters formed along the front line over a length of approximately three kilometers.
Around August 15, 1916, Infanterie-Regiment 173 (173rd Infantry Regiment), which had significantly shaped the Argonne fighting of 1915 and 1916, was withdrawn from the front. After only a few days of rest, its deployment with XVI. Armeekorps (XVI Corps) in the Battle of Verdun took place as early as August 21, 1916. The regiment fought in the Thiaumont-Ferme and Fleury sector until October 1916. In just 16 combat days, the unit suffered massive losses of approximately 1,000 men.
In the second half of 1916, the Argonne had become a comparatively quiet sector of the front, so that rotating units were briefly ordered there for refitting and rest from other combat areas such as Champagne, Verdun, and the Somme.
In November 1916, units of the 6. preußischen Infanterie-Division (6th Prussian Infantry Division) arrived in the eastern Argonne sector, including Ruppiner Infanterie-Regiment 24 (24th Infantry Regiment), which had played a decisive role in the capture of Fort de Douaumont in February 1916. The regimental history of Hauptmann (captain) a.D. Cordt von Brandis from 1930 contains a worthwhile description of this Argonne deployment, which makes the details of the fighting tangible.
Various studies report that during the regiment’s deployment on December 12, 1916, at Hill 285, a German mine containing more than 52 metric tons of Westfalite was detonated. This account is questionable, as no confirmation can be found in French troop records. While there are reports of a detonation at la Fille Morte, and the history of IR 24 (24th Infantry Regiment) on page 304 also contains a reference to a detonation of over 1,000 hundredweights, the regiment was relieved by IR 477 (477th Infantry Regiment) starting December 12, 1916, and deployed further west at Bolante. It appears doubtful that such a massive detonation occurred amidst this relief process. Since the files of the participating pioneer units were burned in Potsdam in 1945, the exact timing of the detonation can no longer be reliably determined.
After the eastern Argonne sector continued to be occupied by changing units in the first half of 1917, it became the operational area of the 2. württembergische Landwehr-Division (2nd Württemberg Landwehr Division) from August 1917 until the end of the fighting in September 1918.
Since a major enemy attack was expected east of the Argonne, the Landwehr units deployed there were swapped with the 2. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Division (2nd Royal Bavarian Infantry Division), which was stationed in the Argonne at the time and considered stronger. Thus, from August/September 1917 onward, the area of Hill 285 and la Fille Morte became the operational area of the württembergische Landwehr-Infanterie-Regimenter 120 und 125 (120th and 125th Württemberg Landwehr Infantry Regiments). To the west, Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 122 (122nd Landwehr Infantry Regiment) was positioned at Bolante. The division sector was divided from west to east into three subsectors: Sector D (LIR 122, Bolante), Sector E (LIR 120, la Fille Morte), and Sector F (LIR 125, Heights 285/263).
Until the end of the year, both sides confined themselves to assault detachment operations. Artillery was also used purely passively for the retaliation of enemy patrol incursions as well as for disrupting supply and the construction of positions. Mine warfare was conducted predominantly defensively, albeit with unbroken intensity, through many smaller detonations carried out to pinch off enemy gallery advancement.
Starting in February 1918, a fundamental shift in strategy occurred. On the German side, efforts were made to end mine warfare and to employ the pioneer and auxiliary troops used for it elsewhere. A transition was made to a more elastic defense tactic by designating the former third line as the main line of resistance and manning the two front trenches only with outposts and weak posts. In the rear area, the construction of further fallback lines had already begun in 1917, such as the II. Argonne Line north of Varenner Straße (today’s D 38) as well as the Argonne switch line between Binarville and Apremont. However, due to a lack of sufficient labor and missing materials as well as weaponry, these positions existed predominantly only on paper.
Nevertheless, in September 1918 the main line of resistance was moved further back, specifically into the II. Argonne Line. The previous main line of resistance became the support line, and a deep outpost zone resulted up to the former foremost position. In the area of the foremost position, only isolated outposts remained, which in the event of an attack were to request destruction fire and then withdraw. The mine warfare installation was abandoned, partially blown up, wired, and otherwise left to the inflowing groundwater. On the French side, too, the depth deployment of the troops had been increased and the forward position areas, including their own mine warfare facilities, had been heavily thinned out. Thus, until September 1918, there were only occasional assault detachment operations and artillery raids.
In mid-September 1918, increased enemy traffic on all access roads made it clear that a major offensive was imminent. Due to changed combat methods, it had become difficult to capture prisoners in order to determine which units were deployed on the enemy side. Through strict secrecy, in particular by prohibiting the use of the English language as well as press reports deliberately leaked in America stating that attacks would take place only on the east bank of the Meuse, it was not until September 25, 1918, that it could be ascertained which enemy faced the German Landwehr units: It was Americans. Until then, it had been certain that a purely French offensive operation was imminent. The deployment of American troops was considered possible at Verdun, St. Mihiel, or in the Champagne, but not in the Argonne.
In the early morning of September 26, 1918, at around 05:30, American units of the 77th Infantry Division advanced far into the German position system after heavy artillery preparatory fire. The division, which had its garrison in Trotten, New York, had landed in England in April 1918 and was one of the first American units on the European theater of war. East of there in the Aire valley, the 28th US Infantry Division attacked positions of the 1. Garde-Division (1st Guard Division). The Garde-Regimenter (Guard regiments) had just been withdrawn from the heavy fighting on the Chemin des Dames and consisted only of a fraction of their actual troop strength. To the west, reaching into the Champagne area, French units of the French 4th Army, mainly the XXXVIII Corps, stood ready to attack the German 9. Landwehr-Division (9th Landwehr Division) and 76. Reserve-Division (76th Reserve Division).
From September 27, 1918, the American units of the 28th US Infantry Division expanded their advance east of the main Argonne ridge in the Aire Valley against the weak forces of the 1. Garde-Division. The Guard units were no longer capable of defense and began to disintegrate after the start of the attack. The 2. Landwehr-Division was threatened in its flank by the advance of the Americans. Although the II. Argonnen-Linie could still be held throughout September 27, 1918, in the evening the order came to retreat to the Argonnen-Riegel between Binarville and Apremont. Although the German troops, employing all available reserves, fought a delaying action for some time and inflicted heavy losses on the Americans at individual strategic points such as the Butte de Montfaucon, by late October 1918 the front had been moved out of the Argonne Forest. The enemy superiority in troops and matériel was overwhelming and further defense hopeless. During the sometimes hurried retreat movements, large quantities of matériel as well as almost all of the German artillery were lost, making an effective defense impossible. Thus, after only a few days of intense fighting and almost exactly four years after its beginning, the war in the Argonne Forest ended.
Today, peace has returned to la Fille Morte and Hill 285. A few years ago, the responsible forestry authority ONF created a circular trail that leads from the monument on Hill 285 through the German position system down into the Süd-Grund and back up along the large mine craters.
Until 2011, the touristically developed Kaiser-Tunnel as well as a small museum could be explored in the Süd-Grund. The facility was largely managed by Michel Holubowski (+December 15, 2017), the former president of the l’Office de tourisme de Clermont-en-Argonne. On every first Sunday during the summer months, a visitor day was held at which Monsieur Holubowski personally served his famous veal ragout from a field kitchen. In connection with disputes between individual persons in charge and for reasons of supposedly lacking safety, the tunnel had to be closed to the public in 2011. A reopening is not in sight, because the repair costs at more than one million euros are too high and serious investors are not available.
With the closure of the facility, the l’Office de tourisme loses approximately 70% of its previous annual revenue. There were ambitious plans. Thus, with further government support, an approximately 200-meter-wide section of the German position was to be authentically restored and developed for museum presentation, a novelty throughout France. Unfortunately, no serious financing option emerged for this interesting project either. Following the change of government in France in 2012, funds previously pledged by the government under President Sarkozy were canceled by the subsequent socialist administration and have not been reinstated to this day.
A French association, the Association des Amis de Vauquois et sa Région, is dedicated to the German and French positions as well as predominantly the remains of mine warfare. Officially approved projects take place regularly, in which the remains of the fighting in the Argonne are researched and restored and preserved as a warning sign for posterity.
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).