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Argonnen Rückraum

Meuse-Argonne Offensive 1918 -

Defensive battle from the Champagne to the Meuse from a German perspective

• Summer 1918 - Americans on the Wester Front
  
• Attack and Defense preparations
  
• German resistance in a hopeless situation
  
• Big fightings from 26. December to 11. November 1918

• First Phase - September 26 - 30, 1918
• Second Phase - October 1 - 9, 1918
• Third Phase - October 10 - 31, 1918
• Fourth Phase November 1 - 11, 1918

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Meuse-Argonne Offensive - Summer 1918 - Americans on the Western Front

From April 1917 to mid-1918, around one million American soldiers had followed the US's declaration of war against the German Reich to the French theater of war. The commander of the “American Expeditionary Forces”, “AEF” for short, General John J(oseph) Pershing, endeavored to form an independent army under his command as soon as possible, instead of deploying the troops scattered along the front under foreign command. So French and British wished. This proved difficult at first, as the soldiers only came across the Atlantic in small groups, without artillery, tanks or other equipment. They were dependent on equipment from the Allied forces. Most of the units were inexperienced in combat and had to be trained locally for the hard tasks ahead.

The 1st U.S. Infantry Division (“The Fighting First”, later called “The Big Red One”), already trained for war in the USA, achieved its first notable success in May 1918 at the Battle of Cantigny. Further successful missions followed. At his insistence and with the consent of the Allied commander-in-chief, French General Ferdinand Foch, the 1st U.S. Army was formed on August 10, 1918 under Pershing's personal leadership.

Meuse-Argonne, General John J. Pershing

Meuse-Argonne, Ferdinand Foch

After the major German offensives of spring 1918 had totally failed, the military initiative was finally on the side of the Allies. General Foch planned to wear down the German defenses with a rapid succession of major attacks spread across the entire Western Front to decide the war by mid-1919 at the latest. This phase today is known as the Hundred Days Offensive. However, it was not a uniformly coordinated operation, but rather separate operations by the French armed forces, the British Expeditionary Force, Canadian, Australian, and other Commonwealth units and, ultimately, the newly formed American units.

Three armies from the USA were deployed in France during the war, whereby only the 1st and 2nd U.S. Army were operationally active. Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, the 3rd U.S. Army commanded by Major General Joseph T. Dickman provided the American occupation troops on German territory after the war.

American propaganda poster, 1918

The Allied offensive plan saw several operations aimed at demoralizing the enemy and winning strategically important areas, as well as road and rail links. These included the Offensive of Amiens from August 8, 1918, in which British units were to recapture the railroad line between Paris and Amiens at the interface between the French and British units. For the Germans, this attack ended in disaster on the very first day, with the destruction of entire divisions, a frontal collapse some 12 kilometers deep and the loss of more than 30,000 men in prisoners and casualties. General Ludendorff later wrote in his war memoirs that it was the

“black day of the German army”.

Another single operation became the Americans' dress rehearsal for the Meuse-Argonne offensive planned for the end of September 1918: the Battle of St. Mihiel. By recapturing the front-salient south of Verdun, the railroad lines from the greater Paris area to Metz and Nancy, which were aimed at the center of Germany, were to be fought free. Furthermore, the main west-east road connections.

In the Battle of St. Mihiel between September 12 and 16, 1918, American and French units succeeded in penetrating the German retreat known as the “Loki Movement” to the Michel position between Etain and Pagny-sur-Moselle. They inflicted heavy losses in men and material on the German troops.

Even though the Americans lost around 10,000 men in this battle, which lasted only five days and resulted in almost 5,000 casualties, the positive effect on the soldiers' self-confidence and their hitherto rather dubious reputation among the allies was immense.

From September 18, 1918, significant parts of the American units were withdrawn from the St. Mihiel area to rejoin the 1st U.S. Army in the Argonne area a few days later.

Meuse-Argonne: Battle of St. Mihiel, September 12 - 16, 1918

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Meuse-Argonne offensive - attack and defense preparations

Meuse-Argonne: Excerpt from the war diary of III/LIR 120

From mid-September 1918, the German front troops in the Argonne recorded increased enemy air activity. Traffic behind the French lines also increased noticeably. Nevertheless, enemy artillery fire remained weak and patrols only detected known enemy units until the end. Limited operations in Champagne or nearby the Meuse were expected, but not a large-scale operation. Certainly not that the American divisions, formed into an independent army after the Battle of St. Mihiel just a few days earlier, would seek the decisive major battle between the Argonne and the River Meuse. As late as September 21, 1918, the daily report of the 2nd (Württemberg) Landwehr Division stated:

“An attack on the divisional front is not expected.”

On September 23, 1918, this deceptively optimistic assessment of the situation was changed by statements from prisoners and the latest results of air and patrol reconnaissance. An attack by the 4th and 5th French army in the Champagne became apparent. On the Argonne front and further east to the Meuse, the 1st U.S. Army was recognized as ready to attack behind the front lines. The start of the offensive was only a matter of days away.

On September 3, 1917, the 2nd Landwehr Division had already been given responsibility for the defense of the central Argonne section, which it was not to relinquish until the end of the fighting. Commanded by its leader, the Prussian General of Artillery Adolf Franke, the previously neglected position construction was resumed, and the position system adapted to modern standards. Until the beginning of 1918, mine warfare was intensified once again in addition to individual operations, but was completely discontinued from February 1918. The expansion of rear positions, the creation of a weakly manned apron and a strong main defensive line around three kilometers behind the front trenches meant that the defense was elastic and deeply structured.

Meuse-Argonne: sketch from the regimental history of LIR 120

On September 24, 1918, the Army High Command 3 (AOK 3) ordered preparations for the major main based on the latest reconnaissance results. The apron was cleared of all things important to the war effort. The artillery took up positions. The bulk of the infantry returned to the main line of resistance (II Argonne Line). In the former central front sections on the Argonne ridge, la Fille Morte and Height 285 (la Haut Chevauchée), only one NCO post remained for observation. Only individual platoons remained in the entire advance area, which also had to withdraw to the main line of resistance in the event of the beginning attack.

Meuse-Argonne: Hochwald section, old and new HWL, as of July 1918, map: PiB 402

On September 25, 1918, the 76th Reserve Division, which had been accelerated from the battles on the Aisne and Oise, arrived and was immediately deployed on the border between Argonne (2nd Landwehr Division) and Champagne Section (9th Landwehr Division). The reserve regiments 252, 253 and 254 were to defend the western part of the Hochwald section as far as the Dormoise section.

1st Guards Division, painting by Carl Röchling, Berlin 1894

East of the Argonne, from the valley of the little river Aire to a line between the villages of Gesnes and Avocourt, lay the battle line of the 1st Guards Division. The Prussian elite regiments had taken part in all the major battles in the west and east during the war. By September 5, 1918, they had taken part in the heavy fighting at the Chemin des Dames and reached their Argonne deployment zone in mid-September 1918. All attempts by their commander, Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia, to prevent the renewed deployment due to the inadequate number of troops and lack of combat strength were unsuccessful. According to the Supreme Army Command (“Oberste Heeresleitung”), the new section was absolutely calm, and the division could also recover there. This was a fatal miscalculation, as further developments were to show.

Together with the 1st Guards Division, the 2nd Landwehr Division belonged to “Group Argonne” and was subordinate to General Command No. 58 commanded by Lieutenant General Alfred von Kleist. The headquarters were located in the Château de Chanzy near Buzancy. The corps bore the addition “z.b.V.” (for special use), as it was one of the “mobile” command and administrative units created from 1917 onwards with no fixed ties to specific divisions.

West of the Argonne was the area of responsibility of the General Command of the I Reserve Corps, to which the 76th Reserve Division was subordinate in addition to the 9th Landwehr Division. Commanded by Lieutenant General Richard Wellmann, the command had only been disengaged from the battles of the 2nd Army near Cambrai on the morning of September 24, 1918. They took up quarters in the mill “la Forge” near the village of Senuc on the evening of the same day. It was to take command of the right wing of the Argonne Group, anticipating the coming major battle with the Aisne sector. The front in the Argonne area was thus divided into three sections, designated from west to east by their geographical position as “Aisne” (76th RD, 9th LID), ‘Hochwald’ (2nd LD) and “Tiefland” (1st GID).

Moulin de la Forge, Senuc, October 1918, source: NARA

Further west, on the edge of Champagne area, between Kanonenberg (Mont Tetu) and the Butte de Tahure, a well-known command unit from the Argonne battlefield also opposed the attack by the 4th French Army, which was ready there: the XVI Prussian Army Corps. The former “Argonne Corps” was now part of the “Perthes Group”, which had its headquarters in the building of today's sub-prefecture in the town of Vouziers. The commander was Lieutenant General Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, former Prussian Minister of War. Little remained of the glorious history of the XVI Army Corps under leaders such as Gottlieb Graf von Haeseler or Bruno von Mudra in the final phase of the First World War. The infantry divisions 33 and 34, which had formed the core of the troops for decades, had now been assigned to other armies. The 42nd, 103rd and 202nd Infantry Divisions were now commanded by the General Command. The former had been formed in 1912 in Sarrebourg/Lorraine, the other two in 1915 and 1916 as so-called “war divisions” on the Russian front.

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Until the failure of the major German offensives in 1918, it was customary, that another division had to stand in reserve behind each front division in threatened sections. Landsturm and Landwehr units, in which mainly older men, farmers, craftsmen and often family men served, were usually only deployed in quiet sections. When large-scale combat was imminent, they were exchanged by active regiments. This was no longer possible in the fall of 1918.

In addition to individual Landsturm battalions, only the 5th Guards Division could be made available to the Argonne Group as an intervention force and security garrison over a width of around 25 kilometers. Commanded by Major General Walter von Haxthausen, its regiments (3rd Guards R.z.F., 3rd Guards-GrenR, IR 20) had been engaged in the Battle of Vauxaillon at the infamous Laffaux Corner until September 18, 1918, and had suffered heavy losses. With companies averaging only 30 to 40 men, the troop strength had fallen to around a fifth of the target number. On September 20, 1918, after a one-day train journey and without any opportunity to rest, the division was unloaded at Saint-Juvin station just behind the Argonne front.

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Meuse-Argonne Offensive - German resistance in a hopeless situation

The general situation in Germany no longer gave cause for optimism, either. More than 70 divisions had returned from the 1918 spring battles on the Western Front, having fought their way back. Ten of them had to be disbanded. The Supreme Army Command had put all its eggs in one basket and also used up the majority of the army's tactical reserves.

Allied counterattacks now began on all fronts. Internal cohesion in Germany and towards the allies was crumbling. Entire front units deserted, large-scale demonstrations and street fighting broke out in the cities, and mass strikes took place in many industrial and arms factories. In mid-September 1918, the Austrians issued an arbitrary appeal for peace to all warring nations. The note was not even seriously answered, as the British and Italians were preparing to break the resistance of Bulgaria and Turkey on the Balkan and Palestine fronts. The entire Danube Monarchy began to totter. To gain back some control over the situation, seven strong German divisions had to be withdrawn from the Western Front and transferred to the Danube and Serbia. This further exacerbated the difficulties in the west.

The incorporation of holidaymakers, convalescents, and recruits into the fighting forces faltered. The number of so-called “shirkers” and “malingerers” rose sharply. Insubordination and indiscipline increased, including looting. Magazines at home and in the staging area had to be secured by active troops.

Spanish flu, newspaper advertisement by a Bremen mortician, 1918

The “Spanish flu” was particularly rampant among the German frontline soldiers. Due to chronic undersupply as well as physical and mental overstrain after weeks of uninterrupted combat, they suffered significantly more than their enemy comrades. The epidemic also killed thousands of civilians and workers at home, especially in the mass accommodation of the large cities. It significantly weakened the industrial sector and the backbone of the fighting troops.

Erich Ludendorf, 1918

But what was the reason that the German commanders and units were still prepared to put up such massive resistance in such a precarious situation towards the end of the war? The explanation lies in a fundamental paradigm shift away from the victorious end of the war that the Supreme Army Command had always promised up to that point. On August 14, 1918, the Crown Council met at the Grand Headquarters in Spa, Belgium. General Erich Ludendorff, de facto head of the Supreme Army Command, gave the Kaiser an unembellished assessment of the situation after the experiences of the battles near Amiens. After Ludendorff's clear words, the hitherto always over-optimistic monarch came to a sobering conclusion:

“I realize we have to take stock. We are at the limit of our capabilities. The war must end.”

The previously propagated “peace of victory” was replaced by the concept of “negotiated peace”.

With the aim of avoiding surrender, keeping the fighting off German soil and being able to negotiate a peace agreement on acceptable terms, the main military focus was now on gaining time, evasive warfare and especially on concealing any signs of awareness of their own defeat. Unsustainable sections of the front were to be abandoned. The enemy was to be inflicted with the highest possible losses in favorable locations. In northern France, the German troops had already withdrawn to the “Siegfried Line” in the spring of 1918 and to the “Herrmann Line” after the defeats in the summer. In the Champagne and the Argonne, only the partially completed “Brunhild Line” could be considered for a holding defense. Its trenches ran via Grandpré in the west to Landres in the east, where it merged into the “Kriemhild Line” on the border with the 5th Army.

v. Hindenburg, Kaiser Wilhelm II., Ludendorff, Pleß, 1917

Meuse-Argonne: Brundhild-Stellung, map: Army-High-Command 3, September 1918

One geographical aspect is of fundamental importance for understanding the strategic decisions made on the Champagne and Argonne fronts in the fall of 1918: As the above position map of German Army Command 3 from September 1918 shows, the Brunhild Line between Vouziers and Grandpré on the border of the Perthes and Argonne groups made an almost 90-degree bend to the north. The area was called the “Aisne bend”. To reach the Brunhild position, the German front troops in the Champagne had to make a retreat movement of more than 30 kilometers and a complex turn on the eastern flank under expectedly strong enemy pressure. In contrast, the route for the units of the 5th Army in the Argonne was only about 10 kilometers.

Meuse-Argonne: Brückenkopf von Montcheutin, 9. Landwehr Division, September 26, 1918

The planned anchoring point for the turn on the eastern edge of the Champagne section was the heavily fortified “Bridgehead of Montcheutin” located in the central bend of the Aisne between the towns of Mouron and Lancon. This would become untenable and thus the overall operation unfeasible if American troops succeeded in reaching the rear of the Champagne defenses by capturing the Argonne ridge.

Considering this, it was necessary to slow down an enemy advance on the main Argonne ridge and further east until the troop movements in the Champagne had essentially been completed. In addition, the 9th Landwehr Division had to stop a French advance from the south to Autry and secure the Aisne crossings. The necessary measures were to place high logistical demands on the troops and their leaders.

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Meuse-Argonne Offensive - major battle from September 26 to November 11, 1918

from: v. Moser, Die Württemberger im Weltkriege, Stuttgart 1927

“The sentries of the three platoons holding the apron under Lieutenant Lehner listen out into the starry night. Shouts and the rattling of wagons occasionally sound from the Biésme valley, otherwise the waves of destruction and the destructive fire of our artillery has the floor. Then, at 11 o'clock at night, something new: from the west, from the Champagne region, the heaviest artillery battle suddenly rumbles over. The enemy artillery also begins to speak. Heavy batteries are fired, the shells creep far into the rear area; Borrieswalde, Châtel, Cornay, the crossroads on the north-south road at “Jungfernplatz” are their targets. At midnight, the neighboring Infantry Regiment No. 122 at La Harazée reported a strong engine noise, moving in the direction of Madame valley and Four de Paris. That was the tank march. The battle in the Champagne is getting closer, now it is also raging in the western part of the Argonne, and then, at 3 o'clock in the morning, it also breaks out here. The howling comes from all directions, sometimes high, sometimes low, sometimes whistling, sometimes ponderous, eerie like death itself, like doom.”

In the regimental history of the Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 120, published in 1922, the former lieutenant and later diplomat Dr. Gustav Strohm vividly describes the prelude to the disaster that befell the German Argonne troops on the night of September 25-26, 1918. It ended just a few weeks later on November 11, 1918, with the de facto defeat of Germany: the Allied Meuse-Argonne offensive.

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Meuse-Argonne Offensive - First Phase, September 26 - 30, 1918

As dawn began to break on the morning of September 26, 1918, the artillery preparatory fire came to an end. By 6.30 a.m., more than 5,000 guns and mine launchers of all calibers from Reims to Verdun had shelled the German advance and defensive positions according to plan. Far behind the front line, camps, railroad stations, traffic junctions and villages were hit with explosive and gas shells as well as aerial bombs.

From the Champagne to the Meuse, the French, and Americans attacked under the protection of their artillery. With the French 4th Army and the U.S. 1st Army, 22 Allied divisions faced only 15 German divisions. Around 200 tanks were deployed in the U.S. 1st Army section to break through the German lines.

Meuse-Argonne: AEF marching in France, July 1918, NARA

Each of the American divisions had 16 battalions of around 1,240 men each, whereas a German division consisted of just nine battalions, or three regiments. After the heavy losses in the battles of the first half of 1918, the troop strength of the German regiments averaged only 500 men, around one-sixth of their target strength. At around 250 soldiers, the strength of the individual companies was also about five times higher among the Americans than in the German army. The result was an overwhelming superiority. In this respect, the Allies already had far-reaching objectives for the first days of the offensive. No serious German resistance was expected. However, the attacks turned out differently than planned.

Meuse-Argonne, extract from regimental history of Bav. FAR 2, Bd. 2

The Allied infantry attack began on the morning of September 26, 1918, on the Champagne front between Aubérive and the western edge of the Argonne forest. Here, the 4th French Army faced the Py, Perthes and Argonne/Aisne Groups (including the 42nd ID, 103rd ID, 199th ID, 202nd ID, 1st and 4th Bavarian ID). The former front line with sections such as the Bois de Ville, Kreuzberg, Kanonenberg and the Butte du Mesnil, which had remained almost unchanged for four years, had been cleared. The new German main line of resistance (HWL 1) lay on the northern edge of the Dormoise stream, roughly on a west-east line Navarin Ferme - Tahure - Cernay-en-Dormois. It continued along the southern edge of the Bois de Cernay via the northern slope of the Moreau valley (R'au de la Fontaine) onto the main Argonne ridge.

The French attack, which had been prepared with hours of barrage fire, was generally repulsed in the main line of resistance. Only south-east of the villages of Sommepy and Souain as well as near Fontaine-en-Dormois did the French succeed in making small breakthroughs, which could be contained with reserve troops. This marked in this section of the front the end of the first phase of what the Germans later officially called the “defensive battle in the Champagne and the Argonne”.

In the “Hochwald” section, on the main Argonne ridge, the artillery preparatory fire also ended in the early morning of September 26, 1918, and merged into a fire roller moving ahead of the attacking American infantry. Apparently, the main German line of resistance, the former II. Argonne line, had remained undetected. The Americans were content to occupy the forward positions in the area of the Haute Chevauchée (Height 285) and the ridge of la Fille Morte. The 76th Reserve Division and the regiments of the 2nd Landwehr Division, which were expecting the attack mainly north of the Varenner Strasse (today's D 38), were left unmolested apart from isolated patrol advances.

However, it turned out that the main American attack was not planned here, but to the east of the main Argonne ridge in the Aire and Buanthe valleys, the Bois de Cheppy and Véry and continued towards the Meuse. After breaking through the German front positions along the Meuse, the strategic objective was to advance via Stenay to the area of the towns of Sedan and, at best, Charleville-Mezières. This was to gain possession of important rail links and the rear of the entire German Western Front.

The 1st Guards Division (1st, 2nd, 4th GardeR z.F.) was located in the “Tiefland” section there. The regiments of the 5th Guards Division (3rd GardeR z.F., GGrenR 3, IR 20), originally intended as a reserve, were immediately integrated into the thin defensive lines after the enemy's intentions to attack were recognized.

The section of the 117th Infantry Division joined up to a line between Malancourt and Nantillois to the east. Its regiments (GrenR 11, IR 157, IR 450) had only been pulled out of the defensive battles on the Somme north of Péronne at the beginning of September 1918, severely decimated.

The 7th Reserve Division (RIR 36, RIR 66, RIR 72) awaited the attack further to the river Meuse. This division had also previously fought in the north of France between Oise and Aisne and suffered heavy losses.

Butte de Vauquois 1918, view over the Buanthe-Tal

Meuse-Argonne: Wiesenschlenken-Stellung near Véry, autumn 1917

Immediately before the start of the American offensive, there was not a single fully combat-capable unit on the German side between the Argonne and Meuse, apart from the 2nd Landwehr Division, or one that was sufficiently familiar with the local conditions. In contrast, the Americans had three complete army corps and thus nine fully equipped infantry divisions for the first attack wave alone. The manpower of the American attackers was about ten times that of the German defenders.

Anticipating the major battle, the German troops had also withdrawn to their main line of resistance (HWL 1) in the lowland section after the start of the artillery preparatory fire. Only individual groups and field guards equipped with machine guns remained in the advance area. The front positions with their secure shelters, concrete structures, and deep wire obstacles, which had been in place for over four years and had been heavily developed, became a weakly manned line of retreat from Boureuilles over the Vauquois hill. Further along the southern edge of the forests of Cheppy, Véry, Montfaucon, and Malancourt.

Meuse-Argonne: Tiefland section, autumn 1917

In contrast to the Hochwald section with the “II. Argonnenlinie”, which had already been established there in 1916, the main line of resistance in the Tiefland section consisted of only a very few continuous trench and dugout systems, but rather of strongpoints scattered across the terrain. These were equipped with machine guns or manned by infantry-only posts. This initial situation, together with the completely inadequate trench strength of the defenders, proved to be fatal, especially as another enemy joined them on the morning of September 26, 1918: an unusually dense early morning fog, which rendered the infantry and machine gun nests ineffective. The US troops had recognized the tactical benefits of the fog, which were massively reinforced using phosphorus and thermite grenades.

In the States, the development of corresponding chemical warfare agents such as phosgene (Green Cross), mustard gas (Lost, Yellow Cross, Yperite) and also phosphorus, TNT or thermite was strongly promoted from mid-1917 and their use was placed in the hands of special units. The “1st Gas and Flame Regiment” was the first of these special troops to be deployed in the French theater of war. After landing in the port of Brest, the officers received six weeks of instruction in English weapon systems, primarily the easy-to-use and mobile Livens projectors and Stokes grenade launchers. They were trained at the headquarters of the British Royal Engineers in Helfaut near Saint-Omer. Parts of the “1st Gas” had already fought on other battlefields before the Meuse-Argonne offensive, for example on the Marne near Château-Thierry and also in the St. Mihiel Salient. Their deployment gave the Americans a significant strategic advantage at the start of the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The American assault troops succeeded in capturing the Woods of Cheppy and Montfaucon at the first attempt. Even though the advance stalled in front of the fortress-like hill of Montfaucon and the 79th US Infantry Division, which was attacking across open terrain, came to a halt in the machine gun and mortar fire of the experienced German defenders. There were heavy casualties. Rapid progress was made in the neighboring sections. The positions of the 1st Guards Division in the Tiefland section were rolled up from the east. American troops, with tanks, advanced on the village of Véry. The sparse remnants of the 1st Guards Regiment z.F. near Cheppy fled back to a line between Baulny and Epinonville. Most of the Guards' artillery fell into the hands of the Americans.

from: Ernst Otto, Der letzte Schwertstreich. Die Abwehr der amerikanischen Maas-Argonnen-Offensive, Zeulenroda 1932

Meuse-Argonne, Butte de Vauquois, view to east, US Signal-Corps, 1919

Between the Aire and Buanthe streams, the attackers, even supported by tanks, also encountered no significant resistance. On the centrally located Butte de Vauquois, which had been fiercely fought over for four years, about 25 men of the 5th and 6th companies of the 2nd Guards Regiment held their ground commanded by the “Vauquois commander”, Lt. Holz. The last carrier pigeon report from the small band of defenders read:

“Vauquois-East. The enemy climbs the mountain from all sides out of the fog. The fight is fierce, but we will hold the line to the last man. Long live the king!”

By 3 p.m. the Americans were already in Varennes-en-Argonne and a little later in front of Montblainville, where the sparse remnants of the 4th Guards Regiment were initially able to hold their ground. At the last minute, the gap between Montblainville and Eclisfontaine created by the loss of the majority of the 1st Guards Division was closed by reserves (GGrenR 3, IR 20), which were brought up quickly, thus preventing a bigger American breakthrough.

”On the main Argonne ridge, however, the 2nd Landwehr Division was now in a critical position. Its left flank was hanging in the air, and the enemy was already operating deep in its rear on the eastern plain. General Franke therefore ordered the 1st battalion of the LIR 122, which was in group reserve in the “Sachsenhain" camp, and the majority of the divisional reserve to the heights west of Montblainville to take a defensive front to the east.

Argonne, main-ridge, german positions September 26 to 27, 1918

When the actual extent of the crisis became apparent, the left wing of the 2nd Landwehr Division with the LIR 125 was bent back along the eastern edge of the main Argonne ridge to the heights of the village of Montblainville. The parts of the group and division reserve ordered there were placed commanded by the GGrenR 3 and from then on blocked the Aire valley south of the village of Apremont, which was naturally narrowed at this point.

The original defense plan of the Argonne Group had envisaged attacking an enemy advancing in the Aire Valley from the Argonne main ridge with standby battalions in the flank and rear. Considering the overwhelming American superiority and the use of all available reserves, this was no longer an option. Instead, it were the Americans who, taking advantage of the successes they had achieved, were to continue their attempts to ambush the positions of the 2nd Landwehr Division to roll up the entire German front to the west.

Meuse-Argonne, Hochwald section, German postions, September 27 to 28, 1918

After a moderately quiet night, during which the Americans reorganized their units and brought up the artillery, there were further attacks on the ruins of the village of Montblainville from the early morning of September 27, 1918. The remaining defenders of the 4th GardeR z.F. were overrun. The Americans advanced a few more 100 meters along the Aire to the level of “Borrieswalde” camp area and the “Lüttwitztal” light railroad station.

Quickly organized counterattacks by the intervention troops near Apremont (including I./GGrenR 3, I./LIR 122) were able to repel the enemy, and further American attacks with tanks were also repulsed. However, the recapture of the village of Montblainville was not successful, as the Americans had placed numerous machine guns on the unvegetated plain of the Aire valley and in the village itself.

In contrast to the heavy terrain losses in the Tiefland section, the 2nd Landwehr Division was able to maintain its positions on the main Argonne ridge also on the second day of the attack without any significant losses. However, when the villages of Charpentry and Baulny also fell into American hands on the afternoon of September 27, 1918, the entire defense was ordered to be withdrawn to the “Argonnen-Riegel” about three kilometers to the north. In this way, the already vastly overstretched front could be shortened and stabilized to some extent.

Meuse-Argonne: Argonnen-Riegel, Map: 2nd (württ.) Landwehr-Division, June 1918

Until the morning, of September 28, 1918, the units of the 2nd Landwehr Division withdrew to the “Argonnen-Riegel” unnoticed by the enemy. It was not until the evening that American troops hesitantly crossed the “Varenner Strasse" (today's D 38) and occupied the former German main line of resistance. LIR 122 now stood to the west and LIR 120 to the east in the “Argonnen-Riegel”. The bent back left flank along the eastern ridge of the Argonne Forest was secured by LIR 125 up to the area of the village of Apremont.

The Americans continued to concentrate on advancing in the Tiefland section and outflanking the 2nd Landwehr Division from the east. The “Bouzon Berg” southwest of Montblainville was bitterly contested. After a brief loss, the area was held until the evening by units of II/LIR 125. Further north, however, the Americans had succeeded in capturing the village of Apremont against the weak resistance of the remnants of the 3rd GGrenR. As a result, the strategically important “Mudra-Höhe” (le Chene Tondu), the large “Borrieswalde” troop camp and the “Apremont Strasse” (today's D 442/D 66) running west from Apremont and thus all units to the west were threatened. “Bouzon Berg” had to be abandoned, and the defenses reduced to the area of the “Mudra-Höhe”.

Meuse-Argonne, Hochwald section, german positions, September 30, Map: 2nd (württ.) Landwehr-Division

On September 29, 1918, the Americans finally succeeded in defeating the sparse remnants of the Guard troups in the Tiefland section without much effort. The village of Exermont and the Bois de Montrebeau in the south were lost. At this point, the 1st Guards Division only had around 350 serviceable men, while the 5th Guards Division had almost twice as many. There was no artillery left. The front section of about 8 km width assigned to the Guards could not be defended with this small number of soldiers.

Only the 2nd Landwehr Division and the 52nd Infantry Division, which had just arrived from Lorraine, could bring the American advance to a halt at least in front of the hilltop of the Bois de Montrefagne (Hill 240). They were able to throw back the surprised attackers with heavy losses as far as the Chaudron Ferme north of Baulny.

Meuse-Argonne, from: History of 2. (württb.) LID

Meuse-Argonne, Mudra-Turm, 1917

From the “Mudra-Höhe” (le Chène Tondu) up to the Mesnil Ferme, the Americans continued their attacks, whereby the German defenders were gradually pushed together on the crest of “Mudra-Höhe” around the wooden “Mudra-Turm” and the so called “Blinkstelle”. Several attempts by the Landwehr regiments 120 and 125 to recapture the village of Apremont at the foot of the hill were unsuccessful due to inadequate attack and artillery preparation.

Despite their overwhelming superiority, the Americans were unable to make a decisive breakthrough during this phase of the fighting. Units of the 28th and 35th US Infantry Division in particular suffered very heavy losses in the concentrated defensive fire of the Landwehr troops. This was despite strong tank and artillery support in the repeated attempt to capture the eastern edge of the Argonne and the “Mudra-Höhe” (le Chène Tondu). As a result, the fighting subsided from September 30, 1918. The Americans began to organize their troops, replenish ammunition and material reserves and bring up the artillery. Three worn-out divisions from the first wave of attack (35th, 37th and 79th US ID) were removed from the front and replaced by fresh units (1st, 32nd and 3rd US ID).

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Meuse-Argonne Offensive - Second Phase October 1 - 9, 1918

In contrast to the situation in the Tiefland section, fierce fighting continued in the western part of the Argonne (Aisne section) on October 1, 1918. There, the 76th Reserve Division had to fend off attacks by the 4th French Army.

After strong artillery preparation, French forces succeeded in breaking through the inadequately manned main line of resistance (former HWL 2) between the two Reserve Regiments 253 and 254 west of Köthe Rücken and penetrating the German defense up to 500 meters deep. Shortly beforehand, RIR 252, which had initially been deployed there, had been withdrawn from the front to act as a divisional reserve.

The two remaining regiments succeeded in sealing off the breach. However, they lacked the strength for a counterattack. Only parts of the RIR 252 that were ordered back were finally able to prevent the French from advancing further along the Bieber Bach and losing the strategically important village of Lancon. By October 3, 1918, the French attackers had been driven back in heavy hand-to-hand and undergrowth fighting and the original situation had been restored.

Meuse-Argonne, Biber-Tal, from: RIR 252

Meuse-Argonne, from ABMC

No less threatening, albeit from the American perspective, was the situation further east at the intersection of the Aisne (76th R.D.) and Argonne (2nd L.D.) groups. Here, on October 3, 1918, parts of several regiments of the 77th US Infantry Division (307th & 308th Inf., 306th MG-Bat.) had gotten behind the main German line of resistance in the unstable Argonne forest terrain. Due to the retreat of the French to the west and the lack of progress of the US attack further east, about 550 Americans were cut off in the valley of the Charlevaux Bach. They were encircled by German troops on the northern slope of the valley. They were about 500 meters east of the Charlevaux Mühle in the “Müller-Grund”. In the days that followed, this so-called “Amerikanernest” was the scene of brutal hand-to-hand fighting, in which spades, bayonets and flamethrowers were used to inflict heavy losses on the inexperienced Americans.

No serious attempts were made to break out or to dislodge the cut-off troops. The main focus of the American High Command was on the success of the attack in the Tiefland section. Expectedly high losses among the trapped troops were accepted in order to tie up the strongest possible German forces in this non-combat-decisive section of the front. For around 190 survivors, the encirclement only ended with the strategic retreat of the German troops a few days later.

In the USA, the units in question were heroized after the end of the fighting under the name “Lost Battalion” and their significance for the overall operation was overglorified. The “Lost Battalion” is still the subject of semi-scientific studies in America today, and was also the subject of a film made for local pay television in 2001. The commander of the unit, Major Charles Whittlesey, in his civil profession a lawyer in New York City, was promoted to lieutenant colonel after the fighting and received the Medal of Honor. However, he could not get over the memory of the events and his responsibility for what he saw as the unnecessary death of his young soldiers. In 1921, he took his life by jumping into the open sea on a ship passage to Cuba.

Meuse-Argonne, Charles Whittlesey

In the Tiefland section, east of the Aire, the renewed American attack preparations were completed on the morning of October 4, 1918. After an intensive artillery-barrage, the infantry attack, supported by tanks, began behind a strong fire roller. Between Apremont and Exermont, the thin defensive line of the 5th Guards Regiment could no longer withstand the attackers. The villages of Chéhéry and Fléville fell, and the bridges over the Aire were blown up by German sappers. To the east of the Aire, the way into the rear of the German defenders seemed to be clear. It was only when parts of the 37th Infantry Division were brought up at an accelerated pace that they were able to recapture Fléville in heavy fighting and stop the further American advance.

Meuse-Argonne, October 4, 1918, from: LIR 120

On the morning of October 5, 1918, the Americans continued their attacks with the same intensity. Renewed artillery preparatory fire finally reduced the remains of rear villages such as Cornay, Marcq, St. Juvin and Grandpré to rubble. The attackers were once again able to advance to the southern edge of Fléville. Otherwise, however, the German defensive front held out everywhere. On this day, Gruppe Argonnen was detached from Armeegruppe Deutscher Konprinz (3rd Army) and placed under the command of Armeegruppe Gallwitz (5th Army), which then had to command the entire section between Argonne and Meuse. On the American side, the exhausted 91st U.S. Infantry Division was withdrawn from the front and its section was taken over by the 1st and 32nd U.S. Infantry Divisions.

Meuse-Argonne, f.l.t.r.: Hohenborn-Höhe, Châtel-Chéhéry, Schloß-Berg, Humser-Berg, Schöne-Aussicht, Cornay

For the 2nd Landwehr and 76th Reserve Division, it was still important to hold the Argonne Heights. The only usable “Nord-Süd-Strasse” for the upcoming retreat movements crossed the well-developed road to Lancon (today's D4) near Châtel-Chéhéry on the “Hohenborn-Höhe” area (Hill 244). Its loss would have posed a threat to the German Champagne retreat and the units fighting further west in the “Aisne Knie”. The “Nord-Süd-Straße” continued over the “Humser-Berg” (Polygon Crossroads) west of Cornay to the villages of Chevières and Marcq. There were further road connections to the west, and the Aire crossing was planned here for the retreat of the mass of the Argonne troops.

Early in the morning of October 6, 1918, French and American troops launched another major attack from Champagne to the east of the Meuse. In the Tiefland section, especially in the area around the village of Cunel, the US troops were able to gain ground. For the night of October 6-7, 1918, the 2nd Landwehr Division was ordered to withdraw its resistance to the line Valerine Valley (Walerne R'au) - “Waldlager Châtel” - “Hohenborn-Höhe” (Hill 244) with the left wing bent back over the ‘Schloss-Berg’ (Hill 223) and “Schöne Aussicht” (Hill 180).

Meuse-Argonne, from 7. to 8. October 1918, from: Gruppe Argonnen

The retreat had to take place in complete darkness and under heavy artillery fire. This time, the disengagement from the enemy did not work unrecognized. Even before the units could set up their defenses again, American troops (including the 82nd U.S. Infantry Division) advanced to attack. Fierce fighting broke out around the aforementioned heights. The “Hohenborn-Höhe” (Hill 244) was held by parts of the RIR 120 in close combat, with US troops attacking again and again. “Schloss-Berg” (Hill 223) and “Schöne Aussicht” (Hill 180) were lost. All reserves (including remnants of the 1st GID, 47th and 52nd RD) were deployed. “Schloss-Berg” (Hill 223) was recaptured by parts of the LIR 122 during the night, “Schöne Aussicht” (Hill 180) remained in the possession of the Americans, who were already operating on the southern edge of the village of Cornay in the evening. For the 2nd Landwehr Division, October 7, 1918, was the day with the heaviest losses of the entire First World War.

The village of Châtel-Chéhéry was finally lost during the night and the following day. The remnants of LIR 120 were no longer able to hold “Schloss-Berg” (Hill 223) against attackers who were many times superior. As a result, “Hohenborn-Höhe” (Hill 244) had to be abandoned. In the early morning of October 8, 1918, the remnants of the Landwehr took up a new defensive line about three kilometers north of the road from Châtel-Chéhéry to Lancon (today's D 4) with a focus on the “Humser-Berg” (Polygon Crossroads) and along the ridge running towards Cornay. This line was held against all attacks. In an attempt to capture the village of Cornay, parts of the 82nd US Infantry Division suffered heavy losses on October 9, 1918. Individual squads entrenched themselves in the houses and cellars of the village.

In the neighboring sections of the front, the French and Americans also tried to achieve the final breakthrough and thus the war decision.

On the night from October 7 to 8, 1918, the 29th U.S. Infantry Division was moved to the east bank of the Meuse to push through the German lines of Gruppe Maas-Ost between Brabant and Azannes with the 18th and 28th French Division. Later, also parts of the 33rd U.S. Infantry Division had to take part. The attack already came to a halt in the line “Kronprinzen-Höhe” (south of Sivry-sur Meuse) - “Ormont-Wald” (Bois d'Ormont). West of the Argonne, French units attacked the 9th Landwehr and 76th Reserve Division, threatening the strategically important “Brückenkopf von Montcheutin”. The village of Autry changed hands several times. The German positions on the “Fried-Berg” (la Côte Bayard) were lost. LIR 116 was almost completely wiped out in these battles.

Meuse-Argonne, Autry, from 9. LID, September 1918

Meuse-Argonne, section of the 1. U.S. ID, October 1918

On October 9, 1918, the 37th Infantry Division (IR 147, 150 and 151) lost Fléville and the “Lichtenau(er) Höhe” (Hill 272). St. Juvin and the Aire crossings were acutely threatened. The 1st U.S. Infantry Division suffered heavy losses in these battles and had to be replaced by the 42nd U.S. Infantry Division.

In the Cornay - “Humser-Berg” (Polygon-Crossroads) area, the front of the 2nd Landwehr Division withstood all attacks. The remnants of the 82nd U.S. Infantry Division encircled in Cornay were fired on from the heights with mine launchers and machine guns, and then all killed or captured in house-to-house fighting by parts of LIR 125. Several American attempts to climb the “Humser-Berg” (Polygon-Crossroads) failed with heavy losses in the machine gun fire of the Landwehr.

Meuse-Argonne, Maasgruppe West, Kriemhild-Stellung, October 15, 1918

After further terrain losses at Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, the 5th Army (Gruppe Maas-West) was already operating completely in the area of the “Kriemhild Stellung” from October 9, 1918, on a line “Chatillon-Höhe” - Banthéville - Brieulles-sur-Meuse. West of the Argonnes, the 76th Reserve and 9th Landwehr Division also moved their positions to the northern banks of the Aire and Aisne, the former to the area around Grandpré, the latter further west on a line between Termes and Grandpré. The time had finally come for the 2nd Landwehr Division to withdraw to the north bank of the Aire.

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Meuse-Argonne Offensive - Third Phase - October 10 - 31, 1918

On the night of October 9 to 10, 1918, the mass of the 2nd Landwehr Division crossed the Aire between Grandpré and Saint-Juvin. Pioneers had prepared bridges and footbridges. This time they managed to break away unnoticed from the enemy. Rearguards crossed the river at around 03:00 a.m. The last officer patrols, left behind to conceal the retreat, reached their new positions at around 04:15 a.m. The American artillery continued to shell Cornay and the “Humser-Berg” (Polygon-Crossroads) still until midday on October 10, 1918. Only then did individual US reconnaissance troops tentatively approach the Aire. At this point, the 2nd Landwehr Division was already in the section assigned to it, starting from the Grandpré - le Morthomme road (today's D 6) via “Hütten-Berg”, “Strand-Höhe” to the valley of the Agron Bach south of Champigneulle. Outposts were located on the banks of the Aire and in the “Strand-Ferme” (Fme des Grèves), which was made into a stronghold.

Meuse-Argonne, 2. LID north of the Aire from October 10, 1918

Between Saint-Juvin and Sommerance stood the remnants of the 37th Infantry Division, whose regiments had been reduced to company strength the day before in the fightings for the “Lichtenau(er) Höhe” and Fléville. Further east, from St.-Georges to Landres, the 41st Infantry Division was to defend itself against American attacks. On the eastern flank of the Gruppe Argonnen, the planned retreat across the Aire was completed on the morning of October 10, 1918, with the withdrawal of these two divisions as well.

In the days that followed, the Allied attack efforts no longer had a uniform character. The successful withdrawal of the Germans, but also the considerable losses suffered by the Americans in the constant mass attacks, forced them to regroup and make extensive new attack preparations. Further fighting only took place where contact with the enemy was maintained. This, for example, was the case east of Saint-Juvin, where the rest of the 37th Infantry Division had to fend off repeated American attacks. On October 13, 1918, the division was withdrawn from the front and replaced by the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division (K.B. IR 30, 31, 32).

Further combat activity in front of the 2nd Landwehr Division initially remained low. On October 14, 1918, the village of Saint-Juvin in the neighboring section of the 45th Reserve Division was lost to the 77th U.S. Infantry Division. Parts of the position force had surrendered without a fight. After the long engagement, the soldiers' stamina waned. Multiple intestinal diseases and, above all, the ongoing “Spanish flu” did the rest. From October 15, 1918, the Americans repeatedly attacked in the direction of the village of Champigneulle. Although a breakthrough was prevented, the recapture of Saint-Juvin was not successful. The Americans had gained a foothold on the north bank of the Aire.

Meuse-Argonne, fightings for the Brunhild- and Kriemhild-Stellung from Oktober 10, 1918, from: LIR 120

On October 17, 1918, the order arrived that the 2nd Landwehr Division, which had been severely weakened meanwhile, was to be relieved. The troop history from 1921 states the following:

(…) This measure was now urgently necessary; the troops were at the end of their tether. They had been fighting for 22 days; some battalions had not been out of their clothes for about 40 days; most of the men had swollen feet and were barely fit to march. The infantry companies still had an average of 30 men. The situation with the artillery was similar; crews and horses were close to collapse. The losses of the division (without assigned troops) since September 25th in terms of dead, wounded and missing amounted to: 123 officers, 3329 men, 403 horses, with the sick around 5000 men. (…)
from: Adolf Franke, Die 2. (württ.) Landwehr-Division im Weltkrieg 1914-18, Stuttgart 1921, page 57

General Adolf Franke

After 2 years of deployment in the central Argonne section and uninterrupted participation in the heavy fightings since the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, the 2nd Landwehr Division withdrew from the front on the night of October 18, 1918. Its positions north of the Aire, as well as those of the 45th Reserve Division, were taken over by the strong 240th Infantry Division (IR 469, 470 and 471). This consolidated the German defense on the western edge of Armeegruppe Gallwitz (5th Army). For the no longer combat-capable 9th Landwehr Division, the deployment in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive was also to end. Their combat strip on the border between Argonne and Champagne was to be taken over by the 195th (Saxon) Infantry Division (Jäg.R 6., 8, 14) from October 13, 1918.

Meuse-Argonne, positions at the "Aisne-Knie" between Grandpé and Vouziers, Oktober 10, 1918, from: LIR 83

Meuse-Argonne, October 1918

The Allied attacks were now focused on the area between Grandpré and Vouziers, known as the “Aisne Knie” due to its distinctive position. Here, the German troops were now in the Brunhild-Stellung on the heights north and east of the Aire and Aisne.

In the area around Grandpré, on the border between the 1st U.S. Army and the 4th French Army, the regiments of the 76th Reserve Division (RIR 253, 252, 254) continued to stand. To the west, the Jäger Regiments of the 195th (Saxon) Infantry Division (Jäg. R 6., 8, 14) and the remnants of the 1st Guards Division re-deployed in the Aisne Group (1st Reserve Korps, from October 12, 1918 “Generalkommando Wellmann”) joined up. Further west and north to Falaise stood the 42nd Infantry Division, from there to beyond Vouziers the 202nd Infantry Division.

In the section of the 76th Reserve Division, there had been strong American attacks in and around Grandpré from October 14, 1918. Units of the 78th U.S. Infantry Division had advanced to the northern cemetery on October 16, 1918, and had established themselves there. The eastern part of Grandpré remained in German hands.

Within the village, on the “Burgunder Nase” (burgundy-nose) and up to the “Strand-Höhe” (Fme des Grèves) to the east as well as the “Hütten-Wald” (Bois des Loges) on the border to the section of the 240th Infantry Division, there were repeated heavy battles until the end of October 1918. The Americans were able to achieve individual terrain gains, but no decisive breakthrough.

Meuse-Argonne, Grandpré, Burgunder-Nase, Nara, January 1919

Meuse-Argonne, Talma-Ferme and Talma-Höhe, Nara, January 1919

The situation with the 195th Infantry Division was similar. American and French units had succeeded in crossing the Aire between Grandpré and Termes. West of Grandpré, the French advanced via the “Talma-Ferme” and “Talma-Höhe” (la Queue de Loup) to the small hamlet of Talma on October 16, 1918. The German garrison, the Reserve Jäger Battalion 22, had disintegrated during the heavy artillery fire and fled to the nearby Bois de Fumuy. According to the accounts in the war diary of the 195th Infantry Division, the soldiers, and their battalion commander, Captain von Mandelsloh, were found there in a completely apathetic state. Captain von Mandelsloh was immediately relieved of his post and transferred.

The adjacent Reserve Jäger Battalion 15 to the east also retreated before the attacking French, but was able to hold the “Talma-Höhe” (la Queue de Loup). After several failed attempts, the hamlet of Talma was recaptured by parts of Jäger Regiment 14 (ResJB 16 and 19) in the late morning of October 17, 1918. More than 100 French soldiers were taken prisoner in the process.

Further west, heavy fighting took place between Termes, Mouron and Olizy from October 13, 1918. There, units of the 42nd Infantry Division stood at the head of the “Aisne-Knie”. The front-line running towards Termes along the Aire was still occupied by parts of the 1st Guards Division and 9th Landwehr Division, which were due to be relieved.

The takeover of the village of Termes from the LIR 83 deployed there fell to the 3rd Jäger Battalion, which had been subordinated to the 1st Guards Division. The traditional Brandenburg unit had been reorganized as a Jäger assault battalion in 1916 and had taken part in almost all the major battles of the war. In addition to its military achievements, it had already made a dubious name for itself during the “Battles on the border” in 1914 by committing war crimes against the Belgian and French civilian population. From April 1918, it was subordinated to the O.H.L. and deployed as a training battalion. Immediately until the renewed deployment to the front at the beginning of October 1918, Austro-Hungarian officers were trained in assault tactics and anti-tank defence at the “Sturm-Schule” established near Sedan.

Meuse-Argonne, JägB 3, training course, 1918

Meuse-Argonne, French attack in October 14, 1918, from: JägB 3

Jäger Battalion 3 had just established itself in the positions in and around Termes when, on the evening of October 13, 1918, a new order was received to take over the “Termes-Riegel”, a section of the “Brunhild-Stellung” on the line “Einem-Höhe” (south of Bois des Sartes) and “Schäferei-Berg” (north of la Bergerie). On the morning of October 14, 1918, during the relief operation, a French attack was launched near Mouron via Aire and Aisne, which the local units of the 42nd Infantry and 1st Guards Division were unable to withstand.

The French advanced through the valleys between Mouron and Termes (Känguru-Tal, Butler-Tal, Castell-Tal) to the heights and then further north and east. They reached the rear of the German forward positions. In the valleys, the sparse remnants of the 2nd Guards Regiment defended themselves, but were unable to stop the enemy advance. Most of the units in the direction of Termes were evaded and killed. Only a few were captured. The latter included the crew of the Kampftruppen-Kommandeur (K.T.K.) responsible for the section as well as the staff of Jäger Battalion 3, which had been established there.

Smaller groups managed to fight their way through to a German line running further north between “Dachs-Grund” (valley east of Brécy-Brières), “Einem-Höhe” and “Schäferei-Berg”. Here, the further French advance was initially halted by the scattered remnants of all the Divisions deployed in the area.

After unsuccessful attempts to push back the French with individual attacks from the heights and valleys towards the Aire lowlands, new French attacks were launched against the dwindling German defenders. On October 15, 1918, when a breakthrough was foreseeable in the area of “Einem-Höhe”, the entire defense was withdrawn to the chord of the “Aisne-Knie” along the road Olizy, Beaurepaire Fme, Talma and Grandpré (today's D 946). Due to the shortening of the front and the more expedient course of the position, the German defense consolidated there.

Meuse-Argonne, October 13 to 15, 1918, from: IR 138

Meuse-Argonne, flood zones between Olizy and Vouziers, from: ID 202

Over the coming days, the main Allied offensive efforts shifted to the northern flank of the “Aisne-Knie”. There, the German defense was located on the heights between Olizy in the south and Voncq in the north. The phase of the fighting there between October 12 and 20, 1918 was later referred to as the “Battle on the Aisne and Aire”.

The German defensive position was initially manned from south to north as follows: 1st GID, 42nd ID, 202nd ID, 4th/1st Bavarian ID, 199th ID. These were only complete divisions on paper. Most of the battalions only had a strength of around 100 men and no longer any significant combat value. Depending on the situation and necessity, these hull units were supplemented by parts of other regiments, sappers, radio operators, members of the staffs, regimental bands, Landsturm units and other stage formations and were constantly shifted back and forth.

The bridges over the Aisne had been blown up. The river had been dammed at various points, especially near the larger villages of Savigny, Vouziers and Vandy, to swamp the adjacent meadows and fields and make it more difficult for the enemy to cross and build bridges.

Nevertheless, French units (RI 131) had already succeeded in crossing the Aisne on an unnoticed bridge between Brières and Savigny on the night of October 13, 1918. Parts of the 42nd Infantry Division (IR 17 and IR 97) were able to stop the enemy's rapid advance on the heights, capturing 6 officers and more than 150 French soldiers. Infantry Regiment No. 17 “Graf Barfuß”, personally led by the commander and later Wehrmacht General Major Otto Stobbe, played a decisive role in the successful counterattack with the deployment of the entire regimental staff. Nevertheless, the attack showed that the damming of the Aisne not had the desired effect and that further French attempts to cross the river could be expected at any time.

After another strong French attack was repulsed on October 14, 1918, with the Germans again taking more than 100 French prisoners, the village of Olizy had to be evacuated on October 15, 1918. It had to be taken a new main line of resistance further north.

Meuse-Argonne, defense positions between Olizy and Voncq, from: ID 202

Meuse-Argonne, fightings near Olizy, from: IR 138

Further attacks took place there and to the east in the direction of Grandpré. The French and Americans now attempted to roll up the German positions from the south and east, causing the entire defense in the “Aisne-Knie” to falter. Despite the attackers' numerical superiority, the Germans were able to prevent a breakthrough. Once again, the devastating effect of a few cleverly positioned machine guns became apparent.

From October 17, 1918, French colonial troops were also deployed in the Olizy area, commanded by the 2e Division Marocaine. Wherever they appeared, the mostly colored soldiers caused fear and terror due to their rumored brutal and cruel behavior. The 4e Régiment de marche de Tirailleurs Tunisiens in particular stood out for its brave behavior during the fighting. There were heavy losses on both sides. On the German side, the number of casualties rose sharply.

After weeks of heavy fighting, many of the soldiers surrendered without a fight. Without any concrete evidence to the contrary, they were also recorded as missing in the casualty statistics. Since the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the 202nd Infantry Division, for example, counted 47 missing officers and 2,110 non-commissioned officers and men according to the war diary on October 14, 1918. These figures could not be explained by usual fighting.

The situation became critical further north in the area of Vouziers, Chestres and Vandy. There the main French attack was to take place.

On October 16, 1918, French pioneers southeast of Vouziers at the great bend in the Aisne near “Erlen-Grund” attempted to build a bridge over the river for the first time. The undertaking and further attempts failed in the machine gun fire of the Bavarian IR 5 standing there.

In the early morning of October 18, 1918, barrage fire began on the German positions and the rear area. Favored by dense ground fog, French units pushed across to the eastern bank of the Aisne via fords, footbridges, rafts, and boats and seized la Pardonne Feme, the brickworks to the north and la Providence Ferme. The Bavarian units withdrew from the lowlands to the eastern heights.

Meuse-Argonne, Aisne section, Vouziers - Falaise, Oct. 1918

Meuse-Argonne, Aisne section, east of Vouziers

Meuse-Argonne, section of K.B. IR 4

In the following days, the numerically superior French succeeded in crossing at further points and gaining a foothold on the eastern bank of the Aisne.

On October 18, 1918, the 4th Bavarian Infantry Division (K.B. 4. 5. and 9. IR) had already lost the “Käse-Berg” (Côte 153), named after the neighboring village of Chestres. This had considerable strategic importance due to its central location. On October 19, 1918, the neighboring “Fürsten-Höhe” fell. Several counterattacks failed due to poor preparation and insufficient troop strength.

In the afternoon, the French broke through the thin Bavarian defenses from the line “Fürsten-Höhe” and ‘Irrgarten’ as well as between “Petit-Ban-Mühle” and the hamlet of Landrèves. The entire position east of Vouziers was lost. The remnants of Bavarian IR 4 fell back disordered. They were followed by the other regiments of the 4th Bavarian ID until October 20, 1918.

As the damming of the Aisne had still not had the desired effect, from October 18, 1918, French units further north in the section of the 199th Infantry Division advanced across the river. Without encountering any serious resistance, they advanced on and over the heights further to the east. Artificially increased ground fog had facilitated the crossing, the elimination of the outposts in the river lowlands and the surprise of the main defenses on the heights. Vandy and the “Horn-Berg” immediately to the north were lost. To the south-east, on the border between the sections of ID 199 and Bavarian ID 4, the “Oldershausen-Höhe” and the “Sybillen-Höhe” were overrun in the course of the day. The situation became threatening.

Meuse-Argonne, Vandy, Gen.Kdo. Wild, October 21, 1918

Meuse-Argonne, Battle of Vouziers, October 20, 1918, from: IR 476

After attempts by individual units to push the French troops back from the heights had failed, the remnants of the 242nd Württemberg Infantry Division (IR 127, 475, 476) and the 1st Guards Division (1st, 2nd, 4th GIR z.F.) were ordered to the threatened section of the front between Vandy and Vouziers. The order was to carry out a major attack planned for October. 21, 1918. The 4th Bavarian Infantry Division, which was no longer operational, was relieved by the 1st Bavarian Infantry Division (K.B. IR 1, 2, 24) and withdrawn from the front. The ambitious goal of the planned counterattack was to completely push back all French units across the Aisne and recapture the entire Brunhild-Stellung on the heights.

The attack made good progress south-east of Vouziers. The 1st GIR z.F. succeeded in capturing “Kamm-Höhe”. The Bavarian IR 1 regained “Käse-Berg” and “Fürsten-Höhe”. The village of Chestres remained in French hands. In any case, the line Pissois-Ferme - Toupet-Mühle was to be reached in the direction of Vandy on the first day of the attack. However, the attack there by parts of the Bavarian IR 2 and IR 475 did not get beyond the Landèves-Mühle. East of Vandy, “Sybillen-Höhe” and “Oldershausen-Höhe” were taken by Bavarian IR 2 and IR 476. Despite reinforcement by IR 127, both positions were lost again in French counterattacks.

The situation stabilized due to the partial territorial gains. However, the main objective of the counter-offensive, formally known as the “Battle of Vouziers”, the recovery of the Brunhild-Stellung, was not achieved. The Aisne crossings remained in the possession of the French and enabled them to move unhindered troops and material replacements to the east bank. In the days that followed, the fighting calmed down, as the Allies had also suffered considerable losses and were preparing for a general offensive planned for early November 1918. The French artillery remained very active throughout and caused daily losses on the German side.

On October 16, 1918, a special unit had already been transferred to the front section of the 4th French Army: the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade, consisting of the 21st and 22nd Jäger Regiment (RCT). The Czechoslovaks, who volunteered to fight on the French side, joined the 53rd and 124th French Infantry Divisions. During the defense against the German offensive from October 21, 1918, and their attacks, they suffered heavy losses between Vandy and Vouziers within a few days. The remnants of both regiments had to be withdrawn from the front at the beginning of November 1918.

Many of the Czechoslovakian fallen rest alongside French, Belgians, Russians in the French section of the Chestres cemetery, which is well worth seeing. It was laid out after the fighting in the immediate vicinity of the forward German positions below the “Kamm-Höhe”. It contains the graves of the majority of the soldiers of all nations involved who were killed there in the “Battle of Vouziers”. There is also a memorial to the Czechoslovakian Jäger Regiments 21 and 22 northwest of Vouziers.

Meuse-Argonne, Battle of Vouziers, Czech stamp, 1938

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Meuse-Argonne Offensive - Fourth and final phase - November 1 - 11, 1918

Meuse-Argonne, German positions 1918, from: Württemberger im Weltkrieg, Stuttgart 1927

On November 1, 1918, the French and Americans had completed their renewed preparations for the attack. The Allied general offensive, known on the German side as the “Defensive battle between the Aisne and Meuse”, began at around 4.30 a.m. with heavy artillery fire, which developed into a barrage of unprecedented intensity. Squadrons with more than one hundred fighter aircraft attacked the German positions and rear installations with machine guns and bombs. The infantry attack began at around 06:30 a.m. On the northern flank of the “Aisne-Knie”, French units stormed, also the divisions of the “American Expeditionary Forces” (AEF) to the south, beyond Grandpré in the direction of the Meuse.

Despite multiple enemy superiority, all attacks were initially intercepted. Once again, machine gun and mine launcher units were primarily responsible for the defensive success. However, in the afternoon and after another strong artillery preparation, French forces succeeded in breaking into the positions of the now heavily decimated 14th Reserve Division near Falaise.

To prevent a breakthrough, the retreat and thus the abandonment of the Brunhild-Stellung in the area of the “Aisne-Knie” was ordered for the coming night with the cue “Kriegsmarsch”. Several rearward lines (including the Quatre Champs Stellung, Le Chesne Stellung, Vendresse Stellung, also known as the Red, Green, and Brown Line) were to be held back to keep the enemy on the western bank of the Meuse for as long as possible. The aim was the orderly withdrawal of the front to the Antwerpen-Maas-Stellung. In the opinion of the Supreme Army Command, resistance could still be put up here for another two weeks. Meanwhile, the desired ceasefire was to be negotiated.

Meuse-Argonne, German rear positions, November 1918, ID 202

Meuse-Argonne, staff map of the 5th Army, End of October 1918

Meuse-Argonne, Gruppen Argonnen and Maas-West, November 1918, from: ID 88

Further east, in the area of Gruppe Argonnen and Gruppe Maas-West, American units of the 1st U.S. Army attacked on the morning of November 1, 1918. The infantry advance was mainly directed against the interfaces of the individual German divisions.

The troops lying mostly defenceless at the front suffered heavy losses due to the devastating effect of the artillery fire and were overrun. Riot units occupied a part of the Freya-Stellung on a line from Bayonville to Andevanne. After fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the Barricourt-Wald (Forêt de Barricourt) had to be abandoned in the afternoon and a new front was established further north. The enemy advance was halted for now employing artillery, which was withdrawn in echelons.

On the first day of the attack, the Americans had succeeded in breaking through more than seven kilometers deep. To the west, near the village of Buzancy, the "Narren-Höhe" (Côte 301) and the entire "Narren-Wald" (Bois de la Folie) had been lost. Here the German positions had been breached to a depth of around 12 kilometers. The situation was critical, especially as there were no reserves left, apart from some completely weakened divisions.

Near the village of Brieulles-sur-Meuse was the southern pivot for the entire retreat movement of the German divisions in the direction of the Antwerpen-Maas-Stellung up to the towns of Sedan and Charleville-Mezières. Here, on the eastern edge of Gruppe Maas-West, stood the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division (K.B. RIR 12, 10, 7).

Even though there were no stronger American attacks in this section either on November 1, 1918, or the following day, the Bavarians also had to retreat due to the flank threat posed by the deep enemy advance further west. As early as the evening of November 2, 1918, Gruppe Maas-West issued the retreat-order “Kriegsmarsch”. Following the section of Gruppe Maas-Ost (Autrichian 1st ID, later 75th RD) starting at Liny-devant-Dun, the Bavarians took up positions on the east bank of the Meuse north and south of the town of Dun-sur-Meuse.

Meuse-Argonne, November 1918

Stenay, Kaiser and Crown-Prince, 1917

Further north, the 117th and 20th Infantry Divisions were brought up from November 3, 1918. Together with the Bavarians, their reinforced and still reasonably combat-capable regiments were to prevent transition attempts by the rapidly advancing American troops and absorb the retreating remnants of the German units in the Antwerpen-Maas-Stellung. They were flooding back on the west bank of the Meuse. ID 117 was given the Lion-devant-Dun section up to Mouzay, ID 20 that up to the north of the town of Stenay. The 5th Army Command (AOK 5) and the headquarters of the German Heeresgruppe Kronprinz had been located there from September 1914 to February 1918.

The O.H.L.'s hopes for a sustained defense in the Antwerpen-Maas-Stellung were not fulfilled. On the southern edge of the Meuse section, near Liny-devant-Dun, parts of the 5th U.S. Infantry Division succeeded in crossing the Meuse in the morning fog of November 5, 1918, and forming a bridgehead on the east bank. The Bavarian IR 7 standing there had totally failed. The bridgehead quickly expanded to the east and north. Further bridge attacks followed. Already in the afternoon, the village of Milly was lost in the section of Bavarian IR 10 and the defense shifted to the area of the “St.- Germain-Rücken” (Côte Saint-Germain) between Murvaux and Lion-devant-Dun. Until November 7, 1918, there was a series of fierce fightings on and around this prominent hill. The town of Dun-sur-Meuse, strategically important as a transportation hub and located directly on the Meuse, had to be abandoned.

On the evening of November 7, 1918, the front had been pushed back to the edges of the “Woëvre-Wald” (Forêt Domaniale de Woëvre) along the D 195 between Mouzay and Brandeville. The German units had nothing left to oppose the enemy. On the night of November 8 to 9, 1918, the troups in Mouzay had to surrender to the Americans and the withdrawal of the main defenses to a line south of Stenay - Baalon - Louppy-sur-Loison was ordered. To the east, the 10th Infantry Division (GrenR 6, IR 47 and 398) had meanwhile occupied the “Freya-Riegel” in place of the Bavarian 5th Reserve Division, which was no longer able to fight.

News of the armistice negotiations, the surrender of the Austrian army and the revolutionary upheavals at home circulated more and more frequently among the soldiers. Considering the approaching end of the war and after weeks of exhausting fighting, many of them were no longer willing to risk their lives for a cause that had become questionable. They fled at the slightest hint of artillery fire or the sighting of enemy soldiers. The younger ones in particular ran away from the troops, hid in the rear area, formed marauding gangs or fought their way home. Entire battalions could not be persuaded to move into the front lines, let alone to counterattack, either by the persuasion of their superiors or the threat of punishment. The military order in all parts of the German army was gradually lost.

Meuse-Argonne, German propaganda-postcard, 1918

Meuse-Argonne, the Front near Stenay, November 9, 1918

To prevent further enemy advances along the Meuse and to protect the railroad lines to the north, the 20th Infantry Division was ordered to defend the town of Stenay at all costs. IR 55, which belonged to the 13th Infantry Division, was placed at the division's disposal. IR 55, together with parts of IR 77, occupied defensive positions south of the town from the former French infantry barracks (today Lycée Alfred Kastler) to the former German “Proviantamt” (stage provisions office, today la Vielle Forge Fonderie). The infantry regiments 79 and 92 held positions to the east as far as the village of Baalon, where they linked up with the 10th Infantry Division.

Despite having housed important command posts and the Crown Prince himself for years, Stenay had so far been spared from enemy artillery fire and the original buildings were still largely intact. Even numerous inhabitants had not left the town and had come to terms with the German occupiers. Even German Crown Prince Wilhelm had a French mistress there, the young florist Blanche Desserey.

On November 9, 1918, German outpost positions north of Mouzay and on the western edge of the “Eichen-Wald” (Bois de Chenois) were lost to the Americans preparing to attack. According to the descriptions in the war diary of the 20th Infantry Division, the III./IR 79 deployed there had totally disappeared from the front overnight. On this day, opposite the 10th Infantry Division, the 5th U.S. Infantry Division captured the towns of Louppy-sur-Loison, Remoiville and Jametz that day.

The American attack on Stenay began on the morning of November 10, 1918. Parts of the 90th U.S. Infantry Division, which had crossed the Meuse at Sassey the day before, were deployed. The Americans initially pushed through the “Eichen-Wald” (Bois de Chenois) and occupied Baalon to the east. The remnants of IR 79 standing there could no longer be persuaded to fight.

The 1st and 2nd Battalion of the 358th U.S. Infantry Regiment were to lead the main attack along the road from Mouzay to Stenay (today's D 964). According to the troop histories of both sides, the Germans allowed the attackers to close in and then opened fire from their skillfully placed machine guns. Within minutes, the Americans suffered losses of over 350 men. The remainder who were still able to fight retreated to the former French firing range (Stand de tir) in a hollow on today's D 964.

Meuse-Argonne, Stenay

Since the German front lines were threatened on the flank from the direction of Baalon, IR 55 had to take up rearward positions on the southern and eastern edge of the actual urban area of Stenay around noon on November 10, 1918. IR 77 moved its positions right through the town to the former Meuse bridge at Laneuville-sur-Meuse. The Americans followed cautiously and occupied the German "Proviantamt" (stage provision office) and the former French infantry barracks. Here they entrenched themselves and awaited further orders, considering the rumored imminent armistice. The regimental commander, Colonel O. M. Leary, personally went to the front and ordered the attack to cease immediately and to confine to defense and reconnaissance until the armistice.

Meuse-Argonne, Pershing and Summerall

A few hours before the armistice came into force, other commanders of the AEF were not so prudent and concerned about the welfare of the soldiers entrusted to their care. These included the American commander-in-chief, General Pershing, himself. He had repeatedly demanded the unconditional surrender of the German army. As a main consequence of the war, he openly advocated the greatest possible military and economic weakening of the German Empire. He allowed many of his officers to order attacks just until the moment of the armistice. In the final hours of the First World War, more than 10,000 soldiers from all sides therefore were to lose their lives, be wounded or go missing.

At the instigation of relatives of the American victims, a US Congressional committee of inquiry was set up in November 1919 to look into the events and the underlying orders. After questioning the generals and other officers involved, including Pershing himself, no sanctions were ultimately imposed to protect the reputation of the American army, despite great public pressure and controversial debate.

From November 10, 1918, the American attacks north of Stenay were concentrated on the Meuse bend between the villages of Inor, Létanne and Mouzon. Here, the remnants of the 27th, 88th and 31st Infantry Divisions, among others, faced the 5th U.S. Army Corps consisting of the 89th and 2nd U.S. Infantry Divisions.

Since October 12, 1918, the 5th U.S. Corps had been commanded by the ambitious General Charles P.(elot) Summerall, who, like Pershing, was vehemently opposed to an armistice. On November 10, 1918, even though the end of the fighting was imminent, he is said to have issued the following cynical order to his officers:

“Only by increasing the pressure can we bring about [the enemy’s] defeat. (…) Get into action and get across. (…) I don’t expect to see any of you again, but that doesn’t matter. You have the honor of a definitive success - give yourself to that.“

Meuse-Argonne, Stenay-Mouzon, November 1918

In the late evening of November 10, 1918, parts of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division attempted to cross the Meuse at Létanne and Villemontry. Pioneers had previously erected footbridges. The Germans recognized the impending crossing attempts and continuously shot the area with artillery and machine-guns. On the following morning and after heavy losses during the night did the Americans succeed in crossing the river at Ferme d'Alma and south of Villemontry. The German troops withdrew to the east. During a counterattack on the morning of November 11, 1918, Major Friebe, commander of Württemberg IR 426, was one of the last higher German officers to fall. When the armistice came into effect at 11.00 a.m. French time and 12.00 a.m. German time, the Americans were on a line between Sénéval Ferme and Autréville. The 5th U.S. Marine Regiment alone had lost more than 1,000 men, fallen or injured, in these last battle-moments.

Meuse-Argonne, Pershing and Wright

The American attack efforts in Stenay were not over either, although they had already been halted by the 90th U.S. Infantry Division responsible for this section of the front on November 10, 1918. On the orders of its commander, General William M. Wright, the 89th U.S. Infantry Division launched an advance on the city on its own authority on the night of November 11, 1918, despite being informed of the date of the agreed ceasefire. Like Pershing and Summerall, Wright was one of the later so-called “hotshot commanders”, for whom quick fame meant more than the lives of young soldiers in the final phase of the fighting.

During the approach to the Meuse and the difficult search for crossing points in the dark, the Americans lost around 360 men to German artillery and machine-gun fire, including more than 60 casualties. Finally, on the morning of November 11, 1918, parts of the 353rd U.S. Regiment entered the area of the incompletely destroyed bridge near Laneuville-sur-Meuse over the Meuse and into Stenay. There was no more serious fighting there, as the German defenders had evacuated the town and parts of the 90th U.S. Infantry Division had already occupied it.

After the events became known, General Wright was relieved of his post on November 12, 1918. He had tried to talk his way out of it by claiming that he lacked information about the attack by the 90th U.S. Infantry Division. He had also wanted to allow his troops to use the bathing facilities in Stenay. In fact, an intense rivalry between him and the commander of the 90th U.S. Infantry Division, General Henry T. Allen, was the reason for his actions. Wright begrudged Allen the notoriety associated with the capture of Stenay.

Stenay was to remain the last town that the Americans and French were able to occupy in the final phase of the First World War. In particular, they did not succeed in reaching the main objective of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, namely taking the cities of Sedan and Charleville-Mezières with their important rail links for German logistics. German defensive successes were not responsible here either. Once again, the questionable command on the American side had the main effect.

Meuse-Argonne, Sedan-Mouzon, November 1918

Meruse-Argonne, Sedan, retreat of the 242. ID

The adjacent sketch from the troop history of the 242nd Infantry Division published in 1922 shows its “Kriegsmarsch”, i.e., the gradual retreat from the Brunhild-Stellung between Vouziers and Voncq towards the Antwerpen-Mass-Stellung around the city of Sedan. The retreat, which began on November 1, 1918, was essentially completed on November 7, 1918, without the units becoming involved in decisive combat, except for sustained artillery fire and individual rearguard actions.

Meanwhile, the other divisions had also moved into their assigned sections along the Meuse. The 14th Reserve Division was to occupy positions in and around Bazeilles, but first to take a bridgehead position on the western bank of the river from Bois de la Marfée via Noyers to Pont-Maugis. This secured the river crossing at Sedan for the withdrawal of the artillery. The 195th Infantry Division, the 76th Reserve Division and the 240th Infantry Division joined up to the town of Mouzon.

In contrast to the situation further south, the weak German units between Mouzon and Sedan were able to prevent the Americans from making a sustained river crossing almost everywhere. Only near Villers-devant-Mouzon, on the afternoon of November 7, 1918, about 100 men of the 77th U.S. Infantry Division succeeded in reaching the east bank on an inadequately destroyed column bridge. They pushed back the 3rd Jäger Battalion (195th ID) standing there and established themselves on the slopes of the Meuse valley near Amblimont. After heavy machine-gun fire and the threat of the crossing point being destroyed by artillery, the attackers withdrew across the Meuse on the morning of November 8, 1918.

The 14th Reserve Division (RIR 16, RIR 53, IR 159) was involved in heavier fighting. Individual battalions (I./RIR 16, I./RIR 53) had to cover the entire withdrawal operation in the direction of the Antwerpen-Maas-Stellung through fierce defense. On November 6, 1918, these units suffered heavy losses in the area of the Vendresse Stellung (Brown Line) near Chemery-sur-Bar, and later also at Bulson and Thelonne, against the equally determined advancing Americans.

From the morning of November 6, 1918, the remaining parts of the division moved to the planned bridgehead position, IR 159 leaning against the Meuse north of Pont-Maugis, RIR 53 along Noyers to the tip of the Bois de la Marfée. RIR 16 was in reserve at Wadelincourt. Later, the parts remaining with the enemy also withdrew, fighting behind the new front line. According to Corps orders, the bridgehead position was to be held at all costs until the evening of November 7, 1918.

On the morning of November 7, 1918, the 42nd U.S. Infantry Division launched attacks from the ridge south of Thelonne, which were initially repulsed. Around noon, however, the positions of RIR 53 were successfully breached in the area of Hill 346 (La Haute Borne), so that the defenders initially withdrew to the ridge between Wadelincourt and Frénois (Hill 255) and in the evening over the Sedan bridge to the eastern bank of the Meuse. Here the planned positions at Bazeilles were taken.

Meuse-Argonne, American advance to Sedan

Meuse-Argonne, Sedan, November 11, 1918, from: IR 476

In the meantime, the 242nd Infantry Division had also crossed the Meuse and taken up defensive positions in the urban area of Sedan. A bridgehead was left in the suburb of Torcy. Trenches were dug along the central Boulevard Fabert on the large Meuse island, with connections to the rear buildings and cellars. Machine-gun and observation posts had been set up on the banks of the Meuse and on the southern edge of the city. An American attack was expected soon.

There had already been unrest among the civilian population in Sedan for several days, as in many other staging posts. The large stage magazines, arms depots and other military facilities were the target of looting. Civilians armed themselves. Deserters joined them. Order could only be restored by active front troops and the threat of summary executions.

Contrary to German expectations, there was no significant enemy activity in the days following the capture of the positions in and around Sedan. The artillery was silent. The infantry also remained quiet. To clarify the situation, a patrol of IR 127 advanced into the village of Wadelincourt on November 9, 1918. Surprisingly, the enemy soldiers taken by surprise there turned out to be French. One of the prisoners taken to Torcy stated that a French attack on the town was not to be expected until the evening of November 11, 1918 at the earliest.

How did it come about that the Americans, although with the tips of their attacking troops only a few kilometers away from Sedan, broke off their advance and French troops moved into the positions west and south of the city? The reason lay in what the Americans later referred to as the “Race to Sedan”, of which the Germans were unaware until the end of the fighting.

During the Allied general offensive from November 1, 1918, Sedan was located within the attack strip of the 4th French Army. They were joined to the east by the 42nd and 77th U.S. Infantry Divisions. It went without saying that the French were reserved the right to take the city, which had considerable historical significance for France due to the lost Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71.

Soon after the offensive began, however, it became apparent that the French troups were unable to keep pace with the rapid American advance between Aisne and Meuse. According to unsubstantiated accounts in his memoirs, Pershing therefore claims to have agreed with the French General Paul Maistre, Chef de Groupe d'armées du Centre, on November 3, 1918: American troops would be allowed to take Sedan if the 4th French Army was unable to keep up.

Meuse-Argonne, march of the 1. U.S. ID to Sedan

Meuse-Argonne, Douglas MacArthur, 1918

In fact, on November 5, 1918, the AEF's Chief of Operations, General Fox Conner, appeared at the headquarters of the 1st U.S. Army and handed over an order stating that Pershing wanted the 1st U.S. Army to take Sedan. This was forwarded to the troops without the knowledge of the army commander, General Hunter Liggett, with the addition that section boundaries were not binding. What was meant here were even not the division boundaries, but only the dividing line to the 4th French Army. However, the commander of the 5th Corps, General Summerall, took it as a carte blanche and ordered the 1st U.S. Infantry Division to advance on Sedan on November 6, 1918. Originally, the division was to cross the Meuse further south at Mouzon and take over flank protection.

Now the units with thousands of soldiers and vehicles turned north and west and got caught up in the movements of the 42nd and 77th U.S. Infantry Divisions. Roads clogged, units intermingled, at night Americans shot down Americans. The commander of the 84th U.S. Infantry Brigade, General Douglas MacArthur, was arrested by the own troops as an alleged German spy, probably because of his flamboyant uniform style. When parts of the 42nd U.S. Infantry Division got in the way of the now advanced 4th French Army at Cheveuges on November 7, 1918, they were told in no uncertain terms: The French would open fire on any American troops that stood in the way of their advance on Sedan.

General Liggett only learned of these events in the late morning and ordered an immediate retreat behind the original border between the American and French armies. From November 9, 1918, French units were then positioned in front of Sedan, but were unable to organize an attack on the town before the armistice.

On November 11, 1918, at 11:00 a.m. French time and 12:00 p.m. German time, the guns fell silent and the Meuse-Argonne offensive came to an end. This episode also marked the end of the First World War. German troops held Sedan and Charleville-Mezierès until they began marching back home on November 12, 1918.

Sedan, German Monument, Saint-Charles Cemetery

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