Argonne Forest – Fighting in the Argonne Sector 1914–1918
The history of the fighting in the Argonne Forest is complex. In their origin and course, they were inextricably linked to the retreat of the German field army in the West, which became known as the “Miracle of the Marne,” beginning on September 9/10, 1914.
Argonne Forest – Advance to the Marne
In late August 1914, the 4. württembergische Armee (4th Württemberg Army) and the 5. preußische Armee (5th Prussian Army) succeeded in crossing the Meuse between Sedan and Verdun. As the Schlieffen Plan provided, the armies executed a left turn around the pivot of Verdun. The 4. Armee (Fourth Army), under the command of the King of Württemberg, faced the French Fourth Army (4e armée) under the command of General Langle de Cary, while the 5. Armee (Fifth Army) of German Crown Prince Wilhelm faced the French Third Army (3e armée) under the command of General Sarrail. The retreating French units, as well as the German pursuers, left the Argonne between them. The 4. Armee marched south west of the Argonne through Champagne, and the 5. Armee marched east of the main ridge of the Argonne. To maintain contact between the two armies, the VI. preußisches Armeekorps (VI Corps) turned west at Varennes, crossed the Argonne via the present-day D 38, and continued marching south. By September 6, 1914, the German formations were able to leave the Argonne behind and advance far to the south into the area between the Aire and the Marne.
Argonne Forest – Retreat
On September 6, 1914, the French began an unexpected and strong counteroffensive that went down in history as the “Battle of the Marne.” Heavy fighting also occurred in the sector of the 4. Armee (4th Army) and 5. Armee (Fifth Army). Further west with the 1. Armee (1st Army) and 2. Armee (2nd Army), a threatening situation had developed, so from September 12, 1914, the 4. Armee and 5. Armee were also unexpectedly to begin their march back.
Consequently, disagreements arose regarding the retreat lines to be taken. Both army commands endeavored to obtain a front sector that was as favorably located and narrow as possible. Geographically, this was situated further south at the edge of the Argonne Forest for the 4. Armee, and further north for the 5. Armee due to the necessary connection to the position area in front of Verdun. Although the leadership of the 4. Armee held the tactically correct view that the option of encircling the fortress of Verdun would only remain through a line south of the Argonne, the views of the 5. Armee were conceded to upon the intervention of the Oberste Heeresleitung. Both armies began their march back through and along the main ridge of the Argonne. During the hurried and uncoordinated troop movements, the connection between the two armies was severed. Ultimately, a new line facing south emerged in the northern area of the main ridge of the Argonne, approximately at the latitude of the towns of Servon, Binarville, Apremont, Montfaucon, Gercourt. This line was further north than originally planned. The 4. Armee had taken up positions from Binarville into the Champagne area, while the 5. Armee retained the area east of the Argonne Forest continuing into the front sector around Verdun.
The French resolutely followed the retreating German units everywhere and, contrary to German expectations, immediately occupied the Argonne Forest with two complete army corps. They felt their way forward in the northern area of the forest and attacked the German rear-guard positions to the left and right of the main ridge of the Argonne. During this fighting, the Germans lost important positions such as the hill of Vauquois.
Until around September 20, 1914, the Germans held back from any offensive efforts of their own. The French used this time to expand their positions and further reinforce their troops.
The main ridge of the Argonne remained largely unoccupied by German units even after the retreat. Connection between the two German armies was to be ensured via the present-day D 442 between Apremont and Binarville. Since no significant French offensive efforts were expected from the impassable forest area, the approximately 4-kilometer-wide sector was secured only in a stronghold-like manner by I. Bataillon (1st Battalion) of Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 26 (26th Landwehr Infantry Regiment). Nevertheless, the potential strategic importance of the second cross-connection through the Argonne via the Varennes road (present-day D 38) between Le Four de Paris and Varennes was recognized. This route was occupied by III. Bataillon (3rd Battalion) of Landwehr-Infanterie-Regiment 26 with strongholds at Vienne-le-Chateau, Le Four de Paris, and Barricade. On September 14, 1914, the regiment was subordinated to XIII. Armeekorps (XIII Corps). Due to a misunderstood order situation, the 3rd Battalion marched from the sector it had been holding to Varennes, where the XIII Corps was located. Although the march back was ordered immediately, the French had seized the opportunity and occupied the abandoned positions at Le Four de Paris. A recapture failed. The central and most important cross-connection through the Argonne Forest had fallen into French hands. Control over the north-south route leading through the Biesme Valley (present-day D 2) had likewise been lost. This mishap was a major cause of the ensuing Argonne fighting, which would last for over four years until shortly before the end of the war.
Argonne Forest – Fighting from September 1914 Onwards
From late September 1914, following the resumption of German attacks, heavy and costly forest fighting occurred. The German strategy envisioned pushing from east to west through the Argonne with units of the 5. Armee (Fifth Army), especially of the XVI. Armeekorps (XVI Corps), to flank the French troops in the Champagne sector and roll them up in coordination with the 4. Armee (Fourth Army). Units of the 33. preußische Infanterie-Division (33rd Prussian Infantry Division) and 34. preußische Infanterie-Division (34th Prussian Infantry Division) (5. Armee) succeeded by the end of the month in advancing from the east, north and south of the Varennes Road (today’s D 38) as far as the old Roman road (today’s D 38c). For a short time, Heights 263 and 285 could be captured. Parts of Metzer Infanterie-Regiment 98 (98th Metz Infantry Regiment) that had stormed across Hill 285 pushed westwards to just short of Lachalade into the Biesme Valley. The units were cut off by French troops and almost completely wiped out. In addition, a strong French position near Barricade Pavilion on the Varennes Road blocked the advance. Ultimately, units of the 33. preußische Infanterie-Division succeeded in capturing this stronghold in extremely fierce fighting. Also in the northern sector of the Argonne Forest, parts of the 27. württembergische Infanterie-Division (27th Württemberg Infantry Division) (4. Armee) gradually gained terrain in the Bois de la Gruerie. Well-known positions such as the Bagatelle and St. Hubert Pavilions were captured. However, the planned breakthrough could not be achieved anywhere.
In mid-October 1914, all units deployed in the Argonne Forest were placed under the command of the commander of the XVI. Armeekorps, General Bruno von Mudra. Even though small-scale warfare for individual positions continued in the following months, this nevertheless led to more concentrated actions.
In February 1915, heavy fighting developed in the sector of the 5. Armee. The German attack plan intended to push forward the mostly unfavorably situated positions in the southern area of the Varennes Road as well as further west on the Bolante Ridge through an attack in particular by Regiments 98, 130, 135, and 144, and in doing so also capture the ridge of la Fille Morte as well as Hill 285. The attack failed with high losses against the third French line and against the French artillery, which was already clearly superior at that time.
Argonne Forest – Fighting from July 1915 Onwards
In the period from July to September 1915, units of the 33. and 34. preußische Infanterie-Division then succeeded in capturing the strategically important ridges of la Fille Morte and Bolante. Despite continued attack efforts, the French held their positions in the area of the crest of Hill 285 and thus continued to possess an observation capability into the surrounding German positions, especially into the la Fille Morte area. For this reason, large tunnel systems were created, such as the Küpper Tunnel and the Kaiser Tunnel, which was accessible to the public until 2011. These underground facilities enabled the Germans to reach the front lines from the rear positions unobserved and unharmed. Bitter fighting for Hill 285 continued.
South of Binarville, heavy fighting flared up in the summer of 1915 in the area of the Dieusson Ravine. There, the French had erected several infantry strongholds staggered side by side and one behind the other, which were named Martins, Central, Cimetères, and Bagatelle Works. In front of the Martins Work lay another fortification, which was named the Labordère Work. Units of the 27. württembergische Infanterie-Division conquered these strongholds in hard hand-to-hand combat between June and August 1915.
Argonne Forest – Mine Warfare
At the end of September 1915, a front line was reached from Hill 263 on the eastern edge of the main Argonne ridge via Hill 285, la Fille Morte, Bolante, the slope of the Biesme Valley northeast of la Harazée to north of the road from Vienne-le-Château to Servon-Melzicourt (today’s D 266), which remained almost unchanged in the coming years. After reaching this line, trench warfare ensued. The impenetrable Argonne Forest quickly gave way to a crater wasteland in the combat zone. To the rear, both sides built complete military infrastructures in the forests, valleys, and villages with standard-gauge and light railway connections, reinforced supply routes, large storage complexes, sawmills, mineral water factories, charcoal burner sites, military hospitals, and a large number of artillery positions.
Since surface attacks were no longer promising, both sides turned to mine warfare. In the area of Hill 285 and the ridge of la Fille Morte adjoining to the west, the Germans created a tunnel system several kilometers long, interconnected and over 40 meters deep, featuring pumping systems, power generators, electric air supply, accommodation areas, and combat tunnels. The French mostly utilized individual combat tunnels as well as smaller interconnected mine gallery systems. Explosions were detonated by both sides here and north across the Bolante until February 1918. In total, there were more than 500 mine explosions with amounts of explosives that were at times unimaginable. In December 1916, a German mine containing over 50 tons of explosives detonated in the area of today’s ossuary on the Haute Chevauchée (Hill 285).
Mine warfare also occurred at other points on the Argonne front. Probably the best-known location is the village of Vauquois, formerly situated on a hill south of Varennes, which was completely destroyed during the fighting. The entire crest of the hill of Vauquois was pulverized and gave way to a chain of craters up to 30 meters deep. Here too, around 50 tons of Westphalite were detonated by German troops on May 12, 1916. The explosion developed with unexpected violence, resulting in the deaths of about 100 French soldiers as well as more than a dozen German soldiers.
Argonne Forest – 1918 Defensive Battle
In September 1918, the fighting in the Argonne ended. On September 25, 1918, American and French troops attacked the German positions as part of the beginning defensive battle in Champagne and the Meuse. Areas that had previously been fiercely contested, such as la Fille Morte or Hill 285, had been evacuated by the Germans beforehand and had given way to a thin outpost line. The mine warfare facility, built over months of work, was blown up or wired off, except for isolated listening posts, and left to the flooding groundwater. The defense was relocated in a stronghold-like manner to various fallback positions, such as the II Argonne Line north of the Varennes Road (today’s D 38) and the Argonne switch line south of the road from Binarville to Apremont (today’s D 66 and D 442 respectively).
Because the materials and labor required for the expansion of these positions, planned starting in 1917, were lacking, they essentially existed only on the maps of the rear command posts. The positions were often either marked on the ground only with lime or had been dug a few centimeters deep for identification. In the area of the Argonne switch line, some bunkers were indeed built, but the surrounding infantry positions, wire entanglements, and basic armament with machine guns, artillery pieces, and Minenwerfer (trench mortars) were missing. The Germans were no longer able to put up sustained resistance from these positions.
Even though the inexperienced American units suffered massive casualties during the attacks, by October 1918 the Germans had already been pushed back to the north of the Argonne Forest. The American advance could no longer be stopped and was heading directly toward Reich territory. The German formations, which now existed only in rudimentary form, had taken up their last defensive position (Anwerpen-Maas-Stellung) in early November 1918 along the Sedan-Inor-Martincourt line. Although the conclusion of the armistice agreement had been announced for that day and the end of the fighting was imminent, on November 11 at around 10:00 units of the 353rd US Infantry Regiment (89th US Division) captured Stenay, the town where German Crown Prince Wilhelm maintained his headquarters until March 1917 and from where the fierce fighting of the years 1914 to 1916 in the Argonne Forest and at Verdun was decisively directed.
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).