Winterberg – Plateau de Californie – 1914 – 1918
Fighting of the 28. badische Reserve-Division (28th Baden Reserve Division) at the eastern foothills of the Chemin des Dames
Chemin des Dames – General
The term “Chemin des Dames” is familiar to most people interested in military history. Unlike battlefields such as Verdun, on the Somme, or near Ypres, locating them is difficult, and knowledge of specific military operations remains vague at best. Historical sites such as the former battlefield of Verdun quickly became the epitome of the suffering and death of the ordinary soldier after the First World War, over time turning into museum and multimedia memorial sites for the horrors of the First World War, a subject of school and university learning, and a trademark of reconciliation between nations.
In contrast, the battlefields at the Chemin des Dames were quickly pushed out of historical view after the end of the First World War, although equally intense fighting took place there and a corresponding number of soldiers died as in the other major battles along the Western Front. The reason for this was the mutinies at the end of the “Nivelle Offensive” unleashed in the spring of 1917, during which entire frontline units of the French army rebelled against the strict service regulations and the absurdity of mass dying. These events brought France’s political and military system to the brink of collapse. There were hundreds of death sentences against mostly young soldiers, of which ultimately only a few were carried out.
These events still evoke shame and controversial debates in France today. To be sure, the French National Assembly decided in 2021 to rehabilitate the soldiers who were shot mostly for trivial reasons or solely for deterrence. However, implementation and the selection of individuals are proving difficult. The proceedings still concern only individual candidates selected on the initiative of relatives or historians, who are then reburied in military cemeteries more secretly than officially under the cross inscription “Mort pour la France”. Until then, this “privilege” had been denied them.
Songs with a pacifist background such as the infamous “La Chanson de Craonne” or the U.S. war film “Paths of Glory” starring Kirk Douglas remained banned in France until the mid-1970s. The historical and social handling of the wartime events of the spring of 1917 at the Chemin des Dames has still not been definitively resolved for the French to this day.
Chemin des Dames and Winterberg – Naming
Various myths surround the origin of the term “Chemin des Dames”. Common to all theories is that initially the road running there, today’s D18CD, bore the name and not the ridge between the cities of Soissons in the west, Laon in the north, and Reims in the southeast, which is now geographically referred to by that name. It was only from the end of the 19th century that the street name became common first as “Route des Dames” and later as “Chemin des Dames”, although it is said to date back to the reign of Louis XV (*1710 – †1774).
According to all theories, the Château de la Bôve, located north of Bouconville-Vauclair, played a decisive role. Often and even in the German Wikipedia, it is erroneously reported that the estate was a hunting lodge of the French Bourbon emperors. While hunting parties of the royal entourage took place in the extensive forests around the castle, the noble ladies strolled on the ridge between the villages of Craonne in the east and Vaudesson in the west. Therefore, the road was given the name “Chemin des Dames”.
In fact, the name goes back to two daughters of King Louis XV., Marie Adélaïde and Victoire de Bourbon. The former had a lady-in-waiting named Françoise de Châlus, later the Duchesse de Narbonne-Lara (* 1734; † 1821). After Adélaïde appointed her as her dame d’honneur, Françoise de Châlus left Versailles and acquired la Bôve Château, where she lived from then on.
To enable Adélaïde and her sister Victoire, who both lived unmarried at the French court and were generally titled “les Dames de France”, to make visits to Château de la Bôve, the state Corps des Ponts et Chaussées was promptly instructed to surface an existing path starting from the road between Soissons and Laon (today’s N 2) near an inn that still existed at the time named “l’Ange-Gardien” towards Craonne and, near Hurtebise Ferme, a branch heading north along Vauclair Abbey to Château de la Bôve. This resulted in the name “Route des Dames” or later “Chemin des Dames” for today’s D18CD.
Such lavish expenditures by France’s absolutist ruling class were the trigger for the French Revolution that began shortly thereafter.
Chemin des Dames – Geography and Geology
Running from east to west and towering over the surrounding terrain by about 100 meters, the ridge of the Chemin des Dames was the scene of various military conflicts in both World Wars and even before that. To the north, the terrain slopes down to the Ailette valley, and to the south very steeply into the Aisne valley. From the southern direction, the high plateau can only be reached via the sometimes deep valley incisions; from the north, an ascent is possible, but very arduous. Until modern times, no route crossed the ridge in a north-south direction that would have been suitable for larger troop movements or the transport of heavy military equipment.
Geologically, the ridge has a uniform, horizontal structure. This made it easier for the soldiers to construct trenches, dugouts, and above all, larger gallery and tunnel systems. Starting from the valley floor (approx. 100 meters above sea level), an approximately 50-meter-thick sand deposit forms the substructure of the entire ridge. This is capped at the top by a greensand layer (glauconite). Above this, at a thickness of about 30 meters, are limestone deposits of varying density. Surrounded by mostly hard, tabular layers, an approximately 10-meter-thick calcareous sandstone layer is embedded within it, in which the area’s many sandstone quarries used for building materials have been created since the early Middle Ages, as well as the well-known and touristically developed “Drachenhöhle” (“Caverne du Dragon”). The upper boundary is formed by a clay layer up to 8 meters thick. The remains of larger gallery and tunnel systems built during wartime and still frequently found today lie within the sand layer directly beneath the solid limestone deposit, which served as a stable ceiling structure. From east to west, the strata dip noticeably. The lower edge of the limestone, and thus also the majority of the military relics from the First World War, can be found in the east (Winterberg/Plateau de Californie) at about 170 meters, in the center (Cerny-en-Laonnois) at about 155 meters, and in the west (Fort de la Malmaison) at about 140 meters above sea level.
Chemin des Dames – Battle of Craonne 1814
In the era of contemporary history, the Chemin des Dames entered military-historical view through only a single event: the “Battle of Craonne” fought in early March 1814. Following the campaign against Russia that ended catastrophically for the French, the power structures in Europe created by Napoléon Bonaparte disintegrated. This was followed by the Wars of Liberation, which culminated in a severe defeat for the French at the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig. Napoléon’s defeated troops withdrew across the Rhine. However, the French Emperor managed to quickly form a new military force from the meager remnants of his former army and confronted the initially hesitant coalition of Russian, Austrian, and Prussian troops in several battles on French soil.
A final battle that ended successfully for the French took place on March 6 and 7, 1814 on the eastern foothills of the Chemin des Dames, near the village of Craonne. The fighting was triggered by the attempt of the Silesian Army, under the command of Prussian Generalfeldmarschalls (field marshal) Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, after capturing the city of Soissons and crossing the Aisne River there, to unite with the two Corps Wintzingerode and von Bühlow marching from the Netherlands, in order to then advance together on the French capital Paris.
Napoleon had divided his army. One half was to retake Soissons, while with the other the Emperor intended to outflank Blücher’s forces to the east, cut them off from their rear communications to the Netherlands, and then strike them in the flank and rear. When Blücher recognized this plan and sought to give battle in the flat plain between Corbény and the Aisne, Napoleon’s troops had already crossed the river at the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, which had been captured by a coup de main, and had occupied the villages of Craonne, Corbeny, and Bouconville. Consequently, only the barren high plateau between Craonne and Cerny-en-Laonnois to the west remained as a possible battlefield. There, the infantry of the Russian corps of Wintzingerode under the command of Count Woronzow had already taken up position.
Blücher expected the Napoleonic troops to advance via Craonne onto the plateau and then through the narrow bottleneck, only a few hundred meters wide, near Hurtebise Farm. Here Woronzow’s infantry, with artillery support and supposedly protected by the steep slopes on both sides, was to confront the French frontally. The cavalry, for the most part held back, under the command of Russian General Ferdinand Freiherr von Wintzingerode with about 10,000 men and 60 guns, was to outflank the French north of the Chemin des Dames and then fall upon the enemy’s rear.
However, due to inadequate orders and poor leadership by Wintzingerode, the mounted units did not advance as planned. A French corps under the command of Marshal Michel Ney succeeded, with heavy losses, in capturing the small village of Ailles at the northern foot of the plateau, scaling it after several failed attempts, and then establishing itself in the left flank of the Russian infantry.
Blücher had still considered completing the outflanking maneuver after all, but reluctantly had to issue the order to retreat due to the intervening French superiority and the threatening situation. The fighting ended with very heavy casualties for both sides. Russians and Prussians lost about 6,000 men, Napoleon’s troops lost about 5,000 soldiers. Thus, the Battle of Craonne was to remain the most costly in casualties of the entire winter campaign.
Blücher now assembled his army around the fortified city of Laon and awaited there the renewed attack of the French emperor. Although the field marshal fell into a severe depression as a result of excessive hardships and probably also corresponding alcohol consumption, and could no longer command the army until the end of the campaign, the numerical superiority of the assembled coalition troops meant that Napoleon could no longer achieve a decisive success in his attack and also in the subsequent engagements. After the lost Battle of Paris, the French emperor abdicated on April 12, 1814, and went into the exile imposed upon him on the island of Elba.
Immediately south of today’s D18CD, approximately at the level of the village of Craonelle, is a stone sculpture of Napoleon, which was inaugurated in 1974 in memory of the Battle of Craonne at the former site of the Vauclerc Mill. Napoleon used the former stone building as an observation post. The mill was completely destroyed in October 1914, during the heavy fighting at the beginning of the First World War. Near Hurtebise Farm there is also the “Monument des Marie-Louise”, a bronze monument erected in 1927 in place of an obelisk destroyed in September 1914 to commemorate the bravery of the young French recruits who were generally referred to by the name of the French empress. Created by Maxime Real del Sarte, the monument bears the years 1814 and 1914 and shows on the left a Napoleonic Guard soldier from the Napoleonic Wars and on the right a French poilu from the First World War, holding a laurel wreath aloft together. It thus also commemorates the heavy fighting of the First World War from 1914 to 1918, which will be discussed below.
Chemin des Dames – first Battle of the Aisne 1914/1915
Turning point of the war 1916/1917
With a major French attack, the battle designated by the Germans as “Operation Gericht” for the Lorraine city of Verdun ended on December 19, 1916. Even though German troops were able to achieve greater successes especially in the initial phase and almost forced the French to abandon the eastern bank of the Meuse River, by the summer of 1916 the attack had bogged down to such an extent that all offensive efforts were gradually suspended. By the end of December 1916, German troops had been thrown back by the French to their starting positions at the beginning of the attack. Both sides suffered a total of about 700,000 casualties in the fighting. Already in November 1916, the British and French had to break off the relief offensive on the Somme that had begun in the summer of 1916 at the height of the Verdun fighting. Regardless of noteworthy German defensive successes, significantly higher losses had been recorded there for both sides, so that active warfare was initially out of the question for the German army in the West.
On the Eastern Theater of War, Romania had emerged as another adversary. Following Russian successes in the first Brusilov Offensive, Romanian King Ferdinand I declared war on Austria-Hungary on August 27, 1916. Although the Romanian army possessed a considerable force of more than 500,000 men, it had only about 500 modern guns and virtually no motorized vehicles. After minor initial successes, the 9th German Army under the command of the former Chief of the Supreme Army Command (OHL) Erich von Falkenhayn stopped the Romanian advance. On December 6, 1916, German troops marched into Bucharest. The Romanian army was annihilated. This initially prevented further Russian offensives. The German victory fundamentally changed the balance of power on the Eastern Front. Supported propagandistically and also financially by the German Empire, the Russian February Revolution led to the abdication of Tsar Nicholas in March 1917 and, later that year, to final political and military destabilization. Ultimately, the Russian October Revolution brought about the armistice concluded in December 1917 with the German Empire and its allies.
At the turn of the year 1916/1917, Germany stood far on enemy territory on all fronts, although England and France were now clearly superior both economically and militarily, also because of the massive financial and material support by the USA. The naval blockade by the English, ongoing since 1914, meanwhile massively exacerbated the famine at home and also the military supply situation. Many representatives from politics and the military leadership nevertheless believed, based on the previous defensive successes on the Somme as well as the foreseeable decision of the war in the East, that they were in a favorable strategic position. The Entente powers felt similarly for themselves, supported by the morally important success of the French at Verdun as well as the hope for an early entry of the USA into the war.
In this emotional stalemate, interim peace efforts on the part of Germany had to fail, regardless of the huge losses and damages from the previous battles, despite hesitant support by the new American President Woodrow Wilson. France and Italy based the settlement of their massive war debts on the principle „Deutschland zahlt!“. Both countries made unacceptable demands, such as the return of all territories annexed by the German side since 1870, the splitting of Austria-Hungary into nation-states, and the cession of large Turkish border regions to Greece.
While the German military leadership was aware of its purely numerical inferiority, it was clear to all responsible parties that further major battles like the one on the Somme could not be endured again. Nevertheless, alongside the foreseeable release of larger troop contingents in the East, two essential military-tactical options fueled the hope for a final success: unrestricted submarine warfare and shortenings of the front, above all through the retreat of the German positions to the so-called “Siegfried Line” prepared since the autumn of 1916. Added to this were fundamental changes and the standardization of the defense strategy on the basis of generally applicable regulations, the drafting of which had already begun in 1916. The new tactic was based on a flexible and thus unit-sparing warfare, alongside a depth structuring of the position system and the massive use of machine guns. According to the projection of the naval leadership, the German U-boat weapon should in any case succeed within half a year in cutting off England from supplies from the USA and torpedoing it to the negotiating table. Thus, a decision of the war—even if by way of negotiations—was to become possible even before the entry of the USA into the war, which was expected due to the rigorous deployment of the U-boat weapon, could affect the course of the war.
Opposite is the complete content of the original surviving order of the Commanding General of the General Command z.b.V. No. 65 (Group Sissonne), Eberhardt von Schmettow, dated May 6, 1917. To the commander of the Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 111 (111th Reserve Infantry Regiment) (part of the 28. Reserve-Division (28th Reserve Division)) the request is issued to report on the combat activity on the Winterberg on May 4 and 5, 1917. From the unusually harsh phrasing, the critical attitude of the corps leadership regarding the negatively progressing fighting and the presumed responsibility of the regiment can be clearly gathered.
G R U P P E S I S S O N N E
K.H.Qu., May 6, 1917.
Dept. Ia No. 1242 Personal!
The Res. Inf. Regt. 111 has allowed itself to be driven off the Winterberg on May 4. As far as is known here, the attacker consisted of 2 battalions of the French 36th Division (36e division d’infanterie). –
The commander of the regiment is to report briefly and as soon as possible through official channels on the combat activity of the regiment on the 4th of this month and on the 5th in the morning. Particular attention is to be paid to what measures were taken by the regiment to contest the enemy’s success. (Immediate counterattacks and their outcome). Situation sketches, strengths, casualties are to be attached. Superiors are to comment.
I expect the regimental commander to weld his regiment together again with the greatest acceleration and energy into a deployable formation; a re-employment of the regiment in the coming days cannot be dispensed with. The 28. Reserve-Division is requested to support the commander in this through active care.
The Commanding General.
signed v. Schmettow
Excursus: Winterberg-Tunnel – Myths and Reality of a Discovery
were AI-edited (notice pursuant to Art. 50 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).