La Main de Massiges – Battles on the Border Between Champagne and the Argonne 1914 – 1916
La Main de Massiges – Chalk Champagne – Louse Champagne
The Champagne region east of the old coronation city of Reims is barren. The soil is chalk-white and almost treeless. Endless fields, where industrial agriculture is practiced today through the use of artificial irrigation and soil fertilization, have replaced the coniferous forests that still existed at the time of the First World War. To the east, this Champagne crayeuse, the Kreide-Champagne, is bounded by the French military training camp Camp de Suippes, where heavy fighting took place in the years 1915 and 1917.
The geological development of the Champagne goes far back into the Mesozoic era. In the Late Cretaceous period, about 90 to 70 million years ago, today’s Paris Basin was covered by a shallow, warm inland sea. Over millions of years, the calcareous skeletons and shells of microscopic marine organisms—mainly coccolithophores—sank to the sea floor. These organic remains compacted into a porous layer of chalk limestone, in places hundreds of meters thick. When the Paris Basin slowly rose during the Tertiary period due to tectonic shifts, the sea receded. A vast cuesta landscape was formed, whose soft chalk rock eroded superficially through wind and water, shaping a gently undulating, open plain that transitions to the east into the more clay- and sand-rich soils of the Argonne.
For a long time, the barren chalk landscape was considered agriculturally worthless; it was therefore also referred to as Champagne pouilleuse, the Lause-Champagne. The soil was too nutrient-poor for traditional agriculture, and rainwater quickly seeped into deeper layers. Yet precisely this geological characteristic proved to be a blessing for viticulture. The chalk soil possesses a dual hydrological function: On the one hand, its porosity ensures perfect drainage so that the roots of the grapevines do not stand in water and rot. On the other hand, the rock stores sufficient moisture at depth to constantly supply the vines even in hot, dry summers. Moreover, the chalk limestone offered another advantage for the population: It was easy to quarry and simple to work. In addition, the rock ensured good thermal insulation. As early as Roman times, people began to industrially quarry the limestone both above and below ground as building material and to use it for settlement construction. Today, the major champagne houses in Reims and Épernay age their sparkling wine in the resulting cave systems at a constant temperature of about 10 to 12 degrees Celsius and ideal humidity.
When the war of movement came to a halt and the front stagnated, the Champagne became the scene of bitter fighting on the occasion of the French offensives in the winter of 1914/1915 as well as during the two spring battles in the years 1915 and 1917. The specific nature of the Champagne soil forced the armies of both sides to adopt completely novel military tactics. The soft chalk rock often lay only a few centimeters beneath a thin layer of humus. As soon as the soldiers began to dig fire trenches and dugouts, the blindingly white chalk was thrown to the surface. From the air, the white lines and spoil heaps stood out in sharp relief against the surrounding terrain. Due to modern enemy reconnaissance by airplane or tethered balloon, it was impossible to conceal infantry and artillery positions from the enemy.
In contrast to the notorious mud wastes of Flanders, however, the chalk also offered advantages: It allowed the simple and rapid construction of deep dugout and gallery systems. After rainfall, the soil absorbed the water at depth and nevertheless dried quickly again. In dry periods, the geological advantage turned into a negative: constant artillery impacts crushed the chalk rock into a flour-like dust. This entered the soldiers’ lungs, thus leading to respiratory diseases, inflammations, and skin irritations. The white chalk glared in the sun and led to constant jams in rifles and artillery pieces. In addition, the chalk dust contaminated the food supplies. It turned the uniforms made of felt and cotton white. When rain was added, the soldiers’ clothing was hardly cleanable anymore. The chalk dust turned into a viscous paste that became hard as stone after drying.
La Main de Massiges: Marne Retreat between Reims and Verdun
To understand the causes and course of the fighting between Reims and Verdun from the end of 1914 onward, a brief examination of the complex events in the context of the retreat of the German armies from the Battle of the Marne in September 1914 is necessary.
Following the unexpected termination of offensive operations on the Marne, the entire northern and middle German army front was relocated eastward and later also northward. On the part of the Oberste Heeresleitung (O.H.L.), this maneuver was intended only as an interim measure. The plan was to resume the offensive as quickly as possible. As is well known, this did not happen; instead, it led to four years of trench warfare and ultimately to the failure of the entire German campaign strategy.
Amidst the chaotic conditions prevailing at the time, the O.H.L. could provide only rough guidelines for the troop movements to be carried out. Units became intermingled, and roads became congested. Vast amounts of weaponry and equipment were lost during the retreat. The fallen from the heavy fighting of the previous days had been buried only provisionally; these men, as well as many wounded, had to be left to the enemy. The weather turned, bringing storms and rain. Which retreat routes were chosen and where new positions were occupied was usually decided directly on site, often under time pressure and with unreliable information regarding the enemy’s position and the whereabouts of neighboring friendly units. During the strenuous day and night marches, many soldiers fell ill due to exhaustion and constant soaking. The morale of the troops and the lower-level leaders dropped rapidly, not least because of the incomprehensible termination of the advance that had seemed victorious just a short time before.
The movements of the German army were not conducted on the basis of congruent issuing of orders, nor were they strategically coordinated. They took place in stages, like a self-accelerating chain reaction. The trigger was the decision by the 1st German Army to break away from the German offensive structure and decisively defeat the French units, which were supposedly in dissolution. In the process, the connection to the 2nd Army, which was acting only hesitantly, was broken. A gap was created into which the British Expeditionary Force and French units newly formed around Paris threatened to push.
Due to inadequate coordination by the O.H.L. and the tragic actions of Oberstleutnants (lieutenant colonel) Richard Hentsch—at the time “only” head of the intelligence department (Foreign Armies) at the O.H.L.—the 2nd Army completely halted its advance. As a consequence, the 1st Army had to begin its retreat due to a lack of flank protection. The hastily sketched plan provided that the 2nd Army was to fall back behind the small Vesle River onto the line Fismes – Reims – Beaumont and the 3rd Army onto the line Thuisy – Suippes. The 4th Army was to cover the area between Suippes and Sainte-Menehould, while the 5th Army was to hold its position from there further east toward Verdun.
The lack of precision in issuing orders immediately led to a tactical tug-of-war at the level of the army commands. An open dispute flared up between the 4th and 5th Armies regarding the exact alignment of the line. Duke Albrecht of Württemberg, commander of the 4th Army, wanted to pull back his left wing at most to the latitude of Sainte-Menehould. Crown Prince Wilhelm at the head of the 5th Army planned a defense line located significantly further north and staggered in depth via Apremont and Binarville. His argument was understandable: if he had to occupy the southern edge of the Argonnes, his front line, while maintaining the encirclement of the Verdun fortress belt, would stretch so thin that it could not be defended with the divisions available.
After fierce disputes via dispatches and radio messages, the O.H.L. finally intervened. For the 5th Army, the line Apremont – Montfaucon – Gercourt was bindingly established. The 4th Army had no choice but to seek connection with the 5th Army near Binarville.
The deep retreat of the 5. Armee (Fifth Army) triggered another domino effect, this time in the reverse direction. Because the western flank of the 4. Armee (Fourth Army) also had to be pulled back further, the neighboring 3. Armee (Third Army) found itself in distress. To prevent an unfavorable bulge in the front line, it also pulled its positions further north to a line Perthes – Souain – Aubérive. This made it inevitable to evacuate the city of Reims, which had been firmly in German hands until then in the sector of the 2. Armee (Second Army), and to hand it over to the enemy. The new German lines now ran in an arc east and north around the city.
Main de Massiges – Typology of the Terrain
At the geological transition from the chalk Champagne to the plain lying east of it, with the defining localities of Cernay-en-Dormois and Ville-sur-Tourbe, an unusually shaped ridge of terrain protrudes. The inhabitants of the area recognized in the five finger-like spurs pointing south and west the outlines of a spread hand and thus coined the name „La Main de Massiges“. They fittingly designated the „fingers“ as „Index“, „Médius“, or „Annulaire“. For the Germans, they were simply hill spurs numbered with Roman numerals. „Annulaire“ corresponded to hill spur I, „Médius“ to hill spur II.
On German position maps, striking names like Donkey, Horse, Ox, or Cow Ravine can be found for the valleys between the spurs. At the eastern edge of the height lies Hill 191, slightly lower than the other crests, which was heavily contested in the years 1914 and 1915 and bore the designation „le Cratère“ on contemporary French maps. This was an indication of the chalk mining practiced there. Hill 191 was later called „Ehren-Berg“ by the Germans, and the central plateau area of Main de Massiges was called „Teller“.
Main de Massiges: Creation of the Front Sector in September 1914
South of Main de Massiges, starting September 11, 1914, the 4. Deutsche Armee (German Fourth Army) with its four corps, the VIII. Reserve-Korps (VIII Reserve Corps) and XVIII. Reserve-Korps (XVIII Reserve Corps) as well as the VIII. Armee-Korps (VIII Army Corps) and XVIII. Armee-Korps (XVIII Army Corps), was in retreat from the front sector on the Marne located between Vitry-le-Francois and Revigny-sur-Orain. Pivots for the complex retreat movements were ultimately the two localities of Hans and Valmy, which, with their important road connections, lay centrally in the area to be passed by the troops. There were no roads leading directly from south to north and suitable for larger troop movements in the sparsely populated area. On the western edge, only today’s D 66 between la-Croix-en-Champagne and Minaucourt came into question; to the east lay today’s D 982 between Ste-Menéhould and Berzieux. Both routes were shared by the neighboring army corps and were consequently heavily used. Since both roads converged in the village of Ville-sur-Tourbe and subsequently continued north as a single road (today’s D 982) toward Cernay-en-Dormois, Séchault, and Monthois, the direction of troop movements in this front sector was effectively predetermined.
When the order for the retreat arrived on September 10, 1914, it was clear to the soldiers that there must have been setbacks elsewhere. More precise details were not announced. The hope for a quick and victorious end of the campaign vanished at that moment. The withdrawal from the positions had already begun in bad weather. From September 11, 1914, it then rained and stormed incessantly. In the following days, after reaching their march destinations, the troops had to endure hours in the pouring rain and storm under the open sky while waiting for further orders. The exhaustion was so immense that individual soldiers fell asleep while standing and fell into the sticky, wet field. During a halt, others gathered closely together in groups to warm each other. Another difficulty was locating and carrying along the wounded from the previous fights, who were still lying in large numbers in the churches and houses of the villages. These were not to be left to the enemy. Added to this were now the many men falling ill on the march.
Aside from all these problems, one particular experience had a depressing effect on the soldiers: repeatedly, after reaching a marching destination under the most difficult conditions, the digging of positions was ordered, only to abandon them shortly thereafter and continue the retreat anyway. The resulting uncertainty would have consequences, as we will yet see.
The XVIII. Armeekorps (XVIII Corps) had already reached the area north of the village of Hans as far as west of Suippes on September 12. While the bulk of the regiments were encamped in wet bivouacs near the village of Hans, the regimental staffs were already reconnoitering the terrain for the establishment of a permanent defensive position. On September 13, the remaining corps gradually followed. At around 16:25, the commander of the 21. Infanterie-Division (21st Infantry Division), Generalleutnant (major general) Ernst von Oven, stationed near Minaucourt,
issued the following fundamental order:
The 21. Inf.Div. moves into a defensive position in the sector from Beauséjour-Fe. (incl.) to Hill 155 (2 km south of Cernay) (excl.). Connecting on the right is the VIII. Res.A.K. (VIII Reserve Corps), and on the left at Hill 155 the 25. I.D. (25th Infantry Division). The western sector is occupied by the 42. I.B. (42nd Infantry Brigade), the eastern by the 41. I.B. (41st Infantry Brigade); sector boundary: the course of the R. de l’Etange – Maison de Champagne-Fe. – Ripont. Line of outposts: 165 (1 km south of Beausejour-Fe.) – eastwards to the stream bed of the La Tourbe and following it to the connection with the 25. I.D.
The first German unit that reached the area around the village of Massiges during its retreat and occupied it facing south was the Infanterie-Leibregiment Großherzogin (3. Großherzoglich Hessisches) Nr. 117 (117th Infantry Regiment), belonging to the XVIII. Armeekorps and the 4. Armee (Fourth Army). The regiment had quartered in Massiges on the afternoon of September 13, with the I. Bataillon (1st Battalion) posting outposts south of the village. In the early morning of September 14, 1914, the II. and III. Bataillon (2nd and 3rd Battalions) began digging positions on Hill 191 north of the village. Since the I. Bataillon was heavily pressured directly by the advancing French, it had to retreat shortly thereafter to Hill 191 as well.
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).