Combres Heights: Chronology of Mine Warfare – War Diary of Pioneer-Miner Companies 329/330
In the Federal Archives, Military Archives Department (Abt. Militärarchiv), Freiburg i.Br., a hitherto unnoticed work preserved only in a black-and-white copy is kept, which illuminates and makes researchable the events of mine warfare on the Combres Heights from a German perspective like no other: the war diary of Pioneer-Miner Companies 329 and 330. The document is part of a collection of documents from the possession of the former company commander, Hauptmann (captain) d.R. Hans Barry. The two companies, alongside changing other pioneer troops, were essentially responsible for the conduct of mine warfare on the Combres Heights throughout the entire course of the war.
Below, the work, written by hand and in Sütterlin/Kurrent script, is reproduced in modern wording. Various supplementary information, photos, map sections, and position sketches have been incorporated.
(Introduction)
Even before the formation of the miner company 10. I.D. on 3.6.15, mining work began on both sides.
Thus, on February 18, the first explosion by 2 Pi. 5. with 8 centners of ammunition took place, more in the middle of the Combresberg. Also in the following period, mining was continued by 2. u. 3. Pi. 5. By and large, these were smaller explosions on both the French and German sides to keep each other at bay.
In May 1915, however, numerous French mining operations were noticed by the trench garrison, as well as in the few galleries operated by the 2. Res.-Komp. II. Pion.Batl. 16. It was realized with certainty that the French mining was not for defensive purposes, but that the enemy was planning a mine attack on our position, especially in the area of the H-Point.
To counter this, the miner company was formed on 3.6.15. This company, which at its founding had a combat strength of barely 150 men, faced considerable difficulties. To secure a trench length of 500 m, there were only 13 attack galleries, of which only 8 had driven their work to over 8 m in front of our trench. Furthermore, it must be considered that galleries G, H, and I, as the three galleries located furthest east from the H-Point, could not be considered for the security of the most endangered sector (in the middle of the current sector 16). Nor could these galleries be operated due to a lack of personnel. They therefore served only for regularly conducted listening attempts.
Of the remaining 10 galleries, at the time only the 5 galleries U2, E1, F1, E2, and C could have advanced their work to about 8 m or partly somewhat further in front of our front line. When the enemy then destroyed our gallery E1 by an explosion on 4.6. and we rendered gallery D2 unusable on 10.6. by our own explosion to secure a trench length of 180 m, in the middle of which approximately lay the extremely endangered H-Point, in total only 3 galleries (D2, E1 u. F1) remained. In addition, galleries A1 and A2, which were on the right flank of sector 16 and thus outside the French mine system, were eliminated for counteroperations.
At that time, the Frenchman was far superior to us in mine warfare; for example, 5 enemy working points were identified in front of the three galleries C2, E1, and F1. As early as the second day after the formation of the mining company, the enemy destroyed this gallery as well for our purposes by the first explosion in front of E1.
This explosion was followed in the course of June by 4 more, specifically on June 17 one each near C1 and C2, on June 21 again one near C2, and finally on June 29 another one near E1. As a countermeasure against these 5 French explosions, we were only able to carry out 3 explosions: on June 10 the first in front of C2, on June 14 the one in front of C1, and on June 24 the one in front of (left blank).
In the following month of July, the French explosions reached their peak and presumably also their last major successes. Only in one case, which may be mentioned here already, did the enemy succeed in surprising us and inflicting some damage. On September 20, on which day the Frenchman at E had already undermined us by 10 m and detonated immediately after we had perceived him around August 26. Our 4 explosions, 2 of which consisted of only 7 cwt. charges, served solely for defense. By July 11, the French galleries had progressed to the point where the enemy expected success from the detonation of the longest galleries. On July 11, 4 strong French detonations then took place, followed by an infantry attack. However, since the enemy intention had already been recognized on July 8 and countermeasures had been taken, these operations remained completely unsuccessful.
Through these extensive and large explosions, however, the Frenchman had also destroyed his best galleries; he had to start all over again and had arrived at the position where we stood at that time.
However, we had gained two lessons: first, that by carrying out our own explosions too early, one runs the risk of destroying one’s own galleries. When the length of one’s own galleries is not yet sufficient, one should leave the blasting to the enemy, wait it out oneself, and in the event of an enemy explosion, calmly accept that one’s own galleries are somewhat destroyed or the trenches leveled. The second lesson is that crushing explosions in the vast majority of cases cause more damage to one’s own galleries than to the enemy’s.
The following month of August proved the correctness of this assumption, namely that the Frenchman had destroyed his own galleries through these explosions.
Even though August was quite quiet regarding explosions, the enemy was nevertheless feverishly busy clearing his galleries, while we pushed our galleries forward at an accelerated pace. In this way, we gradually moved into precarious proximity to each other, yet avoided any explosion. Even in gallery S, where we had undermined the enemy by 8 m, work continued, albeit with all caution, until the Frenchman detonated here without any success on August 23. Our waiting attitude had brilliantly proven itself here and brought us an advantage over the enemy, even though blasting took place again at the same location on September 4 without any noteworthy success. Despite these two crushing explosions by the enemy, our gallery had finally progressed so far by September 15 that a larger charge could be advantageously placed in it. On September 14, the charge was ignited and had complete success. From now on, the Frenchman was permanently at a disadvantage, even though the explosion on September 21 near E1 might make it seem as if the enemy had not yet been pushed back at all points. This French explosion was undoubtedly a gallery that had been suspended for a long time, because despite continuous occupancy of this gallery, the enemy was suddenly perceived here for the first time.
The detonation then took place the very next day. Some expected enemy detonations then still took place in front of E2 and C1, specifically at such a distance in front of our line that no significant damage could be caused by them. Nevertheless, precautionary measures had been taken in good time.
During this period of French detonations, our galleries had all progressed to the point where we could transition to the mining attack. This attack was to be conducted simultaneously at two attack points with two different echelons, a first and a second echelon. The galleries of the first echelon were set up in the front line, timbered with frames, and driven with steep inclines to gain sufficient depth. They consistently had the disadvantages of being very exposed to enemy artillery fire. Spoil transport was extremely arduous, and the spoil itself was difficult to accommodate within the fire trench. The working space at the face was limited, and furthermore the face was flooded during rainy weather.
Galleries C2 and C3 of the 2nd echelon started from the lower readiness dugout and were driven straight and level with a large cross-section (150 x 180).
Due to the larger working space at the face, blasting work could be used. The spoil was removed using mine cars and dumped onto the spoil heap in front of the gallery entrance.
The galleries certainly became longer, but in return performance increased twofold to fourfold. Galleries C2 and C3 were soon followed by C4, C5, and C6, and then by galleries U1, U2, U3, R, and S, taken over by the 1. Komp. II. Pion. 16.
After we gained the upper hand on the right flank of sector 16, the Frenchman shifted his attacking activity to the left flank of sector 16 and beyond, up to opposite our galleries C – S.
But here, too, not only did his work not remain without failure, but he was also pushed back here. With the advance of the 2nd echelon, the first echelon was gradually abandoned, and when on July 11, 1916 the 2nd echelon was in operation, whose galleries had been driven far enough that our position in sectors 16 and 17 appeared secured, the last gallery R1 was also blown with good results. From then on, only the 2nd echelon remained in operation, whose galleries are driven so far that enemy counterworks at all points of sectors 16 and 17 can be awaited with peace of mind.
August 1916.
On June 3, 1915, a special company was formed for the mining work on the Combres Heights, which was given the name Bergmannskompagnie 10. ID. It was composed of miners from the V. A.K. Upon application to the Ministry of War to make the company established, independent pioneer (miner) companies 329 and 330 were formed from the B.K. 10. A.K. as of August 11, 1916. Overall direction in technical matters is retained by Hauptmann Karau, who is at the same time commander of company 329. As commander of company 330, Leutnant (second lieutenant) d. L. Blau is appointed, who on August 14 is transferred to the Jarny war hospital due to illness. Representation in the company leadership is taken over by Lt. d. R. Schmieding.
The war diary kept by the Bergmannskomp. remains with company 329. The combat galleries of the B.K., with the exception of U1 and U2, also remain with company 329.
Company 330 takes over on Aug. 19 all combat galleries of the 1. Res. Pi. 16 in sector 17 and the two U-galleries, which company holds combat galleries U1, U2, U3, R, S, and P. The location of the galleries can be seen from the enclosed gallery plan.
The purpose of these combat galleries is to blast the enemy off the Storchnest, i. e., the highest elevation on the Combres Heights, to deprive him of observation from there. For this reason, a gallery project, the so-called Storchnest Project, was drafted by the Offz. of the B.K. (see Plan 2). During the preparation of the project, the galleries were not driven by the 1. Res. Pi. 16 (1st Reserve Pioneer Battalion 16) in accordance with the project, so that various modifications had to be made during the technical execution, as Plan 3 shows.
U1 and U2 remain as planned.
U3 was originally not supposed to be forked. However, since significant difficulties arose in the extension of gallery P, it was treated solely as a listening gallery and the location of the intended blasting chamber was approached from U3-l. The distance between U2 and U3 likewise necessitated gallery U3-right.
Gallery S is likewise forked to relieve gallery R, which now also receives only a single fork. A further modification of the project had to be made because the French abandoned the right part of their position. It was occupied by us. The consequence was that we dug a second parallel to the saddle axis, which made all galleries approximately 30 m longer.
On August 19, all galleries are occupied by Company 330. On this day, the actual division of the B.K. also takes place. The company is divided into 4 shifts, and the working hours are 8 hours. Since there is a shortage of independent platoon leaders, the oldest sword-bearer, regardless of which company, is responsible for both sectors.
In all galleries, a thorough cleaning (drainage) was begun, which, with the exception of U1 and U2, extended until September 1. On August 20, 3 shifts were employed for loading C4 to the right of PMK 329.
O. U., October 1, 1916
Certified correct:
By order:
Schmieding,
Lt. and company commander.
September 1916.
In the month of September, all galleries are extended, except for gallery P, which is only considered as a listening gallery, and R, whose cleaning drags on until the end of the month. Gallery U2 is brought into operational condition.
On September 2, all Uffze. of the company participate in the rescue work in the Blauschacht gallery, where poisonous gases were struck. Four brave pioneers met a hero’s death here. The rescue operations are directed by Leutnant Göbel, who contracts severe gas poisoning.
The platoon leader dugout approved by the Div. is begun in the Combres Tunnel. On the 3rd, all men of the company are employed for loading and stemming gallery C3 heading.
September 6. Leutnant Göbel receives a 28-day convalescent leave to restore his health.
September 7. Gallery U3-right is begun.
September 9. U3-left is begun. Since gallery U3 heading has reached its prescribed length, the excavation of the blasting chamber is begun.
On September 20, Offz.Stellv. Rössel sprains his right foot and becomes unavailable to the company as a platoon leader. On the 26th and 27th, the workforce is again employed for loading C2 shaft (Göbel Shaft).
On the 28th, C5-right is loaded and stemmed by Lt. Schmieding, for which three shifts from the company were also employed.
The blasting chamber of U1 is completed.
O.K. October 1, 1916.
Certified correct
By order
Schmieding,
Lt. and company commander.
October 1916.
In the month of October, all galleries were extended for the execution of the gallery project. The listening results in the U1 face were negative.
On October 28, the U3 face was suspended at the intended length of 220 m.
By higher order, no more explosive chambers were driven from then on. Here, too, listening was carried out daily by means of a listening apparatus.
In U1-left, about 5 m are still missing until the final length of 112 m.
P was used exclusively as a listening gallery.
R and S were advanced at an accelerated pace. A stretch was branched off to the right from S.
In order to have security for the Rössinggraben (see sketch), on October 27 in gallery R at 150 m a stretch was branched off to the left, which runs approximately parallel to alignment line 345 and will be about 55 m long.
On Oct. 12, the midday shift in U2, at 160.5 m (95 m in front of our combat position), hit a fissure from which considerable amounts of water flowed. The gallery was about 30 cm under water at the face. Since a water-bearing layer was not present, it was assumed that a larger cavity, perhaps a gallery, was nearby. Several days passed with water and mud removal. Only on the morning of Oct. 16 could work be resumed at the face.
Upon tearing away loosened rock, a hole was created that led into a French gallery which had been driven in a large profile (height 160, clear width 1.10 above, 1.40 below) and was timbered with squared timber. The side walls were very cleanly lined with cut boards. The gallery had been driven with an 18° gradient and was 23 m long. At the far end stood a vertical shaft, the lower piece of which had collapsed. To the right and rear, chambers were connected, one for a pump, the other for a hand winch. In addition, a cart of potters’ clay, pickaxes, lamps, blasting caps, rails, hammers, grading frames and hoses were salvaged.
The gallery was explored up to the shaft by Hauptmann Karau, Lt. Häusgen and Uffz. (corporal) Kebler.
Under security by a double post at the French shaft, the breakthrough hole was enlarged and the clearing of the collapsed shaft was begun. An attempt was then made to break upward into the shaft in order to gain as much of the French gallery as possible. During an inserted listening pause, enemy work above the shaft was then unmistakably detected by Lt. Schmieding, Vzfw. (staff sergeant) Krebber and Uffz. Schreiber, specifically, cart driving and box rattling were clearly heard (the typical phenomena for the preparations of a detonation).
By order of the commander of pioneers of the 14. bay. I.D. (14th Bavarian Infantry Division), work in the French shaft was thereupon suspended and a line and a listening apparatus were installed at the bottom of the shaft. To dam off against any potential French detonation, a gas dam was set up and a guard of 1 Uffz., 8 men was deployed in the gallery.
Our intention was to prompt the enemy to a crushing detonation, in order to gain time on our part for the preparation of a detonation. For this reason, noise was made from time to time at the bottom of the shaft, and explosive shots were also fired. The Frenchman apparently awaited a more favorable time and did not detonate.
On Oct. 18 at noon, Lt. Schmieding received the order to load the French gallery.
On Oct. 19 at 17:30, it was detonated. The success was quite good.
According to the report of a pioneer officer, 2 craters had formed. The German one had a diameter of about 60 m and an 18 m depth, the 2nd lay in a northeast direction and was smaller. Between the two, a bridge of 7-10 m remained standing.
The infantry occupied the southern slope of the first crater, which lies about 100 m in front of our foremost line.
For the good performance, praise was expressed to the company and also to the P.M.K. 329 by the 14. bayr. I.D., and 90 Marks were granted from divisional funds.
This detonation seems to have severely irritated the enemy, because since that day art. fire has strongly increased. All gallery entrances are constantly under fire, so that bringing up construction materials is extremely difficult.
On Oct. 19, Oberleutnant (first lieutenant) Barry from F.A.R. 76 (76th Field Artillery Regiment) arrived at the company and took over command.
On October 20, Lt. Blau reported back from convalescent leave and transferred to P.M.K. 329 on the 21st; in his place, Lt. Vecqueray was transferred from Company 329 to Company 330.
At noon on October 27, the company was alerted by the commander of the pioneers of the 14th Bavarian I.D. for 3:00 p.m. At precisely 3:00 p.m., the company stood ready to march with all vehicles. After a brief demonstration by the company, it returned to quarters.
On the 28th, Offz.Stellv. Röstel reported back from a 14-day leave.
To train the company in drill of all kinds, duty was scheduled every afternoon starting October 20.
To observe the northern slope of the Combreshöhe, an officer observation post was established in the plain (Stand Früh) with the participation of the officers of 330.
For the riding training of the younger officers of the pioneer formations, riding instruction was scheduled every other day under the direction of Obltn. Barry.
O.K. Nov. 1, 1916
Certified correct:
Barry
Oberleutnant and company commander
November 1916.
After gallery U1-l had been advanced to 112 m, it was initially suspended on Nov. 9, but resumed operation on the 17th in order to bring it to the same level as the U-face. It reached a final length of 123.50 m on December 4 and from then on, like the completed U-face gallery, was initially used only as a listening gallery.
Following the explosion that took place in U2 on October 19, the clearing work of this gallery was immediately pursued vigorously, and initially the sandbags used for stemming, insofar as they were not crushed, were recovered. Upon advancing further, however, the stemming proved to be so firmly compressed that another gallery had to be driven to the right of the first one. When the gallery had reached a length of 185 m, enemy work to the left of the face at an estimated distance of about 15 – 20 m was heard on Nov. 29, 1916, by Vzfw. Siebert. Since the work apparently lay deeper than the U2 face, the gallery was initially driven very sluggishly in the direction of the enemy work. The rainwater seeping through the crater made the creation of various water sumps necessary, from which the inflows were easily managed by carrying the water out.
U3-face had already reached its final length of 220 m and was used only as a listening gallery. Inconsequential amounts of seepage water also appeared in this gallery. U3-r reached a length of 56 m in the course of November and was timbered in the medium profile with frames 1.60 x 0.80 m. This gallery likely reached its total length of 87 m in the course of the following month.
U3-l was driven to 56 m and then expanded like a chamber for 3 more meters. The first 16 m are in the large profile, the last 40 m in the small profile. The water inflows occurring in this gallery as well could be managed without difficulty.
S-face was brought to a length of 175 m in the large profile by Nov. 29 and then stepped down to the medium profile. On Nov. 6, the S-face gallery was forked at 148 m, and the new S-r gallery was driven up to 20 m in length in the large profile and from here on in the medium profile. Both S galleries receive a moderate upward slope to overcome the heavy overburden.
R-face attained a length of 179 m in November, of which the first 175 m are supported by prop timbering and the remainder is driven in the medium profile with frame timbering.
R-l had been begun in the last days of October and stood at 25 m at the end of November. The first 20 m are driven in the large profile with prop timbering and the remaining meters in the medium profile with frame timbering. Both R galleries present considerable difficulties to drilling because the intermediate strata coming into consideration for the drilling work are quartz-clay-like, with solid quartzitic inclusions. In addition, the rock formation consists mainly of three very solid stone beds heavily bearing quartz and is heavily water-bearing.
In all galleries, the experiences from the winter of 1915–1916 benefit us, which taught us to drive all galleries with a constant, uniform upward slope and to lay drainage gutters immediately.
Provoked by the explosion carried out in U2 on October 19, which destroyed an enemy gallery that had been intercepted, the enemy began brisk mining activity in front of Sector 17 right at the beginning of November. The detonation shots, which were less frequently perceived in the first half of the month, became more and more frequent and were perceived in all galleries of Sector 17. Since enemy firing activity increased more and more in the second half of November, comprehensive observations were made on November 21 and 22, and for this purpose all work in Sectors 16 and 17 was suspended. The number of enemy detonation shots during this time was determined by attentive listening in all galleries to be 42 and 54 shots, respectively.
During this time, surface posts closely monitored the bombardment of the Combres Heights to prevent errors. On November 23, 24, and 29, officers and men clearly detected enemy mining work with entrenching tools in front of tunnel U2. Regarding the range and elevation of the enemy shots as well as the mining work, the estimates of the listening personnel varied widely, so that the exact location of the enemy work could not be determined with absolute accuracy. According to the estimate by Offz.Stellvertreter Röstel on December 29, the enemy is supposed to be about 20 m in front of U2, but only further work will be able to provide a reliable assessment.
To be prepared for all eventualities, on November 25 and 26 another approximately 500 Ztr. of explosives were hauled to the Combres Heights and 400 Ztr. were accommodated in the suspended tunnel U1.
On November 11, Assist. Arzt Dr. Rother returned from the military hospital and received convalescent leave from November 17 to November 30.
For successful detonations, Ltn. Göbel received the Iron Cross 1st Class on November 29.
The following men were awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class:
Pionier Albert Walenski, Pionier August Sawicki, Pionier Erwin Ruland, Pionier Louis Speczowins, Pionier Fritz Pälmer.
O.U., December 1, 1916
Certified correct:
Barry
Hauptmann u. Komp.Führer
December 1916.
In December, the mining work in sector 17 proceeded regularly, without any disturbances on the part of the enemy. However, the adversary still maintained his mining activity in front of sector 17 in full swing until the last week of the month.
Enemy detonation shots were registered daily until December 23 and then only once until the end of the month, on December 28. The initially large number of detonation shots (up to 40 shots on Dec. 6) gradually decreased toward the end of the month to 2 shots, after which enemy work was no longer heard. This phenomenon gives rise to the assumption that the enemy tunnels have become flooded as a result of the persistent rain, because the consequences of the wet weather are also making themselves felt in an unpleasant way in our tunneling operations. The highly water-permeable rock softens and swells, as a result of which the timbering shifts into the galleries. Considerable forces were therefore required for the drainage and maintenance of the tunnels.
Enemy work with entrenching tools could be detected only once in the course of the month, specifically on December 6 between 07:45 and 08:15 in U1.
Since enemy mining work with entrenching tools had already been reported in front of U2 on November 23, 24, and 29 without being able to state the position and distance of this work with certainty and exactness, a vertical shaft 8 m deep was started in U3-r at a length of 50 m in the eastern rib, in order to undercut the enemy work from here with a new floor gallery. The 5 m winch chamber and the shaft itself were also completed during the month of December, and then the new undercutting tunnel U3-Shaft was started.
In December, U3-r and U3-l reached lengths of 83.60 m and 58.20 m respectively and were then suspended and used only for listening purposes. Chamber mines were not yet constructed for the time being.
S-Ort and S-r were driven in the middle frame profile of 1.60 x 0.80 m up to lengths of 214 m and 60 m respectively, as was R-Ort up to 207 m.
Since the middle frame profile, despite its larger dimensions, has proven more favorable for tunneling operations than the small profile of 1.20 x 0.80 m frequently used hitherto, in the future the tunnels were driven only in the middle profile up to their final length.
Tunnel R-l, driven forward to secure the Rössing Trench, was originally driven up to 21.50 m in door-frame timbering and from there on up to 34 m only in the middle frame profile. However, in order to be able to fork R-l later and use it as a main tunnel, the last 13 m were re-driven to the dimensions of the door-frame timbering. By the end of December, the tunnel then reached a length of 42 m.
Since the 1. Res. Pi. 16 (1st Reserve Pioneer Battalion 16) left the subordination of the 19. Res.Div. (19th Reserve Division) on December 20, 1916, the maintenance and drainage of the Kaiser Wilhelm Tunnel and the associated exit tunnels to the south—specifically from U1 to the end of the tunnel in the Herbeuville Heights—were transferred to Pionier-(Mineur-)Komp. 330 (Pioneer [Miner] Company 330). For these tasks, 8 men of the 4. Landsturm-Pionier-Kompagnie (4th Landsturm Pioneer Company) were additionally made available to Pionier-(Mineur-)Komp. 330. Due to the work getting out of hand, by order of the Commander of Pioneers, the continuation of the bypass tunnel already begun between exits 8 and 10 was temporarily suspended.
Leutnant Göbel was transferred to the replacement unit in Mainz on December 26. Hauptmann Barry received a 14-day convalescent leave from December 26, 1916, to January 8, 1917, and was represented by Leutnant Schmieding.
Very unpleasantly felt was the departure of 33 reclaimed Unteroffiziere and men who had to be given up for domestic mining operations, without any prospect of replacements for these men being provided.
For successful blasting operations, Leutnant Schmieding received the Iron Cross 1st Class on December 21.
The following were awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class in December:
1.) Unteroffizier Schwierziewski,
2.) Gefreiter (private first class) Bigos,
3.) Pionier (private, pioneers) Kampa.
Furthermore, the Grand Ducal Hessian Bravery Medal was awarded to:
1.) Pionier Leichtweis, 2.) Pionier Stockum.
O.U., January 1, 1917
For correctness:
Barry
Hauptmann and company commander
January 1917.
In January 1917, in sector 17, apart from continuous repair and drainage work as well as regular listening watch in the completed galleries U1, U2, and U3, work was carried out mainly only in galleries R and S and their branch galleries.
U3-l and U3 shaft were operated only when ample labor forces were available and were driven to a length of 64 m and 10 m respectively by December 31.
By order of the 19th Reserve Division, a charge chamber of approximately 32 cbm volume was constructed in R-Ort at a length of 207.30 m and loading was commenced. Because of heavy water inflows, the floor of the charge chamber had to be provided with a timber platform and the roof and sides had to be lined with sheet metal and roofing felt.
After placing the explosive charge of 350 Ztr. of explosive on January 7, initially only a 5 m thick tamping was set, which on the right side featured a wooden water chute for draining the charge chamber.
The cited explosive charge had to overcome 22 m of undisturbed overburden. Corresponding to the size of the charge, the final tamping of 33 m in length—now without a water chute—was placed on January 15, and the gallery was completed ready for detonation by January 16.
By order of the division, the explosive charge was detonated on the evening of January 16 at 17:45 from the medical dugout.
The explosion proceeded perfectly, and the inspection of the mining gallery undertaken immediately after detonation showed that neither the gallery nor the tamping had suffered any damage. Therefore, the clearance of the dam, which had remained intact over a length of 8 m and could be removed without difficulty, was immediately begun.
The crater is circular, has a diameter of at least 65 m and a crater lip of approximately 5 m in height and over 20 m in width. The location of the crater is situated exactly where it was supposed to be, slightly west of point 351 on the height of the Granathügel. The foremost French trench (9, 10, 11, and 15) is completely buried, so that the enemy, who occupied the crater contrary to our intention, had to work an access trench from the west through the crater lip.
Connected with the explosion was a patrol operation of Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 73 (73rd Reserve Infantry Regiment) and 1. Reserve-Pionier-Bataillon 10 (1st Reserve Pioneer Battalion 10) to the Ravin de la Mort, which brought us 12 prisoners without losses. From the new, so-called “Grävenitz” Crater, another 6, 13, and 6 prisoners on three occasions and 3 machine guns were brought in. The circumstance that not we, but the enemy occupied the crater, necessitated immediate new mining engineering measures. The blown gallery R-Ort was immediately cleared again and is currently ready for loading again at its old length with a charge chamber of 10 cbm volume right in the middle of the “Grävenitz” Crater. To facilitate the upcoming occupation of the Graevenitz Crater by the infantry, a new explosion is to be prepared on both sides, i.e., east and west of the Graevenitz Crater. For this purpose, east of the Graevenitz Crater in gallery S-r at 78 m length, a charge chamber of 24 cbm volume was shot out and this gallery was also made ready for loading.
West of the Graevenitz Crater, on January 20, a new combat gallery R-l-1 was started from R-l at 50 m length, which has already reached a length of 30 m. After completion of these works, it is then to be extended parallel to the French finger position in a western direction and serve as a gallery for further combat galleries to be driven toward the finger position. In a few days, this gallery should also reach a final length of about 40 m, so that the construction of the charge chamber can also be begun here.
A repeated explosion of the Graevenitz Crater appears indispensable because patrol operations cannot unequivocally determine whether and to what extent the enemy has already nested in the crater and prepared counter-measures against a new explosion on our part.
The crater is kept under changing artillery and trench mortar fire at all times, which, according to statements by prisoners, has cost the enemy many dead and wounded. Otherwise, the combat galleries of sector 17 that had already been made ready for loading were kept in order and drained. Listening watch was continued across the entire width of the sector without result. On various days, demolition ammunition was hauled up from the ammunition depot in Hannonville to sector 17.
Aside from the heavy dump bombardment beginning right after the detonation at the R working (especially on dumps R and S), which has since continued with varying intensity day and night, there was no harassment by the enemy.
It should also be noted that for some time the enemy, using 240 mm trench mortars with a range of 1,500 m and tremendous penetrating power, has been eagerly striving to disrupt the mining work, especially at the dumps. Exit U1 and the communication tunnel near U3 were caved in or crushed over a length of 6 m each by direct hits from these trench mortars, although the overburden was around 5 m.
Awarded the Iron Cross, 2nd Class:
1. Unter-Zahlmeister Höhne,
2. Gefreiter Steinberg,
3. Pionier Maczollek, 4. Pionier Jagodzinskiy, 5. Pionier Gabowski.
Unteroffizier Kieroth was promoted to supernumerary Vize-Feldwebel on January 17.
O.U., den 1. Februar 1917.
For the correctness
Barry
Hauptmann u. Kompagnieführer
Februar 1917.
The bombardment of the dumps and tunnel portals in sector 17 by enemy artillery and trench mortar fire, which had already begun in the previous month, increased considerably in strength this month. The Combres Tunnel and the tunnel portals were hit no less than 8 times, specifically:
on 2.2.17 between U2 and U3 over a length of 6 m,
on 2.217 exit U1 over a length of 6 m,
on 3.2.17 between U2 and U3 over a length of 15 m,
on 4.2.17 exit and dump R destroyed,
on 6.2.17 in the incline near exit 3 over a length of 5 m,
on 7.2.17 in the incline near exit 3 over a length of 7 m,
on 8.2.17 between entrance 8 and 9 over a length of 6 m,
on 20.2.17 at exit S over a length of 4 m,
on 26.2.17 at portal R over a length of 4 m,
on 26.2.17 between U3 and U4 over a length of 5 m,
on 26.2.17 ditto dump U3 shattered. On this occasion Pionier Somnitz was slightly, 2 Grenadiere heavily and 1 Grenadier slightly wounded.
Traffic in the tunnel was mostly cut off or hindered for 1 to 2 days by the cave-ins, despite considerable labor forces being deployed to handle these extremely urgent repair works. This grievance is now to be remedied by the construction of a new bypass tunnel. (see sketch page 31). The weakest section of the old tunnel between U1 and S with an overburden of scarcely 3 m in places is bypassed by driving a new parallel tunnel 30 m north of it with an average of 15 m of overburden. These bypass works were undertaken on 5.2., and indeed at four points simultaneously. In U2 work proceeded westward, in U3 eastward and westward, and U4 was initially driven further. Gallery U4 is to be 30 m long and then connected with U3 and S.
On 20.02. the connection between U2 and U3 was established. By February 28, the heading of shaft U3 reached a length of 32.50 m; U4 had been driven 30 m and 4 m had been driven to the east and west.
The 329th Pioneer Miner Company (Pionier-Mineur-Kompagnie 329) provided about 12 miners daily for these tunnel works, and Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 43 (correct: RIR 73) provided an average of 36 men as a transport detail. Since the first 60 m of gallery R are endangered mainly by the heavy artillery and trench mortar bombardment due to the small overburden and because a hit on this gallery would undoubtedly bring our most important work to a standstill temporarily, the construction of an incline from the Combres Tunnel to gallery R was decided upon. (cf. sketch page 31).
This measure has the further advantage that gallery R, which starts as the only combat gallery on the open mountain slope of Combres Heights, receives a direct connection with the Combres Tunnel.
Upon the driving of gallery R, hauling and traffic would then be able to be conducted unhindered through the brake incline to the tunnel. On February 11, about 73 m west of gallery S, excavation of brake incline “R” was commenced from the tunnel, which is to have a length of about 60 m at a 12° gradient.
Our mining activity extended to the driving of combat galleries U1-l, U3 Shaft, U3-l, S Head, R-l-1, and R-l. While work in U1-l, U1 Shaft, U3-l, and S Head was conducted only intermittently as secondary work, work on the R galleries was especially pushed. R-l-1 was halted at a length of 44.50 m by February 10 and provided with a 24 cbm explosive chamber. At the end of the month, this gallery had a length of 75.60 m, and gallery S Head had a length of 229.20 m.
In U1-l and U3-l, explosive shots were fired from time to time to deceive the enemy as to the state of the work.
In contrast to the previous month, enemy explosive shots were heard again in the first half of February, a sign of the fact—confirmed by repeated prisoner statements—that the enemy has not yet ceased his mining activity in front of sector 17. According to the prisoners’ statements, the enemy is driving mine galleries from the banquette (cf. image p. 30) towards the Grävenitz Crater, the presence of which must be considered proven by the listening result below. They were heard on:
February 2, 1917, in S around 5:30 PM 3 shots,
February 4, 1917, in S around 3:00 PM 2 shots,
February 5, 1917, in S between 12:00 PM and 1:00 PM 3 shots,
February 8, 1917, in R around 2:00 PM 3 shots,
February 10, 1917, in S around 4:30 PM 5 shots,
February 13, 1917, in S around 4:30 PM 4 shots.
Mining work with entrenching tools was not detected.
In order to counter and destroy the enemy mining work in front of sector 17, a comprehensive blasting project was drawn up (cf. sketch). The primary purpose of this project is to achieve the occupation of the Grävenitz Crater by our troops and thereby the repulsing of the enemy from Granathügel. The division has approved the proposal of P.M.K. 330 to carry out 4 explosions simultaneously and ordered the necessary preparations for this. It is intended to create a continuous series of craters adjoining the craters of sector 16 for the protection of sector 17 and the defense against enemy mining work. Building upon the already existing Bavaria and Graevenitz Craters, combat galleries U1 Head, U3 Head, S-r, and R-l-1 are to be blown. (cf. sketch.).
By the end of the month, the explosive chambers of the required size had been prepared in the 4 galleries. In order not to draw the enemy’s attention to our intention, work is being continued in galleries U1-l, U3 Shaft, U3-l, S Head, and R-l, which are not currently driven forward for a blast, and above all, shooting is conducted alternately.
On February 17, 1917, the 19th Reserve Division was relieved by the 9th Infantry Division, as a result of which P.M.K. 330 came under the command of Pioneer Battalion 120 (120th Pioneer Battalion).
Reserve Infantry Regiment 43 (correctly: RIR 73) was also relieved at the end of February, which unfortunately resulted in the discontinuation of the support provided by this unit for the maintenance of the Combres Tunnel.
For particularly successful explosions, Hauptmann Barry was awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class on February 20, and on February 26 he was awarded the Hanseatic Cross of Hamburg.
Unteroffizier Schulz was promoted to regular Sergeanten (sergeant) on February 28, 1917.
The following were awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class:
Pionier (private, pioneers) Lieberski, Pionier Kersten, Pionier Mielcarski, Pionier Ogrodowski.
O.U. March 1, 1917.
For accuracy:
Barry
Hauptmann and company commander.
March 1917.
Also in the month of March, work and blasting work in the combat galleries U1-l, U3-l, U3-Shaft, and S-Ort were continued alternately to deceive the enemy, and all galleries were diligently listened in on for enemy work.
At the end of the month, with the varying work, the individual galleries reached a length of
U1-l – 129.00 m,
U3-l – 66.40 m,
U3-Shaft – 20.70 m,
S-Ort – 238.35 m.
Our main mining work continued as before in R-l, which gallery had been brought to a length of 95.00 m by March 31. It is intended to systematically undermine and roll up the finger position from this gallery and thus force the enemy to evacuate the Granat-Hügel.
During this work, the necessary ammunition for carrying out the intended blasts was brought up, and on March 18 at 22:30, by order of the division, the loading of U1-Ort was begun. The explosive chambers are located in U1-Ort at 176.00 m, in U3-Ort at 221 m, in S-r at 224 m, and in R-l at 240 m from the gallery entrance. The sizes of the chambers are 20–30 cbm, calculated to accommodate charges of 225 Ztr. at U1-Ort, U3-Ort, and S-r, and for a charge of 125 Ztr. at R-l-1.
The loading and tamping proceeded smoothly, so that the 4 explosive chambers could be made ready for detonation as early as March 25. The length of the tamping was 30.00 m each for all charges. In addition, a gas dam 4–5 m thick was later placed in front of each charge.
The operation planned for the end of March was however postponed until the next month.
The work in the bypass tunnel could not be advanced in the desired manner due to the absence of the infantry and interrupted by the loading of the explosive chambers, for which all available men were necessary.
Besides, the old tunnel required considerable forces for maintenance and drainage as a result of the thaw that had set in and heavy rain and snowfalls. In addition, on the 16th and 17th, all men of Pion. Min. Komp. 329 were made available for loading the Blau-Schacht gallery, which was detonated on March 18 at 19:20.
Only from March 10 to 24 did the company receive again 24 infantrymen from the recruit depot of Grenadier-Regiments 7 (7th Grenadier Regiment) for support in place of the recalled 43ers (correctly: 73ers). By March 31, the U3-West heading reached a length of 46.20 m, U4-Ost one of 12.10 m, and U4-West of 8.00 m.
The brake incline from the Combres Tunnel to Gallery R could be driven up to a length of 40.20 m at the end of the month despite the absence of the infantry and the loading of the galleries.
The bombardment of the heap by artillery and trench mortars continued also during this month, especially after the detonation of the Blau-Schacht gallery that took place on the 18th at 19:20 as mentioned in section 16.
After the strenuous loading work, the men were granted rest in shifts from March 26 to 29. With half shifts, only cleanup work and the necessary work, such as drainage, listening post duty, and driving the brake incline, were continued.
During the rest period, the company was further trained in drill and exercises with gas masks, especially in the latter, since increased gas readiness had been ordered, prompted by prisoner statements according to which gas was supposed to be installed by the enemy.
The rations and the state of health of the company were good.
The following were awarded the Iron Cross First Class for excellent performance in the detonation of the Graevenitz Crater:
1) Sergeant Schulz,
2) Gefreiter Neugebauer,
3) Pionier Hergesell, 4) Pionier Strozyk, 5) Pionier Skupin, 6) Pionier Henneböhle, 7) Pionier Kahmeier, 8) Pionier Winter, 9) Pionier Pazola, 10) Pionier Ostaeck.
O.U. on April 1, 1917.
For correctness:
Barry
Hauptmann and Company Commander
April 1917.
The month of April was marked by detonations, probably the largest carried out in this war thus far.
In sector 17, the following galleries were designated and prepared for ignition:
1) U1-Ort with a charge chamber of 24 cbm for 225 Ztr.,
2) U3-Ort with a charge chamber of 24 cbm for 225 Ztr.,
3) S-r-Ort with a charge chamber of 24 cbm for 225 Ztr.,
4) R-l-1 Ort with a charge chamber of 15 cbm for 125 Ztr.
All mentioned galleries were already ready for ignition on March 24. The detonation date, originally scheduled for March 31, was postponed to April 5. According to the division order, the sequence of the detonations was to take place as follows:
at 10.00 p.m. gallery R-l-1,
at 10.03 p.m. gallery U1-Ort,
at 10.15 p.m. gallery U3-Ort,
at 10.35 p.m. gallery S-r.
3 detonations in sector 16 and infantry operations of the Grenadier-Reg. 7 (7th Grenadier Regiment) preceded our detonations by about 2 hours. Our infantry assault detachment (Stoßtrupp) penetrated into the enemy trenches on the Granathügel, inflicted bloody losses on the enemy, and captured 3 men from the French 53rd Infantry Regiment (53e RI) (163rd Infantry Division). According to their statements, Regiment 53 had relieved Regiment 415, which had previously been deployed on the Combres Heights, on the night of March 29 to 30. (V Army Corps, General Command 1c No. 764 secret of April 9, 1917.)
Due to the long postponement of the detonation, the 30 m long dams had to be cleared out to about 5.00 m and reset anew in the last two days before the detonation because the sandbags had compressed and no longer closed tightly against the crest. For greater safety, a gas dam of about 4.00 – 5.00 m thickness was placed in front of each dam at a distance of about 5.00 m. The demolition ammunition, Perdit and Donarit, was located solely in the detonation chambers.
(Each charge was provided with a double ignition passed through the tamping. The ignition lines consisted of well-insulated copper wire, the mine detonation cable. At the end of each ignition line was an electric detonator which was inserted into the priming cartridge. The explosive charges were protected against moisture with roofing felt as well as possible.)
By order of the commander of the pioneers, the following were cleared during the detonations:
a) In the position: the Plehwig Crater up to sap 19, the combat position and the 1st line – from 9.45 to 10.45,
b) In the tunnel: From C6 to the brake incline at exit 3 – from 9.45 – 10.45.
Lighting and power current were shut off in sectors 16 and 17 from 9.45 until re-requested.
The officers, Unteroffiziere, and men entrusted with the detonation were equipped with rescue apparatus. A special detail was available at the provided self-rescuers in the old officers’ dugout. The cordoning off of the tunnel was carried out by Unteroffiziere. The grenadiers of sector 17 were safely accommodated in the brake incline at exit 3 and in the bypass tunnel at U4.
“On April 5, arguably one of the largest detonations of this war was carried out at Combres by Pioneer Miner Companies 329 and 330, through which the important view of the plain was denied to the French, a large part of the enemy position destroyed, and our position advanced. With this, a goal has been achieved toward which [the men] worked tirelessly for months in faithful fulfillment of duty under the prudent leadership of the company commanders, officers, Unteroffiziere, and miners.
I congratulate both companies on this outstanding success and express my warmest thanks and fullest appreciation to all participants.”
Despite the tunnel hit between U1 and U2 by a heavy mine, a result of the previous operations in sector 16, whereby the ignition line to U1-Ort was destroyed, R-l-1 and U1-Ort could be ignited on time by Leutnant Vecqueray and Offizierstellvertreter (acting officer) Köstel. In U3-Ort, where the line was also destroyed by a rockfall, ignition was carried out directly on site by the company commander in order not to have an even greater delay than 5 minutes.
Gallery S-r could not be brought to explosion on site despite all efforts and ignition attempts. The charge or ignition device probably suffered damage as a result of heavy shelling and continuous rain, which resulted in a postponement of the detonation date by 5 days.
Clearing out the dam in S-r was immediately begun in order to pack unspoiled ammunition with the old charge. During the cleanup, it turned out that both electric detonators had been brought to explosion but had not ignited. Early on the 13th, the preparation of the charge was ordered again and the detonation date was set for the following day.
In strenuous work, by having the platoon leaders pitch in vigorously to spur on the men, it was succeeded to keep to the tightly set deadline.
On the 14th, at 05:15, S-r was then detonated punctually on the orders of the division to destroy enemy trenches 15, 16, and 17 and to annihilate the strong outposts that had nested right here since the recent detonations. The time of the detonation was chosen such that the reliefs were caught as well. (Prisoners’ report.)
The detonation, the tremors of Combres Ridge, and the falling rocks were quite massive during all detonations. The tamping of all detonated galleries remained intact, so that explosive gases could not penetrate into the galleries. The galleries closest to the detonation points were more or less caved in or damaged by the shock. The crater of S-r had developed a peculiarly steep, elevated bulge on its southwestern edge.
The diameters of the craters are approximately:
at U1-Ort (Weber Crater) approx. 55 m,
at U3-Ort (Barry Crater) approx. 60 m,
at S-r (Prussia Crater) approx. 65 m,
at R-l-1 (Grenadier Crater) approx. 55 m.
The craters are on average 10.00 m to 12.00 m deep. The detonation R-l-1 had a particularly good success because it blew away the occupied access trench to the Graevenitz Crater (R-Ort).
In front of our entire position, a broad obstacle now extends, crater next to crater, whereby a large part of the enemy position was destroyed, denying the French the important view into the plain, and making it possible on the western part of the ridge to advance the front line, which had previously run along the slope, onto the ridge crest itself over a width of about 350 m, 60 – 100 m adjoining our first detonations of the 5th, to expand it, and to occupy this new front line immediately. The detonations were thus a great success.
Battalion order of April 9, 1917, division order of April 15, 1917, and army daily order of April 12, 1917 express their fullest appreciation, particularly to the officers, Unteroffizieren, and enlisted men of the mining companies for the months of laborious work:
1.) Battalion order: of April 9, 1917.
2.) Division order: of April 15, 1917.
3.) Army order: of April 12, 1917.
With the detonation of April 14, a series of detonations on Combres has come to a conclusion. A large part of the French position was thereby destroyed, the view into the plain was denied to the French, and our position could be advanced further under the protection of the craters.
It is thus a goal achieved toward which men have worked for months under the prudent leadership of the company commanders, officers, Unteroffizieren, and miners in tireless, loyal fulfillment of duty.
I express my fullest appreciation to the two mining companies 329 and 330 for this outstanding success.
(signed Weber.)
Army Order of April 12, 1917:
After further detonations by the pioneer mining comp. 330, our front-line position in the sector of the 1. Gren.-Regts. 7 (7th Grenadier Regiment) was advanced by 60 – 100 m over a width of about 350 m. (signed Fuchs.)
The enemy artillery and Minenwerfer fire set in immediately on the 5th after the first detonations in the sector, whereas during the previous detonations in sector 16 it had only set in after about 20 minutes. The bombardment was focused mainly on the position in sector 16 and on the dumps of sector 17. The position was considerably affected by the bombardment.
After the detonation on the 14th, the enemy retaliatory fire with small calibers set in after 3 minutes and with heavy artillery and Minenwerfer (trench mortars) after about 8 minutes. Between 09:00 and 11:00 a.m. the bombardment on the dumps of sector 17 was particularly heavy, and throughout the following day the adversary maintained very heavy artillery and Minenwerfer fire on the entire sector 17.
The consequence of this was that the Combres tunnel was caved in at various points and almost all gallery mouths and spoil heaps of the sector were considerably damaged. At the same time, fire lay on the new 1st line, the course of which had been mapped on the 14th by enemy aircraft in good visibility. (Report of Gren.-Rgt. 7 [7th Grenadier Regiment] of 15.4.17). The new line was completely destroyed and the newly established obstacle showed very considerable gaps. The old line, the communication trenches, and the obstacle in front of the old first line were also heavily damaged.
Approximate number of enemy shots:
Artillery: 2,300 rounds of light and medium calibers, 200 rounds of 22 cm mortars,
Mines: 900 light and medium mines, 50 heavy mines.
The heavy and sustained fire is the best proof that the detonations inflicted sensitive damage on the enemy.
Not only on these days, but also in the course of the entire month, the enemy tried to disrupt our work by shelling the spoil heaps. Furthermore, he is now endeavoring to counter our work threatening his positions by counter-mining operations. This mining activity had already been reported to us through prisoner interrogations. At the end of the month, the approach was definitively established by listening for the detonation shots in R-l and S-Ort.
Our main mining activity, as in the previous month, extended to the operation of all work in the R gallery. R-l reached a length of 119.80 m at the end of the month, R-l-1 was cleared up to 35.50 m and R-Ort up to 194.00 m. The brake incline to R caused some difficulties due to undercutting an infantry dugout located in R; it reached a length of 53.00 m. In addition to this work, the galleries damaged by the detonations were for the most part cleared again and prepared for listening service. In the main tunnel, the cave-ins caused by the bombardments were mainly to be repaired. In addition, the usual drainage and repair work was carried out. The bypass tunnel was completed between U3 and U4, with approximately 23.00 m still remaining to be driven through. A breakthrough from U4 to P for the extraction of flue gases was driven upwards and reinforced to a length of 6.00 m.
The personnel freed up in the bypass tunnel were deployed to further continue this tunnel in U4 to the west and in S to the east.
Unfortunately, after the detonations, the 24 infantrymen made available to us were withdrawn, and despite the extensive work, we had to make do with our own men. On April 19, 18 men of the Armierungskomp. Nr. 164 were made available to us as a labor detachment, and from the 25th onward, some infantrymen from Res.-Inf. Regt. 12 ([12th Reserve Infantry Regiment]) for cleanup work in the tunnel.
On the 25th, the 9. Inf.-Div. ([9th Infantry Division]) was relieved by the 5. Res.-Inf.-Div. ([5th Reserve Infantry Division]), and Pion.-Batl. 120 ([120th Pioneer Battalion]) by Pion.-Batl. 305 ([305th Pioneer Battalion]).
During the rest periods, the company was further trained in shifts in drill and hand grenade throwing.
Awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class:
Leutnant Vecqueray, award certificate dated April 25, 1417.
Bestowed with the Iron Cross 2nd Class:
Gefreiter Sworowski, Gefreiter Schmitz,
Pionier Kistner, Pionier Poporski, Pionier Kohlstadt.
The rations and the state of health of the company were good despite the reduction of the bread ration.
O.U. on May 1, 1917.
For correctness:
Barry
Hauptmann and Company Leader
May 1917.
Our main mining activity, as before, extended in this month as well to the operation of all work in the R gallery, and the S-Ort gallery located next to R was also heavily operated.
At the end of the month, the following reached:
R-Ort 234.20 m,
R-l-1 65.70 m,
R-l-2 49.00 m on a new level
S-Ort 256 m.
R-Ort was temporarily suspended on May 2. The remaining galleries were only used as listening galleries.
The work on the bypass tunnel progressed well. On May 22, the breakthrough took place in the section between U4 and S, so that the tunnel is now completed from S to U2. The brake incline from the tunnel to the R gallery was also broken through and completed except for the installation of a winch for hauling. In the main tunnel, the usual repair and drainage work took place.
The work on the bypass tunnel progressed well. On May 22, the breakthrough took place in the section between U4 and S, so that the tunnel is now completed from S to U2. The brake incline from the tunnel to the R gallery was also broken through and completed except for the installation of a winch for hauling. In the main tunnel, the usual repair and drainage work took place.
The work on the bypass tunnel progressed well. On May 22, the breakthrough took place in the section between U4 and S, so that the tunnel is now completed from S to U2. The brake incline from the tunnel to the R gallery was also broken through and completed except for the installation of a winch for hauling. In the main tunnel, the usual repair and drainage work took place.
Enemy mining activity was observed daily in the month of May. Not only in R-l, R-l-1, R-l-2, R-Ort, and S-Ort, but also in U3, enemy detonation shots were heard. The number of shots amounted to 50 – 70 daily. Direction and distance could not yet be determined. The listening results are shown in the listening logbook for the month of May. The daily reports of the detonation shots spoke of extremely strenuous work by the enemy, who sees his forward position threatened and wants to prevent further progress on our part through counter-mining.
The shelling of the spoil heaps by artillery and mines caused some disturbances, namely on: May 1 on spoil heap S. On May 13 in the tunnel near U2 by mine fire. The bombardment lasted from 17:00 to 19:00. On May 14 at 04:00. On May 22 on the haulage track in the village of Combres. On May 28 in the tunnel between entrance 7 and 8, where about 4.00 m were caved in by a mine.
The men previously employed in 4 shifts were divided into 5 shifts, with a working time of 6 hours instead of 8 with 24 hours of rest. With tighter rations, the strenuous service demanded these measures. The Armierungskompagnie 2/117 also provided 6 more men, i.e., 24 men, in total. In the month of May, the infantry provided the former number of men for the bypass tunnel.
On May 25, the 5. Res.-Div. (5th Reserve Division) was relieved by the 45. Res.-Div. (45th Reserve Division), the Pion.-Batl. 305 (305th Pioneer Battalion) by the Pi.-Batl. 34 (34th Pioneer Battalion). During the rest periods, the company was occupied in shifts with drill and gymnastics.
The following were awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class:
Pioneer Schulik, Pioneer Nisdorf, Pioneer Domachowski, Pioneer Kowalski,
Gefr. Reuß, Gefreiter Hinz, Gefreiter Wilgeroth,
Pion. Gebauer and Gelleszun.
The rations and health condition of the company were good.
From May 12 to 25, 17, Leutnant Vecqueray was on leave; from May 26 to June 23, 17, Hauptmann Barry is on leave, his replacement is held by Leutn.d.Ldw. Borchers.
O.U., June 1, 1917.
I.V.d.K.F.
signed Borchers,
Leutnant.
Barry
Hauptmann u. Komp. Führer, June 24, 1917
June 1917.
The enemy’s mining activity continued throughout the entire month. Through detonation shots, the number of which amounted to about 30 to 70 shots daily, as well as by observing brisk activity on the enemy spoil heaps at the Trottoir and by comparing aerial photographs of these spoil heaps with the photographs of the previous months, this extraordinary effort of the enemy to counteract our works against his positions underground has been established. However, as far as could be determined, this enemy mining activity is limited to the left wing of sector 17 against the 4 western craters of the combat galleries S and R.
The established listening results have shown that the enemy is standing with his mining work in front of combat galleries R and S, specifically probably deeper than R. By determining the directions of the enemy detonation shots as precisely as possible and by plotting these directions in S-Ort, R-Ort, R-l-1, and R-l-2, minefields—as the adjacent sketch indicates—have been established, the combating of which, alongside the attack on the enemy position at the Finger, is our main task.
To disrupt the enemy mining work and to destroy French trenches 8 and 9 and the trench running parallel to these northward between 24 and 18, combat gallery R-l-2 was blown up on June 26, 17, at 01:35 a.m. in direct connection with a detonation of C5-Ort in sector 16 and an infantry patrol enterprise. The detonation proceeded smoothly at the ordered time. The French trenches up to the Grenadier Crater were destroyed, and an enemy patrol of 10 to 15 men, which had been reported shortly before the detonation, was blown up with it.
Through the crater, which has been named Eberhardt Crater, the enemy has been considerably damaged and driven from the northern edges of the Graevenitz and Grenadier Craters. The former could now be occupied by 2 double posts after piercing the southern crater bulge.
The opposing enemy Infanterie Regiment 106 (106th Infantry Regiment) has been identified by the remains of the dead in the Eberhardt Crater.
Besides the successes above ground, the enemy mining activity has undoubtedly also been considerably affected.
The charge of R-l-2, 330 quintals of Perdit, was not introduced as in previous detonations in a round-shot explosion chamber, but in an elongated form (gallery profile 1.00 x 0.80) in order to destroy as long a piece as possible of the French trenches, between which the explosion chamber ran parallel, with an oval crater. The tamping amounted to 36.00 m. The neighboring own galleries were almost undamaged, likewise the dam was intact and has proved to be completely sufficient.
When clearing the dam, the first 12 m could be removed without further ado; beyond that, the sandbags of the tamping were pressed together ever more firmly toward the front.
In contrast to earlier times, the French retaliatory fire did not set in immediately after the detonation. Only 6 minutes after the 1st detonation of C5 did the enemy light artillery begin, and after 13 minutes the enemy Minenwerfer (trench mortars) and heavy artillery set in. It should be noted that the main fire lay on the northern slope of the Combres Heights, the Ravin de la Mort, and in the adjoining plain up to Saulx and was only shifted to the positions and spoil heaps of sectors 16 and 17 after about an hour.
To combat the enemy mining work on the left wing of sector 17, 2 echelons are to be brought forward. As the first echelon, as quickly as possible, a detonation of S-Ort after advancing another roughly 15 m depending on whether the enemy measures still permit this. Here, the main minefield of the enemy is to be caught and his mining activity at least halted. For the same reason, R-l-2 is cleared and driven further north under the Eberhardt Crater into reachable proximity of the enemy minefield and detonated (see sketch pp. 51 and 53).
As a second echelon, the lower-lying galleries S-l and R-Shaft are meanwhile being driven forward in the dotted direction at a greater depth than S-Ort and R-l-2 toward the enemy minefield, in order to catch and destroy the enemy in any case, even if he should be positioned very deep.
For better haulage and ventilation, a connection between the R-Schacht gallery and the S-l gallery is planned (see sketch p. 53).
At the end of the month, the following were reached:
S-Ort a length of 284.00 m,
S-l a length of 31.00 m.
For R-Schacht, the shaft bottom was completed to a length of 8.00 m.
R-l-2 was cleared out up to 28.40 m.
The combat galleries U1, U2, U3, R-Ort, and R-l were used only as listening galleries. U3-Shaft is to be pushed further forward for the same purpose.
The bypass tunnel between U2 and U1 was driven up to 17.60 m. Alongside this, the usual repair and drainage work ran in the main tunnel and the combat galleries.
Disturbances by enemy mine and artillery fire were lower than in the previous month. On June 7, traffic at Entrance 2 was interrupted by a direct hit on the entrance, whereby Res.-Inf. 211 (211th Reserve Infantry Regiment), Pion.-Komp. 21 (21st Pioneer Company), and Pion.-Min.-Komp. 329 (329th Pioneer Mine Company) suffered casualties in dead and wounded.
On June 21, heavy fire lay across the entire Combres Heights as well as on Camp Neujauer and on the road west of Hannonville.
The 24 construction soldiers previously at our disposal (Arm.-Btl. 117 (117th Construction Battalion)) were unfortunately withdrawn from us by the pioneer commander, so that work progressed more slowly at some points. In addition, requests for listening detachments by the 44. Res.-Div. (44th Reserve Division) adjoining to the west and the 8. Landw.-Div. (8th Landwehr Division) adjoining to the north took away a considerable number of the most capable men. Res.-Inf.-Rgt. 211 provided an average of 8 – 14 men for the tunnel and bypass tunnel.
During rest periods, the company was kept busy with drill, shooting, and gymnastics.
Awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class: Vizefeldwebel Siebert.
Decorated with the Iron Cross 2nd Class:
Gefreiter Wammermann,
Pionier Kordus, Pionier König, Pionier Münzberg, Pionier Sobczak, Pionier Solzbacher, Pionier Fiebig, Pionier Machnick, Pionier Kräker, Pionier Käsbauer.
The health condition and rations of the company were good.
O.U. July 1, 1917.
Certified correct.
Barry
Hauptmann and Company Commander
July 1917.
As in the previous month, the enemy’s mining activity was very brisk also in the month of July. The number of explosive shots amounted to 40 – 50 daily up to the 17th. The listening results showed that the works had come considerably closer to us and threatened us in S-Ort.
Therefore, by order of the 45. Res.-Division (45th Reserve Division), for the defense and destruction of enemy close mining works, the combat gallery P-Ort was detonated on July 17 at 9:35 p.m., at a length of 302.00 m. The chamber was set downward in order to achieve a greater effect also in depth. The charge amounted to 420 centners of Perdit, the dam was 40 m long.
Since S-Ort had been driven for about 150 m in frame profile and rising, bringing in the charge required considerable manpower and extremely strenuous labor. All material had to be passed along by hand right up to the working face. Nevertheless, it succeeded within two days to make S-Ort ready for detonation by inserting double shifts and with the energetic help of Pion.-Min.-Komp. 329 and provided men from Inft.-Rgt. 211.
The detonation proceeded smoothly at the commanded time. The new crater located northwest of our previous crater line, called Welsch Crater, has a diameter of about 55 m and has its open side facing the enemy. The main stone fall went into the Ravin de la Mort. Through the detonation we have considerably damaged the enemy in his activity, for until July 23 no enemy explosive shots were perceived in S-Ort.
Pioneer Order No. 52 of July 18, 1917, Division Order of July 19, 1917, and Army Daily Order of July 28, 1917 express their recognition to the company for the good preparation and the detonation planned and carried out with great prudence and vigor (see next page).
Following the explosion, an infantry operation took place in sector II at 9.45 in the evening, furthermore a patrol of the 1st Comp. 211 (211th Infantry Regiment) proceeded from the Graevenitz crater to the Eberhardt crater and attempted to gather information about the enemy from here. However, heavy artillery, trench mortar, and machine-gun fire hindered them in their attempt to reach the new crater. It returned to the Grenadier crater, established outpost positions there in the direction of the Eberhardt crater and the Welsch crater, and later returned.
After a few days, the outposts were withdrawn from the Grenadier crater because there is no connection to it from our first line. Work on the expansion of the Graevenitz crater, however, was continued.
The French barrage following the explosion began immediately with light artillery, with heavy artillery and trench mortars about 5 minutes later, and remained very brisk until 10.15.
S-Ort was cleared again after the explosion. R-l-2 was driven steeply dipping, S-links was continued horizontally, and in addition R-Schacht was started.
By the end of the month, they reached:
S-Ort a length of 81.50 m (according to new measurement),
S-links a length of 76.50 m (according to new measurement),
R-l-2 a length of 42.50 m (according to new measurement),
R-Schacht a depth of 15.80 m (according to new measurement).
As before, the remaining combat galleries were used only as listening galleries.
Since we were very short of labor, the bypass tunnel between U2 and U1 could not be continued in the month of July. Also, only the necessary maintenance work could be carried out in the main tunnel.
Enemy harassment fire was stronger in July than in the previous month; thus the following were caved in:
on July 4, entrance 1 over 8.00 m,
on July 5, the gallery entrance of U2,
on July 16, entrance 2 and the tunnel between U1 and U2.
Our workforce was considerably weakened on various occasions by the detachment of listening details to the 8. Landwehr-Division (8th Landwehr Division) and the 44. Res.-Division (44th Reserve Division). From Infant.-Rgt. 211 6 to 8 men were available to us daily.
During rest periods, the company was occupied with drill, combat service, and gymnastics.
Awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class were:
Gefreiter Langer on June 30, 1917,
Unteroffizier Feller on July 12, 1917.
The Iron Cross 2nd Class was awarded to:
Pionier Roos, Pionier Riemer, Pionier Kuczinski, Pionier Adamcewski, Pionier Serwa, Pionier Jozwiak, Pionier Lusga, Pionier Koralewski, Pionier Pohl, Pionier Reins.
The state of health and the rations of the company were good.
On July 15, the pioneers Becker and Winter were wounded by shrapnel on the way to the position at the U3 slag heap, specifically Becker in the back and on both arms and Winter slightly in the head.
O.U., August 1, 1917
Certified correct:
B.
Hauptmann and company commander
August 1917.
Strongly disturbed by our work in R-l-2, the enemy is trying to stop us there and prevent us from attacking his position. On August 4, his work—drill noises and individual pick strokes—was clearly detected slightly deeper than R-l-2 from the left. Already on the 5th, at 9.30 PM, he detonated a crush charge in the left drift of R-l-2, which partially caved in only about 5 m of our gallery, briefly interfered with the loading of a counter-charge, and buried 3 men of P.M.K. 330 (Pion. Beck, Kordes, Wycick) and Pion. Ulbrich, P.M.K. 329 (see sketch). Within a short time, the buried men could be recovered without significant harm. Unteroffizier Stuhrmann and Pionier Wlodarczak I particularly distinguished themselves during the rescue work (see corps daily order of August 12, 1917 on the page after next).
Following this explosion and our counter-explosion on August 16, 1917, he detonated another charge on August 31, 1917, at 05:40, specifically on the right side of the R.-l.-2. gallery (see sketch 69). By this explosion, about 6 m of the gallery in front of the dam, which had remained standing from our explosion on August 17, 1917, were caved in, whereby the listening post, Gefr. Swarowski, was slightly buried. There is no actual crushing, especially since our gallery remained completely gas-free. Nor did the explosion come as a surprise, as we were informed about the status of the enemy work through eavesdropping. Knocking and drilling noises had been reported beforehand again. The explosion cratered, according to the observed smoke phenomena. Shortly after the explosion, the enemy shelled the approaches on the Herbeuville-Höhe.
Addendum:
The earlier aerial photograph (see page 80) has proven that on August 31, the enemy simultaneously carried out a double explosion to the left and right of the R-l-2 gallery.
While the explosion to the right or west of R-l-2 cratered, the explosion located to the south resulted in only a strong bulge of massive boulders on the surface. The photograph on page 65 reveals this bulge as a dark spot below the x; cf. the aerial photograph on page 80.
Alongside these enemy works, the enemy’s other mining operations proceeded. The explosive shots observed in August amount to 40 – 50 daily. The enemy’s endeavor to ward us off from his finger position is therefore clear.
As already mentioned, on August 5 in R-l-2 we were just busy tamping the charge for the counter-explosion when the enemy explosion already took place. 100 centners of ammunition (Perdit) and a 2.00 m dam had already been put in place. We were able to begin clearing work immediately after the explosion, since no significant damage had occurred and only the hanging wall had come down for about 8 m. The ammunition had remained intact, so that after bringing in fresh priming ammunition, the tamping work could be continued and completed by the morning of the 7th. The charge was now to remain in place until the enemy could be detected nearby again. For this purpose, a listening apparatus was also built into the explosive chamber, with which the enemy work behind the dam was listened to. To deceive him on our part, a working face was set 12 m to the rear of the dam, approximately parallel to R-l-2. In the first days after the enemy explosion, no enemy explosive shot was perceived from the left in R-l-2; only on the 8th were the first ones reported again.
On the 16th, at 05:10, our explosion was then carried out punctually on the orders of the 45. Res.-Division (45th Reserve Division), while from 04:55 to 05:10 a strong assault detachment operation with heavy artillery and trench mortar fire was carried out against the French strongpoint “le Chapeau” in sector III.
Through observation from the Graevenitz crater, a flash was detected, a sign that the explosion had cratered, as was to be expected with the overburden churned up by the earlier explosions. The aerial photograph (next page) shows the new crater on the northern edge of the Eberhardt crater.
In combat gallery R and the neighboring gallery S, the tamping and drift remained intact.
The entire gallery R showed no gas when inspected immediately after the explosion. Only after the miners had worked again for about an hour did gas suddenly become noticeable. The crews were partly completely unconscious, but were able to drag each other out in time. The gallery was therefore immediately timbered after the ventilation had been switched to exhaust effect.
Actual mining operations have not been resumed in R-l-2 since, except for those to deceive the enemy. R-l-2 was used solely as a listening gallery and a listening apparatus was installed in front of the dam. Since the enemy had fired at his former explosion site the day before our explosion and regular explosive shots had also been observed at the other enemy work sites, but after our explosion no enemy shots or other mining work were reported at all until the 19th, it can be safely assumed that our explosion inflicted considerable damage on the enemy. The enemy’s galleries were in any case completely gassed for a few days by the explosion, which can be concluded from the uninterrupted activity of the enemy ventilator at the trottoir, the sound of which echoed over to our crater position for a full three days and nights after our explosion. The sound of this ventilator is otherwise always heard only intermittently (see right).
A patrol operation by the R.I.R. 211 (211th Reserve Infantry Regiment) carried out following the explosion against the French sap at Blaupunkt 22a found the sap cleared at that time.
Relatively late after the detonation, at about 5:25, the enemy laid heavy artillery and trench mortar fire on the Combres Heights (mainly on sector I c-d) and the approaches to Combres, Herbeuville, and the Ost-Tranchée. On this occasion, the tunnel between S and U4 was crushed over a length of about 20 m by a heavy mine.
It was striking that the enemy had already placed heavy fire on the Graevenitz Crater and primarily sector Id on the two previous days, August 14 and 15.
The division order of August 16, 27 expresses recognition to all participants in the enterprise.
Division order of August 16, 1917.
„The enterprise last night, in which members of all parts of the division participated, has fulfilled its purpose. The enterprise was skillfully supported by subsidiary operations of regiments 210 and 211 and the miners. I express my full appreciation to all participants, especially the miners, for this.“
Signed v. Eberhardt.
Since the aforementioned enemy detonations still lie over 170 m in front of our first line, there is nothing to fear, especially since the enemy will be reached and engaged in the foreseeable future with the R-Shaft gallery located 17 m below the R-l-2 gallery. Accordingly, the R-Shaft gallery is being driven forward eagerly in the direction of the Eberhardt Crater. Opposing the other enemy work, the S-left gallery is driven further forward between the Grenadier and Welsch Craters, and furthermore a shaft is sunk in S-left in order to engage the enemy from below here just as with the shaft planned in S-Ort, in case he should lie deeper than our previous attack levels. (see page 75).
At the end of the month, they reached:
R-Shaft gallery a length of 34.70 m,
S-left a length of 130.90 m,
S-left shaft a length of 3.60 m,
S-Ort was cleared again and timbered at 283 m. To start the new shaft, the small profile was reshot from 192 m to 205 m to the dimensions of the large profile, and then the construction of a shaft chamber was begun.
Operation of the bypass tunnel from U2 to U1 also rested this month due to a lack of laborers. In the main tunnel, the usual repair and drainage work was carried out.
Through listening and construction detachments, our labor force was greatly weakened again. Thus, Lt. Vecqueray with 1 man was detached to the Vecqueray construction detachment to Billy and Lt. Schmieding with 1 Uffz. and 8 men to the Southern Army of Metz to listen to enemy work.
On the 29th, however, 15 men of Armierungskomp. 2/117 were made available to us again. P.M.K. 329 was also assigned the section from U1 to Exit 2 for a more even distribution of repair work in the Combres Tunnel.
Enemy harassment fire was generally not as active as in previous months. On August 11, at 6:00 p.m., the tunnel at U3 was crushed over about 20 m by an enemy mine, during which a man from 5/211 was killed. Rescue operations were immediately undertaken by us and P.M.K. 329.
On August 13, Exit 2 was also crushed over 5 m by an enemy mine.
Finally, as already noted, the tunnel was crushed over a length of 20 m between S and U4 after the detonation on August 16.
During the rest periods, the company was occupied with drill and gymnastics. On August 11, the company celebrated its first anniversary by holding athletic and combat games.
Awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class:
Pionier Karl Schneider, Pionier Richard Schinski.
The state of health and rations of the company were good.
On August 30, the 45th Res. Div. was relieved by the 240th I.D., the Pioneer Battalion 345 (commanded by Hauptm. Welsch) by the Pioneer Battalion 240 (commander Hauptmann Brüger).
O.U., September 1, 1917
For correctness:
Barry
Hauptm. and company commander.
September 1917.
Following its fork and crush charges on August 31, 1917, the enemy once again approached our combat gallery R-l-2 from both the left and the right. Beginning September 3, enemy mining noises (blows, knocking, and rolling) were repeatedly reported in the immediate vicinity of R-l-2.
Unexpectedly, on September 21, 1917, at 6.30 p.m., the enemy detonated two crush charges at the Welsch-Trichter, specifically at gallery S-Ort. Exactly as on August 31 (see aerial photograph A, page 96), the enemy attempted this time as well to catch our gallery with a fork charge that wraps around the gallery like a claw (see sketch p. 90). The two detonations coincide with the work that had been determined in June by precise directional surveys with the compass (see page left open). However, explosive shots have not been reported again from these galleries since.
The enemy thus appears to have driven these galleries forward and prepared them for attack even earlier, before we had reached his vicinity with S-Ort. As a result of the detonations of September 21, only a few gallery frames were buckled in combat gallery S-links. In addition, about 12.00 m behind the gallery face, a few meters of the roof collapsed.
Quite remarkably, gallery S-Ort, which was located in the immediate vicinity of the French detonations, showed no damage, so that even the listener present in S-Ort during the detonation perceived nothing other than the detonation and the tremor in the rock. This can only be explained by the fact that the force waves of the fork charge broke and neutralized each other in the vicinity of S-Ort; otherwise, gallery S-links, located 45 m away, could not have shown any damage.
Troops had not been injured by the detonation because a shift change was just taking place, and the galleries also remained continuously free of gas.
The number of enemy shots in the company sector remained at the same level as before in September, at about 40 – 50 shots daily. In the immediate vicinity of our work, the enemy fired only a few weak shots, specifically at the same time as other, more distant ones, in order to deceive us. His activity thus remains quite intense.
Combat gallery R-l-2, which had been destroyed in a small part by the crush charges on August 31, was cleared up to the old dam while avoiding any noise, loaded with 100 Ztr. of explosives and, after close enemy mining noises were reported again starting on the 3rd, detonated on September 10 at 9:00 a.m. by order of the division in order to halt the enemy in his continued work.
Until September 25, no further enemy mining work in the immediate vicinity of the gallery was detected by the listeners in R-l-2. From this, it can be safely concluded that our detonation had the desired success. In the new crater, Hauptmann Barry and Leutnant Borchers discovered a French gallery lined with framing timber on September 18, about 8.00 m underground and 15 m from the eastern edge of the crater. Two days later, the enemy had already made this exposed gallery unrecognizable by removing the framing timber and burying the opening.
Because of the heavy fog, the detonation itself and the behavior of the enemy immediately after the detonation could not be observed.
Retaliatory fire with artillery and mines remained absent, in contrast to earlier times.
Combat gallery S-links, only slightly damaged by the enemy detonation on September 21, 1917, was cleared again within a few hours. Then, especially since enemy explosive shots had approached us considerably at the Welsch-Trichter, combat gallery S-links was detonated by order of the division on September 29 at 4:00 a.m. to fend off close enemy mining work at the Welsch-Trichter. The explosive charge amounted to 350 Ztr. Perdit. With this charge, the detonation cratered well despite the 30 m thick overburden (see aerial photographs page 96B). Our own galleries and the Graevenitz-Trichter remained undamaged in the process. A few days later, the presence of lagging and squared timber was reported in the new crater, from which it can be safely concluded that enemy mining installations were destroyed. Close enemy explosive shots were no longer reported until the end of the month.
Hostile machine gun fire started immediately after the detonation, light artillery about 5 minutes later, heavy artillery and Minenwerfer about 10 minutes later. The bombardment lasted about 1 hour.
The R-Schacht gallery was driven in the direction of the Eberhardt crater. R-l-2 itself was propped and used only as a listening gallery. The S-links shaft was completely sunk and timbered and then a shaft inset was established. In S-Ort, at a length of 215.00 m, the sinking of a shaft was begun, which, like the S-links shaft, is to be sunk down to contour 300. With the shaft bottom drifts, we will then definitely be deeper than the enemy.
At the end of the month, the following were reached:
R-Schacht gallery a length of 73.30 m,
S-links shaft a depth of 14.75 m,
S-Ort shaft a depth of 3.60 m,
S-links was detonated at 170.70 m.
The remaining combat galleries were used as listening galleries, drained, and maintained.
The usual repair work in the tunnel, especially at entrance 1 and 2, was carried out without incidents. We were often disturbed in our work by power outages, as the winch and ventilators came to a standstill.
From Armierungsbataillon 2/117, 15 men were available daily.
Hostile harassment fire was practically nonexistent on our spoil heaps and tunnel mouths throughout the entire month.
During the rest periods, the company was occupied with drill and gymnastics.
Awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class:
Leutnant Borchers,
Unteroffizier Guschke.
The Iron Cross 2nd Class was awarded to:
Pionier Elsner, Pionier Brisch, Pionier Bogdanski, Pionier Wlodarczak II.
Health condition and rations of the company were good.
During the period from 1.9. to 31.9., the company was subordinated to the 240. Inf.-Div. (240th Infantry Division) and attached to the Commander of Pioneers of the 240. I.D. (Hptm. Brüger).
O.U. October 1, 1917.
Certified correct:
Barry
Hauptmann and company commander
October 1917.
Enemy mining activity in October continued to be extremely brisk. The reported number of detonations remained at its previous level of 40 – 50 daily. Repeated mining noises were also reported near combat gallery R, thus on the 5th between 4 and 4:30 p.m. both in the R-Schacht gallery by the working crews and by the listener in R-l-2, on 6.10., 6:00 p.m., also in R-l-2, on the 17th, 9:25 a.m., in the R-Schacht, and on the 18th in R-l-2. On the 20th the enemy was remarkably quiet, so that the assumption of a detonation on his part already existed. Work in the R-Schacht gallery was therefore carried out with increased caution and the listener in R-l-2 was withdrawn further. Also on the 28th a French radio message was intercepted, according to which the enemy intended to detonate, without anything actually occurring. A patrol of Infanterie-Regts. Wesel (56th Reserve Infantry Regiment) reported on the 14th, 9:20 p.m., hostile mining noises between the Eberhardt crater and the enemy trench 23 at the Finger (cf. p. 52). However, these appear to have been only work in the trench itself or at dugouts, especially since they were observed or listened to in the immediate vicinity of the trench and only a few meters deep.
Holding the line Eberhardt Crater – Welsch Crater is our main focus for the time being, followed only then by the attack on the enemy line at the Finger. Accordingly, the work in the R and S galleries is arranged. The galleries R-Schacht gallery, S-links, S-links-Schacht gallery, and S-Ort were driven in approximately the same direction 305°-307° and are, if possible, to be driven first up to the eastern edge of the crater line (Welsch-Eberhardt Crater). The attack and defense plan against the Finger is shown on the adjacent sketch 1:1000. In S-links and S-Ort, as well as in S-Ort shaft, we had to overcome major water difficulties with the onset of heavy precipitation, as the rainwater accumulating in the craters sought its natural outflow through the combat galleries.
For this reason, we branched off laterally from the deepest part of the crater with S-left and S-Ort and created good drainage systems in the galleries. S-left was driven immediately after its explosion along the left side of the tamping, and S-Ort was put back into operation at the end of the month. As left flank security, the R-shaft-gallery-left was reoccupied.
At the end of the month:
R-shaft gallery a length of 112.70 m,
R-shaft-gallery-left a length of 23.10 m,
S-left a length of 163.90 m,
S-left-shaft gallery a length of 17.00 m,
S-Ort a length of 90.00 m,
S-Ort shaft a depth of 11.80 m.
The usual repair work in the tunnel and galleries, especially extensive drainage work, was carried out. The high-voltage power interruptions, which have recently become increasingly frequent and sensitive due to the cable having become very defective, often caused long disruptions. These interruptions often lasted for hours and resulted in the fact that, quite apart from the complete stoppage of haulage, the ventilators in all shafts with their galleries could not run either, and the men consequently had to be withdrawn from the combat galleries due to a lack of air supply. Such unpleasant interruptions naturally reduce efficiency, and this could also make the situation for the miners working in the shaft galleries very critical, indeed even hopeless, in the event of enemy explosions.
To resume operations of R-shaft-gallery-left, the Pioneer Commander placed another 10 men from Armierungskompagnie 2/117 and 10 men from sister company 329 at the disposal of the company.
By order of the Pioneer Commander, S-Ort was occupied at the end of the month with men from Pionier-Mineur-Kompagnie 329.
In the month of October, there was no enemy harassing fire on our spoil heaps.
During rest periods, the company was occupied with drill and gymnastics, and was also further trained through repeated exercises with gas masks and self-rescuers.
Awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class: Pioneer Beyer I.
The Iron Cross 2nd Class was received by the pioneers: Frick, Klinkenberg, Paetz, Rauschenberg, Ribitzki.
By divisional order dated October 11, 1917, Hauptmann Karau, Pion.-Min.-Komp. 329, was entrusted with the tactical overall management of mining operations on Combres. During the leave of Hauptmann Barry from Oct. 1–21, Leutnant Borchers led the company.
The health condition and rations of the company were good
O. U., November 1, 1917.
For correctness:
Barry
Hauptmann and company commander
November 1917.
The enemy had already made his presence felt in October through numerous explosive shots as well as knocking and mining noises. However, no explosion had yet taken place on his part. At the beginning of November, the number of enemy explosive shots remained at the same level as before, at 36–40 shots daily. This continued until the 7th.
On November 8, 1917, at 18:50, however, while we were right in the middle of loading the R-shaft gallery, he detonated a heavy crushing mine, the strong ground tremor of which was clearly noticeable in the local quarters of Hannonville.
As a result of the explosion, carbon monoxide gases penetrated with extraordinary force into the R-gallery and into the entire tunnel system from gallery C6 to entrance 1. (see sketch p. 106). The explosion occurred at the time of the shift change, when all the miners were in the upper part of the R-gallery. (see sketch and profile p. 107).
According to the statements of those poisoned by gas, the miners engaged here in bringing up ammunition were first hurled to the ground by the air pressure of the detonation and then stunned by the gas wave following with even greater pressure.
In all, 11 miners (cf. compilation p. 122) of the Pionier-Min.-Komp. 330 (330th Pioneer Mine Company), 9 infantrymen of the Res.-Inf.-Rgt. 56 (56th Reserve Infantry Regiment), and one artillery observer were killed instantly, and about 31 men fell ill with gas poisoning. Of those who fell ill with gas poisoning, another miner (Pionier Kampa) died on November 14 as a result of a skull fracture suffered during the fall.
Due to the force of the air pressure during the detonation, several other of the killed had also been hurled to the ground with such force that they suffered skull fractures. At the upper end of shaft R sat 6 men who must have been killed instantly by the carbon monoxide gas shot up from the shaft under high pressure, for they were found in a relaxed posture, sitting to rest, without any disfigurement of the face. The killed and gas-poisoned infantrymen were in the Combres Tunnel and fell victim here to the penetrated carbon monoxide gas. (see sketch p. 106).
As a result of the explosion tremor, the shaft R gallery, in whose detonation chamber 80 cwt of ammunition had already been placed, was more or less heavily smashed and caved in up to shaft R. The neighboring gallery S remained intact and free of gas, so that mining work could be continued here without disturbance.
Rescue operations were initiated immediately after the explosion by Leutnant Borchers, together with the Unteroffiziere and men of Pion.-Min.-Komp. 330 still in position. Leutnant Borchers first met the fleeing men and immediately sent them out of the heavily gas-filled tunnel into the open. The Unteroffiziere had meanwhile equipped themselves with self-rescuers in the NCO dugout and penetrated into the gas-filled gallery R from the gallery entrance.
After Leutnant Borchers had sent the men located in the Combres Tunnel into the open, he first informed the company commander of the 7th Company, Res.-Inf.-Rgt. 56 located in this sector of the impending gas danger and immediately had the infantry dugouts in the bypass tunnel and the kitchen in gallery U4 evacuated. He then equipped himself with a self-rescuer in the officer dugout and went up with Pionier Schwarz through brake incline R to combat gallery R. In brake incline R they found the first two dead.
Meanwhile, rescue work in combat gallery R had already made good progress despite the heavy gassing, so that 5 dead had been recovered. Bringing the casualties out of the slippery and dark gallery, whose lighting system had been destroyed, was extraordinarily difficult for the rescue teams. Nevertheless, by exerting all their forces and disregarding the constantly threatening danger of becoming victims of the toxic gases themselves, the rescue teams succeeded in recovering all casualties located in the gallery within a short time. Vizefeldwebel Michalski as well as the Unteroffiziere August and Kleegräfe had rushed to assist from Pion.-Min.-Kompagnie 329 (329th Pioneer Mine Company).
Characteristic of the self-sacrifice with which the rescue work was conducted is the fact that Leutnant Borchers, Gefreiter Langer, and Pionier Grabowski were active until they themselves became unconscious and were evacuated as gas-poisoned.
The achievements of individuals are evident from the following compilation:
Those listed in the table above were proposed at the highest level for the award of the Commemorative Medal for Rescue from Danger. The Pioniere Piotrowiak, Mroz I, Poganatz, Kaminiarz, Molzahn, Löffler I, and Kaczmarek II later, after having helped recover the infantrymen, carried the dead brought to brake incline R further out onto the spoil heap several times.
Further recovery work and the investigation of the accident site were initiated and completed under the leadership of the company commander who had rushed to the scene, together with the other company officers.
The corps daily order of November 13, 1917 expresses appreciation to those mentioned above and the participants of Pion.-Min.-Komp. 329 and the 2nd Company, Armierungs-Bataillon 117 (117th Construction Battalion). (See overleaf order).
At the burial of the slain, His Excellency the General of Pioneers Schroeter spoke, among other things:
“We are proud of you miners; only through you have we held the Combres Heights. Underground combat is the hardest. On the ground, in the air, on the water we can see the enemy, but you can only sense him. After the mishap, return to work with fresh courage and do not rest until your fallen comrades are avenged.”
The burial of the first 11 victims took place on November 11 at the military cemetery in Hannonville s/l Côtes in a shared vault, in which the 12th miner, who subsequently died, was buried on November 16. (Figures pp. 114 and 115 and 197).
Around 21:00, i.e., about 2 hours after the explosion, an officer of the company, Leutnant Schmieding, descended into the shaft under the supervision of the company commander with a breathing apparatus and determined that the lower 2 m of the shaft were filled with debris from frame timbers and masses of rock.
Immediately after the explosion, the ventilation in the shaft and gallery was switched to exhaust action in order to quickly free the shaft and gallery of gas.
As early as the midday hours of the following day (November 9), the clearance work in the shaft had progressed so far that one could penetrate into the shaft gallery.
The shaft gallery was filled almost to the top with masses of rock and splintered timber originating from the support framing, and was stripped of all its support framing. The largest part of the support framing lay down in and at the shaft itself. In the shaft gallery, a white gas was initially present, which was however extracted by the gradual extension of the ventilation pipes.
By November 14, it was already possible to advance up to 110 m, i.e., to the explosive chamber. The gallery was stripped of its support framing along its entire length, which had been crushed and splintered and for the most part blown down into the shaft. The ventilator at the junction to the left R-shaft gallery was completely smashed and hurled 40 m away. The ventilation pipes and the drilling equipment were crushed and bent, and on the ribs appeared the scrapes and slide marks of the swept-past rock. The bends of the gallery at 70 and 80 m length from the shaft as well as the incline at this point had almost disappeared and leveled out due to the force of the explosion (see sketch p. 106).
Up to 3/4 of its total height of about 1.60 – 1.80 m, the entire gallery was filled with rock masses and in places covered with a fine, earthy dust up to a hand’s breadth in height. After clearing and timbering the gallery, the explosive chamber, which was completely caved in up to the roof, could then be reopened.
On November 16, the ammunition located in the explosive chamber (80 centners of Perdit) was found in an intact condition. To all appearances, the explosion center was located to the right front of the explosive chamber and somewhat higher, because the rock masses were hurled toward the left rib of the explosive chamber and tightly compressed there.
As early as November 17, the R-shaft gallery was loaded again and reported ready for detonation on the morning of November 19. On November 19 at 12:00 noon, the gallery was then blown up by order of the 121. Division (121st Division) and without incident. The enemy had already come considerably closer again. The last detonation shots and mining noises had been reported as late as 1 hour before the explosion. The tremor of the Combres Heights caused by the explosion was exceptionally strong. Through the explosion, which cratered, harmful gases penetrated neither through the tamping nor through the rock into our galleries. While gallery R remained undamaged by the explosion, the neighboring combat gallery S-l was caved in over a length of 60.00 m. The explosive effect accordingly manifested itself in this intensive manner up to 90 m from the explosive chamber, from which it could be concluded with certainty that the French works detected by explosion in front of the R-shaft gallery and between the R-shaft gallery and S-left were thoroughly destroyed.
Especially worthy of mention is the quite excellent performance of the company precisely during the loading of this gallery after it was destroyed by the enemy explosion on November 8. Despite the constantly threatening danger of being caught once again by the enemy with an earlier explosion, officers, Unteroffiziere, and men competed with each other to make the gallery ready for detonation as soon as possible in order to avenge the killed comrades.
The Army Daily Order of November 25, 1917 expresses appreciation to the company. (see adjacent order).
Two hours after the detonation at the R-shaft gallery, the S-place combat gallery was also blown up with good success to repel enemy mining operations. The gallery had been temporarily turned over to Company 329 due to the company being overburdened with work. After the detonation took place, it was taken over again by Pioneer Mine Company 330 and gallery R was given over to Pioneer Mine Company 329 in return. The later records regarding gallery R are therefore from now on in the war diary of Pioneer Mine Company 329.
The reconnaissance result of a patrol undertaken on 24.11. by Hauptmann Barry and Leutnant Schmieding into the crater field at the Eberhardt and Welsch craters was the exact determination of the location and size of the new mine craters. (cf. the later aerial photograph p. 121). Remarkable in the Eberhardt crater was still the presence of gallery frames and planks of enemy origin, which originate from an old French gallery.
After the enemy detonation that took place on 8.11., the enemy blasting shots decreased considerably, so that it could be assumed that the crushing blast had also gassed the opponent’s own galleries. Until 19.11., the number of shots slowly increased again, but did not exceed 20 and 30 shots daily. After our detonation on 19.11., the number of enemy blasting shots decreased markedly again and amounted to only 10 – 15 shots in the first days. The close shots remained entirely absent at first and were only reported again from 23.11. onward in front of S-left together with mining noises in the right thrust. This prompted us to immediately shoot out a detonation chamber in S-left at a length of 180 m and prepare everything for loading. But already during these works on 25.11.17 at 7 Nachm. the enemy blasted to the right of the S-left combat gallery, specifically a crushing blast. Through this, the last 9 m of the gallery and the detonation chamber already completed were completely buried and another 9 m of the gallery were heavily caved in. Fortunately, no casualties occurred because the detonation took place at the time of the shift change. The remaining galleries remained intact. Gas had not penetrated our galleries. The clearance work was immediately tackled, and the detonation chamber was ready for loading again by the end of the month.
Enemy artillery fire did not set in during the opponent’s detonations, whereas it did during our detonation on 19.11. Shortly after the detonation, light artillery set in, then the trench mortars opened their fire at 12.15 and the heavy artillery at 12.20 and maintained it in considerable strength until around 1.00 Uhr in the afternoon.
Aside from these blasting works, the ongoing work in the remaining combat galleries continued its course. Until the handover to Pioneer Mine Company 329, the R-shaft-left has a length of 26,80 m.
At the end of the month had reached:
S-left shaft a length of 44.80 m,
S-place shaft the final depth of 18,00 m.
The detonation chambers were located:
in the R-shaft gallery at 115,00 m,
in S-left at 180,00 m,
in S-place at approx. 90,50 m.
The explosive charge in the R-shaft gallery amounted to 550 Ztr. at the 28 m thick overburden and in S-place at 14 m overburden 240 Ztr. S-place was cleared again up to 56,50 m after the detonation and is to be abandoned as a combat gallery due to its shallow depth and used only as a listening gallery.
The usual repair work in the tunnel and in the galleries as well as the drainage work were continued.
To prevent accidents like the one on 8.11., it was decided to secure all operating combat galleries against the Combres and bypass tunnel by means of weather doors. The combat galleries are therefore closed off by double weather doors which together form an airlock each time. The arrangement of the weather doors in front of gallery S is apparent from the surrounding sketch (p. 124). Preliminary work was started immediately.
To manage the work after the French detonation on 8.11., infantrymen of Reserve Infantry Regiment 36 were temporarily made available to the company. Construction Company 2/117 also provided 20 men as a hauling squad in the month of November. From Pioneer Companies 260 and 241 of the 121st Infantry Division, a total of 5 men were detached daily to be trained in listening service.
Leutnant Borchers was detached to the Arendt School in Jarny for 2 days. The Arendt stations present at the front are to establish closer contact with the miner companies, since enemy electrical sounds from drilling machines and other machinery can be detected by them.
Enemy harassing fire was light on our sector. On November 5, during mutual mine fire, the S-Rigge was destroyed by direct hits, and likewise the tunnel between entrances 10 and 11 was caved in for approx. 6.00 m.
Engine noises and a ventilation pipe of approx. 70 cm were detected by an infantry patrol on November 7 northwest of the Welsch Crater. Hand grenades and a few days later a concentrated charge were thrown into the pipe by the patrols.
During the rest periods, the company was further trained in drill and physical training as well as in rescue service with the army oxygen apparatus.
Unteroffizier Suhrmann was awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class.
The Iron Cross 2nd Class was received by:
Gefreiter Papajewski, Pionier Czarnecki, Pionier Ellerkmann, Pionier Molzahn, Pionier Löffler I, Pionier Piotriwiak, Pionier Kaminiarcz, Pionier Poganatz, Pionier Kaczmarek II, Pionier Müller, Pionier Murach, Pionier Nadstoga, Pionier Kurczyk, Pionier Hilbig, Pionier Hein, Pionier Herden, Pionier Pfitzner, Pionier Schindler, Pionier Rausch, Pionier Löffler II, Pionier Olbrich, Pionier Fritsche, Pionier Weinitschke, Pionier Regitz, Pionier Wojcziesak, Pionier Vömel.
The personal details of those fallen on November 8 are shown in the following compilation:
The sole responsibility for the entire mine warfare at Combres, which had been placed in the hands of the leader of Pioneer-Mine Company 329 in the previous month to the exclusion of the Pioneer Commander, was returned to the individual leaders of the two miner companies for the sectors assigned to them. From now on, the miner companies were directly subordinated to the General Command and were only attached tactically to the 121. Inf.-Div. (121st Infantry Division). The companies remained subordinated to the commander of pioneers of Pion.-Batl. 121 (121st Pioneer Battalion) solely in disciplinary and administrative matters.
C.P., December 1, 1917.
For accuracy:
Barry
Hauptmann and company commander.
December 1917.
The enemy continued his mining activity in the first days of the month in the previous manner. The next works were reported in front of S between the S-links and S-Ort galleries. On December 3, at 14:00, gallery S-l, which was already ready for loading at the end of November, was precisely blown up on the order of the 121. Inf. Div. for the defense against and destruction of nearby enemy mining operations. The charge amounted to 600 Ztr. Perdit. The detonation cratered. The diameter of the crater is approx. 60.00 m, the crater lies directly west of the Welsch Crater and bears the name Below-Trichter (see p. 133).
The tamping remained undamaged, as did the S-Ort gallery. In the R-Shaft gallery, a few meters were caved in. All galleries remained free of gas.
The enemy artillery and mine fire did not start until 02:15 and was particularly heavy on sectors Id and e. By direct hits in front of the K.T.K. right, a stack of mines was detonated and the pioneer park, tunnel entrances 1 and 2, and the winch railway were destroyed. After the detonation, only distant enemy blast shots in varying numbers of 17-35 shots daily were heard, proof that the enemy’s close works were destroyed.
On December 10, at 07:33, Company 329 blew up the R-Ort combat gallery, also for the defense against nearby enemy mining operations.
Following its explosion on December 3, S-links was immediately cleared and driven forward again, and the S-l shaft gallery lying beneath S-links was likewise vigorously pushed forward.
While during the first half of the month only enemy mining work was perceived in the rear echelons, close shots in front of S were reported again from December 16 on. The number fluctuated between 20 and 30. On December 21, drilling with an electric machine was then detected in the S-l shaft in the left rib, and likewise on the following day during the night shift. Both results were promptly reported by the duty officer, Vizefeldwebel Siebert. On the orders of the company commander, Hauptmann Barry, a blast chamber was immediately excavated at 69 m in the S-links shaft gallery and the loading of the same began on December 22. The explosion was intended to act as a crushing mine. The charge was 150 Ztr. Perdit. On December 23 at 09:15, the gallery was blown up on the division’s orders from the S tunnel mouth and the reported work was destroyed.
Contrary to expectations, gases accumulated in combat gallery S, so that several gas dams were hastily installed in the Combres Tunnel. After the construction of the dams, the ventilation was to be changed over, work that was carried out by Hauptmann Barry, Offz. Stellvertr. (acting officer) Röstel, Unteroff. Guschke, and Unteroffz. Schwierziewski.
During this work, at 11:20, the French blew a mine. A tremendous tongue of flame rushed out of the S tunnel mouth at high speed. Everyone inside gallery S was hurled many meters through the air and violently thrown to the ground. Hauptmann Barry, who was furthest forward, sustained severe burns to his head and hands as well as severe contusions and had to be evacuated to the military hospital as severely wounded. Unteroffizier Schwierziewski was killed. Feldwebel (first sergeant) Röstel and Unteroffizier Gusch got off with contusions, and Gefr. Skrotzki suffered a fractured thigh.
Gases also penetrated gallery U3, killing 2 men of Pionier-Mineur-Kompagnie 329 (329th Pioneer Miner Company). The gallery itself was badly damaged; the entire timbering of S-rechts, S-Ort, and S-links was torn out by the blast pressure up to 150 m from the portal. Debris from the ribs and the roof filled the drive to a depth of about 1 to 1.30 m. S-Ort shaft, S-l shaft, and S-Ort (small profile) had remained intact.
Leutnant Häusgen (Pion.-Min.-Komp. 329) tried to enter gallery S with Unteroffizier Bigos, 330, a few hours after the enemy explosion. However, the enemy explosive gases ignited on their lamps. Both got off with minor burns.
By the end of the month, no enemy mining shots could be heard, so it can be assumed that enemy work was also affected by the explosion. Clearing work in the S gallery was immediately resumed. Since enemy mining shots were again detected by listening in C5 and C4, the C6 shaft was cleared again and brought to a length of 139 m. The S-Ort shaft was completed in the month of December and the S-Ort shaft gallery was driven 12.70 m in the direction of the Welsch Crater. The clearing work in S-l and S-Ort reached 65.00 m and 220.00 m respectively. Due to the increased work, only the main damages could be repaired in the Combres Tunnel. The progress of the ventilation doors under construction was also hindered thereby.
Replacements for those killed in the month of November arrived in mid-December. Otherwise, the labor force was the same as in the previous month.
Apart from the days of the explosions, there was little enemy harassment fire on our position. On December 10, the tunnel between exit 1 and 2 was slightly caved in by trench mortar fire.
During rest periods, the company received further training through drill, gymnastics, and also in rescue service using oxygen apparatus.
Leutnant Schmieding was on leave from 8. – 21.12.17. Leutnant Borchers from 22.12.17 – 15. 1.1918.
For the wounded Hauptmann Barry, Leutnant Schmieding commands the company during Leutnant Borchers’s leave.
Awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class:
Pionier Kaczmarek I, Pionier Denker, Pionier Bartsch, Pionier Spitzer, Pionier Somnitz.
O.U. on January 1, 1918.
For correctness:
I.V.d.K.F.
signed Schmieding
Leutnant
January 1918.
The enemy detonation on 23.12.17 had once again shown that the opponent is striving with all seriousness and utmost vigor to gradually push us out of the Eberhardt-Welsch-Trichter line with our subterranean defenses, in order to take possession of the Graevenitz-Trichter and above all that of the Granathügel and the Storchnest. The seriousness of the situation is furthermore reinforced by the fact that the enemy has also resumed his activity to the right of the combat gallery U3.
The tenser situation made necessary the employment of two further miner companies, which arrived in the middle of the month: on 13.1. the Pionier-Mineur-Komp.325 and on 15.1. the Bavarian Miner Company 5.
By order of the Gen. Kds. V. A.K. dated 19.1.18 Dept. Ig Pi No. 145/12 Geh., the companies were combined into a battalion, Battalion-Karau (without establishment).
The battalion regulated the work schedule of the companies as follows:
1.) Pionier-Mineur-Kompagnie 329 operates the combat galleries in R, U3-Bremsberg, and one side of the tunnel connection from S to Exit 2.
2.) Pionier-Mineur-Kompagnie 330 operates the combat galleries in S and the other side of the bypass tunnel from S to Exit 2.
3.) Pionier-Mineur-Kompagnie 325 operates the combat gallery in U3 right, C6, and the connecting stretch between Entrance 2 and 4. In addition, it is to maintain the tunnel between Entrance 4 and Entrance 11.
4.) Bavarian Miner Company 5 operates C4, C5, and the bypass from U1 to the old tunnel in the direction of C6. In addition, it is to maintain the tunnel between Entrance 4 and the East Exit.
Due to the reorganization, the company handed over combat gallery C6 to Pionier-Mineur-Kompagnie 325 on 13.1. and retained only gallery S with its branches and shafts as its combat area.
The attack plan worked out by Hauptmann Karau is guided by the following principles:
a) to suppress the minefields of the enemy main system on the left wing (Finger),
b) to flank this system through a larger work (U3),
c) in conjunction with the destruction of the enemy minefield in front of the right wing, to systematically mine and dismantle the northern slope of Combres and make it untenable for the enemy.
Company 330 therefore has the task—together with Pionier-Mineur-Kompagnie 325, which operates the R shaft galleries—using the S-left shaft galleries and S-face shaft galleries, to destroy the enemy main minefields on the Finger and, if possible, to include the 1st enemy line in the detonations.
Company 330 therefore has the task—together with Pionier-Mineur-Kompagnie 325, which operates the R shaft galleries—using the S-left shaft galleries and S-face shaft galleries, to destroy the enemy main minefields on the Finger and, if possible, to include the 1st enemy line in the detonations.
The three shaft galleries are driven in a parallel direction. Whether the enemy line can be reached in a rush is hardly to be assumed.
We must therefore be prepared for enemy detonations and be in a position to detonate ourselves at any time
The listened-for enemy demolition shots in combat gallery S were few in the month of January, with an average of 10 – 12 shots reported daily, which increased to 20 on some days from the middle of the month onward. Work with hand tools or drilling equipment was not detected.
On January 30 at 6:50 p.m., however, the enemy detonated a squash mine half-left in front of S-left, which slightly collapsed the S-left shaft gallery over a length of 15.00 m. Neighboring galleries were not damaged. A short time after the detonation, blasting gases penetrated, gassing the entire gallery S up to the portal. Thanks to the tightly closing ventilation doors in the main and bypass tunnels, which were immediately sealed due to the rapid intervention of the duty Sergeanten Gürke, the gases did not penetrate into the tunnel. Personnel losses did not occur because a shift change was just taking place. As early as the evening of January 31, all operations in S could be resumed.
On our side, no blasting was carried out in the month of January.
After completion of the cleanup work, at the end of the month they reached:
S-left shaft gallery a length of 66.00 m,
S-heading shaft gallery a length of 49.40 m.
S-heading was used only as a listening gallery after it had been put in order up to 255.00 m.
S-left was completely dammed off up to the S-left shaft.
In order to achieve better ventilation, a raise was started facing south opposite the S-left shaft, which is intended to break through at the Graervenitz Crater.
Power outages and water caused us a lot of trouble in the shafts, especially S-heading.
We experienced very frequent work interruptions in the S-left shaft due to the gases released during further driving from the December 1917 detonations.
After the arrival of the new miner companies, the construction soldiers 2/117 were withdrawn from us.
Enemy harassment fire lay little on our sector, apart from the day of the detonation.
During the rest periods, the company was maintained in a usable condition through drilling, gymnastics, and roll calls, and was further trained in rescue service with oxygen apparatus.
For Leutnant Schmieding, who was entrusted with the adjutant duties of the new battalion, Leutnant Borchers took over the company.
Awarded the Iron Cross First Class: Vizefeldwebel Kieroth and Pion. Mielczarek.
Awarded the Iron Cross Second Class: Gefreiter Zabski, the pioneers Sauer, Scharf, Pfau, Opitz.
Vizefeldwebel Siebert was promoted to Offizier-Stellvertreter on January 28, Unteroffz. Gürke to Sergeanten on the 20th. Gefreiter Przysiecki was promoted to regular Unteroffizier. Appointed as Gefreiten were the pioneers Ambrosy, Schinski, Marczinscyk, and Adamczewski.
The Kaiser’s birthday was observed in a manner appropriate to the times through a field service, band music, and a cozy get-together.
O. U. February 1, 1918.
I.V.d.K.F.
signed Schmieding
Leutnant
February 1918.
Throughout the entire month, only a few enemy demolition shots were reported; although the number increased to 18 on individual days, on some days they were absent entirely. On the other hand, starting February 17, enemy mining noises (tapping and picking) were reported almost daily in the S-left shaft gallery from both half-left forward and half-right forward at various times of the day. The distance is estimated at about 30 – 40 m.
On February 24, the mining noises of the work listened for half-right forward of the S shaft gallery were also detected in the S-heading shaft. We are therefore facing two enemy works with our two shaft galleries. Nothing precise can be determined about the elevation of the works, but a large difference in elevation does not appear to exist. After careful consideration, we initially continued driving quietly with both our galleries in the ordered directions, withdrawing the personnel from the gallery only during the enemy’s previously usual blasting times, ½ 6 – 8 a.m. and p.m.
Neither the enemy nor we carried out any blasting in the month of February.
Aside from often considerable disruptions caused by defects in the high-voltage power line, work proceeded in its usual course.
At the end of the month:
S-Left shaft gallery a length of 84.00 m,
S heading a length of 79.80 m,
the raise in S-left a length of 39.50 m, including the horizontal section.
At the end of the month, S heading was abandoned as a listening gallery and is being dammed; by February 28, 8.00 m of dam had been installed. No work could be done on the bypass tunnel.
In order to have employment for the crews during the times when they were withdrawn from the face, the company had the section from S to Entrance 2 including the bypass tunnel assigned to it. In addition, some shifts worked on the expansion of the S portal and on the spoil heap of S.
The usual repair and drainage work was carried out.
To listen for enemy mining noises, the Dolezalek listening device was assigned to us, with which we achieved outstanding results. The detection of enemy work, which we were later able to perceive with our ears, is also attributable to the tests with this device.
Aside from February 24 and 25, there was little harassing fire on our sector. On February 25, the tunnel east of Exit 2 was caved in for 4 m by an enemy mine and traffic in it was disrupted. Clearing work is underway.
On February 18, increased combat readiness was ordered for divisional sector 2 and 3, because it had become known through agents that the Frenchman intended to launch a major enterprise.
Our pioneer battalion also went into alert readiness as an exercise, the setup of which, considering the composition of the battalion, was very instructive for the men themselves.
In the event of an alarm, the battalion occupies the Herbeuville Position (2nd Position), the company occupies the sector from approach route B to 200 m west beyond approach route D.
On February 8, the Commander-in-Chief Generalleutnant (major general) Excellency Fuchs visited the battalion, had Hauptmann Karau give him a detailed briefing on the situation on Comber, and greeted the company; he spoke very praisingly, especially of the old companies.
Pioneer Kops was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class by him.
Hauptmann Barry was still on leave as a result of his wounds. On February 18, Leutnant Henkel from the staff officer of Pioneers 58 arrived at our company as a transfer after a company commander course in Jeumont to serve as a platoon leader.
Unfortunately, we had two deaths in the month of February: Pioneer Kister died in an accident on February 6 in combat gallery S through contact with the high-voltage power line, Gefr. Schreiber on February 21 at the S-l shaft also through contact with the high-voltage power line of the winch he was operating. Both are buried in the churchyard in Hannonville s.l.C.
On the morning of February 27, 1 officer and 9 men were captured by Regt. 7 (121st Infantry Division). Since the prisoners had previously been stationed on Comber, Hauptmann Karau and Leutnant Borchers put various questions to them about French mine warfare. Yet nothing special could be gotten out of them, since as infantrymen they were not allowed into the galleries.
During the rest periods, the company was kept in a usable condition through drill, hand grenade throwing, and roll calls, and training of the company in pioneer service was begun.
The health condition and rations of the company were good.
Hauptmann Barry was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the House Order of Hohenzollern with Swords.
The Iron Cross 2nd Class was received by:
Pioneers Schmitz, Hentschler, Scholz, Slachiera, and Buchta.
O.U., March 1, 1918.
Certified correct:
I.V.d.K.F.
Borchers
Leutnant
March 1918.
The mining noises in front of the S-left shaft gallery, which had already been reported in the previous month, were reported almost daily during the month of March and detected by the naked ear without apparatus. According to the listening results, these were the aforementioned hostile operations to the right and left of the combat gallery. Detonation shots were reported relatively infrequently, with a maximum number of 8 to 10 shots per day.
The fact that the enemy has taken all precautionary measures in defending against our underground attack on his finger position is proven by the statement of a prisoner of war from the French 2nd Infantry Regiment (2e RI), who was captured near Les Eparges on March 27, 1918. He stated that the Cote de Combres was completely undermined. He had been personally active in loading the mines. According to his statement, 26 metric tons of explosives were used. However, the undermining of this ridge by the German side had not remained unknown to them.
Despite the looming danger of explosion, we calmly continued our S-gallery in the ordered direction in order to await a favorable time for a detonation and, as before, withdrew the personnel during the morning and evening hours.
On the left flank of our mining system, the enemy had approached so closely that as early as March 9 at 9:00 a.m., Company 329 had to detonate the R-left shaft gallery with a crushing charge. Due to the explosion into our own system and escaping gases, the detonation by Company 329 caused severe casualties. The director of the detonation, Leutn. Bodesohn, the Offizierstellvertreter Langer and Michalski, and 1 Unteroffizier were severely burned, and 2 Unteroffiziere were more lightly burned. Later during the clearing work, 1 Unteroffizier and 1 man were killed by explosion gases, and Leutnant Strotmann was very seriously gas-poisoned.
On the day of the detonation, we began blasting out the explosion chamber in the S-left shaft gallery at a length of 90.00 m, since the enemy had come very close to us and the situation now promised a good effect. The charge was calculated at 1,000 centners with an overburden of 40.00 m. The explosion chamber had to have a size of 80 cubic meters and the stemming had to be placed along the entire length of the gallery to 90.00 m. For blasting out the chamber, placing the charge, and stemming, a working time of at least 3 weeks was assumed. However, by offering work bonuses, through the tireless, tenacious endurance of the company, and with the help of attached details from the other companies of Battalion Karau, who handled the transport of ammunition and sandbags during the loading, it was possible to complete the entire work within 14 days.
The gallery was stemmed up to the S-left shaft and then provided with strong struts, since the effect of such a large charge was not yet known.
As a precaution, the combat galleries S-left and S-Ort were well stemmed and closed off with a 1.00 m thick concrete block to keep out penetrating gases. Likewise, a 4.00 m thick gas barrier well packed with mud had been placed in S-Ort in the large profile on this side of the shaft. Furthermore, since the breakthrough of S-left to the surface was completed, every conceivable precautionary measure had been taken to make the penetration of gases into our galleries impossible. Shortly before detonation, carbon monoxide papers were also attached at various points to immediately detect any penetrating gases. For safety, 3 detonation lines were attached for the charge.
By order of the Division, the detonation took place on March 26 at 08:30 under the direction of Lt. Borchers. Due to the expected heavy shock, the Division had ordered a complete evacuation of combat sectors c and d.
After the completed evacuation was reported, the detonation took place punctually. The shock was tremendous. Tunnels and galleries remained gas-free and could be re-entered immediately after the detonation. S-Ort shaft gallery and R-shaft gallery right were both caved in for approx. 20.00 m.
By officer observation (Lt. Zeidler 325, Offizierstellvertreter Röstel and Siebert 330) from the plain, the successful effect of the detonation on the enemy mine system was established. Shortly after the detonation, heavy gases streamed out of 2 uprises and finally out of a portal at the enemy spoil heaps, furthermore people tumbled head over heels down the spoil heaps.
In the afternoon hours of the 26th, transports were observed from the portals. All observations clearly indicate that with the detonation we had thoroughly caught the Frenchman and severely disrupted and gassed his gallery system.
The detonation produced a crater of approx. 82.00 m in diameter. Aerial photography shows 2 smaller craters within the main crater. The presence of these corroborates the earlier report on enemy mining work to the right and left of the detonation. Thus the detonation, the largest since the conduct of mine warfare at Combres, brought us complete success.
Battalion Order of March 26, 1918 and Order of Army High Command C of March 31, 1918 express recognition to the company:
1.) Bn. Order of March 26, 1918
Bn. Karau. B. No. 605
Miner Order.
„Leaders, officers, and enlisted men of the Pion.-Mineur-Komp. 330 (330th Pioneer Miner Company) have once again demonstrated their skills during today’s detonation. It has been established by officer observations that we have thoroughly caught the Frenchman. This success is owed, alongside leadership, tenacious endurance, and the often-proven intrepidity of all participants, to the brave Unteroffizieren and enlisted men. The company is certain of the thanks and recognition of all superiors for what has been accomplished in recent weeks.
I direct that the Unteroffizieren and enlisted men be given two duty-free days on which only roll call or other light duty will be held. The company will make the further arrangements.“
M.d.F.b.
gez. Karau
2). Army High Command C – Ia Pi. No. 11602/5086/18 No. 482
Commendation of Bn. Karau
March 31, 1918.
„The Miner Bn. Karau executed the largest crater detonation at Combres since the conduct of mine warfare there on March 26, 1918, following weeks of the most strenuous and hazardous work opposite ready-to-detonate enemy mines, which, thanks to prudent and expedient technical and tactical measures, was crowned with complete success.
I express my special recognition and warmest congratulations to Company 330, which was primarily involved, as well as to all other participants of the battalion for this brilliant mining-technical achievement.“
The Commander-in-Chief
gez. Fuchs
Enemy artillery and trench mortar fire did not set in after the detonation
Until March 31, enemy work was no longer reported. On the 31st, however, half-right forward of the S-Ort combat gallery, a new enemy work appeared, not previously reported, which has already come so close that it can be perceived by ear and will force us to detonate S-Ort as well at the earliest possible time.
The tunneling operations proceeded normally in the month of March, apart from high-voltage disruptions.
S-links shaft gallery was extended to 90.00 m and blown. S-Ort shaft gallery reached a length of 91.30 m. The meters caved in by the explosion were cleared out again at the end of the month.
The upward driving in S-links broke through to the surface at a length of 56.00 m and was provided with steps and wire mesh.
S-links shaft gallery is being cleared out and, according to a new project drawn up by Leutnant Borchers, Bodesohn, and Strotmann, and Offizierstellvertreter Siebert, is to be swung to the left and brought to a deeper level by means of a brake incline.
Temporary work was carried out on the bypass tunnel, as well as the usual repair and drainage work in the tunnel, and the breach in the tunnel between exit 2 and exit 3 caused by a mine in the previous month was completely cleared.
There was relatively little harassing fire on our sector.
The company leadership was held by Lt. Borchers. Lt. Henkel was transferred on 16.3.18 to Pion.-Batl 19 (19th Pioneer Battalion) and Lt. Fries, Bayr. Min.-Komp. 5, was detached to the company as platoon leader.
During the rest periods, the company was maintained in a usable condition through drilling and roll calls and further trained in pioneer service.
The state of health and provisioning were good.
The Iron Cross 2nd Class was awarded to: Pioneer Stickel.
For correctness:
I.V.d.K.F.
Borchers
Leutnant.
April 1918:
Hannonville s.l.C., 1.5.1918.
Following our explosion of S-links shaft gallery on March 26, 1918, the Frenchman had been very quiet; at the beginning of the month of April, he became very active again in front of our combat gallery S as well as in front of combat gallery R of Pioneer Miner Company 329.
In S-Ort shaft gallery, eager mining was heard straight ahead and from the right. From a greater distance, detonation shots were reported daily. From 12 to 13.4., the detonation shots ceased; on the other hand, the mining noises in S-Ort shaft gallery were perceived again without a listening apparatus. The temporary cessation of detonation shots and alternating mining is nothing striking, and the assumption of an enemy explosion was not given.
Then, on 13.4., 3:30 p.m., at a time never observed before, the enemy blew up in front of S-Ort. Two brave miners, men who were always closest to the enemy, one decorated with the Iron Cross 1st Class, Pioneer Beyer I, and Gefreiter Marczinzyk I, met a hero’s death in the process, two others, Gefr. Marczynzyk II and Pioneer Koj, were lightly wounded.
The combat gallery was tightly pressed shut to 30.00 m, so that the two dead men could not be recovered by the end of the month, despite strenuous work—which was extremely dangerous due to the penetrating gases, during which everyone gave their best and risked their lives—by those who worked there.
The clearance work ultimately had to be completely suspended for days at a time when larger amounts of gas appeared upon the firing of the jammed earth masses.
Likewise, the enemy blew up a day later, i.e., on April 14, at the left flank of our mine system in front of R, pressed the gallery shut, and buried 8 brave miners of P.M.K. 329, one who could be recovered fell victim to the immediately escaping gas quantities.
The remaining combat galleries, including S-links, were spared from the explosion.
The two explosions prove once again that the enemy’s objective is to push us away from the shell mound, and that we must in any case push our gallery tips in front of the Eberhardt-Welsch Crater line.
On our side, combat gallery C6 shaft gallery in the sector of the 1st Battalion, IR 377 (377th Infantry Regiment) on 16.4.18 was successfully blown by Company 329 to destroy enemy mining work in front of the Weber and Karau Craters. The Werder Crater was created (see page 168).
The company operated combat gallery S-Ort shaft gallery, which had reached a length of 113.50 m on the day of the explosion, and after repairing the R-links shaft and clearing the dam in S-links shaft gallery at 50.00 m, started a deeper meeting to the left according to a new project.
The new gallery branches off to the left at about 45°, was extended to 15 m, and provided with a brake chamber for a winch at the end. From here, a brake incline is set up parallel to the old combat gallery, which stood at a depth of 15.60 m at the end of the month. This incline is intended to reach a deeper level to enable advancement under the craters in a deeper zone.
Temporary work was carried out on the bypass tunnel; by the end of the month, 23.00 m had been driven. Work on expanding the S portal and the usual drainage and repairs in the tunnel from S to entrance 2 were also carried out.
There was relatively little harassing fire on our sector, even after the explosions. We repeatedly suffered from high-voltage disruptions, which hopefully, however, have been eliminated after changing the high-voltage network.
Larger ventilators helped us to occupy the galleries, which were heavily gassed by the explosions, again faster than usual.
On the 24th, a redistribution of the work was undertaken, which, however, did not affect Company 330. Afterward, the Bavarians received the rear echelon worked out by a project and the main operation in the U3 inclined plane.
Hauptmann Barry returned to the company on Apr. 2, 1918. However, he did not take over the command of the company, but was detached to the staff of the Karau Battalion, since he had not yet recovered and had been granted leave for a cure, which he began shortly thereafter. From Apr. 17 onwards for 6 weeks for a cure to Wiesbaden, then another 2 weeks for after-cure to Miltenberg am Main.
Leutnant Borchers kept the command of the company and was appointed company commander by battalion order of Apr. 20. 8. Leutnant Borchers was detailed to the gas course from Apr. 17, 1918 – Apr. 21, 1918, per order of Apr. 20.
During the rest periods, the company was maintained in a usable condition through drilling and roll calls and further trained in pioneer service.
The state of health and the rations of the company were good.
The Iron Cross 2nd Class was awarded to: Unteroffizier Winter, Pionier Kaiser, Pionier Kaczkowiak, Pionier Neuhaus, Pionier Werner II.
For correctness:
(signed) Borchers
Leutnant and company leader
May 1918.
Hannonville s.l.C., June 1, 1918.
In this month, the company worked in combat gallery S, at the shattered portal of gallery S, and on the maintenance of the Combres Tunnel from S to entrance 2. Work on the bypass tunnel could not be carried out due to a lack of men.
Work was carried out at three locations in combat gallery S. The gallery started last month to undermine the enemy mining work in S-left shaft was continued. In S-face shaft, on May 5, similarly to S-left, a new face was started for the deeper echelon, about 20 m west of the shaft, provisionally called S-face shaft inclined plane. The third workplace was the old S-face gallery. At a length of 101.00 m, it was provided with an explosive chamber and loaded on May 2 with a crushing charge of 150 Ztr. After completion of the mine, the gallery was equipped for listening with the apparatus and with the ear in order to be able to observe the Frenchman continuously. The detonation was only to take place if the enemy should disturbingly attack our rear echelon, which was not yet ready for detonation.
Enemy mining activity was very brisk again. Work was observed daily in front of the faces of S from May 1 to May 25. In the first few days, there were only blasting shots that were clearly perceived half-right and half-left of our work locations. The shots were so large in number—for example, on May 18, 82 shots were reported—and listened to from such different directions that one absolutely had to reckon with 3 to 4 enemy mining operations audible from gallery S. Listening results regarding prospecting work that could be heard with the naked ear were only achieved on May 23 to 24.
Offz. Stellv. Röstel, as well as Vzfw. Kieroth, determined that the Frenchman was working near our completed mine. At the same time, enemy work was also detected in gallery R of the neighboring Company 329, so that the company was forced to load there as well.
We waited with the ignition of our explosion until the loading work of Company 329 had progressed so far that an enemy counter-explosion on the left wing could no longer harm the working miners in R. S-face shaft gallery was then blasted on the evening of May 25, 1918. The blasting proceeded according to plan.
On our side, everything remained intact. Through new, larger ventilators, the gases were managed in a few hours, so that no delay in our work occurred.
The Frenchman must have been caught well by the explosion, because so far only once again were 2 blasting shots listened to from afar. A few days later, on May 28, the Pioneer Miner Company 329 also blasted. It has also temporarily achieved complete quiet in front of its sector.
The two explosions from our side are not offset by any explosions by the French this month.
The blown gallery S-Ort-Schacht is being cleared out again to serve as a listening gallery, because the work in the deeper tier has not yet progressed far enough to be able to proceed offensively
Except for a few minor interruptions, the high-voltage power did not fail this month.
The harassing fire in the sector was moderate throughout.
Status of work at the end of May:
S-links-Schacht-Stollen 24.00 m,
S-Ort-Schacht-Stollen 66.70 m,
S-Ort-Schacht-Bremsberg 6.50 m.
The blown gallery S-Ort-Schacht is being cleared out again to serve as a listening gallery, because the work in the deeper tier has not yet progressed far enough to be able to proceed offensively
Except for a few minor interruptions, the high-voltage power did not fail this month.
The harassing fire in the sector was moderate throughout.
Status of work at the end of May:
S-links-Schacht-Stollen 24.00 m,
S-Ort-Schacht-Stollen 66.70 m,
S-Ort-Schacht-Bremsberg 6.50 m.
Changes in the company:
According to the miner order of 4.5.18, the company commander, Leutnant Borchers, was entrusted with the leadership position of Pionier-Min.Komp. 325. The command of the company for Hauptmann Barry, who was on leave for a cure, was taken over until further notice by Leutnant der Reserve Vecqueray, who was ordered back to the company for this reason.
On 15.5.18, the company received a new officer, Leutnant der Reserve Niemeier, who had been transferred from Pionier-Mineur Kompagnie 398, according to the order of Group Argonne, Dept. IIa No. 726.
Sergeant Dirkes was wounded on 17.5 in position in the left upper arm and chin by the explosion of a grenade launcher.
Awards:
The men of the company received five days of rest for the first time for brilliant achievements on Combres. During the rest period, they were employed accordingly.
Personal awards were received by:
the Iron Cross 1st Class:
Unteroffizier Jatzek
Awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class were the pioneers: Amler, Friebe, Beyer II, Kliemek.
The Rescue Medal on the Ribbon was received by Offizier-Stellvertreter Michalski, Pionier-Min.-Kompagnie 329.
The Commemorative Medal for Rescue from Danger was awarded to: Sergeant Schreiber, Unteroffz. Lechleiter, Voss, Przysiecki, Stuhrmann, Pionier Grabowski, Gefr. Langer, Pionier Solzbacher and Ellerkmann.
The state of health and rations in the company were good.
Certified correct:
(signed) Vecqueray
Leutn. d. Res.
June 1918.
Hannonville s.l.C., 1.7.18.
After our explosion of S-Ort-Schacht-Stollen on May 25, greater quiet set in, so that we can assume we have thoroughly harmed the French.
The clearing work was pursued with high pressure in order to have good and sufficient security for our deeper tier in S-Ort-Bremsberg. On June 9, the gallery was already 81.50 m long and the blasting of the explosive chamber was started, since this length promised us sufficient security for S-Ort-Bremsberg. The chamber was blasted to a size of 16 cbm and was intended to hold 200 Ztr. By June 12, the work had progressed to the point where loading could begin.
In order to achieve truly good listening results, a listening apparatus was then installed at 15 m, which was permanently operated by a listener. The other sandbags were stacked at the face. The first enemy works were heard on June 23 with and without the apparatus, and they subsequently intensified from day to day to such an extent that the company was forced to blow up the gallery on June 27.
At the same time, mine U3-Bremsberg was detonated, where the Frenchman had blasted on June 5 at 20:05.
With these two blasts, we will certainly have caught the Frenchman between S-l and U3, so that we will have some peace and quiet in front of this combat sector for a while.
The gases escaped in large quantities and came out of the portal. By installing a new ventilation tubing line to the S portal, the gases were extracted to such an extent that the gallery was already free of gas on June 29 and clearance work could begin.
Work in S-Ort-Bremsberg was severely impaired by massive water inflow. Only by installing a wing pump in the incline and a larger electric pump in the S-Ort shaft could the work be advanced again.
Work in S-l shaft made favorable progress. On June 20, the incline reached an inclined length of 40 m and a vertical depth of 20 m. At 40 m, driving was continued horizontally.
Work at the S portal was completed; likewise, the usual drainage and repair work in the tunnel from S to Entrance 2 was carried out.
Probably misled by our vigorous work in S-l and S-Ort-Bremsberg, the enemy detonated a charge on June 15 at 08:40 in front of R and S-l without causing us any damage whatsoever. Work was resumed as early as 10:00 in the morning, and the blast was observed from the Ölsner Crater – likely an overcharged crushing blast whose crater formation was incomplete. The crater lies north-northwest of the Graevenitz Crater, about 120 m in front of it.
Enemy mining activity was not as active as in the previous month, but increased considerably towards the end of the month.
Due to major and minor repairs on both winches, performance in the combat galleries was significantly impaired.
Nuisance fire on the sector was moderate throughout.
Status of work at the end of June:
S-l shaft 51.00 m,
S-Ort shaft 40.00 m, after the blast S-Ort-Bremsberg 14.00 m.
Health and rations of the company were good.
On June 1, Unterzahlmeister Sobe took over treasury administration for k.w. Unterzahlmeister Höhne, who was reduced in rank to Unteroffizier.
Hauptmann Barry returned from his leave on June 13 and was detached to the staff of the Karau Battalion. On June 15, Hauptmann Barry assumed command of the Karau Battalion for Hauptmann Karau, who is on leave until July 30, 1918.
Leutnant Vecqueray went on a 3-week leave on June 30, 1918. Leutnant Niemeier took over his deputization.
During rest periods, the company received further training through drill, combat and musketry service, as well as gymnastics.
Sergeant Lechleitner was awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class.
The Iron Cross 2nd Class was awarded to: Pioniere Schmidt, Koj, Maron, Maul, Geisenheimer, Musialik, Renner, Olech, and Tabaczynski.
Unteroffiziere Feller and Lechleitner were promoted to Sergeant, and Gefreiter Behricke to Unteroffizier.
For accuracy:
(signed) Niemeier
Leutnant der Res.
July 1918.
Mining report from July 3 to 18, 1918.
1. Own mining activity.
During the last reporting period, combat galleries Cöln 2 and Unna 2 were loaded, while Unstrut 2, Schelde 2 and 3, Saale 3, and Rhein 4 were advanced further. In Unna 2, at a length of 110 m, a branch was driven to the right in order to destroy the enemy work located there.
Unstrut 2 currently has a length of 169.60 m, the advance caused great difficulties due to the repeatedly occurring carbon monoxide gases.
Following our crushing explosion on June 27, Schelde 2 was completely cleared out again so that the excavation of a new charge chamber could begin.
Schelde 3 could only be manned when sufficient labor was available.
Saale 3 made quite encouraging progress and its gallery heading is already beneath the northern edge of the Below Crater.
The advance in Rhein 4 is very slight, on the one hand due to heavy water inflow, and on the other hand because Company 329 was used to support the other companies.
Counter-works could not be carried out due to the severe outbreak of influenza, which reduced the manpower to half of the usual strength for a long time.
The bypass tunnel and the tunneling work at the K.T.K. could only be manned on a few days.
2. Enemy mining activity.
The number of reported enemy shots is strikingly low. In front of the entire sector, only 10 shots were heard at a greater distance during the first half of the month. On the other hand, all the more working noises were detected with the listening device. To the right of Unna 2, the Frenchman has started a new gallery in the Ravin de la Mort, with which he is trying to outflank us from the right. (See sketch overleaf).
Since July 8, we have again come so close to the enemy in Unstrut 2 that his work can be heard with the apparatus. On July 13, the enemy was again detected in front of Schelde 2, in front of the dam in Rhein 3. In Saale 2, on the other hand, no enemy activity has been noticed so far despite constant listening.
3. Own intentions.
The loaded gallery Cöln 2 will remain in place with a provisional stemming of 5 m until further notice.
Unna 2 is also loaded and is not to be detonated until the new enemy work is suspected at the right branch.
In Unstrut 2, we will probably have come close enough to the enemy in the foreseeable future that detonation will be necessary again.
After completion of the charge chamber currently under construction, Schelde 2 will be loaded again and will then remain until the enemy has come close enough.
The brake inclines Schelde 3 and Rhein 4 will be sunk further.
Saale 3 is to be pushed further forward for the time being, since the enemy has not been detected here at any time so far despite careful listening.
If sufficient labor is available, work in the bypass tunnel and at the K.T.K. will also be pursued.
Mining report from July 19 to August 3, 1918:
1. Own mining activity.
No further changes have been made to combat galleries Cöln 2 and Unna 2, which were reported as loaded in the last report. Unna 2 is ready for ignition, while in Cöln 2 the stemming could not yet be placed.
During the last reporting period, the galleries Unstrut 2 and Schelde 2 were also made ready for ignition, while Rhein 3 has already been loaded since the end of June, so that galleries Cöln 2, Unstrut 2, Unna 2, Schelde 2, and Rhein 3 can currently be detonated. (see sketch). Detonation has been refrained from so far because the enemy has not yet come close enough.
In Unna 2 Staffel, the excavation of the charge chamber has begun, as we are far enough along to destroy the detected enemy spoil heaps.
In Saale 3, at a length of 100 m, excavation of a charge chamber has also been begun, which is currently approx. 100 cbm in size. There still remain the two brake inclines Schelde 3 and Rhein 4. Both of these, after having been suspended for some time due to a shortage of labor, have been resumed and have a current length of 16 and 26 m, respectively.
As for secondary work, only the breakthrough at the K.T.K. to the new tunnel was completed; the expansion and new work in the tunnel at entrance 4 were continued.
2. Enemy mining activity.
Enemy mine blasts were hardly heard at all over the last 14 days; on the other hand, enemy work was very frequently detected during the listening pauses using the listening apparatus, so that it stands to reason that the enemy is now working with cutting machines and only blasts when he has to tunnel through strong rock strata. However, what remains peculiar is the circumstance that for a long time the enemy has not come close enough anywhere to be heard with the naked ear. This may perhaps be explained by the fact that he is currently working mainly on the rear, lower-lying echelon.
Since July 8, we have again come close enough to the enemy in Unstrut 2 that his work can be heard with the apparatus. On July 13, the enemy was once again detected in front of Schelde 2 and in front of the dam in Rhein 3. In Saale 2, on the other hand, no enemy activity has been noticed up to now despite constant listening.
3. Own intentions.
The loaded gallery Cöln 2 will remain in place with a provisional tamping of 5 m until further notice.
Unna 2 is also loaded and is not to be detonated until the new enemy work is suspected at the right echelon.
In Unstrut 2, we will likely have come close enough to the enemy in the foreseeable future that blasting will have to take place again.
After completion of the charge chamber currently under construction, Schelde 2 will be loaded again and will then remain in place until the enemy has come close enough.
The brake inclines Schelde 3 and Rhein 4 will be sunk further.
In Unna 2 Staffel, the excavation of the charge chamber has begun, as we are far enough along to destroy the detected enemy spoil heaps.
In Saale 3, at a length of 100 m, excavation of a charge chamber has also been begun, which is currently approx. 100 cbm in size. There still remain the two brake inclines Schelde 3 and Rhein 4. Both of these, after having been suspended for some time due to a shortage of labor, have been resumed and have a current length of 16 and 26 m, respectively.
As for secondary work, only the breakthrough at the K.T.K. to the new tunnel was completed; the expansion and new work in the tunnel at entrance 4 were continued.
2. Enemy mining activity.
Enemy mine blasts were hardly heard at all over the last 14 days; on the other hand, enemy work was very frequently detected during the listening pauses using the listening apparatus, so that it stands to reason that the enemy is now working with cutting machines and only blasts when he has to tunnel through strong rock strata. However, what remains peculiar is the circumstance that for a long time the enemy has not come close enough anywhere to be heard with the naked ear. This may perhaps be explained by the fact that he is currently working mainly on the rear, lower-lying echelon.
3. Own intentions.
In a short time, the combat galleries Unna 2 Staffel and Unstrut 2 will be detonated.
To secure their brake inclines, Schelde 2 and Rhein 3 will remain primed and ready for detonation until the enemy has come close enough to be successfully engaged, or alternatively until the brake inclines have advanced so far that they would be adversely affected by a later detonation.
In Saale 3, a blast of approximately 2,500 centners is being prepared, which is intended to destroy all enemy work in front of R and S, in order to then break through with Schelde 3 and Rhein 4 to the finger.
Unstrut 2 will be cleared out again after the detonation; if necessary, it is to be detonated together with its branch (fork detonation) once the latter has been driven 20 m further.
Unna 2 is being pushed further forward by driving into the explosive chamber. The branch is not cleared out again.
If sufficient forces are available, work will be done on driving the bypass tunnel and on urgent repair work on the Comber Tunnel.
August 1918.
Mining report from August 3 to August 18, 1918.
1. Friendly mining activity.
Nothing has been changed regarding the galleries Unstrut 2, Schelde 2, and Rhein 3, which were reported as ready for detonation in the last report.
Unna 2 branch 1 was driven out to 71 m, then, due to the approach of enemy operations, chambering of the explosive chamber was commenced. On August 12, the charging operations were completed. On August 15 at 08:30, the detonation of Unna 2 and Unna 2 branch 1 took place to counter enemy operations that the opponent had launched in the Ravin de la Mort since approximately early July and with which he evidently intended a flanking thrust against our entire system.
At the same time, Cöln 2 was detonated to prevent the enemy from further establishing themselves to the east.
All 3 detonations were crater blasts and proceeded according to plan. As observed from the plain, the debris hurled away from the two craters of the Unna galleries plunged down the slope in the Ravin de la Mort and almost completely buried the French gallery entrance, which was clearly visible before the detonations. Hereby, the defensive purpose of the detonations has been fully achieved.
At the same time, however, the slope in the Ravin de la Mort has now been reduced by the 3 detonations to such an extent that a new flanking mine attack by the enemy out of the Ravin de la Mort is beyond the realm of all probability; thus, a renewed step forward has been taken hereby.
Of the remaining galleries, Unstrut 2 branch 1 was pushed forward with all force in order to be detonated simultaneously with Unstrut 2. However, the enemy operations, which can be heard more and more clearly every day (in front of the branch), are approaching so rapidly that it cannot be expected to forestall the enemy with a simultaneous detonation of Unstrut 2, which is ready for detonation. A decision has been requested from the group command. Therefore, currently only deception work is being carried out in the branch until the enemy operation is put out of action by a detonation of Unstrut 2.
Schelde 3 made only minor progress because it could be worked very little due to a lack of men.
In Saale 3, the explosive chamber was completed on August 17; it has a size of 220 cubic meters.
Rhein 4 made fairly regular progress, although work was naturally hindered greatly by strong, unexpected water inflow.
As for tunneling work, the new lining at entrance 4 was continued. The bypass between exit 2 and S could be worked very little due to a shortage of men.
2. Enemy mining activity.
Enemy activity was quite brisk during the specified period. The enemy operations were once again characterized by the fact that the opponent made almost no use of the blasting method, but evidently used cutting machines on a large scale.
The enemy concentrated mainly on our right wing. In front of the Unna Gallery, he was extraordinarily active until the detonations on August 15. He was also frequently heard in front of Unstrut 2. In front of Unstrut 2 branch 1, enemy activity could be detected daily.
Toward the end of the reporting period, the Frenchman had already approached so closely here that the operation of the mine dogs could be clearly heard with the listening device. In all probability, this is the work directed against Unstrut 2, the detonation of which on June 5 of this year cost Bavarian Minenwerfer Company 5 (bayerische Minenwerfer-Kompanie 5) 8 men.
Since Unstrut 2 itself is charged and tamped, the enemy can, of course, not be observed as well and safely from there.
In front of our left wing, the enemy was less active, but he was detected on various occasions in front of Rhein 3, Saale 3, and Schelde 2.
Now that the enemy’s flanking thrust against our system has been finally thwarted by the detonations on August 15, increased activity on his part must be expected in front of our remaining front; specifically, the Frenchman will probably approach here with a new, in all probability deeper echelon. For as observations from the plain have shown, the enemy currently appears to be engaged in the construction of a rear echelon, a fact to which our listening results in June already pointed (mining report of June 3–18, 1918).
At the center of our plans at present is the major detonation of Saale 3 by Pioneer Minenwerfer Company 330 (Pionier-Minenwerfer-Kompanie 330), which will be the largest of all detonations carried out by us and one of the largest ever executed in mining warfare (2,500 centners). It is intended to destroy the enemy works in front of Rhein Shaft, Saale Shaft, and Schelde Shaft. The preparations for this detonation are of a very considerable scope and will take up at least the rest of the month, but will likely take even longer.
Rhein 4 and Schelde 3 will continue to be sunk to the desired depth of 20 m in order to be driven toward the Finger after the detonation of Saale 3.
The charges in Rhein 3 and Schelde 2 will continue to remain in place for the protection of the sinking operations in Rhein 4 and Schelde 3. Unstrut 2 is to be detonated as soon as the approaching enemy work can be effectively engaged.
Unstrut 2 branch 1 is deferred until the detonation of Unstrut 2, since, as previously stated, an effective detonation cannot be carried out in the branch given the tactical situation, while on the other hand the detonation of Unstrut 2 directed against the enemy work will undoubtedly cave in the tip of the branch, which naturally makes any further driving of the branch illusory until the detonation of Unstrut 2. Following the detonation of Unstrut 2, the driving of the branch is then to be resumed with all force.
Unna 2 is cleared again and deflected slightly to the left to serve as right flank protection for Unstrut 2. Unna 2 branch 1 will not be cleared again, since the purpose of the branch has been fulfilled.
Cöln 2 remains in place for the time being.
Regarding tunneling work, the further expansion between entrances 4 and 5 and the completion of the bypass between exit 2 and S are planned.
From the Unna shaft, a raise is to be driven for the purpose of better ventilation, which breaks through near combat trench 1.
Furthermore, the battalion has been tasked with the construction of a series of engine rooms with adjoining shelter galleries for high-voltage detachment 18.
The more precise determination regarding the location and layout of these structures still requires detailed arrangement with the high-voltage detachment, which has been initiated.
Mining report from August 18 to September 3, 1918.
1. Own mining activity.
No changes were made to the charges of Unstrut 2, Schelde 2, and Rhein 3 that were already in place. The focus of all our activity was the charging operations in Saale 3. For this purpose, all dispensable personnel of the 3 other companies were placed at the disposal of P.M.K. 330. Thus, it was achieved that as early as September 2, the entire charge of 2,500 Ztr. had been placed—a very large part of the charge consists of medium and heavy mines that are otherwise no longer usable—and 48 m were tamped. Due to this concentration on Saale 3, the remaining work took a back seat.
Unna 2 was further cleared, and the gallery at 170 m was deflected to the left, since further clearing work proved inexpedient.
Contrary to our earlier intentions, Unstrut 2 Staffel 1 was advanced again, since, according to the latest listening results, the enemy work is located even further away than originally had to be assumed.
Schelde 3 was suspended during the reporting period due to a shortage of personnel.
Rhein 3 made quite good progress. Its brake incline was sunk to the intended depth, despite the water influx that was often barely manageable.
The raise started at the Unna shaft for the purpose of better ventilation was advanced well.
In the tunnel, the new construction at entrances 4 and 5 was continued. The bypass between exit 2 and S was shut down during the reporting period.
The construction of the combat stairs between U1 and U2 was resumed and is nearing completion.
2. Enemy mining activity.
The enemy activity was not very active. It concentrated mainly on Unstrut 2 Staffel 1. However, according to the latest listening results, the enemy appears to be even further away than was probable according to the initial listening reports. In front of Unna 2, the enemy was no longer detected, a sign that our detonations on August 15 had the intended effect.
3. Own intentions.
The intention is to blow up Saale 3 as soon as possible in order to provide air for the other galleries, however, some time will presumably pass before the detonation, since such a powerful detonation naturally requires thoroughly elaborated precautionary and safety measures.
Unna 2 is being extended further.
The charge in Unstrut 2 remains in place for the time being, since, as a result of the changed tactical situation in front of the Unstrut galleries, the joint detonation of Unstrut 2 and Staffel will nevertheless be made possible.
Unstrut 2 Staffel 1 is being extended further until the tactical situation makes a detonation imperative.
Schelde 3 is to be sunk further as soon as personnel become available again after the detonation of Saale 3.
The charge in Schelde 2 will also remain in place for the protection of the sinking work in Schelde 3.
In Rhein 4, the foot of the brake incline is to be expanded on a larger scale as a loading point and provided with adequate drainage facilities, after which the gallery will be driven further horizontally in the same direction.
The charge in Rhein 3 will continue to serve as a protective charge.
The rising work at the Unna shaft is to be vigorously promoted in order to achieve better ventilation as soon as possible.
To what extent the tunneling work can be manned is a question of personnel.
Although personnel will become available again after the detonation of Saale 3, the withdrawal of 2 companies for training purposes will necessitate a distribution of labor that will allow, first and foremost, only the combat galleries to be operated.
Intended are the further new expansion of the tunnel near entrance 4 and the further driving of the bypass between exit 2 and S and the completion of the combat stairs between U1 and U2.
Work on the rooms for the high-voltage department will not be able to be started until the middle of the month.
In the month of September 1918, the chronological records and also the mine warfare on Combres come to an end.
On the night of September 12, 1918, the Allied offensive against the St. Mihiel salient began. In accordance with orders, the Karau Battalion left the mine warfare installation on the Combres Heights and took up its alarm position on the Herbeuville Heights at around 07:00 in the morning. On the evening of September 12, 1918, the Karau Battalion began its retreat, initially as a reserve to Hannonville s.l. Côtes, then on the evening of September 13, 1918, to Pareid behind the Michel-Stellung.
Based on the records in the war diaries of the 13. Landwehr-Division (13th Landwehr Division), in particular LIR 60 (60th Landwehr Infantry Regiment), which initially held the positions on Combres with LIR 15 (15th Landwehr Infantry Regiment) despite massive French superiority, it can be assumed that the four explosive charges mentioned in the report in the Saale 3, Unstrut 2, Schelde 2, and Rhein 3 galleries still lie deep within the mountain of the Combres Heights today.
The explosive charge in the Saale 3 gallery, at 125 tons (2,500 centners), is by far the largest of the First World War.
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).