Spada Wood – Trouée de Spada –
the Spada Gap and the fighting on the Meuse Heights 1914-1918
North of the town of St. Mihiel, on a line between the villages of Rouvrois-sur-Meuse in the west and Vigneulles-lès-Hattonchâtel in the east, lies a little-known yet interesting front sector: the Spada Gap. Because of the military-geographic significance of this area, heavy fighting occurred there in 1914 during the advance of the German troops. In the following years of trench warfare, the area was fortified by both sides. Many traces of the German positions, the course of which hardly changed throughout the duration of the war, are still preserved.
General – Pre-war Period
Everyone who visits the former battlefields of the First World War in eastern France via the standard route knows this impression. If one drives from the area around the city of Metz toward Verdun, coming from the Moselle Valley, one reaches the Woëvre Plain. This wide landscape stretches out seemingly endlessly with fields, forests, and scattered villages. Toward the west, a prominent elevation can be seen on the horizon, which becomes increasingly imposing as one approaches. These are the Meuse Heights, in French Les Côtes de Lorraine or Les Hauts de Meuse. The ridge, which extends along the eastern bank of the Meuse from the area around the town of Dun-sur-Meuse in the north down to Toul on the Moselle over a length of about 100 kilometers, came into the focus of military attention even before the World War.
After the end of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, which resulted in the loss of the borderlands in Alsace and Lorraine, including the border fortifications, for the French, a new defensive concept against the German Empire became necessary. The tactic of a rigid defense close to the border was abandoned. Suitable terrain positions were selected based on military-geographical criteria. These were located up to 50 kilometers away from the new political borders. In the event of a German attack, the plans consciously included the abandonment of areas close to the border, including the Briey iron ore basin, which was important for the raw material supply. During the implementation of the new defensive concept, the Meuse Heights assumed decisive importance.
From the mid-1870s, the French set about constructing the chain of barrier forts between Verdun and Toul, which was planned as a central element of the new fortification system. Its strongest concentration was reached in the area from the city of Verdun south to St. Mihiel. The heights east of the Meuse, which here reached a width of up to 15 kilometers and a height of 400 meters in places, were integrated in a special way. Another circumstance was decisive. Over nearly 60 kilometers from the north to Hattonchâtel in the south, there is no geological outcrop of the heights in an east-west direction. The Côtes de Lorraine thus represented a continuous, natural defensive barrier with the best opportunities for observation and the construction of positions. In addition to the forts around Verdun, further installations were built to the south, such as the forts of Génicourt, Troyon, des Paroches, Fort du Camp des Romains near St. Mihiel, and further south the Fort de Liouville. In between, earthworks and field fortifications were created that could flank each other. The Meuse heights became a central pillar in the French defense against the German Empire.
However, south of Vigneulles-lès-Hattonchâtel there was a sensitive vulnerability. In the ridge of the Côtes de Lorraine, there is a continuous gap that becomes about nine kilometers wide toward the Meuse. The French have always called this area La Trouée de Spada, while the Germans called it the Spada Gap. Here there was a direct connection into the Meuse Valley for several east-west routes, such as the department roads between St. Mihiel and the Moselle cities of Pont-à-Mousson and Gorze, which were strategically important at the time. On the French side, it had been recognized that serious dangers threatened at this point, especially for the railroad connection running in the Meuse Valley between the fortress cities of Verdun and Toul, but also in the form of a possible German breakthrough toward the west.
Therefore, the area was heavily fortified. Field positions were constructed on the eastern slope of the valley incision, particularly around the Hattonchâtel spur and the villages of Vigneulles and Heudicourt. Also in the further eastern forest areas of the Woëvre Plain, the French constructed extensive trench systems that, in the event of an attack, reached as far as the level of the village of Saint-Benoît into the expected outpost zone. To the west, the exit into the Meuse Valley was covered by the two forts de Troyon and des Paroches, with the latter being assigned the task of serving as a barrier fort for the gap. The artillery of both forts was to subject any potential attacker to a devastating crossfire as soon as he had advanced far enough into the gap. The Fort Camp des Romains, located south of St. Mihiel, was to support the defense efforts if needed.
September 1914 – German Advance
On August 2, 1914, the German war machine set in motion toward France. To be able to classify the following events in the area of the Côtes de Lorraine and the Trouée de Spada, a brief examination of the fundamental war strategies of both opponents is helpful.
The German Empire followed the Schlieffen Plan developed at the end of the 19th century. This provided for the field army to advance into northern France with a strong right wing, swing toward Paris, and destroy the French troops in a southern direction toward Alsace and the Alpine region. They shied away from a direct attack on the Verdun-Toul line, as its strength had been recognized.
According to French Plan XVII, despite the numerical inferiority of their own forces, an offensive approach with two main thrusts was also intended. A northern group was to advance from the area between Verdun and Maubeuge, incorporating Belgian territory, against the German Empire, while a southern group was to march frontally from the Épinal-Belfort-Nancy area against Alsace-Lorraine and the Saarland. To secure the intervening space, i.e., the central line between Verdun and Toul, the French had provided only a single army with reduced equipment, namely the 3rd Army under the command of General Pierre Ruffey.
As a consequence of this basic constellation, the area between the Meuse and Moselle rivers and also the Meuse Heights between Verdun and St. Mihiel remained, so to speak, untouched by the events of war until September 1914. Not even the field fortifications in the forests, created during peacetime, were occupied by the French. Following the failure of the French offensive efforts, the units intended for the defense against a German attack were deployed to defend against the Fifth Army of German Crown Prince Wilhelm, which was advancing southward west of Verdun. No one expected a German advance in the area of the Woëvre Plain or the Meuse Heights.
This unexpected exposure of the ridge had not escaped the German army leadership. On September 6, 1914, elements of the V. Preußischen Armeekorps (V Prussian Army Corps) began a first attack on the Côtes de Lorraine. The ambitious goal was the capture of the Meuse forts located south of Verdun, de Troyon, des Paroches, and Camp des Romains. This was intended to provide flanking support for the attack of the 5. Armee (Fifth Army), which was now being conducted on the western bank of the Meuse. The German troops, in particular units of the 10. Preußischen Infanterie-Division (10th Prussian Infantry Division) under General Robert Kosch, crossed the Woëvre plain without significant resistance and climbed the Meuse heights from the Longeau valley and the lowland of the Creuë brook.
Elements of the Posenschen Regiments Königsjäger zu Pferde Nr. 1 (Posen King’s Rifle Regiment of Horse No. 1) had succeeded in advancing via Chaillon and Lamorville into the Spada gap and even reaching the Meuse Canal at Lacroix-sur-Meuse. Detachments of the 56. Feldartillerie-Regiments (56th Field Artillery Regiment) had followed and deployed in the area of the gap to shell Fort de Troyon. They suffered heavy losses from heavy French defensive fire, primarily from the batteries of the forts of Paroches and Génicourt. This demonstrated the strategic importance of the Spada gap and also of the forts protecting it.
More intense fighting flared up mainly around the stubbornly resisting Fort de Troyon. Within a few days, the fort was bombarded until ready for assault by Prussian artillery and several 30.5 cm mortars of the Austrian army. The deputy commander of the fort, Hauptmann (captain) Francois Xavier Heym, categorically refused capitulation to a Prussian parliamentarian on September 9, 1914, so that the bombardment was continued and the assault was ordered for September 12, 1914. This did not come to pass because, in the course of the broken-off Battle of the Marne, the troops on the Côtes de Lorraine, with success directly before their eyes, were forced to retreat.
After the German Schlieffen Plan had failed with the hasty retreat from the Battle of the Marne, a change in the Obersten (colonel) Heeresleitung took place on September 14, 1914. General Erich von Falkenhayn took over the operational leadership from the luckless General Helmuth von Moltke. He intended to regain the military initiative immediately. It was planned to become active again in northern France with reinforced units of the 2. Armee (Second Army) under General Karl von Bülow. In order to gain a preponderance of forces for the intended pincer movement, the 6. Armee (Sixth Army) of Bayerischen Kronprinzen Rupprecht, stationed between Metz and Strasbourg, was to be transferred to the northern army wing.
Already at the beginning of September 1914, still during the Marne Campaign, the formation of a new Armee-Gruppe from parts of the 6. Bayerische Armee (6th Bavarian Army) and the 5. Preußische Armee (5th Prussian Army) had been decided for the area of the Woëvre plain. The rest of the two armies was to become the operational reserve. Under the command of General Hermann von Strantz, the V. Preußische Armeekorps (V Prussian Corps) and III. Bayerische Armeekorps (III Bavarian Corps) were united into Armee-Abteilung Strantz (Army Detachment Strantz) starting on September 16, 1914. From the Metz area, Armee-Abteilung Strantz was to advance westward again and attempt to capture the Côtes de Lorraine, the three Meuse forts Camp des Romains, des Paroches, and de Troyon, as well as the city of St. Mihiel. If possible, a Meuse crossing was to be established and an advance continued in a westerly direction toward Bar-le-Duc from the gained area. In this way, together with the units of the 5. Armee (Fifth Army) attacking in the Argonne, the fortress of Verdun was yet to be encircled.
The French had drawn consequences from the events at the beginning of September 1914. In particular, the protective positions in front of the Spada gap and the Longeau brook valley were occupied. Strong reserves were kept ready in the Meuse valley down into the Spada gap. Although everything had been done to counter a renewed German attack, the French leadership was completely surprised by the advance of Armee-Abteilung Strantz starting on September 19, 1914. The reasons were multifaceted. It had rained heavily for several days, all paths and roads were muddy. On the French side, the conviction had been reached that the Woëvre plain was impassable for a massed artillery deployment for the foreseeable future. Probably due to this misjudgment, a large part of the position troops and the reserves of the French 2nd Army (2e armée) were withdrawn again to deploy them elsewhere. Thus, the course of events at the beginning of September 1914 essentially repeated itself.
In fact, the renewed German advance began on September 19, 1914. In pouring rain, the infantry, without encountering significant resistance, occupied the ordered artillery positions near the Côtes de Lorraine. From the morning of September 20, 1914, the artillery went into action. Despite considerable difficulties, they had succeeded in occupying the assigned positions. Until noon, there was no significant French resistance, and the French artillery also remained silent. The surprise had apparently succeeded once again.
German artillery fire was suspended around 12:00 due to a lack of discernible effect, and the infantry attacked by order of the commander of the III. bayerisches Armeekorps (III Bavarian Corps), General Ludwig von Gebsattel. Contrary to all expectations, however, massive resistance developed in the area of the villages in front of the Meuse Heights. The villages and the slopes located to the west of them had been developed into fortresses. Above all due to the stubborn defense of the villages of Vigneulles, Heudicourt, and Hattonville, the German advance was halted. Artillery was targeted against the villages, resulting in massive destruction.
The fighting lasted well into the night of September 21, 1914. The capture of Vigneulles proved to be the most difficult. Strong French forces had entrenched themselves in the houses and cellars. Field positions had been established in the cemetery area. Despite their numerical superiority, the attacking elements of the 6. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiments (6th Bavarian Infantry Regiment) initially failed to advance across the road running through the center of the village between Hattonchâtel and Heudicourt (today’s D 179). The Bavarians were thrown back several times. In the streets, there was brutal hand-to-hand combat, arson, and also massacres of the defenders.
The capture of the village was only successful long after midnight by means of a gun from the 1st Battery of the Kgl. Bayer. 3. Feldartillerie-Regiments (3rd Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment) under its leader Leutnant (second lieutenant) Quesner. It had taken up position at the edge of the village and was subsequently pushed into the village by artillery crews and infantry. In direct fire, individual houses where resistance flared up were shot to pieces from close range. After the capture of the northern village of Hattonville had succeeded and encirclement threatened the French, the remaining defenders fled from Vigneulles. The village was still burning days later. Corpses, animal carcasses, and equipment were scattered everywhere. The eastern part of the village up to today’s D 179 was completely destroyed by the fighting.
To prevent the French from reorganizing their remaining troops and bringing up reserves, the continuation of the German attack had already been ordered for the morning of September 21, 1914. The V. Preußische Armeekorps (V Prussian Corps) and the III. Bayerische Armeekorps (III Bavarian Corps) were to take possession of the Côtes de Lorraine and advance far enough westward that on the following night the heavy artillery could take up position against the Meuse fortifications of de Troyon, Camp des Romains, and des Paroches. For the Prussians, this meant ascending the Meuse heights with the 9. und 10. Division (9th and 10th Divisions) between Herbeuville and Saint-Maurice.
The artillery to be deployed with the III. Bayerische Armeekorps against the forts of Camp des Romains, des Paroches, and Liouville was essentially to move up along the roads from Chaillon to Heudicourt (today’s D 133) and Varvinay to Savonnières (today’s D 162). The intended protective positions lay southwest within the large forest area, roughly on a line between the village of Woinville via the former Abbey of St-Christophe, the woods of de Wawroils, de Verzel, via the Côte Ste. Marie, and then along the northern edge of the Narmont, Chanot, and Gilaumont forests. There, and thus in the area of the Spada gap, was the boundary between the combat sectors of the V. Preußische and III. Bayerische Armeekorps.
Unlike the Prussians, who made little headway because they had to contend with flanking artillery fire from the area of the Combres Heights and allowed themselves to be embroiled in costly skirmishes in the dense forests on the Côtes de Lorraine, the advance of the Bavarian units proved more favorable. At daybreak, the 10. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment (10th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) and the 13. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment (13th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) pushed into the forests above Hattonchâtel. The troops encountered only sporadic resistance. Further south, the right wing of the 5. Bayer. Infanterie-Division (5th Bavarian Infantry Division), consisting of the 11. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment (11th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment), advanced, occupied the prominent elevation located centrally at the eastern exit of the Spada Gap (today: Haut Plain), and took the villages of Varvinay and Savonnières without resistance. The parts of the 5. Bayer. Division stationed further east also advanced and took the designated protective artillery positions in the area of the heights of le Mont and Butte de Montsec.
By the evening of September 21, 1914, the 13. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment had reached the area of the former Premonstratensian Abbey of l’Etanche near Deuxnouds-aux-Bois as well as the neighboring farm. Here, skirmishes broke out with entrenched French units. Contact with the Prussian troops fighting to the north had not yet been established, so any further advance had to be postponed for the time being. Larger French troop concentrations were observed withdrawing westward.
Engagements at Lamorville and Spada from September 22 to 24, 1914
On September 22, 1914, the planned artillery protective positions were to be reached. The 10. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment (10th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) was tasked with taking the villages of Lavignéville and Lamorville, piercing the large forest area (Gilaumont, le Chanot, Narmont) toward the Meuse, and occupying the northern forest edges. In the dense morning fog, Lavignéville was captured almost without resistance. During the advance on Lamorville, the fog suddenly cleared. A French skirmish line and following columns numbering more than 2 regiments became visible as they marched toward the Bavarians at a distance of barely 1.5 kilometers. Fire was opened immediately. Intense fighting in open terrain followed. The numerically superior French succeeded in penetrating north into the Bois de Lamorville and threatening the Bavarian flank. There was still no sign of the Prussian troops. Around noon, field artillery brought up was able to provide some relief. Only toward afternoon did the preußische 47. Infanterie-Regiment (47th Infantry Regiment) reach the scene. The French attack gradually slackened. Finally, at around 15:00, the French withdrew toward the north and west.
Also on the morning of September 22, 1914, other parts of the 10. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment (10th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment) had penetrated into the Gilaumont Wood. Heavy resistance was immediately noticeable. By evening, they only succeeded in advancing westward to the edge of the Chanot Wood, approximately at the level of the village of Spada. The artillery deployment had been completed at that time as ordered. The guns stood ready to fire in their positions. On the morning of September 23, 1914, the bombardment of the forts Camp des Romains, Paroches, and Liouville began as planned. Since an endangerment of the artillery positions through encirclement was assumed due to the unclear situation in the Chanot Wood, the entire forest area was to be captured. In addition, this was intended to preempt a feared French attack from the Lacroix-Maizey-Lamorville triangle and to occupy the unwooded ridge around Hill 294 east of the village of Rouvrois-sur-Meuse, which obstructed the view to the north. From this, the engagement at Spada developed on September 24, 1914.
Even on September 23, 1914, the attack continued in Chanot Wood. Everywhere, French groups fell back fighting. Wild firefights broke out in the rough forest terrain. Towards afternoon, the edge of the forest was reached when a strong French skirmish line was sighted just a few hundred meters away and immediately taken under fire. The French fell back.
Around 17:00, the expected division order for the attack on the ridge east of Rouvrois-sur-Meuse arrived. Parts of Regiments 10 and 13 advanced with the support of other units around 20:00. As time was pressing, a prior reconnaissance of the attack terrain was omitted. In the valley floor between the burning villages of Spada and Lamorville, it was realized with surprise that crossing the Creuë brook was impossible due to the rainfall. Solutions were sought. At the Relincourt Mill, two footbridges were found over which the regiments laboriously crossed. Much time was lost.
At midnight, the troops dug in below the ridge in the open field. In the early morning of September 24, 1914, the Bavarians had then reached the crest of Hill 294. Strong French detachments on the Lamorville-Lacroix road (today’s D 162) became visible. After opening fire, the Bavarians came under massive French artillery fire from the direction of Fort des Paroches as well as the Selouse Forest.
To the northeast, the preuß. 10. Division (10th Prussian Division), which was supposed to support the attack, had not advanced further due to a misunderstanding. The situation of the Bavarians became threatening. The French steadily reinforced their forces. French artillery caused massive casualties. A flanking attack from the Selouse Forest could only be fended off with difficulty. Toward afternoon, a relief attack by the 47. preuß. Infanterie-Regiment (47th Prussian Infantry Regiment) on the Selouse Forest collapsed under enemy artillery fire. Parts of the 6. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment (6th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment), which were positioned centrally in the front line, were pulled out despite the dangerous situation in order to participate in the attack on the Fort du Camp des Romains. As dusk began to fall, the meager remnants of the Bavarian troops retreated to the northern forest edges of the Gilaumont and le Chanot. The attack had failed.
The casualties of the troops were immense for the year 1914. The 10. Regiment (10th Regiment) had lost 12 officers and more than 700 Unteroffiziere (corporal) and enlisted men, the 13. Regiment (13th Regiment) 13 officers and more than 360 men. The battalions involved in the attack were reduced to company strength. The regiments had not suffered higher casualties even during the operations before Verdun and in other battles of the World War. During the attack on September 24, 1914, a young officer who was to achieve dubious notoriety during the National Socialist era was severely wounded in the face while serving as adjutant of the I. Bataillon (1st Battalion) of the 10. Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiment (10th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment): the then Oberleutnant (first lieutenant) and later leader of the SA Ernst Röhm.
With the failure of the attack on Hill 294, the main offensive efforts in the area of the Spada Gap ended. Even though the capture of the heights east of Rouvrois-sur-Meuse had failed, the pinning down of French units nevertheless enabled the unhindered deployment of artillery as an essential prerequisite for the capture of the city of St. Mihiel, which was successfully accomplished on September 24, 1914, and the sensational storming of Fort du Camp des Romains, which succeeded just one day later. As a result, the French lost a major cornerstone in their eastern defense between Verdun and Toul. Possession of Fort du Camp des Romains guaranteed German troops logistical and artillery supremacy in the local area for the next
four years of trench warfare
Nevertheless, the success was not unclouded. The western bank of the Meuse, including the villages of Rouvrois-sur-Meuse and Maizey, remained in French hands except for a small bridgehead near the village of Chauvoncourt. It had not been possible to take the forts of Paroches and Troyon. From late September 1914 onwards, the French took up positions on the heights of Rouvrois-sur-Meuse. Bavarian troops established positions along the forest edges of the Gilaumont, Chanot, and Narmont woods as well as on Hills 322 and 331 dominating the Meuse Valley. German outposts were established in the destroyed village of Spada and near the Relincourt Mill (formerly Relaincourt Mill). Following the capture of Lamorville, strong defensive positions were created west and north of the village. The line had to be bent northward here, as the Prussians had not made progress on the Côtes de Lorraine. The front ran along the Meuse heights along the Bois de Lamorville, then east of the localities of Seuzey and Vaux-lès-Palameix in the direction of Combres Heights. In the area of the Spada Forest, the enemy lines were to essentially remain in place until the Franco-American Offensive in September 1918 and subsequently become one of the most heavily fortified position sectors of the entire Western Front.
After the fighting subsided, both sides attempted to positively influence the course of their positions by skillfully exploiting the available terrain options. Here, the German side was at an advantage, at least in the central part of the Spada sector, due to the heights and dense forests. The French occupied the ridge around the Côte de Rouvrois, creating a no-man’s-land approximately one kilometer wide. Near Maizey, the front lines approached each other because the French had to secure the road running through the Meuse Valley toward Verdun, today’s D 964. Further east, near the villages of Lavignéville and Lamorville, the position ran across open terrain. On both flanks of the actual Spada position, heavier fighting repeatedly occurred in the following months, whereas the fighting in the center gradually subsided.
By mid-1916, the Spada sector was to become the operational area of the 11. Königlich-Bayerischen Infanterie-Brigade (11th Royal Bavarian Infantry Brigade) with the 10th and 13th regiments. The Kgl. Bayer. 10. Infanterie-Regiment König (Royal Bavarian 10th Infantry Regiment “King”) was tasked with occupying the eastern part of the forest area from the village of Lavignéville to about the middle of the Bois de Narmont. The western adjoining part of the ridge was assigned to the Kgl. Bayer. 13. Infanterie-Regiment Franz Josef I., Kaiser von Österreich und Apostolischer König von Ungarn (Royal Bavarian 13th Infantry Regiment Franz Josef I, Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary), including Hills 322 and 331 along the Meuse Valley, the so-called Côte Ste-Marie.
Immediately after the establishment of the front line, the Bavarians set about expanding the positions. Step by step, the forward battle trench was completely lined with masonry, cut into the rock, or concreted.
At regular intervals, infantry bunkers, observation, machine gun (MG), and Minenwerfer (trench mortar) posts were added. In places, the fortifications, which are predominantly still well-preserved today, were less than 50 meters apart. Individual position sectors and trenches were named after officers of the units deployed there. For example, centrally located in the Chanot Forest, there was the „Staubwasser-Stellung“, named after Oskar Staubwasser, Hauptmann (captain) and commander of the 2nd Battalion of K.B. IR 10 (10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment), north of it the „Körnlein-Stellung“, named after Oberleutnant d.R. Körnlein (first lieutenant), leader of the 12th Company of K.B. IR 10, and further north the „Sonntag-Stellung“, named after Hauptmann Sonntag, initially company commander, then commander of the 3rd Battalion of K.B. IR 10. Although from 1916 onwards units from other German regions also occupied the positions, the designations dating back to Bavarian troops were predominantly retained until the end of the war.
Since a functioning position system requires not only combat trenches, but also supply and logistics facilities as well as accommodation facilities for replacement and reserve troops, the villages behind the front were expanded. The village of Spada, located in the middle of no-man’s-land, was heavily fortified as a strongpoint and totally destroyed during the subsequent years of the war. Camp areas were created in the woods and valleys behind the positions. Among the important camps in the Spada sector were the “Königsmulde readiness camp” centrally located in the Chanot-Wald, the “Kaiserschlag readiness camp” located on the “St. Mihiel-Straße” (today’s D 901), as well as the “Neu-Rothenburg readiness camp” on today’s D 162 between Lamorville and Varvinay. Well-preserved remains of the first two can still be found, including from the “Königsmulde readiness camp” also remnants of the associated military cemetery of the Königl. Bayer. Infanterie-Regiments 10 (10th Royal Bavarian Infantry Regiment). Added to these were camps closer to the front, above all the “Pionier-Hügel readiness camp” immediately behind the centrally located front lines.
From the beginning of 1915 onwards, no major combat activities took place anymore. The Spada sector had become a combat zone of the lowest order. Construction activities were intensified. In addition to a dense network of light railway tracks and paved paths, power lines were laid into the readiness camps as early as the end of 1914. In places, the lines were extended all the way to the front lines in order to operate mining equipment such as drills and chisels, as well as electrically charged wire entanglements or minefields.
Starting from the village of Varvinay, a motor-driven water supply network extending into the camps and forward positions was created from the second half of 1915 onwards. After initial difficulties with pipe bursts and pump failures, the water supply functioned smoothly from the spring of 1916 onwards at the latest. Extensive logistical facilities for the troops were established in the villages behind the front. For example, regarding the village of Varvinay, reports mention a mineral water factory, a swimming pool, and a hot-water bathhouse in the municipal washhouse that was already put into operation in November 1915. From January 1916 onwards, Russian prisoners of war were employed in road and path construction. These were accommodated in a guarded camp area on the St. Mihiel-Straße (today’s D 901).
With the Battle of Verdun, the period of continuous troop presence in the Spada sector ended. Both sides used correspondingly quieter front sectors to refresh and rest exhausted units. In mid-June 1916, as the Battle of Verdun approached its climax and the English and French unleashed the Battle of the Somme, the period of position warfare for the Bavarian regiments 10 and 13 was over. They had shaped the Spada sector for over two years. The troops of the III. Bavarian Army Corps were pulled from the front and thrown into the hell of Verdun. The Spada sector was taken over, sometimes in rotations of only a few months, by units that had previously been deployed at all focal points of the Western Front. These continued to include Bavarian troops, for example from November 1916 onward regiments of the 2. Bayerische Infanterie-Division (2nd Bavarian Infantry Division), which had fought at Verdun and on the Somme, then also parts of the 5. Bayerische Reserve-Division (5th Bavarian Reserve Division), which had been deployed both on the Somme and in the Battle of the Aisne (Nivelle Offensive). In the course of 1917, units were added that had stood in the heavy battles in Belgian Flanders, such as parts of the 208. Infanterie-Division (208th Infantry Division), which in August 1917 during the Third Battle of Ypres had been almost completely worn down.
Also in 1918, other sectors of the Western Front initially stood in the focus, such as in connection with the German major offensives designated as the Great Battle in France, all of which ended unsuccessfully. As a reaction to the German defeats, the Allies decided, under American command, to eliminate the St. Mihiel salient. Already in 1915, the Germans had begun the construction of a chord position, which they intended to occupy in anticipation of the attack starting on September 10, 1918. Earlier than expected, the Franco-American attack started on September 12, 1918, which was to develop as a pincer movement with two attack tips: southeastward against the area between the village of Flirey and the Priesterwald (Bois-le-Prêtre) as well as northwestward in the direction of the Combres Ridge (Les Éparges) and via the village of Hattonville eastward. The goal was to encircle and destroy the German troops in the salient.
In the Spada sector, the 192. Königlich-Sächsische Infanterie-Division (192nd Royal Saxon Infantry Division) and, adjoining to the east, the 5. Landwehr-Division (5th Landwehr Division) were stationed at this time. The opposing French units attacked only after a delay of several hours. The Germans avoided encirclement only because the retreat from the tip of the salient was initiated at the last minute on the afternoon of September 12. Furthermore, the Austrian units of the 35. k.u.k. Division (35th Austro-Hungarian Division) stationed on the Meuse Heights, as well as the 13. Landwehr-Division (13th Landwehr Division) defending the Combres-Abschnitt north of it, had been able to prevent the northern spearhead of the Americans from advancing until September 13, 1918. In just three days, however, the St. Mihiel salient, held and heavily fortified by the Germans for over four years of war, was lost.
Current Situation and Exploration Opportunities
There is hardly any position sector that provides more impressive remains of the German position system for military-historical exploration in the area of the battlefields of Verdun, the Argonne, as well as the St. Mihiel Salient. Over long distances, the German trenches—amounting to about 13 kilometers in the front line alone during wartime—are still remarkably well preserved. Based on the mostly excellent condition of even the concrete installations, one can hardly suspect that these remains of armed conflict are now more than 100 years old.
Exploring the Spada sector takes a considerable amount of time and, due to the topography of the terrain, requires physical fitness. For the German side of the former positions alone, one should plan for three independent tours. Explorations in the area of the central Spada forest can be started from a parking space about 250 meters inside the forest area. To reach it, starting from the French war memorial in the village of Spada, one takes the path branching off to the south in the direction of the forest area, which is open and passable. Within the village, the path is named “Rue Dite sur les Traveaux”. Starting from the parking position, the forward German position system can be explored on foot in both easterly and westerly directions.
The position sector on Hills 322 and 331 is best explored starting from several parking spaces centrally located on the Côte Ste-Marie. These can be reached via a similarly open and easily passable path starting from the D 964 a little southeast of the village of Maizey. On the IGN-TOP25 map, the turnoff is called “Croix Marchal”.
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).